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SUMMARY
The year 1945 sav the creation of a new territorial regime in  central Europe. 
The UK, USA, USSR and Erance had assumed supreme authority over Germany, 
including the right to decide its status and frontiers. Germany was not annexed; 
it continued to exist.
The Potsdam Agreement of 2 August decreed that Poland, which had lost 
territories in the east to the USSR, should be accorded the right of 
“administration” over German territories to the east of the Oder and Western 
Neisse Rivers (including Stettin/Szc2ecin) plus the southern part of East Prussia. 
These areas 'were not treated as occupied territories. The final delimitation of the 
western frontier of Poland 'was to take place at the peace settlement with 
Germany. Such a settlement remains outstanding.
Germany became progressively more divided in  the years 1945-1949. The States 
occupying the western zones of Germany (the UK, USA and Erance) gradually 
established greater unity within their zones and in Berlin (which was treated 
separately), while the USSR, occupying the eastern zone, set up a separate system. 
In 1949, this culminated in  the creation of two States, the ERG in the west and the 
GDR in the east. Each at first claimed to act in  the name of Germany, to the 
exclusion of the other, though neither was ever identical with Germany or 
entitled to act in  its name.
Due to the division of Germany, the German Reich, which still existed, ceased 
actively to function. No peace settlement has been concluded; thus the western 
frontier of Poland has not, formally, been finally delimited, as provided for in  the
Potsdam Agreement. This lack of formal delimitation has resulted in  great 
controversy between Poland and the ERG with regard to the status of the relevant 
territories and the quality of Poland’s tenure. No such disagreement exists 
between Poland and the GDR; in 1950 they concluded a treaty recognizing the 
Oder-Neisse line as the Polish-German frontier.
Shifting perceptions of the geopolitical situation in Europe eventually resulted 
in previously hostile States concluding bilateral treaties which have regulated, 
for the parties, hitherto contentious issues. Particularly significant are the 
Qstpolitik treaties of the ERG - with the USSR, Poland, the GDR and Czechoslovakia.
The treaty with Poland contained acceptance by the ERG of the Oder-Neisse line 
as the western State frontier of Poland: the ERG could no longer question Poland’s 
tenure of these territories. The ratification dispute in  the ERG with regard to this 
treaty, which apparently raised substantive questions about Poland’s rights, has, 
actually, no legal effect on the relationship between the parties under 
international law, but is, nevertheless, important in understanding West German 
perceptions of the issue.
Germany continues to exist, at least according to the UK. The Soviet position 
seems to deny the existence of Germany, but is highly ambiguous. The USSR, 
however, does acknowledge the existence of joint rights and responsibilities with 
regard to Germany as a whole.
The Eour Powers responsible for Germany are not bound by the Poland-ERG 
treaty; their rights and obligations are not affected by it. Thus they are not
obliged, as yet, to confirm the Oder-Neisse line as the Polish-German frontier at a 
peace settlement. However, a combination of political and legal factors would 
probably cause them to do so. The formal bar which seems to exist at present to 
Poland’s unreserved tenure could be removed, without a peace settlement, by four 
Power agreement. The failure to do so is due to a lack of collective political w ill 
(let sleeping Germans lie ), rather than deficient legal capacity.
The rules of State succession indicate that a reunified Germany would be bound 
by the treaties of the ERG and the GDR to accept the Oder-Neisse line as the 
Polish-German frontier. Neither the ERG nor the GDR is identical with Germany; 
the State which they create by unification would also lack such identity. Thus the 
Germany for which the Eour Powers are responsible would not immediately be 
bound by these treaties. However, unification could only take place with the 
approval of the Eour Powers, and it must be assumed that, during the process of 
unification, they would make provision for the application of their own 
competence (which is the sole manifestation of the still-existing German State) to 
the new Germany.
The FRG-GDR frontier is a direct result of the unusual status of Germany. Eor 
the two States it is an inter-State frontier - this they have themselves confirmed 
in the 1972 Treaty on the basis of their mutual relations. Eor the Four Powers, 
acting in their capacity as States having residual responsibility for Germany as a 
whole, the frontier resembles, legally, an internal frontier, despite the physical 
barriers.
The Potsdam Agreement provided for the transfer of the German population
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from the territories to t>e administered by Poland. The legality of the transfer has 
t>een questionned, particularly in the ERG, hut was probably lawful, though the 
manner of execution may not have been.
Problems relating to citizenship have arisen, particularly with regard to 
Germans in the FRG. The citizenship law of that State is an amended version of 
the 1913 Reich citizenship lav/ and, as such, its ambit covers citizens of the GDR. 
This has caused legal and political dispute between these States. Another 
consequence is that FRG citizenship may apply also to certain Polish citizens. 
Because Germany continues to exist, citizens of the FRG and the GDR, who come 
within the terms of the 1913 citizenship law as at 1949, probably possess German 
citizenship in addition to their FRG and GDR citizenships. This would not be 
accepted by Soviet-bloc States, which anyway do not recognize dual citizenship. 
Thus, the citizenship status of Polish citizens formerly resident in  eastern Poland 
(that part which became part of the USSR) has been regulated on a bilateral 
basis.
The citizenship status of the Germans is a consequence of the status of 
Germany; outstanding issues may exist until a final settlement is achieved.
CHAPTER ONE
Introduction
The origins of this work lie in  Berlin. The main international railway line 
from the Netherlands to Poland takes the traveller (apparently) through ¥est 
Germany, East Germany, West Berlin and East Germany again before arriving at 
the Polish frontier. The journey is a scenic bore; the land is flat from Hoek van 
Holland to Warsaw and beyond. But this tedium is partly compensated for by the 
journey from West to East Berlin, entailing as it does a short transit over the
i
Berlin Wall with the Reichstag dominant just beyond the Wall on the western side. 
This holds true for the first few journeys. Eventually it is replaced by no more 
than the compulsive contemplation of the mood of the East German border 
security and passport officials (at best, correct) as one approaches each 
checkpoint, whether it be Berlin (Hauptstadt der DDR) or the Polish frontier. 
Poland, by comparison, usually feels like the West.
It was the complexity of such journeys which prompted the writer to wonder 
why Greater Berlin should be as it is. From an interest in Berlin developed a 
curiosity about Germany itself and the existence of two German States. From that 
arose the question of its frontiers, in  particular the frontier with Poland. It is not 
immediately apparent to one who has only known Berlin as a city with a wall 
running through it, Germany as being divided into two States and Poland as a 
country including Wroclaw and Gdansk but without Lwowand Wilno, why such a 
state of affairs should incite such deep feelings, amounting sometimes almost to 
hysteria, among not only politicians and historians but international lawyers too.
The present work is an attempt to come to objective conclusions with regard to 
what the writer considers the most important and controversial legal issues in  
this area. These are: the legal status of the Polish frontier on the Oder-Neisse, the 
legal status of the frontier between West and East Germany, the status of Germany 
itself, plus consequential issues of nationality and citizenship. None of these 
problems is unrelated to the others and it w ill be seen that conclusions reached 
with regard to one issue are of significance for the others.
The central question dealt with is the legal status of the present frontier 
between Poland and the GDR. Much of the available literature on this subject 
seems to follow one of two courses. The writer decides that he favours the 
proposition that the frontier question has already been decided, or should be 
decided, in  favour of Poland (i.e., that the frontier should be formed by the Oder 
and Neisse rivers). The work is then devoted to an analysis of the legal situation 
designed to prove the preconceived political judgment. This method seems to form 
the basis of wrork for virtually every Polish lawyer working in this field in Poland 
(with one very notable exception), whose work has come to the attention of this 
writer.
The second course prevails in the Federal Republic of Germany. Those 
concerned seem to start from the standpoint that the frontier question remains 
open under existing conditions, and then set out to establish how this may be so 
according to the law. Again, there are exceptions, and the number of these seems 
to increase with the passage of time and, perhaps, changing perceptions. 
Nevertheless, if  the reader is confronted with a cross-section of the available
literature by West German and Polish writers, the dominant and prevailing 
impression is that the West Germans all try  to establish one set of legal 
conclusions, while the Poles try  to establish quite another. Yet the same sources 
of law are referred to by both sides. In  other words, each side seeks to establish 
the legal conclusions it deems desirable, from a particular political perspective, 
using the same law.
The proposition maybe defended that international law is an instrument to be 
used in and for the conduct of foreign policy. This is, arguably, what many Polish 
and West German writers are in effect doing, since many of the more common 
analyses resemble the official policies of the Polish and West German States. 
However, it was precisely this apparent manipulation of the law for political 
purposes which led the present writer to decide that a legal analysis which would 
look at the issue from the perspective of international law, rather than that of 
Poland or the FRG, might justifiably be useful, necessary and undertaken.
This should not be taken as criticism of all those who have studied the 
Oder-Neisse line; nor is it intended as an outright condemnation of particular 
individuals. Much of the existing research has been of the highest standards 
regardless of the slant adopted by those actually doing the research. And there 
are some who seem to have presented the issues as problems of international law 
without allowing their own political opinions to affect their analysis. But that is 
not to say that the present writer found himself in agreement with these writers.
Genuine legal disputes do remain which are not dependent merely upon the 
differing views of those most actively involved in the study of the issues. The
problem is that no final and formal settlement has ever been concluded with 
regard to certain issues left outstanding after the defeat of Germany in  1945. The 
UK, USA and USSR concluded an agreement at the Potsdam conference in August 
1945, one of the purposes of which was to regulate certain matters in  the 
meantime until a peace settlement was actually reached with regard to Germany. 
For present purposes, the most important provision was that which outlined the 
decision to allow Poland the right to administer substantial areas of pre-war 
German territory while relegating the final decision on Poland’s western frontier 
to a peace settlement.
Such a peace settlement was to involve Germany - it w ill be shown that 
Germany did, legally, survive as a State after 1945. Further controversy has 
arisen with regard to the legal status of the two German States (the Federal 
Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic) which were created 
in  the years 1949-1955. Problems exist with regard to the relationship of these 
two States inter se. vis-a-vis Germany - if, indeed, Germany survives as a State - 
and the status of the frontier between the FRG and the GDR. The division of 
Germany is the principal legal impediment to the conclusion of a peace 
settlement and, therefore, the failure to decide upon a final delimitation of 
Poland’s western frontier. This failure to conclude a peace settlement and, 
thereby, formally close the frontier issue forms the basis for the West German 
claim that the frontier has not been finally settled. The Polish view, generally 
stated, is that the frontier was decided at Potsdam and that, even if  a peace 
settlement were to take place, its only purpose, as far as the Polish western 
frontier is concerned, would be to confirm the present territorial disposition. 
Furthermore, the view has been developed that, with the coming into existence of
the FRG and the GDR, Germany ceased to exist. Both the FRG and the GDR have 
recognised the Oder-Neisse line as the western State frontier of Poland and the 
issue is therefore closed.
There exists, therefore, areal dispute as to the status of the Oder-Neisse line, a 
dispute which is not always clarified or rendered more liable to settlement by the 
biased approach of many who study it. Related to this frontier issue is the status 
of Germany, the two presently active German States and their common frontier 
and millions of individuals, mostly of Polish and German ethnic origin, who found 
themselves being moved to new homes during and after 1945 as a result of these 
territorial adjustments.
This study aims to look at these issues as problems of international law, 
without favouring the claims of any State simply because it is that State. This 
writer does have his own views on the Polish-German frontier and where it 
should be situated. There is much to be said for the present borders of Poland, 
regardless of their origin, because they allow Poland a territory which in many 
ways is more valuable than that which it possessed prior to 1939: it is richer in  
terms of mineral wealth and agricultural potential; it is argued that its frontiers 
are strategically easier to defend (the value of this may be questioned in  view of 
the present geopolitical disposition which means that the army of a foreign State 
regarded by many Poles with extreme hostility is already stationed on Polish 
territory); there is no question of a Polish corridor between two parts of 
Germany, though there is a question of a Polish corrider between the USSR and 
the GDR. Moreover, the minorities which, in pre-war Poland, constituted about 
one third of the population, no longer exist there. This is not necessarily a good
thing but it is often perceived as such. There is also the negative argument, 
which should not be underestimated, that the prospect of actually altering any 
frontiers now, and w'hat that might entail, serves to add stability to the present 
situation. It is this negative argument - the undesirability of changing the 
existing state of affairs - which is, for the present writer, by far the most 
convincing. Other arguments made in favour of the Polish tenure might also be 
made on behalf of Germany - why should it not enjoy the benefits of these 
territories?
Another argument in Poland’s favour is that it should have received territory 
at the expense of Germany because of the lands which it lost to the USSR. ¥h ile  
there has been much sympathy for such a view, the neutral observer might still 
vender why the defeated aggressor State should lose some of its territory. This 
writer is, then, strongly in favour of the proposition that the Polish frontiers are 
best situated where they are at present and that no attempts should be made to 
alter them. However, while acknowledging this, it is hoped that the study has 
been undertaken with an open mind as to the legal status of the border between 
Poland and Germany and that this is reflected in the final product.
It is appropriate to mention certain subjects which have been deliberately 
excluded from this study despite, perhaps, being t>rima facie relevant. Thus there 
is no study on the legal status of Berlin as such. The writer is quite aware that the 
GDR claims East Berlin as its capital city and treats it as part of its territory, 
enjoying substantial support in  this policy from the USSR, while, in  the view of 
the Western Powers, the whole of Berlin remains subject to Four Power 
occupation and East Berlin is not part of the GDR. Questions, and disagreement,
also exist with regard to the relationship between West Berlin and the Federal 
Republic. Another issue is: to what territory does the Quadripartite Agreement of 
1971 apply (Berlin or West Berlin) and did this agreement bring about any 
change in the legal regime relating to Berlin despite the claims of the States 
involved that the legal status of Berlin was not affected by it? Each of these 
questions is of importance. Some are very closely related to the status of 
Germany, the FRG and the GDR. But none is crucial to the legal status of the 
Qder-Neisse line as the western State frontier of Poland. Furthermore, it is 
possible to reach conclusions about the status of Germany without becoming 
deeply involved in the legal status of Berlin and the citizenship of its inhabitants. 
Berlin is not avoided. It was felt, rather, that the frontier issues would not be 
affected by conclusions reached with regard to that city.
The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), which produced 
a Final Act at Helsinki in  1975, is also worthy of mention. The Final Act is 
discussed inasmuch as it may be regarded as part of a political process which 
included the signing and ratifying of several treaties by the FRG and the States to 
its East. While the Final Act’s territorial provisions have sometimes been 
perceived as ’‘confirming” the existing territorial and political situation in  
Europe, the view is not generally taken by international lawyers that the Final 
Act added anything, legally, to existing rights and duties, or altered them.
The Polish-German frontier is not the only border in  Europe which has been 
adjusted since the Second World War. In  particular, the Polish-Soviet frontier was 
moved substantially westwards and this matter is discussed. Nevertheless, it is far 
less controversial than the Polish-German frontier.
The research is, wherever possible, based upon English-language sources. 
This presents few problems where international agreements are concerned, 
because most of the relevant ones concluded prior to the Ostpolitik of the Federal 
Republic used English as an authoritative language. Reliable translations of 
other instruments have been freely available.
The writer has felt less constrained by linguistic considerations where the 
examination of the views of others has been concerned. Generally, 
English-language sources have been utilised when available - and much has been 
published in English on these topics. But much of the best work is available only 
in  Polish or German. In  such cases, these sources have been used and cited. 
Where quotations from German or Polish are given, these are accompanied by 
English-language translations. Much of the work which has been done by Polish 
specialists in this subject has been published by the Institute of Western Affairs 
in Poznan, in English, and these publications have been very useful in conveying 
what might be regarded as the Polish view as seen by the Polish Government, 
although not all of its work has been as limited in ambit.
Most of the work has been done at the University of Glasgow. However, it was 
possible to carry out some research in Poland and West Germany, which proved 
very useful in  obtaining access to certain books and journals not so easily 
available in the UK. Nearly eight months were spent altogether in two research 
visits to Poland. This research was carried out mostly at the Polish Institute of 
International Affairs in  Warsaw and the Institute of International Law at the 
University of Warsaw. These visits were also used for meetings with Poles who
have specialized knowledge of these subjects. In  this context, visits to the Polish 
Academy of Sciences in Poznan were particularly profitable.
Two months were spent in  West Germany, at the University of the Saar in  
Saarbrucken and the Max-Planck- Institute for Foreign Public Law and 
International Law in Heidelberg, allowed access both to some of the best libraries 
of German materials and some very distinguished West German specialists on the 
topics covered in this study.
While the primary purpose of these visits to Poland and West Germany was the 
undertaking of legal research, the opportunity to speak to others working in this 
field was of great importance in  helping the writer to try  to understand better 
Polish-German relations in  general, and to appreciate the present state of 
relations between Poland and West Germany and the reasons for this.
It is hoped that the work presents a legal analysis of the issues covered 
without favouring either Poland or the German States. There are few definitive 
solutions presented; this is because of the w riter’s view that vital questions 
remain open. However, where particular issues remain undecided, suggestions 
are made for how they ought, finally, to be settled, based upon the existing law.
Pufendorf, it is said/referred to Germany as, constitutionally, something like a 
monster. From the perspective of international law since 1945, such a remark 
would lead one to describe Pufendorf as an optimist, or as one who is very 
economical with the truth. The problems which remain are not insoluble, but 
they do require further attention before they may be considered fin ally  closed.
CHAPTER TWO
The Qder-Neisse Line: Preliminary Remarks
(i) The Problem
It has been necessary, in  order to study the status of the border between 
Poland and Germany since 1945, to examine the history of the dispute over a 
longer period. The frontier of Poland in the west enjoyed substantial stability 
until the partitions of Poland in  the second half of the 18th century, which 
brought about the destruction of Poland as a State. Poland's western frontier was 
altered during each of the three partitions until it ceased to exist altogether, only 
to be revived after World War I with the reemergence of an independent Poland. 
Germany was obliged to accept the frontier as established in the Versailles 
settlement, but disputed its validity in  later years.
However, the frontier is no longer a matter of purely bilateral concern 
between Germany and Poland. Eirstly, as a result of the assumption by the UK, 
USA, USSR and Erance of supreme authority with regard to Germany in  1945, these 
States have a role to play in the final delimitation of the border. Secondly, the 
debate over the status of this frontier, and the agreements which have been 
entered into with regard to it, are part of a process, that of detente. The frontier 
issue is only one element, albeit a very important one, of a process or concept that 
involves more States than the immediate protagonists.
It was decided to begin studying the issue from the date of the Treaty of 
Versailles of 1919, plus related instruments, such as the Upper Silesian plebiscite
and award of 1921, because Poland's reemergence as an independent State at that 
time seemed to bring about a resurrection of the Polish-German disagreement 
over sovereignty over territory, which because a casus belli for World War I I  - cf. 
Poland's refusal to permit German demands with regard to access between the 
main area of the Reich and East Prussia. It should be remembered that Poland did 
not deny the Reich access to East Prussiathrough Polish territory; the privileged 
German transit through Pomerania, established by the Versailles treaty, 
functioned very well. It was the refusal of Poland to accede to the illegitimate 
further demands of Germany with regard to access which gave rise to conflict. 
The dispute as it stands now is a direct consequence of the measures agreed by the 
UK, USA, USSR and, later, France, with regard to defeated and occupied Germany at 
the Potsdam conference, and in particular the following sentence:
"The three Heads of Government reaffirm  their 
opinion that the final delimitation of the western 
frontier of Poland should await the peace settlement."1
This was a reiteration of the view expressed at the Crimean conference at Yalta.2 
The present work w ill refer to these matters, but is prim arily concerned with the 
controversy over the frontier between Poland and Germany, the Treaty of 7 
December 1970, between Poland and the FRG, also known as the Warsaw Treaty, 
and the territory which, forming part of the territory of the German Reich 
within its borders on December 31 1937, was in 1945 placed under Polish 
“administration".^  However, East Prussia, also affected by the Potsdam Protocol 
and by the Warsaw Treaty, w ill not be considered at this stage, except to note that 
the Soviet Union and Poland entered into a treaty concerning the demarcation of
the frontier between the two States in this area on March 5 1957.^  
The Warsaw Treaty establishes, inter alia, that the FRG and Poland agree that:
"...the existing frontier line, which, in  accordance with 
chapter IX of the decisions of the Potsdam Conference of 
2 August 1945, runs from the Baltic Sea immediately west of 
Swinoujscie, along the Odra (Oder) River to the point of 
junction with the HysaLuzycka (Lausitzer Neisse) River 
and along the Nysa Luzycka (Lausitzer Neisse) River to the 
frontier with Cezechoslovakia, constitutes the western State 
frontier of the Polish People’s Republic."^
Thus the frontier is known and referred to as the Oder-Neisse line. While the 
Warsaw Treaty is the main instrument under scrutiny here, it should be noted 
that the Oder-Neisse line is also referred to in the following instruments: the 
Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe - the Helsinki 
Final Act - of 1975.6 The Declaration on Principles Guiding Relations between 
Participating States provides, as one of ten principles, each of which is declared to 
be of "primary significance":
" III. Inviolability of frontiers.
The participating States regard as inviolable all one another’s 
frontiers as well as the frontiers of all States in  Europe and 
therefore they w ill refrain now and in the future from 
assaulting these frontiers. Accordingly, they w ill also refrain  
from any demand for, or act of, seizure and usurpation of part
or all of the territory of any participating State."7
The parties to the Helsinki Final Act, which is not binding in law, included all 
European States except for Albania, plus the USA and Canada. The point to note is 
that the participating States "regard" all European frontiers as "inviolable". This 
seems to mean that frontiers may be altered by peaceful means, but this would 
depend upon how "demand", in  the second paragraph of the principle, is 
interpreted. According to the Final Act, the Oder-Neisse line, referred to 
indirectly, is free from violation.
The Oder-Neisse line is referred to byname in two agreements which preceded 
the Warsaw Treaty, to one of which Poland is a party. The Treaty of 12 August 
1970,8 between the FRG and the USSR - the Moscow Treaty - is one. The English 
translation provided by the Press and Information Office of the Federal 
Government in  Bonn stipulates at Article 3 in  part:
"They (the parties) regard today and shall in future regard 
the frontiers of all States in Europe as inviolable such as they 
are on the date of signature of the present Treaty, including 
the Oder-Neisse line which forms the western frontier of the 
People’s Republic of Poland...."
If  Article 3 is taken as a whole, then this part shows that the FRG w ill not attempt 
to bring about alteration of the Polish western frontier by non-peaceful means, at 
least, and it has even been argued that the FRG may not try to alter any European 
boundaries, even by peaceful means.9 In view of the provisions of Article I of the
Warsaw Treaty, this dispute over interpretation, as far as that particular aspect of 
the legal position of the FRG is concerned, cannot be considered by itself, as the 
Federal Republic makes further declarations with regard to the frontier in  Article 
L
Poland concluded an agreement with the GDR, regarding the demarcation of 
their common border, on 6 July 1950 - the Zgorzelec Treaty,10 Article 1 of which 
states:
"The High Contracting Parties are agreed that the established 
and existing frontier running from the Baltic Sea along aline  
west of the locality of Swinoujscie [formerly Swinemunde ] and 
then along the River Oder to the confluence of the Lusatian 
Neisse and along the Lusatian Neisse to the Czechoslovak 
frontier, constitutes the state frontier between Germany and 
Poland."
Thus the GDR had taken it upon itself to recognize the Oder-Neisse line. One 
interesting assessment of this was the following:
"Recognition by the GDR of the boundary on the Oder and 
Neisse Rivers established by the Potsdam Agreement constituted 
“the peace settlement" mentioned in that Agreement."11
While the Zgorzelec Treaty constitutes one element in the confused legal status of 
Poland's borders, it is definitely not a peace settlement as envisaged at Potsdam. If
it were, there would have been no need for any other agreement or treaties to 
regulate or define the legal stances of various States with regard to the 
Oder-Neisse line. They would be superfluous. It might be contended that the 
Warsaw and Moscow Treaties, the Treaty on the Basis of Relations between the FRG 
and GDR - the Basic Treaty, or Grundvertrag, -  of 1972, the Treaty on Mutual 
Relations between the Federal Republic and Czechoslovakia of 11 December 1973 - 
the Prague Treaty, and the Berlin Quadripartite Agreement of 1971, taken 
together, constitute an attempt by the States involved to achieve a settlement of 
some of the issues which might have been incorporated in a peace treaty;12 for 
example, agreements with regard to frontiers and undertakings of renunciation 
of the use of force. Why else would these agreements and treaties have been 
considered necessary, were it not for the very absence of a peace treaty? They 
are not intended as a complete substitute for a peace treaty. Some of the 
agreements contain provisions which, directly or indirectly, so specify, for 
example the Warsaw Treaty, Article I?. But they do attempt to achieve a 
settlement of sorts in  the absence of a peace treaty. Nor do they necessarily 
constitute merely a modus vivendi. as has been asserted The necessity of a 
peace settlement was stipulated for in the Potsdam Agreement at a time when it 
was still believed that this could be achieved - in fact, no other possibility was 
envisaged. The situation in Europe altered so fundamentally and dramatically 
afterwards, that it has to be considered whether a peace settlement was a realistic 
option even in  1970, and whether the agreements and treaties mentioned are of a 
more permanent nature. If  they were not so considered when they came into 
being, they may come to acquire that character, if  they have not already done so. 
Of course, during the negotiations with Poland over the Warsaw Treaty, the FRG 
informed the Western Powers14 that it had informed Poland that the rights and
responsibilities of the three Western Powers, and presumably those of the USSR, 
with regard to Germany as a whole remained unaffected. However, this may, in  
part, be accounted for by a fear on the part of the FRG, that the Warsaw Treaty 
might be construed as being inconsistent with the provisions of its Grundeesetz 
(Basic Law). This obliges the Federal Republic not to take action which would 
render impossible the reunification of divided Germany.
As events turned out, the Treaties were not automatically ratified, and the 
Bundestag did consider whether the Warsaw and Moscow Treaties were consistent 
with the Grundgesetz. On 17 May 1972, an All-Party Resolution on these two 
treaties was adopted by the Federal German Parliament,1 ^  according to which the 
Warsaw and Moscow Treaties constitute merely elements, albeit important, in  the 
modus vivendi which the FRG seeks to establish with other States in Europe. This 
is reasonable in view of the ostensibly limited ambit of the treaties - they all 
include statements that they do not affect existing agreements. This includes the 
Potsdam Agreement, which provides for a peace settlement to be concluded with a 
united Germany. However, the actual situation of Germany as a whole is such that 
the agreements may come to be seen as permanent, since the status quo in  Europe 
seems to be beyond change through peaceful means.
There is further authority which shows that the Zgorzelec Treaty is not a 
peace treaty as was envisaged at Potsdam. According to the Allied declaration of 5 
June 1945,10 the governments of the allied Powers assumed supreme authority 
with respect to Germany. This included the power to
“...hereafter determine the boundaries of Germany or any part
thereof and the status of Germany or of any area at present being 
part of German territory." (Preamble)
Apparently, then, only the three Powers - UK, USA and USSR, later joined by 
France, could determine the boundaries of Germany. It has already been noted 
that, according to the Potsdam Agreement, the heads of Government took the 
"opinion" that the final delimitation of the German-Polish border should take 
place at the peace settlement. It was also agreed that, until this event took place, 
the former German territories east of the Oder-Neisse line should be placed under 
Polish administration. It is interesting that, while this is apparently a temporary 
measure, and was undoubtedly seen as such at the time,17 at least by the British 
and Americans, the relevant territory is referred to as "former" German territory. 
When the heads of Government said it was their "opinion" that the final 
delimitation of the frontier "should" await the peace settlement, this looked more 
like the expression of a hope or an intention, rather than the sp ecify in g  of an 
essential procedure.
Leaving this aside, it suffices to note that, in  1950, the GDR was not recognized 
as a State by the UK, USA or France, the three States responsible, with the USSR, 
for Berlin and Germany as a whole. They are not parties to the Zgorzelec 
Agreement, nor have they given it their approval. Therefore, even if  the GDR 
was competent as a State to conclude this agreement, it would be res inter alios 
acta as far as the Western Powers were concerned. The whole of Germany was 
under occupation then and remained so, in the case of the British, French and 
American zones, until the Paris Treaty of October, 1954, which ended the 
occupation status of the FRG, while the occupying Powers retained certain rights
and responsibilities with regard to Germany as a whole.18 The Soviet Union 
granted sovereignty to the GDR on 25 March, 1954.19 According to the Protocol of 
the Potsdam Conference, Part I A (3) (i), the Council of Foreign Ministers, 
established in Part L shall be utilised:
"..Tor the preparation of a peace settlement for Germany to 
be accepted by the Government of Germany when a Govern­
ment adequate for the purpose is established.”
Obviously, it was envisaged that there would be one government for the whole of 
Germany before a peace settlement could be concluded, which would deal with the 
matter of the German-Polish border. The government of the GDR did not possess 
that character.
While the Zgorzelec Treaty and the Warsaw Treaty deal with the same frontier, 
the character of these instruments is not the same. The former attaches 
permanency to the Potsdam Agreement. It states that a permanent, fixed frontier 
has been established (Preamble). The FRG, however, claims that this frontier 
cannot be permanently fixed until the peace settlement, and it says that this is the 
true meaning of the Potsdam Agreement. The then Federal Minister for Foreign 
Affairs, Walter Scheel, said:
“The Article (Article I of the Warsaw Treaty) gives the 
Potsdam decisions no other nor added significance than 
results from the wording of the decisions and the 
circumstances under which they came about. Herein lies
a vital distinction between this treaty and the Goriitz 
treaty concluded by the German Democratic Republic in  
1950."20
This reflects a fundamental difference of opinion between East and West as to 
the true nature of the Potsdam Agreement. The Soviet bloc States tend to regard it 
as setting down a settlement for Europe, despite the provisions contained therein 
with regard to a future peace settlement, while Western States tend to dispute this. 
If  the words of the Potsdam Agreement are taken only by themselves - see p. 11, 
supra - then there would appear not to have been any final settlement, either of 
the issue of German unity or of Poland's western frontier. To this extent, the 
western States are correct in their view that the conditions set out at Potsdam 
have not been fulfilled. Having said this, more recent developments cannot be 
ignored. At Potsdam, a peace treaty was considered essential for returning Europe 
to normality. But the balance of power in Europe in  1945 and thereafter was such 
that "normality" could never be what was considered normal prior to 1939. A new, 
but nevertheless normal, situation has arisen in Europe since then. This includes 
a divided Germany (in the view of this writer, since Germany had only been a 
Reich since 1871, the idea of one German State being a “normal" condition was, to 
some extent, a fiction. Rather, it may be that the divisions of contemporary 
Germany are simply deeper than in the past). A peace settlement would appear to 
be out of the question. There have been no negotiations, or even suggestions for 
negotiations, between the relevant States for many years, either with regard to 
German reunification or with regard to a peace treaty. The early years of the 
1970's were dominated by the talks which led eventually to the signing of the 
Helsinki Final Act. Proposals have been made with regard to peace treaties with
Germany,21 but these have always been rejected sooner or later.22 The present 
borders of Europe, at least where Poland and the two German States are concerned, 
appear to be fixed, with no prospect for any change. It is also possible that a 
unified German State would be obliged to accept the Oder-Neisse line as its border 
with Poland, even without this being sanctioned in any peace settlement. This 
w ill be discussed later.
(ii) The Warsaw Treaty
The fu ll title of this instrument is: “Treaty between the Polish People's 
Republic and the Federal Republic of Germany concerning the Basis for 
Normalization of their Mutual Relations." The differing interpretations of this 
treaty adopted by each of its parties tend to give the impression that it is not one 
agreement, but two separate stances which happen, somehow, to take the same 
form. This is evident in two respects: first, the inability of the two States to reach 
a consensus as to the main purpose of the treaty; second, the exact meaning and 
consequences of Article I.
Article I (i)  provides that the FRG and Poland agree that the existing 
boundary, the Oder-Neisse line, shall constitute Poland's western State frontier. 
For Poland, this was certainly the most significant aspect of the treaty. The then 
Prime Minister of Poland, Jozef Cyrankiewicz, made this clear in  his speech given 
immediately after the signing of the Warsaw Treaty:
"...only on this basis, the recognition of the inevitability 
and inviolability of Poland's western frontier along the 
Oder and Lausitz Neisse laid down in the Potsdam Conclusions,
has it been possible to sign today this treaty which pioneers 
the way to the normalization of the relations between Poland 
and the second German State which arose out of the ashes of 
the third Reich-the Federal Republic of Germany."2^
While Poland acknowledged that the treaty provided not only for an agreement 
with regard to the Oder-Neisse line, but had a more general purpose of 
normalizing relations between the two countries, as is stipulated in Article I I I  (1) 
and the Preamble to the treaty, nevertheless it was emphasizing that the 
agreement on the Oder-Neisse line, contained in Article I  was a precondition for 
this normalization. Although the treaty is said, in  its title, to be a basis for 
normalization of the two States' mutual relations, for Poland the whole process 
depended upon the accord reached in Article L which was a sine qua non for any 
normalization.
On the other hand, the FRG sees Article I as only one aspect of the treaty; its 
main purpose was to start the procedure whereby normal relations with Poland 
would eventually be established. Nor was the treaty regarded by the FRG as an 
individual instrument. Rather, it was one consequence, for the FRG, of its 
Qstpolitik. and not simply a means of recognizing the Oder-Neisse line. Walter 
Scheel expressed the view of the FRG:
"...the frontier article is not the only -  and in  a certain way not 
even the most important - article of the treaty. It merely creates 
the foundation for it. The German-Polish treaty is no frontier 
treaty, and even as an agreement on the renunciation of force
it is only incompletely described. Its actual significance is 
depicted appositely as “treaty concerning the basis for 
normalizing relations.""24
One aspect of the Federal Republic’s Qstpolitik was to increase contacts 
between Germans in the FRG and Germans, or persons of German ethnic origin, in  
socialist countries. These were by no means restricted to the GDR. Prior to World 
War II, there had been up to ten million inhabitants in  that part of Germany 
which in 1945 came under Polish administration.^  While most of these were 
expelled or left these territories of their own accord during the immediate 
post-war period or even prior to the unconditional surrender of Germany on 8 
May 1945, hundreds of thousands did remain. The FRG had two objectives - to 
facilitate contacts between these persons and its own citizens already resident 
within the territory of the Federal Republic, and to enable families to be reunited 
through the emigration of these people from the socialist countries to the FRG. At 
the initialling of the Warsaw Treaty, on 18 November 1970, the Polish Government 
communicated an "Information on Measures for the Solution of Humanitarian 
Problems" to the Federal Republic.28 This estimated that, under agreement 
between the Polish Red Cross and the Red Cross of the FRG, approximately four 
hundred thousand Polish citizens left Poland for the Federal Republic, in  order 
that families might be reunited - Paragraph 1. Paragraph 2 says that Polish 
nationals resident in Poland, of "indisputable German nationality", may travel to 
either German state, Polish regulations permitting. The wording and timing of 
this communication together suggest that it was a concession on the part of 
Poland, to allow further contacts and emigration. Paragraph 3 shows the FRG has 
asserted that numbers of Germans greater than those to which Poland would admit
desired to leave Poland:
"The competent Polish authorities do not dispose of any 
figures approaching those alleged t>y the FRG for applica­
tions for permission to travel to the Federal Republic."
However, the Polish Government then promised that all applications would be 
carefully examined, and that the work of the Red Cross organisations of Poland 
and the FRG with regard to this matter would be facilitated. This concession by 
Poland is very closely linked to the Warsaw Treaty by time - the communication 
being made at the initialling of the treaty. This was a practical achievement for 
the Federal Republic, facilitating the release of more Germans from Poland being 
one of the important objectives of its Qstpolitik. Both States appear to have gained 
from entering into the treaty. Poland obtained recognition by the FRG of the 
Oder-Neisse line, although it has been argued that subsequently the FRG 
unilaterally reinterpreted this recognition, in the All-Party Resolution of the 
Bundestag of 17 May 1972. In  the meantime, thousands of Polish Citizens of 
German ethnic origin were leaving for the Federal Republic. The link between 
the Warsaw Treaty and the "Information" of the Polish Government concerning 
ethnic Germans was confirmed by the Foreign Minister of the Federal Republic, 
who said in  1970:
"We would not have been able to conclude this treaty had we 
not had sufficient evidence that the Polish side was prepared 
to meet us halfway in the sphere of human reliefs for us decisive, 
(emphasis by this writer)
"From the outset, this complex of problems formed amain theme 
of the negotiations in Warsaw. In its successful mastering we 
see not only the crucial test of the normalisation but the 
fundamental complementation of the treaty as a whole. Even 
if  this finds informal expressiion in  the treaty itself, it neverthe­
less forms a vital part of the instruments concerned in the 
German-Polish negotiations....
"The “Information" the Polish Government has given us 
touches on themes of fundamental importance. It lies in  
the very nature of things that in  it the emphasis is on the 
relatively easily comprehensible sphere of family reunion.
"We know, however, that fam ily reunion represents only 
one side of the problem and that the situation of the Germans 
remaining behind poses equally weighty questions. In  the 
final analysis, both complexes are a matter of the normalization."27
(iii) Circumstances of the Warsaw Treaty
It is informative to view the Warsaw Treaty in its context. It is one of a series of 
treaties and agreements concluded by or involving the FRG, with regard to its 
condition as one part of a divided Germany. The Moscow Treaty, which concerns 
itself largely with the renunciation of the threat or use of force, was accompanied 
by the so-called Bahr-Papier, an agreement between both parties concerning 
common policies.28 Paragraph 5 states that the Moscow Treaty and corresponding 
agreements to be concluded with the GDR, Poland and Czechoslovakia "form a 
homogeneous whole." While Paragraph 10 says:
"The Governments of the Federal Republic and the Soviet Union 
welcome the plan for a conference on matters concerning the 
strengthening of security and cooperation in Europe and w ill do 
everything that depends on them for its preparation and successful 
prosecution."
The USSR and FRG here are tying in the Soviet desire for a European conference 
on security and cooperation with the Moscow Treaty, which preceded the other 
treaties concluded with socialist States by the FRG. It has been pointed out29 that 
the measures incorporated in the Moscow Treaty forestalled parts of the Helsinki 
Final Act and may have helped to secure a favourable attitude on the part of the 
FRG to the initiative of the USSR with regard to the security conference. The 
Moscow Treaty is not simply an aspect of the Qstpolitik of  West Germany. For the 
Soviet Union, one problem was that the FRG insisted that the Moscow Treaty - not 
then concluded - would not come into effect until a satisfactory conclusion to the 
negotiations then taking place with regard to Berlin had been achieved.^ 0 The 
Soviet Union was negotiating with regard to Berlin with the other occupying 
powers, though not about Berlin's status under international law; Paragraph 3 of 
Part I of the Quadripartite Agreement on Berlin of 1971 states:
'The four Governments w ill mutually respect their individual 
and joint rights and responsibilities, which remain unchanged.''^ 1
According to the Preamble, the Four Powers had concluded the Agreement, 
"Guided by the desire to contribute to practical improvements of the situation." 
The Berlin talks had commenced on 26 March 1970, and the FRG made their
satisfactory conclusion - from the viewpoint of the Federal Republic, which 
meant securing easier and closer ties between FRG and West Berlin - a condition 
for ratifying the Moscow Treaty, on 7 June 1970 2^ Considering the tension which 
had existed with regard to Berlin, the FRG appears to have been extremely 
assertive in connecting ratification of the Moscow treaty with the successful 
conclusion of the negotiations over Berlin, less than three months after they had 
begun. This may be a reflection of the importance attached by the Soviet Union to 
the Moscow Treaty, and its aim of bringing about a conference on security and 
cooperation in Europe. While the Moscow Treaty contributed towards the removal 
of direct tensions between the two States, the Quadripartite Agreement also
i
enabled relations between them to improve, in view of the close relationship of 
West Berlin to the Federal Republic. It should also be taken into account that, if  
the parties had failed to conclude the Moscow Treaty, the other treaties between 
West Germany and the socialist countries could not have come into existence, at 
least in the form which they took. The FRG had to consider the potential human 
and economic benefits which it, and its citizens, might receive after the 
successful conclusion of negotiations with the USSR, and compare them with 
possible amelioration of the position of West Berlin. This would be so, in that the 
FRG, by making what might be construed as a diplomatic ultimatum, attached 
priority to the Berlin negotiations. If  they failed, the Moscow Treaty presumably 
would not have come into force. The result of this would have been, for the West 
Germans, failure in both cases, but it seems that this risk was considered 
worthwhile if  it would contribute towards achieving a settlement for Berlin.
Therefore, in 1970, the position was that the Soviet Union, desirous of 
arranging a conference on security and cooperation in Europe, which it would
subsequently interpret as having confirmed the existing geopolitical situation, 
including the USSR's position and influence, in Europe,^ negotiated the Moscow 
treaty on renunciation of force with the ERG. The latter State had an interest in  
entering into this treaty, which formed part of a whole to be made up of other 
treaties with other socialist countries. This enabled the FRG to commence the 
normalization of relations with Poland, Czechoslovakia and the GDR. The 
renunciation of the threat or use of force by the two States was supposed to 
remove one of the obstacles to the conference on security and cooperation. Why 
should this have been considered necessary? The two States had not concluded a 
peace treaty; although the Soviet Union had announced in 1955 that it regarded 
the state of war with Germany as ended. If  there was to be a conference on 
security and cooperation, the signatories may have felt more secure in  
negotiating with a treaty basis amongst some of the participating states already in  
existence.
As has been seen, the FRG attached the highest priority to the practical, if  not 
legal, alteration of the conditions of West Berlin. At one time, the whole series of 
treaties appears to have been dependent upon the successful conclusion of the 
Berlin negotiations. This process included the Warsaw Treaty (see p. 24 , supra). 
So while the Warsaw Treaty was negotiated separately, it might not have come 
about if  the Moscow Treaty had failed, this being dependent upon the outcome of 
the negotiations with regard to Berlin. And as the Helsinki Final Act includes a 
provision whereby the signatory States recognized the inviolability of each 
other's frontiers and territory, it becomes doubtful whether the FRG could have 
become a party to the Final Act without first having reached an accommodation 
with Poland. After the conclusion of the Quadripartite Agreement, the Soviet
Union stated that it could only enter into force after the ratification by the FRG of 
the Moscow Treaty, and so it transpired that the whole collection of agreements 
might collapse if  the West German parliament failed to vote for ratification of the 
Moscow and Warsaw Treaties. The treaties finally gained the approval of the 
Bundestag in May, 1972. However, a joint, all-Party Resolution was also passed by 
the Bundestag.^ 4 This was a declaration with regard to the two treaties. Its status 
and meaning have been the subjects of legal debate, to which reference w ill be 
made.
ftv) The Status of the Polish-German Frontier and Polish Western Territories 
after the Warsaw Treaty.
The Polish Supreme Court, in  the Polish State Railways Case, stated in 1948 the 
following, which reflects the legal position adopted by the Polish State:
“After surrender the German State lost its sovereignty, while 
the Recovered Territories were submitted to the sovereign 
possession and authority of the Polish State on the basis of 
the agreement concluded among the victorious Powers ....“^
The Potsdam Agreement actually said that the German eastern territories 
concerned should be placed under the "administration" of the Polish State. 
Whether, in 1945, this meant "sovereignty", is unlikely. If  the USSR, USA and UK 
had intended at the time that Poland should definitely acquire sovereignty over 
the relevant territory, they possessed the vocabulary to say as much. However, 
the attitude of the Polish State is obviously different - but it should be
remembered that in  1948, Poland was already firm ly allied to the Soviet Union, 
while in 1945, there was still hope, at least in the UK and USA, that it might be able 
to follow a more independent course; also, the attitudes of East and West had 
already polarized in  1948. Referring to the territories as "recovered", the Polish 
Court is saying that they had come back into Poland's possession, which means 
that at some time previously they had been taken away from Poland. But the 
territories in dispute, like other areas in Europe, had often changed hands and the 
fact that they had been Polish territory at some point previously did not 
necessarily strengthen Poland's title in  1948. The Polish view is confirmed in  the 
Preamble of the Zgorzelec Treaty,^ 8 where it is stated that Poland and the GDR 
wish "to stabilize and consolidate mutual relations on the basis of the Potsdam 
Agreement which established the frontier on the Oder and the Lusatian Neisse." 
Thus Poland stated that its western frontier was "established" by the Potsdam 
Agreement. If  this be accepted, it follows that the territory to the east of that 
border, within the Polish frontiers, is under Polish sovereignty.^ 7
Poland recognized the German Democratic Republic as a State after its creation 
as such in 1949,3° in  response to the formation on 20 September 1949, of a 
separate government for the western sectors of Germany.^ 9 The western 
occupying powers held the opinion that there was only one German State, the 
FRG, plus a Soviet zone of occupation in east Germany. The Polish position, that 
there are two German States, has been consistent since the early 1950's, though 
Poland at first recognized only one German State - the GDR - and seemed then to 
reject the construction of two German States. The GDR at first also regarded itself 
as the only German State.40 This is evident in that Poland has entered into 
agreements with both the GDR and FRG as to the position and status of its western
frontier: the Zgorzelec Treaty of 1950, and the Warsaw Treaty of 1970. The two 
German States have therefore recognized the Oder-Neisse line. In  Article I (3) of 
the Warsaw Treaty, the parties state that:
“They declare that they have no territorial claims against
each other and w ill advance none in the future."
If  the two States declare that they have no territorial claims against each other 
(present tense), presumably this would imply a renunciation of any previous 
claims which either party had made against the other with regard to territory. 
But the present Polish-German frontier did not come into existence in  1970, when 
the Warsaw Treaty was signed; nor when the treaty was ratified in  1972. In  fact, 
it existed since 1945. In  law may be another matter. The GDR recognized the 
Oder-Neisse line in  1950, before most States had recognized the GDR. For purposes 
of administration, at least, according to the Potsdam Agreement, the Oder-Neisse 
line was to constitute the western border of Polish territory. But by 1974, the UK, 
USA and France had all recognized the GDR to the extent that they had entered 
into, or were preparing to enter into, diplomatic relations with that State.41 The 
territorial divisions which took place in central Europe between 1945 and 1950, 
apart from the withdrawal from Austria in 1955 of the occupying powers, had in  
reality taken on the character of permanency. There is no cession of territory 
under the Warsaw Treaty, nor under the Zgorzelec Treaty. Poland's title to the 
territory, such as it may be, was not established by the treaty with the Federal 
Republic. In that sense, the Warsaw Treaty, not being a treaty of cession, of itself, 
gives Poland no title to the western areas. But it does contribute to the legal 
regime of Polish borders. It should not be read in isolation, and may be important
in  its consequences for a future, unified Germany, which may t>e bound by this 
treaty and others not to context the Oder-Neisse line.
The official stance of the FRG - and that of the UK, USA and France in their 
capacities as occupying powers of Berlin, and having responsibility for Germany 
as a whole with the USSR - has always been based upon a different interpretation 
of the Potsdam Agreement. First, the FRG contends that the Agreement did not 
permanently establish the Polish western frontier. It is true that Part V III of the 
Protocol provides, inter alia that the final delimitation of the western frontier of 
Poland should await the peace settlement. This part of the Agreement has already 
been considered. If  this was merely the "opinion** of the Heads of Government, it 
may be argued that no permanent commitment was made with regard to the 
frontier issue, in which case, any of the three might be free to change its 
"opinion" in favour of the Oder-Neisse line becoming the permanent border 
between Poland and Germany, if  it has not aready acquired that character, 
whether Germany be divided or as one State, and without awaiting the peace 
settlement, as apparently envisaged at Potsdam.
Second, the FRG has consistently expressed its opinion that, as far as its 
frontiers are concerned, or the frontiers of Germany, it can negotiate only on its 
own behalf; the consequence being, according to the Federal Republic, that a 
unified Germany would not be bound by such agreements regarding frontiers as 
had been entered into by the FRG and GDR. On the other hand, nor would 
Germany be obliged to contest such agreements and treaties. Thus, Article IV of 
the Yarsaw Treaty stipulates:
“This Agreement shall be without prejudice to any bilateral or 
multilateral international agreements which the Parties 
have previously concluded or which affect them."
This is accepted as including the Potsdam Agreement. So, according to the Yest 
German interpretation, the Yarsaw Treaty would not alter the effect of its 
provisions, which include the permanent delimitation of Poland's western 
frontier. However, the inclusion in  the treaty of Article I? was insufficient to 
convince the Federal Parliament that the Yarsaw Treaty should be ratified. An 
All-Party Resolution, purporting to interpret the Moscow and Yarsaw Treaties, 
was adopted by the Bundestag on 1? May 1972.42 This states, at Paragraph 2:
"The Treaties do not... create any legal foundation for the 
frontiers existing today."
This may be true, in  that the Oder-Neisse line existed prior to the Yarsaw Treaty 
and did not depend upon the Rind permission or assent of the Bundestag for its 
actual existence. However, while the Yarsaw Treaty may not by itself have 
established a legal frontier, its consequences for the FRG and, perhaps, a unified 
Germany, maybe greater.
(v) The Bundestag Resolution
It has been said that this Resolution was presented to the Government of 
Poland without any express objection on its part,^ and that, according to Article 
31, paragraph 2 (b) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 1969,44 the 
Resolution constitutes part of the context of the treaty for the purpose of
interpreting it, if  it be accepted by the other party or parties to the treaty. The 
same writer stated that, although the Vienna Convention was not in  force between 
the parties in  1972 - nor does it have retroactive effect, according to Article 4 - 
still it was "generally regarded in this respect as declaratory of existing law." 
However, statements by representatives of Poland indicate that the Resolution was 
not accepted. Much depends upon the extent to which the provision is actually 
declaratory of international law. Is acceptance constituted by non-rejection 
alone, or does it require positive action? Must actual approval be communicated? 
It has been pointed out^ that the Polish Minister for Foreign Affairs emphasized 
that "... the Treaty [was] the only acceptable basis for our relations with the 
Federal Republic of Germany" and added that "... for Poland the text of the 
agreement alone [could]be binding". This would appear to exclude the Resolution 
from consideration as part of the context for purposes of interpretation. Yet this 
instrument plays a controversial role in Polish-FRG relations: its applicability, 
denied, apparently, by Poland, is supported by some in the FRG. The actual text of 
the Resolution is also controversial.
The importance attached by the FRG to the normalization of relations with 
Poland was discussed above. Paragraph 1 of the Resolution describes the Yarsaw 
and Moscow treaties as elements of a modus vivendi which the FRG seeks to 
establish with its Eastern neighbours. But normal relations between States have 
an element of permanency not implied by the term modus vivendi. The FRG may 
argue that in  such matters, nothing can be permanent until the peace settlement. 
In this case, it should describe its relations with all States, including the UK and 
the USA, as parts of a modus vivendi/*6 In fact, the territorial status quo basically 
has remained unchanged since 1949, a substantial period by European standards.
It is possible that the apparent permanency and settled quality of central 
European frontiers is, in  part, due to the absence of a peace settlement, which 
might serve as a catalyst, if  it existed, for revanchist trends in States which felt 
they had suffered at the peace settlement. This might be conducive to further 
conflict. Seen in this perspective, the situation in  Europe with regard to frontiers 
is unlikely to alter, and normalization of relations between the ERG and Poland 
should not be looked upon as an element of a modus vivendi but rather as a 
permanent settlement between the two countries of the frontier issue. In  this 
respect, it is worth recalling the paramount importance attached by Poland to the 
recognition by the FRG of the Oder-Neisse line, during the negotiations prior to 
the signing of the Yarsaw Treaty.
The Resolution states, at Paragraph Z that the treaties do not establish a legal 
foundation for existing frontiers. The opinion of the Bundestag, that the Yarsaw 
Treaty created no legal foundation at all for the present frontiers, is unlikely to 
have been acceptable to Poland if  presented during the negotiations in  1970. Of 
course, it is true that the Oder-Neisse line does not depend upon the Yarsaw Treaty 
for its legality, but that treaty does contribute towards it. For the Federal 
Republic, Article I of the Yarsaw Treaty was a concession in its strategy of 
normalizing relations with Poland. Perhaps, for Poland, normalization of 
relations was a means to achieving Article I . It is therefore unlikely to have 
accepted many statements made in the Bundestag Resolution.
There is also the question, whether by unilaterally interpreting a treaty 
already signed with another State, the FRG was in  danger of breaking a 
fundamental rule of the lav/ of treaties, pacta sunt servanda - that a treaty is
binding upon the parties to it and should be performed by them in  good faith. If  
Poland has accepted the Resolution, then there would be no problem. If  it did not, 
then there may be, considering that the Resolution was adopted nearly one and a 
half years after the treaty had been signed and, apparently, sealed - though not 
yet ratified.
If  Article 27 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties were applicable, 
the Bundestag Resolution would be affected so that, if  it were established that 
Poland rejected the Resolution as being interpretive of the treaty, the FRG would 
be precluded from invoking the provisions of the Resolution in  support of its own 
interpretation. Article 27 states:
“A party may not invoke the provisions of its internal law as 
j testification for its failure to perform a treaty. This rule is 
without prejudice to Article 46.“
Article 46 provides that a State cannot prevent itself being bound by a treaty by 
virtue of a provision of its internal law regarding its competence to conclude 
treaties unless it entered into the treaty making a violation which was manifest 
and concerned a rule of its internal law of fundamental importance. The Federal 
Republic would be precluded from invoking Article 46 as an escape clause, 
assuming it wanted to do so, because, according to its own argument, the 
Resolution is consistent with the Yarsaw Treaty, which is consistent with its 
Grundgesetz and the fundamental provisions of that t>asic law with regard to the 
unification of Germany, the future establishment of its frontiers and the 
competence of the FRG to conclude treaties with regard to these matters.
(v i) Unified Germany.
The Federal Republic insists that it cannot bind a future German State to 
accept the Oder-Neisse line as its eastern frontier. This is also the view taken by 
the UK, USA and France - that the final delimitation under international law of 
Poland's western frontier must take place at the peace settlement, when a single 
German State with its own government, freely elected, has come into existence. 
See, for example, the Note delivered to the Soviet Government from the UK in  1952, 
after consultation with France and the USA. This provides, in  part:
“The conclusion of a just and lasting peace treaty which would 
end the division of Germany has always been and remains an
essential objective of Her Majesty's Government the conclusion
of such a treaty requires the formation of an all-German Govern­
ment, expressing the w ill of the German people. Such a Government 
can only be set up on the basis of free elections in the Federal 
Republic, the Soviet Zone of occupation, and B erlin ...
"Her Majesty's Government would recall that in  fact no definitive 
German frontiers were laid down by the Potsdam decisions, which 
clearly provided that the final determination of territorial 
questions must await the peace settlement.”47
In 1970, after the intialling of the Yarsaw Treaty, the UK's position was the 
same; this can be seen from part of the text of a Note from the UK to the FRG - 
similarNotes were sent by the USA and France:
"Her Majesty's Government note with approval the initialling  
of the Treaty. They share the position that the Treaty does 
not and cannot affect the rights and responsibilities of the 
the Four Powers as reflected in the known Treaties and 
Agreements."48
The attitude of the Federal Republic is summarized in Paragraph 2 of the 
Bundestag Resolution:49
“The FRG has assumed on its own behalf the obligations it 
undertook in the Treaties. The Treaties proceed from the 
frontiers as actually existing today, the unilateral altera­
tion of which they exclude. The treaties do not anticipate 
a peace settlement for Germany by treaty and do not 
create any legal foundation for the frontiers existing today."
This is apparently very clear. However, there exist a number of legal and positive 
factors which suggest irregularities in the position of the FRG.
(v ii) The Theory of Identity.
Prior to 1970, the FRG had insisted that it was identical with the German Reich 
as it existed within its frontiers of 31 December 1937.-*° This includes the 
territory of both German States, Berlin, plus substantial areas of present day 
¥estem Poland, and East Prussia - now divided between Poland and the Soviet 
Union. The Yestem Powers adopted the following position:
"Pending the unification of Germany, the three Governments 
consider the Government of the Federal Republic as the only 
German Government freely and legitimately constituted and 
therefore entitled to speak for Germany as the representative 
of the German people in international affairs.“5*
The same position has been adopted on other occasions?2 The Federal Republic 
claims that it undertook the obligations of the Moscow and Yarsaw Treaties on its 
own behalf. In  the Notes sent to the three Yestern Powers on 19 November, 1970, 
with regard to the Yarsaw Treaty, it was stated that the FRG "pointed out [to 
Poland] that it can act only in the name of the Federal Republic of Germany." 
However, if  the FRG is identical with the German Reich or at least entitled to speak 
as the representative of the German people in  international affairs, then its 
treaty obligations and rights ought to apply to the Reich when it is reconstituted. 
It has been written:
“If  the Federal Republic is identical with the all-German state 
.... how can it reserve that government's freedom of action?"^
A similar thought has been expressed elsewhere:
"Ein wiedervereinigtes Deutschland ist an die Vertrage zunachst 
dann gebunden, wenn es rechtlich mit der Bundesrepublik 
Deutschland identisch ist." ^
My translation:
"First of all, a reunified Germany is bound by the treaties, 
if  it is legally identical with the Federal Republic of Germany."
In  the Convention on Relations Between the Three Western Powers and the 
Federal Republic of 1952 as amended by the Paris Protocol of 1954 - in  which form 
it finally entered into force - Article 7, paragraph 2 says:
"Pending the peace settlement, the Signatory States w ill 
cooperate to achieve, by peaceful means, their common 
aim of a reunified Germany enjoying a liberal-democratic 
constitution, like that of the Federal Republic, and 
integrated within the European Community.”^
This does not refer only to the ill-fated European Defence Community. After the 
signature of the original conventions with the FRG in  1952, the UK, USA and 
France declared:
“These conventions, as well as the treaties for a European 
Defence Community and a European Coal and Steel Community, 
of which France is a signatory, provide a new basis for uniting 
Europe and for the realization of Germany's partnership in  
the European Community.”^ 6
If  the FRG cannot commit a reunified Germany to accept the Oder-Neisse line.
a frontier to which it has given its consent in the Warsaw Treaty, how could it 
commit a reunified Germany to integration within the European Community? It 
may be that a future, unified Germany, in  theory, would not be obliged to remain 
a Member State of the Community. This is not consistent with the behaviour of 
the ERG in the Community. It is one of the founder Member States. Its 
commitment, if  measured by its financial contribution, has been the greatest of 
any Member State. In  view of this commitment - and the FRG, in terms of 
territory, population and economic strength, would, after all, constitute the 
biggest and strongest element in a reunited Germany - it is difficult to envisage 
how Germany could, in  fact, break away from the Community. The FRG appears to 
have preempted any future withdrawal of Germany. The Preamble to the Treaty 
establishing the European Coal and Steel Community says, inter alia:
“Resolved to substitute for age-old rivalries the merging of 
their essential interests; to create, by establishing an economic 
community, the basis for a broader and deeper community among 
peoples long divided by bloody conflicts; and to lay the foundations 
of institutions which w ill give direction to a destiny henceforward 
shared....."
While the Preamble to the Treaty of Rome, establishing the EEC, contains these 
words:
“Determined to lay the foundations of an ever closer union 
among the peoples of Europe,
Resolved to ensure the economic and social progress of their
countries by common action to eliminate the barriers which 
divide Europe."
Both of these treaties, to which the ERG is an original signatory, provide for 
progressive integration of the States parties by economic means - but the 
purpose, at the time, was to increase political ties between the States involved. 
Would this mean that, in  the event of complete integration of the Member States 
into one State, the ERG would withdraw from the Community, with all the political 
and economic consequences which this would entail, because by remaining in  the 
Community, it would be permitting the alteration of its frontiers, an act from 
which it claimed it was precluded, as the alteration of German frontiers should 
await the peace settlement? The ERG even promises, in Paragraph 8 of the 
Bundestag Resolution^7 to "unwaveringly pursue the policy of European 
unification with the aim of developing the Community progressively into a 
political union." Ultimately, this could affect the borders of Germany as much as 
the Warsaw Treaty did. But no reservation is made with regard to European 
unification, that the ERG can act only in its own name. A situation may be 
foreseen where the eastern part of Germany, united with the western areas, 
would be compelled to become a part of the greater community. In that sense, the 
Federal Republic w ill have acted, in allowing itself to become integrated into the 
European Community, in  the name of the whole of Germany, contrary to its 
assertion that in matters concerning Germany as a whole it is not competent to 
act.
(v iii) Succession of States
While it may be the case that final settlement of the western frontier of
Poland must await the peace settlement, it may be that, because of the actions of 
the FRG and GDR, the only settlement possible would be one which confirms the 
Oder-Neisse line as the border. The Potsdam Protocol provides (Part X II):
"The three Governments, having considered the 
question in all its aspects, recognize that the transfer 
to Germany of German populations, or elements thereof, 
remaining in Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary, w ill 
have to be undertaken."
i
This was because problems were foreseen if  German minorities remained in these 
States. Since Poland already had parts of eastern Germany - “former German 
territories" - placed under its administration, it seems reasonable to assume that 
the transfer of the Germans in these areas was also considered desirable. It is not 
possible to calculate how Poland, if  pan or all of the "former German territories" 
were taken from it at a peace settlement, could absorb the seven million or so 
Poles living in these areas - and it is unlikely that Germany would want to have a 
large Polish minority within its frontiers. It should be recalled that, according to 
Chapter V I of the Yalta Agreement, the three Heads of Government said that 
Poland "should receive substantial accessions of territory in  the north and west." 
This was stipulated immediately after the statement that the eastern frontier of 
Poland should be, more or less, the Curzon Line. This has been regarded as an 
attempt to compensate Poland for the territory which it lost in the east, although 
it is far from certain that such a link was intended to provide legal rights to 
compensation. It has been argued that the Potsdam Agreement separated the 
questions of the eastern and western frontiers of Poland?8 They have been
regulated in  separate documents, at different times and by different parties. The 
Heads of Government also said, as they would at Potsdam, that the final 
delimitation of the western frontier of Poland "should" await the Peace settlement. 
The word "should" is used with regard to the peace conference and with regard to 
the territory which Poland is to receive to its west and north. If  the FRG 
interprets "should” as "must" for the purposes of the peace conference, perhaps it 
ought also to adopt the same attitude to the accessions of territory which are to be 
made in  favour of Poland. This means that, wherever Poland’s western frontier 
would be after the peace settlement, it would definitely be substantially further 
west than its border of 1 September 1939. The Federal Republic has always held 
that the western frontier of Poland should be decided in accordance with the 
terms of the Potsdam Agreement.
This would have to be taken into account in the negotiations for any future 
peace treaty, and the successor German State would haw its territory restricted as 
a consequence, since, if  it is desired to act according to the provisions of the 
Potsdam Agreement -  which accepts the decision at Yalta, that Poland should 
receive territory in the north and west - it must also accept that Poland shall 
receive territory at the expense of Germany as it existed prior to World War II. It 
has been pointed out that, even if  the Warsaw treaty were concluded by the FRG 
on its own behalf only, a successor State could, if  it chose, adopt the obligations of 
the treaty?9 Indeed, since the peace settlement cannot take place under present 
conditions until there is one government for the whole of Germany, and since 
such a unified Germany presumably would consist of the territory of Berlin, plus 
the former GDR and FRG, both of which have recognized the Oder-Neisse line as 
the western frontier of Poland, such a German State could participate in  the
settlement having already recognised that border. This would make the work of 
the peace conference easier, assuming that it would give effect to the previously 
expressed intentions of Germany and Poland in recognizing the frontier. 
Skubiszewski argues that Poland did not accept any reservation from the Federal 
Republic lim iting the duration or effect of the Warsaw Treaty.60 Even if  so, 
however, it does not defeat the interpretation by the FRG of the Potsdam 
Agreement, which is accepted by both States as being valid in Article I?  of the 
Warsaw Treaty, while passing over the differing interpretations of the 
Agreement by each of the States. But there is still no reason why, as the FRG 
claims, the treaty must have only a temporary existence. For reasons already 
stated, it may come to be seen as the instrument which permanently has settled 
the issue. According to Brownlie, “the change of sovereignty does not as such 
affect boundaries.*61 If  the Federal Republic is not, for the purposes of the 
Warsaw treaty, identical with the German Reich, and since it has held that a 
future, unified German State would not be bound by the treaty, then that State 
would be identical neither with the FRG nor the GDR. Consequently, if  it should 
come into existence, a change of sovereignty would occur. If  Brownlie's view is 
accepted, then the boundaries of Germany would not necessarily be affected.
In fact, it is difficult to see how the existing state of affairs could possibly be 
altered by any peace treaty. It is unlikely that Poland would accept w illingly any 
award which entailed the loss to Germany, without territorial compensation, of its 
western territories or any part of them. The purpose of the Warsaw Treaty was to 
begin the normalization of relations between Poland and the FRG, based upon the 
acceptance by the latter State of the Oder-Neisse line as the western frontier of 
Poland. Even if  a reunified Germany were not bound by the 1970 Treaty, Poland
would still be in  existence as a State, presumably within the same borders. The 
Federal Republic states that it accepts the Oder-Neisse line. It has asserted - in  the 
Bundestag Resolution, for example - that a united Germany would not be bound to 
accept it. But nor would it be obliged to reject it. Nevertheless, the FRG 
perpetuates doubts amongst other States with regard to this issue, causing the 
suspicion that the Oder-Neisse line is not accepted.
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CHAPTER THREE
The Applicability and Effect of the Bundestag Resolution of
17 May 1972. The Commitment of Interested States to the Oder-Neisse Line
(1) Origins of the Resolution
The Bundestag Resolution1 has already been mentioned and a few of the 
issues raised by it were briefly discussed. Here it is intended to discuss the 
applicability and effect of this Resolution in detail.
The Resolution served one obvious and immediate purpose, which was to 
obtain ratification by the FRG of the Warsaw and Moscow Treaties, 
approximately one and one half years after they had been signed. The 
Resolution was adopted on 17 May 1972, but that was not all. The Federal 
Government, apparently attempting to forestall criticisms, published a 
"clarification" of the Resolution on 19 May 1972? That is, it published a 
clarification of an interpretation of the Moscow and Warsaw Treaties. The 
Federal Government intended the Resolution to be adopted in  connection with 
the ratification of these treaties, so it is reasonable to characterise the action of 
the Federal Government in this way, regardless of whether or not the 
Resolution does in  effect interpret the treaties. It is an indication of the 
controversy of these measures, that it was even considered necessary to clarify  
the Resolution.
The treaties were finally ratified by the FRG on 23 May 1972. The Soviet
Union ratified the Moscow Treaty on 31 May 1972; Poland ratified its treaty on 
26 May 1972. On the Soviet and Polish sides, there were no problems in  
obtaining ratification; however, the problems of achieving it in  the FRG caused 
a great deal of debate in Poland, particularly with regard to the Bundestag 
Resolution, to which reference w ill be made later.
The Resolution was necessary to secure ratification for two reasons: first, the 
ruling SPD-Free Democrat coalition wanted to obtain not just majority support 
for the treaties, but the backing of as much of parliament as possible. This was 
because of the nature of the treaties, which dealt with issues fundamental to the 
existence of the FRG and its people, millions of whom had spent large parts of 
their lives in former German territories which had been incorporated into 
Poland and the Soviet Union. The Federal Government did not wish to alienate 
large segments of its population by being seen to “sign away" enormous areas of 
"German territory". It is irrelevant in  this particular context whether the 
territory concerned was German, and it was irrelevant to consider for these 
purposes whether the FRG had any capacity to "sign away" anything other than 
the territory of the FRG (and even that is a matter of debate in  view of the 
residual powers of UK, USA, France and USSR with regard to Germany as a 
whole); the point is that there were many Germans in the FRG, whose opinions 
were also voiced by Bundestag members, who did, or might, believe that by 
ratifying the treaties the FRG was disposing of German territory. In other 
words, a large part of the population could envisage, whether or not this was the 
position legally, the loss of their original homes and lands, to which many still 
had hopes of returning - there were many organisations of "refugees" from
Pomerania, Silesia and East Prussia in the Eederal Republic, which served to 
keep such people in contact with one another, act as pressure groups - often to 
great effect - in  various spheres of public life , including the lobbying of 
Bundestag members, and also to keep alive a peculiar German nationalism 
bearing many similarities to the Drang Nach Qsten mentality. These 
organisations have lost much of their impetus and influence, as the original 
"refugees" have died, usually to be succeeded by children born in  the territory 
of the ERG, and therefore having a much weaker emotional connection, if  any 
at all, to the "homeland". In  the years 1970-1972, however, these organisations 
still possessed much influence, and of course, the question of recognising a 
Polish frontier on the Oder-Neisse line was just the kind of issue to inspire them 
in their work.
The second reason that the Resolution was necessary to secure ratification of 
the treaties was perhaps simpler - the evaporation of the Government’s majority 
in the Bundestag. This had always been slender, but a number of SPD Deputies 
resigned from the Party on the grounds that they could not accept the 
provisions of the treaties. The CDU/CSU was also opposed to the treaties,^  and so 
the Government had to make compromises in  order to achieve the consensus it 
desired. One consequence of this was the adoption of the Bundestag Resolution. 
Even so, the CDU/CSU did not vote for ratification of the treaties; its Members 
generally abstained, despite having been involved in the composition of the 
Resolution.4 The treaties were ratified, but rather than appearing to act with 
the genuine support of the electorate, it was obvious that, although there was 
substantial support for the treaties, they had been ratified because the
opposition, in  the form of the CDU/CSU, had been persuaded not to oppose the 
treaties, which was something much less than the desired national consensus.
It is evident, therefore, that the Bundestag Resolution is an instrument which 
came into existence, not by agreement of the ERG and Poland, or the ERG and the 
Soviet Union, during the negotiations prior to the signing of the Moscow and 
¥arsaw Treaties; rather it is the product of ¥est german political manouvering, 
not discussed on equal terms with the other States which would be most directly 
affected by it?  The fact that the Soviet Ambassador was present at the meeting 
of 9 May 1972, when agreement was reached on the text of the Resolution, does 
not mean that he took an active part in  the formulation of the Resolution. 
Although given the official Soviet international legal viewpoint, which is that 
“Germany" does not exist, that there are two German States - the GDR and ERG, 
and that the Oder-Neisse line was established by the Potsdam Agreement, it is 
surprising that agreement could be reached with regard to certain statements:
"The rights and responsibilities of the Eour Powers with regard to 
Berlin and Germany as a whole are not affected by the treaties."6 
"The treaties...do not create any legal foundation for the frontiers 
existing today."7
But it is even possible that the Soviet Union and the ERG would have been in  
complete agreement about these statements. The USSR could accept them 
because they are general enough in scope to accommodate the differing legal 
views of both sides. The ERG could make the latter statement because it has
consistently taken the opinion, along with the UK, USA and France, that the 
final settlement of the frontier between Poland and Germany must await the 
peace settlement8 The Soviet Union could agree to it, because it has generally - 
and always during the previous th irty years - taken the view that the issue of 
Poland’s western frontier, the Oder-Neisse line, was actually settled at Potsdam 
in  such a way that, were there to be any peace settlement, its only purpose as 
far as the frontiers of Poland are concerned would be to confirm what was, in  
the view of the USSR, decided at Potsdam, i.e., it envisages simply a “rubber 
stamp" procedure in this instance. It would therefore follow that the Moscow 
and Warsaw treaties would not be establishing a legal foundation for any 
frontier. Rather, they are regarded simply as confirming the status quo. As for 
Poland’s attitude, the following statement by one Polish writer shows that, 
officially at least, the issue was regarded as settled, as a non-issue in fact:
"Poland’s alliance with the Soviet Union and other Socialist countries 
is a sufficient guarantee of the lasting character of the fron tier.... 
and the security of this frontier raises no fear. Consequently, prior 
to the conclusion of the Treaty there was no "unsolved" or "contro­
versial" frontier problem in Polish-West German relations. There 
was only the problem of the attitude of the West German government 
to the established and existing western frontier of Poland ...“9
This statement is unconvincing. If  it is indeed true that the only problem 
was the attitude to Poland’s western frontier of the Federal Government, then 
Poland seems to have shown very little faith in its "alliance with the Soviet
Union and other Socialist countries", since it was prepared to enter into a treaty 
in which it would make concessions to the Federal Republic,^  simply in  order 
to remove that problem of the attitude of the Federal Government. I f  this 
problem of attitude was the only factor which caused concern to Poland, then 
the ratification procedure on the German side can only have strengthened any 
Polish misgivings about the way in  which the frontier issue was regarded in  the 
FRG. For, although Poland could indeed show to the world that the matter of its 
western frontier had been incorporated in a treaty with the FRG, the reality 
was that that treaty almost failed to get beyond the signature stage. Indeed, the 
problem with regard to the Gder-Neisse line was not the attitude of the ¥est 
Germany Government, which in  fact had been the driving force behind the 
campaign for ratification in the FRG. The real problem was that the Opposition, 
with the support of large segments of the population, was not prepared to give 
its approval to the ratification. It is therefore clear that, although ratification 
of the ¥arsaw and Moscow Treaties was finally achieved, this did not dispose of 
the problem of attitude in the FRG towards the Oder-Neisse line. If  Sulek is 
correct in  saying that Poland’s frontiers were secured by virtue of its alliance, 
and that the only outstanding issue was that of attitude, then in  fact the 
ratification of the ¥arsaw Treaty achieved nothing except to show that in  the 
FRG there still existed hostility towards the post 1945 territorial status quo. 
Contrary to the expressed opinions of both FRG and USSR, that the Moscow and 
¥arsaw Treaties do not create any legal foundation for the frontiers existing 
today, rather these instruments do have a legal effect on the Oder-Neisse line 
and therefore form part of the legal regime with regard to that border. If  the 
only purpose for Poland in concluding the ¥arsaw Treaty was to deal with the
opposition to the border of elements of ¥est German society, then it failed in its 
task and made needless concessions to the FRG in  agreeing to the emigration to 
Germany of Polish citizens of German origin.
The Bundestag Resolution was an instrument drawn up in order to placate 
¥est German opposition to the ¥arsaw and Moscow Treaties, thereby securing 
their ratification. However, while the Resolution solved that problem, it has 
unfortunately caused a number of legal controversies which might not 
otherwise have arisen. There is debate over whether the Resolution is a matter 
of internal importance only, i.e., for the FRG, or if  it has any influence on the 
¥arsaw and Moscow Treaties as envisaged in Article 31(2) (b) of the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties of 1969 (hereinafter referred to as the 
"Vienna Convention"). A number of Polish and ¥est German writers have 
expressed predictably opposite views with regard to this issue, and these w ill be 
discussed in  so far as they are relevant to clarifying the matter.
Related to the above issue is the necessity of considering official statements 
by Polish representatives with regard to the ¥arsaw Treaty and the extent to 
which, if  at all, the Resolution must be considered along with the treaty. Many 
statements have been made, rejecting the Resolution as an instrument related to 
the treaty and as a factor of importance in Polish-¥est German relations, in  
seemingly unequivocal language. However, these statements, to which, due to 
their status as official remarks made by senior Polish Government officials, 
importance must be attached, are seen to be equivocal in  substance in  that, 
while it is repeatedly stated that only the treaty itself can govern the relations
between Poland and FRG, there is little  evidence of the Bundestag Resolution 
being negated specifically by name. In light of the controversy related to the 
status of the Resolution, this lack of unequivocal negation perhaps detracts 
from the statements made by the Polish side, since a clear denunciation of the 
Resolution, which was never forthcoming, would appeal’ to have been desirable. 
These statements w ill be examined in order to see whether or not they actually 
exclude the Resolution from the sphere of Polish-¥est German relations.
There is one further possibility, which is that the Bundestag Resolution, in so 
far as it is concerned with the ¥arsaw Treaty (it also makes statements with 
regard to other issues, such as the membership of the FRG in  NATO,** relations 
between FRG and GDR,*^ and the relationship between the FRG and ¥est 
B e r l i n ) , * ^ d o e s  not add anything to the treaty, nor does it detract from it. Indeed, 
the Federal Government made this very point in its clarification of the 
Preamble of the Resolution, when it said:
"It alters nothing of the rights and duties resulting from the 
treaties and stands in  conformity with the spirit and letter of 
the treaties."**
If  the Federal Republic was simply emphasising in the Resolution that it is 
always possible to alter state frontiers by peaceful means, involving the freely 
given consent of the States concerned, which is a manifestation of the exercise 
of their soverign power, then other States could not reasonably object to such 
an innocuous expression of one of the rights of States. Indeed the FRG, USSR
and Poland all expressed the same opinions, only three years later, in  the 
Helsinki Final Act:
"They consider that their frontiers can be changed, in  accordance 
with international law, by peaceful means and by agreement."*^
However, this statement was made simultaneously by virtually every other 
European State, plus the USA and Canada, as one of a series of common 
statements concerning security in  Europe. The Bundestag Resolution, on the 
other hand, was a unilateral statement. It does not specifically provide that 
peaceful alteration of frontiers by common consent is possible, but this is 
implicit in  such statements as:
"The treaties proceed from the frontiers as actually existing today, 
the unilateral alteration of which they exclude."
(Paragraph 2 of the Resolution) and:
“In view of the fact that the final settlement of the German question 
as a whole is still outstanding..."
(paragraph 5).
As regards the first quotation, the exclusion of unilateral alteration of frontiers 
only indicates that bilateral or multilateral alteration would be permissible. As 
for the second, the consistently expressed view of the FRG has been that the 
German question can only be settled when there is one Government
representing the whole German people, i.e., when the present existing 
inner-German frontier has ceased to exist. As unilateral alteration of frontiers 
is excluded, this could only mean that the inner-German frontier may be 
removed by peaceful means, i.e., by consensus. Here, “alteration” is taken as 
including the total removal of a frontier. The German question also includes the 
issue of the Polish-German border. According to the FRG, this can only be 
settled finally in  a “peace settlement" - which has always been taken to mean, 
among the ¥estern Powers responsible for Germany as a whole, a peace treaty 
concluded between the coalition of the United Nations, on the one hand, and 
Germany on the other. This means therefore that the Polish frontier issue is 
still outstanding, being part of the “German question”, and may conceivably be 
altered from its present course at a peace settlement - which would constitute a 
change by peaceful means. ¥h y  should the FRG have gone to such lengths to 
express the obvious, which is that States may alter their frontiers by agreement 
and by peaceful means? It has already been pointed out that one purpose of the 
Bundestag Resolution was simply to secure ratification of the ¥arsaw and 
Moscow Treaties. But that does not mean that in the Resolution it should be 
necessary to include statements of the obvious. An alternative explanation is 
that the statements concerned may have constituted a substantive alteration of 
the provisions of the treaties with Poland and the USSR or, even if  they did not 
amount to such a change, may have been regarded by the FRG as having such 
effect. ¥h y  did the Resolution provoke such a strong reaction in Poland? It 
would seem that, even if  Poland did not consider the Resolution to have made 
any substantive alteration to the legal regime which had been established, it 
may have been concerned that if  it were seen to agree to the Resolution, this
might be construed as an admission on its part that the Resolution added or 
subtracted something from the terms of the ¥arsaw Treaty. In  any case, Poland 
found it necessary to emphasise that it attached prime importance to the treaty 
itself. However, there remains the problem that most denials of the relevance 
of the Resolution are at best implicit, which results as a consequence in the 
need to examine statements made with regard to the treaty itself, which is the 
context in which most of these statements were made.
There is no question of a lack of support for the Resolution in ¥est Germany. 
¥hen voting on the ratification Bills and the Resolution took place on 17 May, 
513 Members voted to adopt the Resolution. No votes were cast against it and 
there were only 5 abstentions .* ^
(ii) Applicability of the Resolution
The wording of the Resolution is such that it could have been regarded by 
Poland as a direct challenge to the apparent success it had scored in obtaining 
recognition by the ERG of the Oder-Neisse line as Poland’s western frontier. In  
particular. Paragraph 2 would have caused concern, as it provides:
“The treaties do not anticipate a settlement for Germany by 
peace treaty and do not create any legal foundation for the 
present existing frontiers."*?
It has already been observed that the USSR could agree that the Moscow and 
¥arsaw treaties did not "establish" any frontier. In  common with Poland, the
USSR held that the Oder-Neisse line was established legally at Potsdam. However, 
for Poland it was of importance that the FRG recognized the frontier. This was 
not simply a matter of attitude on the part of ¥est Germany. Poland regarded 
this recognition as having legal effects. Therefore, if  Poland’s interpretation of 
the action of the FRG was the correct one, it meant that the ¥arsaw Treaty would 
form part of the legal regime of the Oder-Neisse line, and would do so 
independently of whether or not this border was established, for the purposes 
of international law, in  the Potsdam Agreement.
The clarification of Paragraph 2 of the Bundestag Resolution did not offer 
comfort to Poland. ¥h ile  specifying that the FRG made no claim to alter borders, 
it ends with the ominous warning that, on the other hand, a reunified Germany 
would not be bound by the treaties with Poland and USSR. The Federal 
Chancellor, Herr Brandt, had attempted earHer to sweeten the p ill during a 
Bundestag debate when he "assured the Soviet and Polish Governments that the 
passage in  the Resolution in  which it was stated that the treaties created no legal 
basis for existing frontiers did not devalue the recognition of the Oder-Neisse 
frontier by the Federal Republic contained in the Moscow Treaty.”*^
Therefore, there is the problem of evaluating conflicting opinions as to the 
effect of two very important treaties, and the possible influence of a unilateral 
instrument, asserted by one side to have a direct connection with the treaties, 
while the other disputes its relevance to any part of the treaties. ¥hat 
relevance can the Resolution have for the Moscow and ¥arsaw Treaties? Here it 
is intended to consider mainly the ¥arsaw Treaty and any possible effect on the
status of the Oder-Neisse frontier.
There are two levels at which the issue should t>e considered: first, the 
general question, which involves the general law of treaties; to what extent 
may an instrument such as the Bundestag Resolution be considered along with 
the treaty to which it is supposed to be related, and what effect w ill it have on 
the treaty? Secondly, there is the specific issue of the applicability of this 
Resolution to the ¥arsaw Treaty.
As for the general problem of interpretation of treaties, this was discussed at 
great length and in detail by the International Law Commission (IL C ), which 
during the 1960’s prepared draft articles for a convention on the law of treaties. 
These articles formed the basis of the work of the United Nations Conference on 
the Law of Treaties, held in two sessions in  Vienna in  1968 and 1969. In  the 
Vienna Convention as it finally emerged, the interpretation of treaties is dealt 
with in Articles 31-33. including, in Article 31 (2) (bL provision for just the 
type of instrument as is the Bundestag Resolution. The treaty came into force in  
January, 1980. However, it does not have retroactive effect (Article 4). Nor are 
Poland and FRG as yet parties to the treaty, although the FRG is a signatory State. 
On the other hand, parts of the treaty are definitely to be regarded as 
constituting customary international law. Some are even mentioned by name in  
the P r e a m b l e ,  * 9 w h i l e  further on it is pointed out that the Convention has 
achieved both a "codification and progressive development of the law of 
treaties". Do the articles on interpretation of treaties, and in particular Article 
3J_(2)_(b), come under the heading of codification - and hence binding as
customary international law on both Poland and FRG - or are they part of the 
progressive development of the law of treaties?
If  the ¥est German, Arndt, is correct, the answer is clear. He claims, with 
regard to the Bundestag Resolution, that it is an "instrument related to the 
treaty" in the sense of Article 31(2)(b). He adds that, while neither of the 
signatories was a party to the Convention at the time, still "it was generally 
regarded in this respect as declaratory of existing law."2® However, there are 
weaknesses in his argument. The first one is that he cites no authority 
whatsoever in support or justification of what is a very serious claim, i.e., that 
Article 31(2)(b) was generally regarded as declaratory of pre-existing law. 
Arndt has been quoted because his statement highlights the problem of 
establishing the status of the articles on interpretation. This was indeed a 
contentious issue; some even expressed doubts as to whether any legal rules of 
interpretation existed at all, while others, though not questioning their actual 
existence, expressed doubts as to the extent of their legal effect. One member of 
the ILC who was most vehemently opposed to the theory that there were any 
legal rules of interpretation at all was Ruda (Argentina):
"He (Ruda) agreed with the Special Rapporteur (¥aldock) that, 
for the time being, the subject of the interpretation of treaties 
should find its place in the d raft... He considered that, at the 
present stage of development of international law, there did 
not as yet exist for States any obligatory rules on the subject of 
interpretation... At least, if  any rules existed, they were subject
to considerable doubt, except for the rule in  Claris non fit 
interpretation."2*
He then characterised as “progressive development" the inclusion of any rules 
on interpretation in the convention:
"Although he did not wish to imply that the Commission could 
not formulate any rules in the matter, he stressed that these rules 
would not constitute a codification of existing law; they would 
represent proposals for the progressive development of inter­
national law.”22
Ago (Italy) was much more enthusiastic about the inclusion in the convention 
of rules of interpretation. ¥h ile  not expressing an opinion as to whether any 
obligatory rules already existed, he strongly advocated the inclusion of certain 
rules in any convention on the law of treaties:
“The interpretation of treaties, however, was of capital importance 
for the Commission’s work and for the law of treaties in general... 
certainty of the law of treaties depended mainly on certainty of the 
rules of interpretation."2^
Waldock, the Special Rapporteur, deals with the question of the existence of 
rules of interpretation in his Report no. Ill, Section I I I 2<* He also discusses the 
debate over whether any rules of interpretation even exist and what purpose
any such rules might serve. Waldock in the end also comes to conclusions about 
the general nature of the rules of interpretation. These do not support the view 
that there are any rules of interpretation with the exalted status of customary 
international law. He says (Paragraph 6):
"In short, it would be possible to find sufficient evidence of recourse 
to these principles and maxims in international practice to justify 
their inclusion in a codification of the law of treaties, if  the question 
were simply one of their relevance on the international plane. But 
...the question posed by many jurists is rather as to the non-obligatory 
character of many of these principles and maxims; and it is a question 
which arises in national systems of law no less than in  international 
law. They are, for the most part, principles of logic and good sense 
valuable only as guides to assist in appreciating the meaning which 
the parties may have intended to attach to the expressions which they 
employed in a document.
...recourse to many of these principles is discretionary rather than 
obligatory, and the interpretation of documents is to some extent an 
art, not an exact science."2^
This passage is very important. It was adopted by the ILC as part of its 
commentary on the Draft Articles on interpretation (and other treaty related 
issues) at its 18th Session, and may also be found in the Official Records - 
Documents of the Vienna Conference. Waldock clearly dispels the notion that 
there are precise, definite rules to which reference may be made when
interpreting treaties. Even if  the type of instrument referred to in Article 
31_(2)_(b) - an instrument made by one or more parties in connection with the 
conclusion of the treaty and accepted by the other parties as an instrument 
related to the treaty - could be regarded as “a principle of logic and good sense", 
that is not enough to accord it the status of international law. It has never been 
a requirement of any rule that, to constitute part of the body of international 
law, it must be logical and make good sense. If  this were the case, the existing 
body of public international law might substantially be reduced.
There is jurisprudence of the International Court of Justice dealing with 
agreed statements and understandings as to the meaning of provisions reached 
prior to the conclusion of a treaty. Waldock discusses this in  Paragraph 19 of 
the same Report, in  order to decide whether such statements and 
understandings are to be considered as part of the context for the purpose of 
interpreting a treaty, or as part of the travaux preparatoires. in  which case 
according to the Vienna Convention they would be relegated to the status of 
supplementary means of interpretation. Waldock quoted two cases in  which 
opposite views were taken by the Court: the Conditions of Admission to
Membership Caseffi and the Ambatielos C a s e and took the view that the latter 
case, in  so far as it was relevant to the rules of interpretation, should be 
preferred to the former. In  the Admissions Case, the Court said (p.63) that it 
considered the text of the actual treaty in question - the Charter of the United 
Nations - to be sufficiently clear and that therefore there was no need for resort 
to any preparatory work. Since the Court distinguished between the actual text 
of the treaty and travaux preparatoires, it must be assumed that any instrument
preceding the conclusion of the treaty and not actually part of the treaty text 
would be considered simply as travaux preparatoires. to which the Court in  that 
case was not prepared to make reference.
However, in  a joint dissenting opinion. Judges McNair, Read, Winiarski and 
Basdevant declared:
"Without wishing to embark upon a general examination and assess­
ment of the value of resorting to travaux preparatoires in  the 
interpretation of treaties, it must be admitted that if  ever there is a 
case in which this practice is justified it is when those who negotiated 
the treaty have embodied in an interpretative resolution or some 
similar provision their precise intentions regarding the meaning 
attached by them to a particular article of the treaty."2®
The Vienna Convention distinguishes between travaux preparatoires. which 
according to Article 32 are merely supplementary means of interpretation, and 
agreements or instruments related to the treaty, which have a higher status, 
while in  the above extract no such distinction is made. However, in  the 
Admissions Case, the Court had defined everything as travaux preparatoires 
which was not part of the actual text of the treaty, and the dissenting opinion 
should be read in this context. So, while an interpretative resolution could be 
regarded in 1948 as part of the travaux preparatoires in light of the opinion 
given by the Court, the views of the dissenting judges are still of relevance 
because they show that an instrument such as the Bundestag Resolution may
have an important effect on the treaty with which it is connected.
The Ambatielos Case29 in  effect follows the joint dissenting opinion as quoted 
above, but goes further, to the point where the judgment resembles, as regards 
interpretation, the provisions of the Vienna Convention. The joint dissenting 
opinion in  the Admissions Case refers to an interpretative resolution with 
regard to a particular part of a treaty as being still part of the travaux 
preparatoires. The Court in  the Ambatielos Case, discussing a declaration agreed 
upon by the UK and Greece with regard to a treaty entered into by the two 
States, said:
"...the provisions of the Declaration are in the nature of an inter­
pretation clause, and, as such, should be regarded as an integral 
part of the Treaty, even if  this was not stated in terms."3°
Here there is clear expression in favour of regarding as integral to the treaty 
instruments such as the Bundestag Resolution, always assuming that these have 
been agreed upon by the parties. This is of course not necessarily the case with 
regard to that Resolution. However, while this ruling is clear, it should be 
remembered that, as Waldock said, it was contrary to the views expressed in  the 
Advisory Opinion on Admission to the United Nations. So the legal position was 
not clear, though Article 31(2) of the Vienna Convention does follow the 
Ambatielos Case in including in the context of a treaty for purposes of 
interpretation agreements related to the treaty and drawn up in connection 
with its conclusion, and therefore it is clear that the States participating in the
Conference were in favour of the provision. Article 31. on the general rule of 
interpretation, which had been Draft Article 27, was adopted at the Conference 
by 91 votes to none.^ *
The States participants were clearly in  favour of including Article 31(2) 
-type instruments in the context of the treaty, but it must be emphasized that, as 
far as unilateral instruments were concerned, these would have, in  a bilateral 
treaty, to be accepted by the other party before they could have any effect. This 
was also discussed by the ILC; both with regard to the general concept of the 
provision and its actual wording. Tunkin (USSR), referring to the provision 
which became Article 31(2)(b). said he agreed about the relevance of any 
instrument annexed to the treaty, but wondered what was meant by a "related 
instrument":
"A party to a treaty might draw up a document in connection with 
the conclusion of the treaty. Surely, if  such a document was purely 
unilateral it should not be taken into account in  the interpretation 
of the treaty."^2
Waldock explained his reference to related instruments. He said that when a 
treaty was concluded, certain documents were frequently drawn up which, for 
the purposes of interpretation, were regarded as part of the treaty.^ The 
Bundestag Resolution would conform to Waldock's description and therefore 
form part of the treaty with regard to interpretation, if  the provision was 
applicable between the FRG and Poland, and if  Poland accepted the Resolution.
Rosenne (Israel) made much the same point as Tunkin, but drew attention 
also to the problem of confusion of the domestic and international aspects of 
treaty making. He said a situation might arise where there could be a unilateral 
understanding on the meaning of a treaty by the United States Senate that was 
not always accepted by the other side.
”A purely unilateral interpretative statement of that kind made in  
connection with the conclusion of a treaty could not bind the parties."®*
All of those who commented on instruments related to the treaty emphasized the 
non-binding character of any unilateral statement not accepted by the other 
party or parties to the treaty. Waldock gave the best explanation of future 
Article 31 (2). He repeats that the instrument must be made in connection with 
the conclusion of the treaty and be thus accepted by the other parties to the 
treaty. Waldock gave the best explanation of future Article 31(2). He repeats 
that the instrument must be made in connection with the conclusion of the 
treaty and be thus accepted by the other parties. He then adds:
“...the fact that these two classes of documents are recognized in  
para.2 as forming part of the "context" does not mean that they are 
necessarily to be considered as an integral part of the treaty. Whether 
they are an actual part of the treaty depends on the intention of the 
parties in each case. What is proposed in para.2 is that, for purposes 
of interpreting the treaty, these categories of documents should not be
interpreted as mere evidence to which recourse may be had for the 
purpose of resolving an ambiguity or obscurity but as part of the 
context for the purpose of arriving at the ordinary meaning of the 
terms of the treaty.”®®
Waldock maintains the possibility of separating the related instrument from the 
treaty itself, while admitting the value of such instruments where agreed upon 
by all the parties. Nevertheless, the fact that such instruments should not 
necessarily be considered as integral parts of the treaty indicates that the treaty 
is still the main element in  relations between States, although this may be 
altered by the different intentions of States involved in a particular treaty.
The conclusion to be drawn with regard to the legal status of instruments 
related to treaties as envisaged in Article 31(2)(b) of the Vienna Convention, 
according to the attitudes of States participating in the Vienna Conference, the 
work of the ILC in this area, and especially the relevant work of Waldock (who 
had examined the relevant jurisprudence), and the opinion of the Court in  the 
Ambatielos Case, is that though rules of interpretation do exist, their status as 
rules of general (customary) law is debatable. Once incorporated into a treaty, 
their binding force for the contracting parties is beyond doubt.®® Apart from 
this, and to the extent that any rules of interpretation may have legal validity, 
one of these rules is that an instrument related to a treaty may be referred to by 
the parties in order to interpret that treaty, as long as the instrument has been 
accepted by all of the parties to the treaty. Given the debate in the ILC over the 
status of all rules of interpretation and the conflicting case law, the "rule” about
related instruments cannot be regarded as having the force of customary 
international law. This means that, even if  Poland is found to have accepted it, 
the Resolution w ill not necessarily have the effect which is described in  the 
Vienna Convention, since, even if  Poland was a party to it, it does not have 
retroactive effect.
Neither Poland nor FRG are parties to the Convention, and so at the most it 
can act as a guide in any attempt to establish the status of the Resolution with 
regard to the Warsaw Treaty. While a large majority of States participated in  the 
Vienna Conference, most are not yet parties to the Convention.®  ^ They can 
therefore be bound by it only to the extent that it represents a codification of 
customary international law, that is, where States, prior to the adoption of the 
Convention, had habitually acted or refrained from acting in their 
international relations in the same way in similar situations because they felt 
that they were under a legal obligation so to act or refrain from acting, in  an 
area which would be covered by the Vienna Convention.®8 The Preamble of the 
Convention itself declares that certain principles with regard to the law of 
treaties are universally recognized, and it is often written that in many respects 
the convention was declaratory of customary international law,®® but it is clear 
from the travaux preparatoires - the work of the ILC and the Reports of Waldock 
- that the same status was not attributed to the articles on interpretation of 
treaties. It is not sufficient to say that these articles, and in particular Article 
3i_(2)_(b),. are bound to govern the treaty relations between States. This 
provision cannot automatically govern relations between Poland and the 
Federal Republic of Germany. This particular question is of course separate
from the issue of whether or not Poland did actually accept the Bundestag 
Resolution for any purpose at all. But it has been necessary because of the 
existence of contrary opinions,*® to analyse the status of the articles on 
interpretation.
The Resolution is not automatically excluded from the treaty relationship 
between Poland and ERG, but it is necessary to examine the attitude of Poland in  
order to see what significance, if  any, it attached to the Resolution. If  Article 
3A_(2)_(b)_ did apply, and Poland had accepted the Resolution, it would of course 
have legal effect and the attitude of Poland as a consequence would not have so 
much importance. As this provision is not applicable, a close examination of 
Poland’s actions with regard to the Resolution is crucial.
Those parts of the Vienna Convention dealing with interpretation were 
acceptable to most States. They were adopted by unanimous vote,** but this does 
not imply that the States participants regarded these articles as declaratory of 
customary international law. They could have been voting for development of 
the rules as prescribed in the convention, so that they would acquire through 
the treaty binding authority with regard to interpretation of future treaties, an 
authority which until then had been lacking. This would be in  accordance with 
the evidence as already discussed.
(iii) State Practice with regard to the Bundestag Resolution.
The ERG supposedly adopted the Bundestag Resolution as a measure related to
its bilateral treaties with the Soviet Union and Poland. It could be expected that 
those two States, being most directly affected, would have been presented with 
the Resolution as quickly as possible in  view of the desire of all three 
Governments to obtain ratification of the treaties. The Soviet Ambassador to the 
ERG did participate in  some of the negotiations which took place among the 
main political parties in the ERG prior to final agreement being reached with 
regard to the text of the Resolution. To that extent, it may be presumed that the 
Soviet Union was also informed about developments. In fact, the Soviet Union 
received a copy of the Resolution from the ERG, as did the UK, USA and Erance,*2 
but there is no record of Poland having been notified officially by the ERG 
about the existence of this document and its relationship to the Warsaw and 
Moscow Treaties. It seems that the ERG was more concerned, although it was 
acting fu lly within its authority, to keep the Eour Powers fu lly informed about 
its treaty practice, than to keep its treaty partners informed. It has been 
asserted that the Resolution was presented to Poland, but the writer cited no 
authority in support of his claim.*® There do exist, on the other hand, various 
statements made by representatives of Poland which are relevant to this issue. 
These were made both prior to and after the adoption of the Resolution. The 
Polish Eoreign Minister, in  a speech to the Polish Parliament on 27 April 1972, 
said:
"I should like to stress that the treaty constitutes the only acceptable 
platform for our relations with the German Eederal Republic. We are 
interested in its entry into force, and are prepared to carry out its 
provisions in good faith. In  consistence with Article I I I  of the treaty,
we w ill take further steps aimed at expanding cooperation and fu ll 
normalization of relations with the German Federal Republic.
But we shall never agree to take up any negotiations, with anybody, 
which would aim at weakening or undermining the provisions of this 
treaty."^
The most important part of this extract is the statement that the treaty 
constitutes the only acceptable platform for Polish-West German relations, a 
clear warning that any attempt by the FRG to base the relationship of the two 
States on any other foundation would be rejected. Although Olszowski spoke in  
very general terms, it is unlikely that he would have known almost one month 
in  advance that a Resolution of the kind adopted would come into existence. 
Nevertheless, he stated the Polish position and this would have been drawn to 
the attention of the Federal German Government. The extract should also be 
considered in the context of the whole speech, which was a summary of the 
stand of the Polish Government with regard to the Treaty^ and an estimation 
by the Foreign Minister of the significance of the Treaty, both for the two States 
and for the general situation in Europe. The speech was made in  view of the 
impending ratification of the Warsaw and Moscow Treaties and this ratification 
was considered to be crucial. The history of Polish-German relations - as 
interpreted by the Polish Government - was briefly summarised, and, regardless 
of the approach any individual takes to the history of Poland, it is clear that one 
of the most significant factors has been the status and position of that country's 
borders. Thus Poland wanted to have secure frontiers, at least nominally. It had 
already entered into agreements with the USSR and GDR with regard to its
frontiers, end the treaty with the FRG meant the recognition by that State of the 
Oder-Neisse line as the western frontier of Poland.
A measure of the insecurity felt in  Poland with regard to its possession of the 
territories which it gained, or recovered, in 1945, is the frequency with which 
the leitmotif of “security" (bezpieczenstwo) recurs in the speech. It is 
emphasized that Poland demands recognition by the FRG of the Oder-Neisse line 
- not because of any threat to the security of the frontier - as usual we are 
informed that these frontiers are sufficiently protected by the might of the 
USSR and the Socialist community^ (whether they are sufficiently protected 
from the might of the USSR the Minister made no comment). Rather, only such 
recognition by the FRG could, in  Poland’s view, provide a genuine basis for the 
normalisation. In  this context, mention is also made of the occasions when 
Poland’s borders have been under attack, even when Poland has ceased to exist 
as a State. It is emphasized that the treaty w ill contribute also to a more 
generally secure system in  Europe. Yet, had Poland genuinely felt so secure due 
to the protection of the Soviet Union, it would not have needed to enter into a 
Treaty with the FRG for the reasons stated, as such recognition by the FRG had 
no practical effect on Poland’s control over the disputed territories. It had 
possessed at least de facto control since 1945 snd there had been no attempt by 
any of the Western Powers or the FRG to alter this state of affairs, except for 
regular reiterations of the view that a final decision with regard to Poland's 
western frontier should be made at a peace settlement involving the 
participation of one government for a united Germany. There had also been 
threats against the Oder-Neisse line by Poland’s allies. In particular, there was
some pressure for the return to the Germans (i.e. to the GDR) of 
Szczecin (Stettin). By reaching an agreement with the FRG, Poland also made it 
more difficult for the USSR to exploit Polish feelings of insecurity, in  the event 
of Poland becoming less dependent upon the USSR, by pointing out the potential 
danger from the Federal Republic were Poland to loosen its connections with 
the East. As Poland had its own bilateral treaty with the FRG, it reduced the 
scope of the USSR for independent discussions with the FRG (since Poland was 
dependent on the USSR for the security of its frontier, the USSR could always 
threaten to open negotiations with regard to Germany as a whole with the FRG, 
GDR or the Western Powers, which could obviously be detrimental to Poland). 
Although it was not in a position to say as much, it is nevertheless true that by 
entering into the Warsaw Treaty, Poland reduced the scope for the exertion of 
such pressures.
The recognition of the Oder-Neisse line was seen as eliminating another 
possible source of future conflicts and consolidating peace in Europe. But if  
Poland genuinely felt that the USSR protected its frontiers, it would have had 
little to fear in the 1970’s, from even the most militaristic West German 
Government. On the other hand, i f  any State is desirous of altering the frontiers 
of Poland, and it possesses the m ilitary capacity to do so, it is unlikely that 
Poland’s treaties with the USSR, GDR and FRG, the only States with a direct 
interest in the western and eastern Polish borders, would protect it from them. 
This does not constitute a denial of the possibility that Poland demanded 
recognition of the Oder-Neisse line in order to obtain a real basis for 
normalisation of relations with the FRG. However, contrary to the impression
which Olszowski sought to communicate, the matter of Poland’s security with 
regard to the FRG was a consideration taken into account by the Polish side, 
though it claimed to enjoy fu ll security through its alliance with the Socialist 
countries. Indeed, the claim which subsequently appeared in the Bundestag 
Resolution, that a reunified Germany would not be bound by the treaty, could 
certainly have been interpreted in  Poland as a threat to the security of the 
State.
Another aspect of this speech is relevant with regard to the Bundestag 
Resolution. Poland demanded the recognition of the Oder-Neisse line by the FRG 
in unambiguous terms and this is to be found in Article 1 of the Warsaw Treaty. 
However, the Resolution of 17th May then purports to attach a specific 
interpretation to the treaty. If  it does not alter in  any way the effect of the 
treaty, why was the Resolution adopted? If  it was adopted purely in order to 
placate the Opposition and obtain ratification of the treaties, then it means that, 
at least in the FRG, the Resolution was seen as effecting substantive alterations 
to the treaties - if  not, there would have been no reason to adopt it. Why else 
would it have almost universal support in the Bundestag? The speech by 
Olszowski emphasized the importance of the treaty as it stood, in  particular the 
provisions of Article 1 The consequence of this is that, taking into account the 
compromises made by both sides with regard to the treaty^ and the complicated 
negotiations which were required in  order to reach a consensus, there was very 
little likelihood of the Resolution being acceptable to Poland.
Two days after the Resolution was adopted, further official Polish comment
with regard to the Warsaw Treaty and its ratification was forthcoming. The 
Politburo issued a communique which reiterated the Polish stance, i.e., that only 
the text of the treaty itself could be binding on the parties/*8 It was further 
stated that :
“The fundamental obligations contained in the treaty between Poland 
and the FRG conform to the provisions of the Potsdam Agreement, in  
that they deal with the recognition of the western frontier of Poland 
on the Oder and Lusatian Neisse as inviolable and final. Only on such 
a basis was the normalisation of relations between Poland and the FRG 
possible."^
This remark contains two elements: a statement of the Polish evaluation of the 
effect of the Potsdam Agreement, which is not generally accepted by the Federal 
Republic and the three Western Powers; and the fact that Poland could only 
agree to normalisation of relations based upon the Warsaw Treaty. That is, any 
other instrument purporting to affect the normalisation would not be relevant.
Therefore, there is clear evidence that Poland did not accept the Resolution as 
having any legal effect on Polish-West German relations. There are repeated 
statements that in  this respect only the Warsaw Treaty itself can be of binding 
force; if  this is the correct position, then any debate as to the legal status of the 
provisions of the Vienna Convention with regal'd to the interpretation of 
treaties is of less significance; if  the Resolution is not applicable, then it is not 
necessary to consider its influence upon the Treaty, since it can have none.
However, any potential effect of the Resolution w ill be considered, in  order to 
foresee whether Polish-¥est German relations would be altered substantively in  
the legal sense. This is of importance because, even if  the Resolution is not a 
valid instrument, i.e. part of the legal relationship between Poland and the ERG, 
the fact that it is considered in  the ERG as an instrument relevant to Polish-¥est 
German relations means that that State w ill act as if  the Resolution is valid.
There is one element of doubt in the attitude of the Polish side. ¥h ile  the 
Treaty is repeatedly regarded as the only valid basis for the relations between 
the two States, the Bundestag Resolution is not rejected unequivocally. This 
would have been impossible prior to the adoption of the Resolution; it is not 
feasible to deny the validity of a specific instrument before it has even come 
into existence, and therefore the statement by Olszowski of 27 April 1972 is the 
most that could have been expected in the circumstances. However, the 
Communique of 19 May, issued only two days subsequent to the adoption of the 
Resolution, is also silent with regard to it. There is at best only an im plicit 
denial, which is nevertheless a denial. In  these circumstances, however, it 
would have made the issue clear were Poland to have made an unambiguous 
rejection of the terms of the Resolution, yet such a statement was not 
immediately forthcoming. However, there are two factors which justify the 
failure of Poland to reject in  unequivocal terms the applicability of the 
Resolution. Eirst, Poland had not been informed officially of its existence (see 
p.75), and there was no reason for it to comment on something which, for 
Poland, possessed no official existence. Second, given that Poland was not 
officially informed about the adoption of the Resolution, it might have appeared
that Poland was attributing greater value to the instrument than it cared to 
admit were it to have issued a condemnation of the actions of the Bundestag and 
a clear rejection of the Resolution. Thus, Poland was in the position of wishing 
to emphasize the legal state of relations between itself and the ERG, while 
avoiding any implication that it accepted the Resolution, which for Poland did 
not even possess any official existence. In this situation, an emphasis on the 
relevance of the ¥arsaw Treaty alone, which simultaneously denied by 
implication the applicability of any other factor, was perhaps the most effective 
way for Poland to reiterate its position while reserving its rights. The 
Bundestag Resolution is mentioned by name in yet another speech by Eoreign 
Minister Olszowski:
"..no reservation contained in the unilateral Bundestag Resolution 
- from the point of view of international law and the obligations 
resulting from the treaty - has any force under international law.
However, even this statement is not an explicit denial of the effect of the 
Resolution, but rather a denial of any reservations in the Resolution. Olszowski 
does not mention which parts he considers to be reservations - but he does not 
describe the Polish attitude with regard to those elements in the Resolution 
which are not regarded as reservations; but the Resolution is also described as 
"unilateral" - a clear indication that it was not accepted by Poland, regardless of 
whether it was even presented to that State, since, if  Poland had accepted it, the 
Resolution would no longer by unilateral in character, but part of the legal 
relationship between Poland and the ERG, i.e., bilateral.
On the evidence of official Polish statements, the clear conclusion is that in  
fact Poland did not regard the Resolution as having any legal effect on its 
relations with the ERG. Nor is there evidence that the Resolution was actually 
presented to Poland and, if  it had been, that Poland accepted it. Poland did not 
totally reject the Resolution in unequivocal terms, but it would appear that, 
while such rejection might have been desirable in order to remove all doubts, 
had such a manner of rejection been employed, Poland may have appeared to be 
attributing greater significance to the Resolution than it was in fact prepared to 
concede. The Bundestag Resolution "...expresses the political opinions of leading 
representatives of ¥est Germany and is a matter internal to that country. It 
has, of course, no legal standing, either as regards interpretation of legal 
sources or auxiliary legal sources, without any links with international law."^1 
Eurthermore, this writer shares the view of Professor Skubiszewski, that "the 
resolution is neither an authoritative (binding) interpretation of the 
Bonn-¥arsaw Treaty nor does it constitute part of the context for its 
interpretation. Eor Poland rejected the idea of an interpretative instrument 
that would supplement the Treaty and she declared that the Treaty was the only 
acceptable basis for her relations with the Eederal Republic of Germany."^ The 
interpretation of the ¥arsaw Treaty given in the Bundestag Resolution is not 
the authentic interpretation agreed upon by the two sides; it is the unilateral 
interpretation of the ERG 53
In  any case, the actual text of the Resolution w ill be examined in order to see 
if  it would have any effect on the legal status of Polish-¥est German relations or
the legal status of the Oder-Neisse line, were it applicable to them; since, if  it 
should be established that the Resolution actually would alter nothing, i.e., that 
it would have no legal effects, then even the question of Poland's acceptance or 
rejection would be of less importance. Poland could not formally intimate to the 
ERG its rejection of the Resolution, since it did not receive it, though it did make 
its position clear in its statements at the time, as discussed above. Eor a 
unilateral document proposed by one party in a bilateral treaty to have effect, it 
must be accepted by the second party.^ The ¥arsaw Treaty is not a boundary 
treaty, but it does deal with boundaries. One of the main purposes of regulating 
boundaries in treaties is to establish finality and stability,^ and if  the ¥arsaw 
Treaty is read alone, it is clear that the ERG has recognized the Oder-Neisse line 
as the western frontier of Poland - though it does not stipulate that it is the 
border between Poland and Germany. The assertion in Paragraph 2 of  the 
Resolution, that the treaties with Poland and the USSR do not create any legal 
foundation for the existing frontiers, does not add in  anyway to the finality and 
stability of the Oder-Neisse line and was one of the most unacceptable aspects of 
the Resolution for the Polish side.
(iv ) The Substantive Provisions of the Bundestag Resolution
Although the Resolution was drawn up in  connection with the ¥arsaw and 
Moscow Treaties, it would be wrong to assume that its provisions are concerned 
only with the relationship between ERG, on the one hand, and Poland and the 
Soviet Union on the other - although the development of these relationships 
was the cause of the Resolution coming into existence. Rather, it resembles a
general statement of the foreign policy of the Federal Republic with regard to a 
number of States and it includes general declarations about the membership of 
the ERG in various international organisations. There are ten paragraphs, and 
only in the first six is mention made of the treaties with Poland and the USSR. 
The Resolution should be read in conjunction with the clarification of it issued 
by the Eederal Government on 19th May.^ This takes the form of specific and 
separate statements with regard to the preamble and each of the ten 
paragraphs. The commentary on the preamble is the longest single section, 
and provides, in  part:
"The joint Resolution...services the object of dispelling any still- 
existing doubts with regard to the treaties with Moscow and Warsaw; 
and through this to ensure for these important treaties a wide 
parliamentary approval. It alters nothing of the rights and duties 
resulting from the treaties and stands in conformity with the spirit 
and letter of the treaties."^
The Eederal Government is admitting that the purpose of the Resolution is to 
obtain support from parliament. In fact, it failed in  this objective, as most 
members of the CDU/CSU abstained in the ratification vote on the treaties. What 
actually occurred, was that by adopting the Resolution, widespread disapproval 
was avoided. So, although the treaties were ratified, the Resolution maybe said 
to have achieved at most one of the two objects which it was intended to have - 
ratification without the comprehensive support that was envisaged. Nor can it 
have been sufficient to dispel all doubts, since, if  this had occurred the treaties'
wider support would have been reflected in the vote, with a much higher count 
in favour.
If  the Resolution alters nothing of the rights and duties resulting from the 
Warsaw Treaty, as is asserted, then it is unclear why Poland should have insisted 
that only the Treaty itself was valid. It is suggested that this position was taken 
by Poland, not only to maintain its position that it had not even been notified of 
the Resolution's existence - as Poland did not acknowledge the official validity of 
the document, it could not do so by implication as this would have weakened its 
position - but Poland was still aware of the document, and may also have 
regarded it as altering substantively its treaty with ERG. If  the Resolution had 
really been seen as altering nothing of the treaties, then it might have been 
simpler for the Federal Government to make it clear that the Resolution was 
purely for domestic political purposes and to emphasize that only the treaties 
were relevant in  terms of international law. If  the Resolution was not 
considered in  the ERG as having any legal effect on the treaties, why was it 
acceptable to almost all members of the Bundestag? After all, all of the contents 
of the Resolution, in  so far as they were relevant to the treaties, would have 
been implied in  the treaties, and in particular in Article IV of the Warsaw 
Treaty:
"The present Treaty shall not affect any bilateral or multi­
lateral international agreements previously concluded by 
either Contracting Party or concerning them.”^
This means that instruments such as the Potsdam Agreement, to which neither 
Poland nor FRG was a party, would still apply in  their entirety and that either 
side could maintain its own interpretation of the legal effects resulting from 
them.
The corresponding provision of the Moscow Treaty, also Article 4 is almost 
identical, except that there is no mention of treaties or arrangements 
"concerning" the two States, as opposed to those to which they are parties. This 
means that the terms of the Warsaw Treaty itself, as far as relations between 
Poland and West Germany were concerned, did not require further elaboration, 
unless this was to indicate something not apparent in  the Text. For example. 
Paragraphs 4 and 7 of the Resolution, which deal, first, with relations between 
the FRG and the Four Powers as defined in the conventions of 1954 and 1955, and 
second, the membership of FRG in  NATO, are both clearly included in the ambit 
of Article IV. Paragraph 10, on the other hand, is simply a statement of policy 
with regard to the GDR and has no legal effect on the relationship with Poland.
However, it is possible that the Resolution, had it been accepted by Poland, 
might have altered the legal effect of the treaty, and this would explain why it 
was acceptable to the Bundestag. Thus in  Paragraph 2, it is stated that the 
treaties do not create any legal foundation for the frontiers existing today. It is 
already established that Poland would not have agreed to enter into a treaty on 
the normalisation of its relations with FRG without the recognition by the latter 
State of the Oder-Neisse line. To claim that the Warsaw Treaty establishes no 
legal foundation for the western frontier of Poland is to introduce an element of
doubt into an apparently clear text, because, although that border is not 
dependent upon the 1970 Treaty for its legality, nevertheless that treaty does 
have legal effects, including Article L which deals with the frontier issue. At 
the very least, the treaty creates the legal foundation for the recognition by 
the FRG of the Oder-Neisse line. If  this appears to be a statement of the obvious, 
it might also be argued that in  Paragraph 2, the FRG is seeking to deny the 
obvious; despite its assertions to the contrary, the Resolution would cause a 
change in the legal effect of the Warsaw Treaty. The FRG cannot claim that in  
recognizing the frontier, no legal consequences occurred for the legal 
foundation of that frontier, given that the FRG had disputed the validity of that 
frontier consistently in  conjunction with the Western Powers, and arguably 
had an interest, albeit of a tenuous nature, in  territory which had been German 
and which, if  the West German interpretation of the Potsdam Agreement were 
accepted, could potentially revert to a reunified Germany at a peace settlement. 
Poland could also have accepted the Resolution, had it regarded that instrument 
as in no way weakening its position; the fact that Poland considered only the 
treaty to be valid shows its attitude, although even if  Poland had regarded the 
Resolution as innocuous, it might still have refused to consider it as relevant, 
taking the view that the w ill of the parties had already been expressed jointly in  
the treaty.
Another aspect of the Resolution which would have caused many doubts 
about the motives of the FRG is the use of the term modus vivendi in  Paragraph 
I. This was discussed earlier (Chapter Two, pp. 33-34). Normalization of 
relations, if  regarded merely as a modus vivendi is not in  fact normalization, it
is a temporary change in one aspect of the foreign policy of the ERG. That State 
does not describe its relations with its western allies as part of a modus vivendi 
yet if  there were to be alteration in the legal and political status of the two 
German States, the relationship between the ERG and those States with which in  
theory it is on the best terms (and in fact with all States) would be affected in  
the same ways. In  Paragraphs 7 and 8, the ERG reaffirms its commitment to two 
international organisations - NATO and the EEC - yet its membership of these 
organisations could also be described as part of a modus vivendi for West 
Germany, though it is not.
However, as far as Poland is concerned, taking into account its insistence on 
reaching agreement on the Oder-Neisse line as an essential step towards placing 
mutual relations with the FRG on a treaty basis. Paragraph 2 is the most 
important. The clarification of this paragraph says that the frontiers may be 
altered only with the agreement of the other side; it envisages the possibility of 
peaceful change of frontiers, that is, with the consent of the States involved. 
Any State may in such circumstances alter its frontiers. The crucial element is 
that any alteration must be peaceful, rather an unlikely eventuality in  central 
Europe. The Warsaw and Moscow Treaties say that the existing frontiers in  
Europe are inviolable,^ although one view is that they exclude even peaceful 
change of frontiers:
"The provisions on the inviolability of the frontier and territorial 
integrity are supplemented by the declaration of the Federal Republic 
that she has "no territorial claims against anybody nor w ill assert such
claims in  the future" (Treaty with the Soviet Union, Art. 3). Thus no 
modification of the frontier comes into account t>y any method, 
including peaceful change.”^
But it is possible that States may agree to alter their frontiers without one 
making any claim against the other, since a claim implies a belief that there 
exists an entitlement to the thing claimed. Any alteration in frontiers may be 
regarded as an exchange of territory - and here only land borders are under 
consideration. Thus, under the Berlin Quadripartite Agreement of 1971, 
provision was made for minor exchanges of territory between West Berlin and 
the G D R O n e  such exchange involved Steinstucken, an enclave of Western 
occupied territory which was separated by the territory of the GDR from West 
Berlin proper. This exchange took place without either side making any claims 
against the other, apart from the usual differences in opinion with regard to 
the question of Berlin, or West Berlin. Therefore, it is respectfully suggested 
that it is not entirely accurate to say that all possibility of peaceful change of 
frontiers is excluded by the Moscow and Warsaw Treaties. Certainly all claims 
are excluded as far as the ERG is concerned, since it admits that it has none, but 
it would still be possible, legally for the ERG to be involved in a peaceful change 
of frontiers, through exchange of territories, though not without at least the 
consent of the three Western Powers and perhaps also the Soviet Union. In  
practice, this is unlikely; any "offer" in the context of Polish-German history 
would be based upon a feeling that there was some entitlement to the territory 
at stake. Thus, it is theoretically possible for the FRG to be involved in peaceful 
changes in the frontiers in central Europe.
In  view of the conclusion that Paragraph 2 of  the Resolution would alter the 
effect of the Warsaw Treaty with regard to the legal status of the Oder-Neisse 
line, the statement in  the clarification of the Preamble of the Resolution, that it 
“stands in conformity with the spirit and letter of the treaties", is incorrect. 
The conclusion is that, had Poland accepted the Resolution, it would by its 
acceptance have brought about a substantive legal change in the effect of the 
treaty, meaning that the recognition accorded to the western frontier of Poland 
by the Eederal Republic would have been, at least, highly dubious and certainly 
not conducive to making Poland feel that it had secure frontiers. The Federal 
Republic may indeed consider the Resolution to reflect its legal attitude towards 
the Oder-Neisse line. However, as the Resolution is not applicable in its legal 
relationship with Poland, it can have effect only in the Federal Republic. At the 
international level, the only relevant instrument is the Warsaw Treaty, which is 
perfectly clear in stating that the Oder-Neisse line constitutes the western 
frontier of Poland. And while there was much debate about the status of rules of 
interpretation of treaties when the ILC was doing the groundwork for the 
Vienna Convention, even the most doubting member accepted that there could 
be no question of interpretation where the sense was clear and there was 
nothing to interpret - in  Claris non fit interpretation
(v) The Western Frontier of Poland: Actions of the Four Powers.
The Bundestag Resolution is effectively discounted as an instrument having 
any international legal effect, and is of importance only in assessing attitudes 
in  the FRG at the time of ratification.
The Warsaw Treaty established for Poland the final recognition of its 
frontiers which it had sought since 1945, and Poland clearly saw this 
recognition as a contribution not only to its own security but as an influence 
upon the general situation in  Europe. This was pointed out by the Eoreign 
Minister one month prior to ratification:
"The Treaty has been recognized as an important step towards the 
consolidation of European peace and security and as an augury of 
normalisation of relations between the German Eederal Republic 
and Poland."^
The formal links between the Moscow and Warsaw Treaties, the Quadripartite 
Agreement on Berlin and CSCE were discussed above (Chapter Two, pp. 24-28). 
CSCE was of special importance to the Eastern-bloc States because they saw it as a 
means of obtaining Western recognition of the principle of inviolability of 
frontiers, an essential element for peace and security as they are seen in the 
socialist States. This is evident from the declaration of the head of the Polish 
delegation at the negotiations of 1974 which preceded the Helsinki Einal Act:
"...the prime importance we attach to this principle (of inviolability 
of frontiers) results not only from Polish reasons. Poland’s frontiers 
today are finally fixed and universally recognized. The problem of 
our frontiers has been resolved once and for all. We attach so much 
importance to this principle out of a concern for Europe’s security
and its peaceful development out of our concern for each European 
state and nation.”6*
This belief that Poland's frontiers were universally recognized and finally fixed 
is relevant to the Bundestag Resolution, since if  Poland had actually accepted it, 
it could not claim that its frontiers were finally fixed. In  fact, there is some 
doubt as to the extent of the recognition which the Oder-Neisse line has received 
among interested States, i.e., USSR, GDR, ERG, UK, USA and Erance. The original 
, intention had of course been that the Eour Powers would not recognize the 
frontiers of Germany, but that they would themselves determine them,6  ^end in  
the Potsdam Agreement the western frontier of Poland, and hence the eastern 
frontier of Germany, was to be delimitated or determined finally at the peace 
settlement.
The Soviet Union, in  a draft peace treaty with Germany, regarded the 
Oder-Neisse line as the western frontier of Poland 66 The GDR recognized the 
Oder-Neisse line in 1950 6  ^ These two States have consistently maintained that 
the present German-Polish border is valid. It has already been established that 
the ERG recognizes the border, though it has indicated in a Note VerbaJe to the 
UK, that it considered that the rights and responsibilities of the Eour Powers 
with regard to Germany as a whole, and this includes the borders of Germany, 
were unaffected, a statement agreed upon by the UK.66 It was also stated that 
the treaty enjoyed the fu ll support of the British Government, that its 
provisions were welcomed, and particular mention was given in this context to 
the western frontier of Poland.69 But careful attention should be paid to these
statements. The British Government did not say that it approved of the 
Oder-Neisse line as the western frontier of Poland. It merely gave its approval 
to such recognition by the Federal Republic. Therefore, it cannot be said that in  
these statements following the initialling of the Warsaw Treaty the UK 
expressed its own approval of the Oder-Neisse line.
Winston Churchill, no longer Prime Minister, but having been deeply 
involved in the Polish question, gave a summary of what he saw as having been 
the attitude of the British Government towards the question of Poland's borders, 
prior to the Potsdam Agreement:
“...the provisional western frontier agreed upon for Poland... is not a 
good augury for the future map of Europe. We always had in the coali­
tion Government a desire that Poland should receive ample compensation 
in  the West for the territory ceded to Russia East of the Curzon Line. But 
here I think a mistake has been made, in which the Provisional Govern­
ment of Poland have been an ardent partner, by going far beyond what 
necessity or equity required...**^
The statement shows that the UK did not favour Poland being allowed to 
administer territory as far as the Western Neisse, which is the present position.
The UK had felt that it would be enough to allow accessions in  Poland's favour 
only as far as the Eastern Neisse river. Poland in fact received less territory 
from Germany than it lost to the USSR, so it is not clear what kind of equity 
Churchill had in mind. It is true that large areas of the territory lost to the
USSR were of poorer quality in  agricultural terms than those parts of 
Pomerania which fe ll under Polish administration, while the mineral reserves 
of Silesia also went to Poland (though part of Silesia had been Polish prior to 
1939), but such considerations are unlikely to have been of much significance 
for those evicted from their homes and lands by the Soviets. Poland also lost two 
of its greatest cities, Lwow and ¥ilno (now Lvov and Vilnius). Although the 
population of the lands around those cities was more Ukrainian and Lithuanian, 
in  the cities themselves, the majority of the population was Polish. If  Churchill 
was genuinely interested in necessity and equity, he might not have agreed so 
readily that the USSR should extend its territory as far as the Curzon Line. It is 
quite possible that the USSR would have taken what it wanted without the 
blessing of the British, but it was not necessary for the UK to be so cooperative 
in extending its hegemony. The British attitude towards Poland and the Polish 
Government in exile, which was the lawful Government of Poland at least until 
1944, was generally less sympathetic than that of France and the USA. Of course, 
for most of the war the Polish Government was exiled in London and therefore 
the British were more closely involved with it than any other of the allies, 
particularly with regard to negotiations between the Soviets and the Polish 
Government in the last two years of the war, when the USSR insisted more and 
more strongly that it would extend its border westwards, while the Polish 
Government demanded that Poland should retain all of its territory, and the 
British had to try  to achieve a consensus, which in the end meant the Polish side 
being forced to agree to virtually all of the Soviet Union’s demands with regard 
to their common border and the composition of the future Polish Government, 
as a result of the decisions taken at the Yalta Conference.*^
France and the USA received Notes identical to that communicated to the UK 
by FRG, and both States expressed their approval. However, all three Western 
Powers had stated in the DeutschlandvertragJ^ the treaty which ended the 
occupation regime in the Federal Republic, that the final determination of 
Germany’s borders must still await a peace settlement. This view was reiterated 
by the UK in  the Exchange of Notes with the FRG following the initialling of the 
Warsaw Treaty. This same position is consistently taken by the Western Powers. 
One Nato Communique said:
"Ministers noted the clarifications made in the context of the Treaties, 
and reflected in  the Exchanges of Notes between the FRG and the 
Three Powers, to the effect that quadripartite rights and responsibilities 
for Berlin and Germany as a whole remain unaffected pending a peace 
settlement...”7^
While the same wording is not always used, nevertheless the same idea is 
conveyed on every appropriate occasion, in  order that there may be no 
ambiguity about the attitude adopted, such as the following comment on the 
Eastern Treaties:
“...the existing Treaties and Agreements to which the FRG is a 
party and the rights and responsibilities of the Four Powers 
relating to Berlin and Germany as a whole remain unaffected.’’7*
The acceptance by FRG of the territorial status quo in  Article I of the Warsaw
Treaty was approved t>y all Four Powers bearing responsibility for Germany as a 
whole, including the ultimate determination or delimitation of its frontiers. 
However, this does not mean that the three Western Powers did themselves 
agree to the Oder-Neisse line, and these States have consistently maintained that 
their rights and responsibilities remain unaffected. The Soviet Union also 
claims that its position with regard to Germany as a whole has not changed. 
This can be explained by the different interpretations of the existing treaties 
and agreements. Thus each side is actually stating that its position, as it 
evaluates it, is unaltered, and in  this way it is possible for the Four Powers to 
make joint statements with regard to Germany, so long as these are kept at a 
general level.
It is not realistic to state that the three Western Powers committed themselves 
to giving their approval to the Oder-Neisse line at a future peace treaty by 
virtue of their having approved the 1970 Treaties. Nor does this mean that they 
would be opposed to it. Certainly the approval accorded the Moscow and Warsaw 
Treaties, while not bringing any further commitment on the Four Powers (the 
USSR of course incurred rights and obligations as a result of the Moscow Treaty, 
but this is separate from the treaties involving the Western Powers, and the 
USSR did not enter into this treaty in its capacity as an Occupying Power), shows 
that their attitudes had been modified somewhat. It is likely that the Western 
Powers, acknowledging that the relevant territories are firm ly established as 
Polish (in the practical, as opposed to the legal sense), do now favour the 
Oder-Neisse line, but they are prevented by the terms of the Potsdam Agreement 
from making prior legal commitments to this end. As long ago as 1959, the UK
may have taken a more sympathetic position, when it said that "the final 
delimitation of the frontier between Germany and Poland cannot be formalised 
until there is a peace settlement."7  ^ The use of the term "delimitation" as 
opposed to "determination" is probably of no significance. Although 
delimitation may mean the final implementation of something already decided, 
for example the Oder-Neisse frontier, while determination may be broader, such 
as the general decision as to where a border should be, the two terms were used 
interchangeably in the Potsdam Agreement at least in  so far as it is concerned 
with Poland's western frontier, and in the absence of explanatory 
circumstances, it cannot be assumed that a different meaning was intended. 
However, as has been suggested,76 the term "formalisation" could mean that a 
final approval would be given at the peace settlement to a pre-existing situation, 
and this may have been the intention of the UK in 1959. But all such 
declarations must be taken in light of the constant reiteration of the view that 
the rights and responsibilities of the Four Powers with regard to Berlin and 
Germany as a whole remain unaffected, which means that the significance of 
the 1959 statement is at best limited. The effect of the repeated insistence on the 
maintenance of rights based upon the unconditional surrender of Germany and 
the assumption by the Four Powers of supreme authority with regard to that 
State, is that any treaties and agreements relating to Germany, insofar as these 
deal with matters in connection with which the Powers have retained 
competence, have to be read in light of that authority and the instruments in  
which that authority is contained and exercised, including the Potsdam 
Agreement.
The alternative is that the rights and responsibilities contained in  that 
instrument should be considered in  the light of future developments, such as 
the Warsaw and Moscow Treaties and the positions adopted by the Western 
Powers with regard to these treaties. The Moscow and Warsaw Treaties, after 
they came into force, did affect the legal position, in  particular by binding the 
FRG to acceptance of the Oder-Neisse line as the western State frontier of Poland. 
The three Western Powers gave their approval to this new' situation, and any 
assessment of the position of these States with regard to the Oder-Neisse line 
would have to take account of the fact that they were prepared to approve the 
acceptance by West Germany of this frontier, while maintaining their own 
rights and responsibilities. It may justifiably be asked why they were prepared 
to approve such an obligation for the Federal Republic, yet perhaps to deny it 
for themselves, considering that the Qstpolitik of the FRG was so closely related 
to their own role in Germany.
The express reservation of their own capacity with regard to Germany 
indicates a willingness to accept the bilateral regulation of particular issues 
while insisting that such regulation, formally, remains to be considered in light 
of a peace settlement. The Western Powers have kept open the possibility of 
territorial changes at a future settlement; in  practice, it is difficult to anticipate 
any adjustment of the present territorial disposition, and the Allies would be 
exercising their rights and obligations in light of post-war developments. 
Nevertheless, the rights which they retain are real; this means that, along with 
the USSR, they may decide upon the course of the Polish-German frontier. The 
significance of their approval of the Warsaw Treaty is that it makes any real
change in the frontier in future all the less likely, but does not lim it the legal 
right to demand such change. The view of this writer is, therefore, that the 
first approach is the correct one, i.e., primary importance should be attached to 
the Potsdam Agreement; the reason for this is the constant insistence that the 
rights and responsibilities contained therein are unaffected. It is relevant that 
such statements are also made at crucial times, e.g. when the Warsaw Treaty was 
initialled and ratified. On the other hand, it is argued that the Powers modified 
their future role and also that of the peace settlement, by giving their consent 
to the shifting of territorial arrangements onto the bilateral plane, as a 
manifestation of their competence.77 But if  this is accepted, the practical result 
is that, as Skubiszewski suggests, the Powers would still be able to make the final 
determination of Poland's western frontier at the peace settlement,76 but as this 
determination would amount to no more than a “rubber stamp" approval of the 
existing situation, there would be no real determination as such, and it would be 
clear that in fact the rights and responsibilities of the Powers had been 
affected, contrary to their repeated statements otherwise, in  which case, the 
determination of the western frontier of Poland, at least as the Western Powers 
see it, would not be that process which was envisaged at Potsdam. Of course, this 
solution would probably be acceptable to the USSR, not because it considers that 
the Warsaw and Moscow Treaties restrict the competences of the Powers, but 
because it has maintained since 1946 that the western frontier of Poland was 
actually established at Potsdam and that all that remained for the Powers to do at 
the peace settlement was to give it their approval.
All three western Powers approved of the treaties concluded by the FRG with
Poland and the Soviet Union, including the recognition by the FRG of the 
Oder-Neisse line. The USSR also favours it. But is this enough to have a 
substantive effect on any of the rights and obligations contained in the Potsdam 
Agreement, and in  particular that part dealing with the Polish-German border? 
Indeed, do the Four Powers have any legal authority to take any action or make 
any statement which would restrict their freedom of action at a peace 
settlement? The approval, such as it was, that was given to the treaties was in 
each case a unilateral act of the State concerned. The Western Powers may have 
agreed upon a common attitude towards these treaties, in their capacity as States 
having responsibility for Germany as a whole, but without the cooperation of 
the Soviet Union, their scope for action is very limited. The Potsdam Agreement 
involved only UK, USA, and USSR, but France was accepted before the 
Conference as an equal partner in the occupation and control of Germany, and 
it accepted most decisions already taken with regard to Germany; in matters 
relating to Berlin and Germany as a whole, and the external borders of a unified 
Germany would come within the ambit of this authority, the Four Powers 
exercise their control jointly. Unilateral action in  this field is not permitted and 
has met with protests when it appeared to be taking place. Thus in  1955, after 
the USSR and GDR concluded a treaty concerning their mutual relations,79 and a 
letter had been sent to the USSR by the GDR with regard to certain agreements 
as to the control and guarding of lines of communication between FRG and West 
Berlin,86 there quickly followed a joint statement8* by the UK, USA and France. 
This was because the GDR had stated in the letter that the Soviet troops in the 
GDR were stationed there temporarily and would, it was implied, be removed 
pending the conclusion of an appropriate agreement8  ^whence the control of
troops and materials for their garrisons from the UK, USA and Erance would 
presumably, be controlled by the GDR. The statement of the Western Powers 
made their views known with regard to these agreements between the GDR and 
USSR:
"They wish.... to emphasize that these agreements cannot affect the 
obligations or responsibilities of the Soviet Union under agreements 
and arrangements between the three Powers and the Soviet Union on 
the subject of Germany and Berlin. The Soviet Union remains 
responsible for the carrying out of these obligations."
It was being made clear to the USSR that, in  the view of the other Powers, it had 
no authority to make unilateral alterations in  its relationship to Germany or 
any part thereof, in  so far as it was deaing with Berlin or Germany as a whole.
The approval by the Western Powers of the 1970 Treaties must be seen from 
this perspective. They had no authority to make declarations with regard to the 
Oder-Neisse line, where such declarations would alter their commitments with 
the Soviet Union under the various treaties and agreements. The view of the 
Western Powers has been that the western frontier of Poland may be settled 
finally at the peace settlement, and therefore their declarations, made 
independently of the Soviet Union, must be seen in this context. These 
declarations cannot constitute any substantive alteration in the commitments 
made with regard to Germany. The fact that, if  these declarations could make 
alterations to the situation, it would be to strengthen the chances of final
agreement being reached on the validity of the Oder-Neisse line, which also, is 
favoured by the USSR, is not relevant, as that State took no part in  the 
statements made by the UK, USA and Erance. For the statements of approval of 
the Warsaw Treaty to be regarded as committing these States to the Oder-Neisse 
line, there would have to be a breach of the Potsdam Agreement and the idea of 
joint Eour Power control of Germany as the Western Powers see it, because in  
their interpretation of that Agreement, which they have maintained 
consistently, the final decision with regard to the border must await the 
reunification of Germany. This is not to say that the Powers would demand a 
revision of existing frontiers at any such settlement. The development of the 
concept of inviolability of frontiers, which appears in each of the treaties 
concluded by the ERG with USSR, Poland, GDR and Czechoslovakia, as well as in  
the Helsinki Final Act, and to which each of the concerned States has committed 
itself, and the general prohibition on the threat or use of force as a means of 
settling disputes contained in the Charter of the United Nations, means that the 
Oder-Neisse line is more secure now than ever. It is unlikely that Poland would 
agree to any alteration of its borders which would result in  the loss to Germany 
of part or all of the territories which it had administered since 1945. Of course, 
the USA, UK and Erance, while agreeing to the concept of inviolability of 
frontiers at CSCE, maintained their existing rights and obligations.
The most that can be said is that one or more of the Eour Powers may bind 
itself or themselves to follow a particular course in the future - that is, it/they  
w ill, in  agreeing upon joint action, be bound by earlier commitments. This is 
what is claimed, in  effect, by some writers, for the three Western Powers as a
result of their approval of the signature by the ERG of the Warsaw Treaty. One 
does not have to look far to see the difficulties in such a situation: where one 
State undertakes to follow a particular course and a second State adopts a course 
legally inconsistent with the first, there would appear to be little  scope 
remaining for joint action.
The maintenance of existing joint rights and duties appears to require a 
construction that obligations or commitments accepted by fewer than all Eour 
Powers together must, where inconsistent with the joint capacity, be deemed to 
be subject to that capacity. However, where all of the Eour Powers have 
undertaken, but not jointly, the same commitments with regard to the future 
exercise of their joint capacity in  Germany, a situation may be foreseen where 
they could, indeed, find themselves bound not to adopt measures contrary to 
such commitments.
Thus, if  each of the Eour Powers undertook not to demand any alteration of 
the present western frontier of Poland, this could bind them when acting 
jointly, since each would be obliged to support such a course vis-a-vis the 
others. Eor separate undertakings by the Eour Powers to affect their joint 
rights and duties, it would have to be made clear by each State that it intended its 
joint rights and duties to be affected. This would require acceptance by each of 
the other Eour Powers.
If, on the other hand, the Eour Powers were to agree jointly, in  advance of 
a peace settlement, to support the Oder-Neisse line, this would surely bind them
when the time came to effect the final and formal delimitation of the frontier.
While they have successfully retained their privileges assumed after the 
defeat of Germany in 1945, it is expected that the Western Powers would be 
inclined to approve the Oder-Neisse line at a peace settlement. The reasons for 
this are practical as well as legal ,8  ^ There is now an established Polish-German 
border. It was decided at Yalta that Poland should receive an unspecified 
amount of territory in the west at the expense of Germany. If  it were desired to 
make any changes in  this frontier, a new border would have to be agreed upon, 
which would mean Poland either receiving more German territory or else 
losing some of what it now possesses to the united German State. There is no 
reason to assume that any alteration of the frontier would necessarily be to the 
detriment of Poland. The best evidence for considering this is the statements of 
the Powers. During the immediate post-war years, there was strong opposition 
to the Oder-Neisse line as the border8*(by UK and USA), but these attitudes have 
been modified somewhat, although the French were from the beginning more 
sympathetic.8^
The most significant practical reason for maintaining the present external 
German frontiers is that to attempt any alteration now would require massive 
movements of population. This proposition takes for granted that whichever 
State lost territory as a result of changes in frontiers would be expected to 
absorb its own citizens living in those territories. In  this context, the following 
statement by Bevin, the British Foreign Secretary, is of interest:
"The question of where the final delimitation of the frontier w ill rest 
w ill depend to a large extent on what the population is that returns to 
to Poland...There had been agreement, at least by inference, that the 
Poles should go up to the Oder and the Eastern Neisse. The population 
of the territories to the west of this latter river, even on a pre-war 
basis, amounted to a little over 3,000,000, most of whom were said to be 
already gone... On the other side, as I understand it, there are 4,000,000 
Poles in the territory that has been ceded to Russia. ¥ iil they return to 
Poland, or w ill they remain in  Russia?... it depends on what happens."^
¥hat happened was that most of the Germans in those territories left for 
Germany proper, i.e., that part which was divided into four zones of occupation. 
Some did remain but many of these left during the 1970’s as a result of the 
improvement in relations with Poland. Most of the Poles in that part of Poland 
which in 1945 fell under Soviet sovereignty left for Poland and, naturally, those 
places where they could be absorbed most easily were that part of East Prussia 
and German Eastern territories which had fallen under Polish administration. 
The only practical way to avoid massive upheaval is to approve the existing 
frontier between Germany and Poland. It must also be taken into account that 
many of the Poles living in  these territories have been bom there and consider 
these places as their homes, while those Germans who had been born there are 
now of the older generation. In  other words, by mere passage of time, a 
situation w ill be arrived at in which there w ill be no Germans alive who had 
been born in these areas. Those who have been bom there may also consider 
that they have a right to regard it as their home and to live there.
The Potsdam Agreement also provided for the orderly transfers of German 
populations to Germany from Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary.®  ^ There is 
one problem here; what was meant by Poland? There are three possibilities; 
Poland as it existed immediately prior to ¥orld ¥ar II; Poland as it existed after 
part of its territory had been lost to the Soviet Union, but without those 
territories which, prior to 1937, had been part of Germany; and Poland within 
its present frontiers. It is suggested that the third possibility is the correct one; 
although the Potsdam Agreement did not stipulate that the territories placed 
under Polish administration would definitely become permanent Polish 
territory, nevertheless it was certain that at least part of that territory, perhaps 
as far as the Oder and Eastern Neisse, would become Polish, and the whole of the 
territory could become so. This was decided at Yalta and endorsed at Potsdam. It 
can be assumed that the UK, USA and USSR, when they spoke about Poland, 
agreed that at least part of that Poland would include former German territory - 
this had already been decided. Therefore, it is most likely that the Poland 
referred to in Paragraph X II of the Potsdam Protocol is that Poland which 
includes former German territories. This is certain, if  we consider the number 
of Germans agreed by the Allied Control Council in  Berlin in  the Resolution of 
20 November 1945, who were intended for resettlement to the British and Soviet 
zones (approximately three and a half m illion), while in  pre-war Poland, there 
were about 741,000 (census of 1931).
(v i) The Western Frontier of Poland: Actions of the ERG and the GDR
In the Zgorzelec Treaty of 1950 88 the GDR recognized the Oder-Neisse line 
as the State frontier between Germany and Poland, while the ERG, in  the ¥arsaw 
Treaty,89 accepted it as the western State frontier of Poland, but this treaty 
makes no mention of any frontier between Germany and Poland. According to 
the ERG, it could not treat this border as the border between Germany and 
Poland, because it was not entitled to speak for Germany. As a result of these 
treaties, neither of the two German states may demand any alteration in  the 
frontier, because having recognized it, the only course open to them would be to 
propose a change by peaceful means, to which Poland would be free either to 
agree or to disagree.
This recognition by ERG and GDR is separate from, but not unrelated to, the 
question of whether a united Germany would be obliged to give its consent to 
the frontier, though again there are limits to the power of negotiation of a 
united Germany at the peace settlement. The Potsdam Agreement stipulates that 
the Council of Eoreign Ministers "shall be utilised for the preparation of a peace 
settlement for Germany to be accepted by the Government of Germany when a 
Government adequate for the purpose is established.'98 Erom this wording, it 
seems that the German Government's role would be to accept the decisions 
arrived at by the Eour Powers. This does not mean that Germany would have no 
voice,9* it simply means that the Eour Powers would not have to listen.
At present, the chances for the establishment of a united German State and 
government are so remote that the attitudes, as expressed in legal form, of the
two German States towards the Oder-Neisse line are of great importance for the 
actual issue today, and many writers have pointed out that, as long as a peace 
settlement is pending, neither German State could question Poland's frontiers.92 
However, this begs the question of the attitude of any united German state with 
its own government. The Tour Powers would not be obliged to act according to 
the wishes of Germany at a peace settlement. On the other hand, were Germany 
to support or advocate the adoption of the Oder-Neisse line as the German-Polish 
frontier, which presumably would have the support of Poland, it is difficult to 
foresee a situation in  which the four Powers would then oppose it. It is even 
possible that a unified Germany would be obliged to give its consent to the 
Oder-Neisse line, as a result of the actions of the GDR and ERG. It certainly would 
not have to oppose the existing border.
With regard to German acceptance of the Oder-Neisse line, as opposed to 
acceptance by GDR and ERG, it is relevant to consider the extent to w'hich either 
of these two States is identical with Germany. Being identical, presumably their 
rights and obligations would apply also to Germany.
In 1949, both the GDR and ERG claimed to be the sole representatives of the 
German people. The first constitution of the GDR referred to ‘'Germany" and 
"one German citizenship.'9  ^ This was never accepted by the Western Powers, 
which objected both jointly9* and individually^. However, the ERG was also 
making dubious claims. It too asserted that only it was entitled to speak for all 
Germans. This had the political support of all three Western Powers which at 
one point regarded the Eederal Government as the only one entitled to speak for
Germany in international affairs 98
Despite the claims of both German States that they were the true Germany, 
neither in fact could claim to represent the German people in the sense that, 
prior to World War II, this function was carried out by one German government. 
The ERG gave up this approach as its Qstpolitik developed in  the late 1960's 97 By 
1969, the GDR was already accepted, albeit for certain limited purposes only, as a 
State in its own rig h t98 Having accepted that two German States actually did 
exist, the ERG could not represent all of the German people. In  the Treaty on the 
Basis of Relations between the ERG and the GDR of 21 December 1972 the two 
States together renounced all claims to represent one another:
"The ERG and GDR proceed on the assumption that neither of 
the two States can represent the other internationally or act 
in its name."99
The extent of the jurisdiction of each State was described by the Treaty, each 
State proceeding on the principle that its jurisdiction is confined to its own 
territory, and undertaking to respect the other‘s independence and autonomy in  
internal and external affairs.*88
The Eederal Republic has claimed to be identical with the German Reich, 
particularly during the earlier period of its existence.*8* Had it maintained that 
claim, then any rights and duties of the ERG would also be rights and duties of 
an all-German State. Thus recognition of the Oder-Neisse line by the ERG would
be recognition by Germany. But the ERG made it clear in  the negotiations with 
Poland with regard to the Warsaw Treaty, that it was acting only in its own 
name. This must be interpreted as an admission by the ERG that it no longer 
considered itself identical with Germany - a crucial shift in  policy. If  there is 
real identity of States, that condition or status cannot, as a matter of 
convenience, be cast aside, depending upon the circumstances.
This renunciation is also not without its own consequences. It has rightly 
been said that, if  the Eederal Republic is not competent to speak for an
i
all-German State, it w ill also be without authority to reserve the freedom of 
action of that State in  the event of its being able to act.102 The Eederal Republic 
gave up any outstanding claims to represent the Germans of the GDR, in their 
capacity as citizens of the GDR, when the Grundvertrag entered into force.
It may be that "Germany" still exists, but without any present form. In  the 
event of it assuming tangible form once again, if  it is not identical with either 
of the two present-existing German States, it w ill be a successor State, in  which 
case all of the treaties concluded by either German State would have to be 
considered in  order to ascertain whether, according to the law of State 
succession, they would pass on to Germany; or else it w ill be a continuity of the 
old State, but within different boundaries.
The attitude of the ERG towards the Oder-Neisse line, as expressed through 
its actions, has been discussed in the context of the Bundestag Resolution. 
Clearly, recognition of the Oder-Neisse line was a trauma for the West Germans.
Perhaps this was in contrast to the recognition by the GDR, which may have 
been a policy imposed upon that State *8^  In one sense, this would be easier to 
accept for the East Germans, because genuine consent or agreement was absent, 
whereas the process which took place in ERG was a genuine attempt to come to 
terms with the Polish-German border as it existed. There was opposition in  East 
Germany to the Oder-Neisse line, but this was muted. While the ratification 
process of the Warsaw Treaty may have revealed much opposition, this only 
emphasises that the actual recognition, as confirmed by the ratification, was 
bsed upon genuine, if  not unanimous, consent.
While the Zgorzelec Treaty is fulsome in its description of affairs 
("....recognizing the fixed and existing frontier as the inviolable frontier of 
peace and friendship which does not divide, but unites the two nations...."), the 
Warsaw Treaty by contrast is muted and rhetoric-free. The Preamble contains a 
brief mention of World War II, then in measured terms outlines the aims of the 
two States. At no point does the ERG claim to represent the whole of Germany, or 
the GDR - the first line of the Preamble expressly refers to the Polish People’s 
Republic and the Eederal Republic of Germany. The Zgorzelec Treaty, however, 
refers to the German "nation” - though the GDR alone was a partner in  this 
agreement with Poland, nevertheless it claims to act on behalf of the German 
nation (whatever that is, it certainly implies something greater than the 
GDR).104
The GDR has subsequently ceased to claim that it represents any part of 
Germany, apart from that part of Germany which is within the borders of the
GDR, and it no longer claims to speak for Germans unless they are East German 
citizens according to the GDR law on citizenship. There is one anomaly 
(depending on the position one adopts) in  this case. This is with regard to 
Berlin, and in particular. East Berlin. According to conventional western 
opinion (at least in  the public statements of USA, UiC and Erance), Berlin 
remains under occupation by the Eour Powers and has a status different from 
that of the other parts of Germany. If  one accepts this view, then the GDR claim 
that East Berlin, and the citizens of East Berlin, are within its jurisdiction de 
jure, as opposed to de facto (a state of affairs which cannot seriously be 
disputed), is legally incorrect. Thus when the GDR claims to represent only 
itself as a separate State, it is including within that claim East Berlin and its 
inhabitants, although the Soviet zone of occupation in  Germany, in which the 
GDR was founded, did not of course include Berlin. Therefore even now, 
according to the Western allied Powers, the GDR exceeds its legitimate authority 
and sovereignty. This has not prevented these countries from acknowledging 
de facto that East Berlin is the capital of the GDR.® Effectively, East Berlin is 
part of the GDR, even though there remains evidence of the city's status as an 
area occupied by the Eour Powers.*88 West Berlin is very closely associated with 
the Eederal Republic, but it is always clear that it is a separate legal entity from 
that State. This separation has been emphasised by all Eour Powers, and any 
connections between the two are links which exist despite the fact that they do 
not possess the same legal status.*87
The Warsaw Treaty in its scope differs greatly from the Zgorzelec Treaty. 
Whereas the latter is concerned specifically with the Polish-German frontier.
that issue is only one of many which are regulated by the former instrument. 
The treaty with the ERG contains the statement that it does not affect any 
international agreements concluded by the two parties or concerning them 
(Article IV ). The GDR treaty contains no such statement. This can be taken as a 
reflection of the differing attitudes of the two German states. Through Article 
IV, the ERG could maintain that its previous legal viewpoints had not changed - 
thus preempting any attempt to establish that the ERG had altered its position 
with regard to, inter alia, the statement in  the Potsdam Agreement that the final 
delimitation of the Polish-German frontier should await the peace settlement. 
The absence of any disagreement between Poland and the GDR as to the 
conclusions reached at Potsdam and their effect meant that the parties did not 
require any expression of maintenance of existing legal positions. The 
Preamble makes clear their consensus as to what had occurred at Potsdam a 
matter beyond question:
"...desiring to stabilise and consolidate mutual relations on the 
basis of the Potsdam Agreement which established the frontier 
on the Oder and the Lusatian Neisse ...."*88
Officially at least, this reapprochement between the two States took place partly 
as a consequence of the Potsdam Agreement, while the improvement in  
relations between Poland and the ERG occurred in spite of the Potsdam 
Agreement.
The effort which was required on the part of the ERG and its citizens to be
able to accept the Oder-Neisse line as the western State frontier of Poland should 
not be underestimated. It was not simply the case that only the Eastern Germans 
in  the Federal Republic and sympathisers in the CDU/CSU maintained hopes of 
the Polish-German border being adjusted to the detriment of Poland. Even W illy 
Brandt in the immediate post-war years, had maintained such hopes, but was 
prepared by 1970 to acknowledge in treaty form a reality with which he and his 
compatriots had had to come to terms.*89 Nor on the other hand should it be 
imagined that for the Poles the normalization of relations with West Germany 
was an easy process. When Chancellor Brandt arrived in  Warsaw for the 
signing of the Warsaw Treaty the national attitude was more ambivalent than 
would be reflected by an apparently unanimous approval of the normalization 
of relations. Brandt himself has alluded to this in his memoirs.* *8
The legal position since 1972 is that both German States have recognized 
the Oder-Neisse line. The questions remain: is there a State of Germany and is 
the border between that State and Poland constituted by the Oder-Neisse line? If  
there is no such State, would a new German State be bound to accept the present 
Polish-GDR border? These issues are not specifically answered by either the 
Warsaw Treaty or the Zgorzelec Agreement. As long as the two German States 
continue to exist there can be no question that they have accepted the new 
borders, and are bound not to question them.
In such a situation, the Polish western frontier enjoys greater legal and 
political stability than at any time since 1945, but there remains the possibility 
that a united German State would not be bound to recognize it, unless it can be
shown that the existing treaties and agreements also apply to it. West Germany, 
prior to signature and ratification of the Warsaw Treaty, insisted that it cvould 
not by that treaty bind a future unified Germany not to question its provisions. 
The GDR in 1950 claimed to represent the whole of Germany.* * * This meant that 
it considered itself to be acting on behalf of the whole of Germany, but 
definitely excluding those territories newly-administered by Poland, since the 
treaty was designed to show where Germany and Poland met. Since the treaty 
stipulated that they met at the Oder-Neisse line, it cannot then be asserted that 
Germany includes territories to the east of that frontier. While the GDR later 
modified this position to the extent that it regarded itself and FRG as successor 
States to Germany, it nevertheless began by regarding itself as entitled to 
represent the whole of Germany in 1950. This is important in  assessing the 
actions and attitudes of the GDR as it shows that both German States were 
prepared to be treated as "Germany", and not for what they really were. This 
attitude of the GDR has been described as having political rather than legal 
significance:
"..in the early stage of its existence that State (the GDR) considered 
itself authorized to represent the entire German nation in  the sense 
of representing the political interests of Germany taken as a whole.
In this period, emphasis was laid on the Republic's political representa­
tion of the entire German nation, divided as it was into four occupation 
zones. The interpretation given in those early years of the German 
Democratic Republic to the legal problems of succession after the 
former German Reich was such that the East German Government was
not responsible for these obligations of the Reich which had been 
assumed against the interests of the German nation."* *2
According to the writer, the GDR considered that it could represent all of 
Germany for certain political purposes while disclaiming, where this proved 
convenient, any legal responsibility for the actions of the Reich. In  other 
words, it was proposing that, should the Second World War be deemed to have 
been contrary to the interests of the German nation, the GDR would not be 
responsible for any obligations of the Reich resulting from it. This might 
include the reparations provisions in the Potsdam Agreement:
"1. Reparations claims of the USSR shall be met by removals 
from the zone of Germany occupied by theUSSR, and from 
appropriate German external assets."* *^
Reparations were still being taken by the USSR from the Soviet zone of 
occupation when the GDR was established in 1949. The cost to the GDR was such 
that it could be regarded as an obligation assumed against the interests of the 
German nation (regardless of whether or not they were justified). However, the 
GDR continued the payment of reparations in accordance with the decision at 
Potsdam. It had no control over this, other than unilaterally to declare an end to 
payments, but the interests of the German people were definitely adversely 
affected by the obligation to make reparations which was imposed upon 
Germany. This is the first inconsistency in the attitude of the GDR - it would, 
despite everything, observe certain obligations. The second inconsistency is
more important; that is, the general view that, where it chose, the GDR regarded 
itself as representing the whole of Germany. It is not defensible to assert that 
one is not liable for certain consequences of being the representative of the 
German people, while claiming the right to represent them. If  they are 
genuinely represented, then this would include the disadvantageous aspects as 
well as the advantageous. The same writer observes critically that the German 
Lander wanted to act in  certain respects as successors to the Reich, while 
denying any burdens which went with such benefit:
"..individual German Lander were in fact ready at the time 
to act as successors to the former Reich to the extent to which 
this was of benefit to them, whereas they were in no hurry to 
act so in the matter of discharging the Reich's obligations.
Whenever it was a question of assuming any burdens consequent 
on succession after the former German Reich, the German Lander 
showed themselves to be highly reluctant."* **
There is no substantive difference between the attitude of the Lander and that 
of the GDR, and even if  this comment on the Lander is justified, it does not 
characterise their behaviour as being any worse than that of the GDR. In  order 
for the GDR to make a credible claim to represent the whole of Germany, it 
would have to be prepared in that context to accept the legal responsibility too. 
In  such a situation, the terminology may be such as to give the impression that 
the GDR denies such responsibility. However, if  the actual meaning of what is 
being claimed is that the GDR represented the whole of Germany, then there are
certain legal consequences which flow from such representation and any 
denial of liability ought to be regarded in that context.
As far as the GDR and Poland were concerned, the 1950 treaty between the 
two States settled the issue of the frontier in specific terms, the general decision 
having been taken at the Potsdam Conference. Thus the statement that the final 
determination of the western frontier of Poland would take place at the peace 
settlement, really meant a detailed delimitation of what had been decided, 
without any substantial alteration. The 1950 treaty was seen as a formal 
recognition by the GDR of a pre-existing frontier. One month prior to the 
signing of the treaty, the two States had issued a communique in  which they 
made it clear that the proposed treaty would not, in  their joint view, create any 
new frontier, since it was to make provision for “the demarcation of the 
established and existing frontier along the Oder-Neisse."**^ All of these factors 
leave no doubt that the GDR, at a very early stage of its existence, accepted that 
large areas of pre-war German territory, which had at one time been part of the 
proposed Soviet Zone of occupation, were to become part of Poland with no 
prospect for them to be returned to Germany.
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CHAPTER FOUR
The FRG-GDR Frontier 
(i) Origins
The GDR-FRG frontier differs in  character from the Polish-German frontier. 
The latter border certainly exists and is accepted as, in principle, having legal 
validity. The problem since 1945 has been in establishing vdiere, in  law', it 
ought to be situated. The former border, on the other hand, has a very definite 
existence but doubts exist as to whether or not it ought legally to be there at all. 
In other vords, the practical thereabouts of a valid frontier have been 
questioned, and the validity of the other, clearly-situated frontier is open to 
discussion. This in turn depends upon thether or not the FRG and GDR actually 
exist as States since, if  they are not separate legal entities but rather possess 
some link which joins them as one legal entity, then the present division would 
not be a legally valid frontier. By this is meant that line at which the 
sovereignty of one State is superceded by that of another State.* Although the 
GDR and FRG control the territories up to their common frontier, at which point 
the authority of each one ceases ,if they possess any link which prevents them 
being Xwo separate States, then while authority over the territory is passed from 
one to the other, it w ill be a change of character less than that of sovereignty? 
Their link would involve some connection between the xwo which means that 
they are not foreign to one another.
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If, however, the GDR and FRG are considered to be two separate States, then 
the line which divides them is a frontier, just as the line dividing the GDR and 
Poland is a frontier. The line of the present border was established, although 
this was probably not intended at the time, by allied agreements of 1944 and 
1945. The main agreement was the Protocol of September 12, 1944,^  ^/hich was 
subsequently amended to include France as an Occupying Power. The 1944 
Protocol on the Zones of Occupation in  Germany was not designed to create a 
state frontier running through the heart of that country; its function was, as 
stated in the title, to divide the country into zones of occupation. Thus there was
I
a Northwestern Zone, to be occupied by the UK; a Southwestern Zone, to be 
occupied by the USA, and the USSR obtained the Eastern Zone. There had been a 
suggestion4 that Germany could be divided into a number of smaller states, so as 
to weaken it (along the same lines, it was suggested that the country's industries 
could be dismantled so that it would become an agricultural and, hence, 
m ilitarily weak, state), but this was not the intention of the Allies?, at least as a 
matter of deliberate policy. Stalin also spoke in favour of maintaining German 
unity. In  the Protocol of the Potsdam Conference6, it is provided that:
"...for the time being, no central German Government shall be established."7
However, the language used makes it clear that this was regarded as a temporary 
state of affairs until a decision would be made whether or not to establish such a 
government. And while the country was clearly divided into different zones of 
occupation, there was from the beginning of the occupation a limited joint 
governmental structure:
"In accordance with the Agreement on Control Machinery in Germany, 
supreme authority in  Germany is exercised, on instructions from their 
respective Governments, by the Commanders-in-Chief of the armed forces 
of the USA, the UK, the USSR and the French Republic, each in his own 
zone of occupation, and also j ointly, in matters affecting Germany as a 
whole, in  their capacity as members of the Control Council."8
A number of amendments were made to the Protocol on the zones of 
occupation,8 in particular, the agreement of 26 July 1945 on practical aspects of 
France's obtaining its own zone in Germany.*8
The zones belonging to France, the UK and USA became the territory for the 
Federal Republic, while the Soviet zone became the Democratic Republic, 
although the actual situation could have been much different, as the American 
and British armies had, while the war was still in  progress, advanced into what 
was to be the Soviet zone. Only later did they agree to withdraw to behind the 
lines of the pre-arranged zones. Germany was divided into four zones though 
still subject to some centralised administration, though not by Germans, so it is 
at this stage too early to speak of two Germanies coming into existence; even if  
the exercise of control was different in  the Soviet zone from the three western 
zones in character, the western zones were also separate from one another. But 
in  1946, the UK maintained the view officially that Germany still existed as one 
entity and this can be seen in R.v. Bottrill. ex parte Kuechcenmeister * * in  
which a certificate was produced from the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs 
which stated, inter alia:
133
"(1) Under para. 5 of the preamble to the declaration dated June 5,1945, 
of the unconditional surrender of Germany, the Governments of the 
United Kingdom, USA, USSR and f  ranee, assumed “supreme authority 
with respect to Germany, including all the powers possessed by the 
German Government, the High Command, and any state, municipal or 
local government or authority. The assumption for the purposes 
stated of the said authority and powers does not effect the annexation 
of Germany.”
(2) That in  consequence of this declaration Germany still exists as a state 
and German nationality as a nationality, but the Allied Control Commission 
are the agency through which the government of Germany is carried on."
Thus spoke the UK in 1946. Along with Trance and the USA, it was to maintain 
that a peace settlement between Germany and the Allies was outstanding, while 
“Germany" even in comparison with the disjointed entity which w'as occupied 
by the Allies from 1945, became steadily more divided. Even if  the view were 
held that Germany still existed as a State, by 1949, there was already a division 
between'the Soviet zone on the one hand, and the other zones. In  that year, the 
ERG and GDR were created, though not as fu lly independent States, yet 
nevertheless each one under separate government, with separate policing 
systems.
It is evident that the legal status of the ERG-GDR border is inextricably linked 
vdth the legal status of the two German States and the question of the continued 
existence of Germany. Until the creation of FRG and GDR, there was in  theory
134
no State frontier within Germany. lo r a very long period, the ERG refused to 
recognise the GDR as a State, and refused to conduct diplomatic relations with 
any State which had entered into diplomatic relations with the GDR12 (with the 
exception of the Soviet Union). In  furtherance of this policy, the ERG broke off 
diplomatic relations with some States, including Yugoslavia and Cuba. 
Eventually, through the exercise of its Qstpolitik. the ERG recognized that the 
GDR existed as a State and has entered into many treaties with it, but maintains 
the view, expressed by Chancellor Brandt, that “Even if  there exist two States in  
Germany, they are not foreign countries to each other; their relations with 
each other can only be of a special nature.”^  The GDR has maintained since 
soon after its inception in  1949, that the GDR and ERG are two separate German 
States. A study of the nature of the frontier therefore entails some analysis of 
the legal status of the two existing German States, the putative unitary German 
State - whether or not it exists insofar as this can clarify the legal status of the 
relevant borders. This is also relevant in the final analysis of the status of the 
Oder-Neisse line.
(ii) Developments from 1949 to 1972
In 1949, the position was that two German States had been set up in  Germany, 
the GDR not being recognized by the Western allies, while the ERG did not obtain 
recognition by the USSR. The line which delimited the eastern from the 
western zone became a frontier between the two German States, at least de facto. 
and exists now, though in a much stronger physical sense, due to the barriers 
erected there. While the ERG eventually recognised the GDR, albeit, it claimed.
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as another but not foreign State, both prior to and since this act it has carried 
out certain practical measures designed to support its view that the border is not 
an inter-State border in  the fu ll legal sense. This is also related to the question 
of the status of ERG and GDR as States. ¥ ith  regard to the European Community, 
when Yest Germany became a party to the Treaty of Rome,1*1 certain provision 
was made with regard to trade between the two German territories, in  the 
Protocol on German Internal Trade and connected problems This Protocol 
was signed by all six Member States, and, “by common accord of the Member 
States shall form an integral part....” of the EEC Treaty.16
This Protocol indicates that the inner-German border, for the purposes of the 
EEC, was considered as having a character different from other borders of 
Member States. It states:
"Since trade between the German territories subject to the Basic Law 
for the Federal Republic of Germany and the German territory in  
which the Basic Law does not apply is a part of German internal trade, 
the application of this Treaty in Germany requires no change in the 
treatment currently accorded this trade."1^
The effect of this is to create a substantive difference, for certain trade 
purposes, between the FRG-GDR border, and the FRG's borders with other States 
which are or were not part of the EEC, for example, Austria, Switzerland and 
Czechoslovakia.18 The provisions of the Protocol have the effect of attributing 
to internal-German trade the status of non-inter-State trade, with the resulting 
economic repercussions. If  the GDR ("the German territories in  which the Basic
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Law does not apply**) were, for the purposes of the Treaty of Rome, to be 
regarded as a non-Member State, without its possible link with the FRG, then 
trade between the FRG and GDR would be subject to the same regulations as trade 
between other Member and Non-Member States. Goods produced by the GDR and 
exported to the FRG are thereby given an advantage over goods exported to the 
FRG from other non-EEC territories.
The Protocol is evidence that the FRG considered its common border with the 
GDR to be different from its other borders, that there is some connection 
between the two German States which would permit an agreement to give 
special treatment to German goods crossing that frontier. In  addition, the 
Protocol itself makes the frontier different, since it attempts to modify the 
effects of the Treaty; albeit for very limited purposes. Therefore, for purposes 
of European Community law, the inner-German border, while still definitely a 
frontier, has a different status from all other frontiers. The GDR is not part of 
the EEC, so the inner-German frontier is not the same as, for example, that 
between France and ¥est Germany. On the other hand, the border is, for 
purposes of certain EEC trade, less divisive than the border between the FRG and 
its other neighbours which are not Member States.
¥h y was this particular frontier accorded this particular status? The answer 
is that ¥est Germany maintained in 1957 that there was still only one Germany 
and that it (the FRG) was representing that Germany. ¥h ile effect could not be 
given to its laws, including its Basic Lav, throughout “Germany**, provision 
could be made in certain fields for maintenance of the concept of one Germany.
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Thus, inner-German trade was not to be regarded as affected by the EEC Treaty 
such as to render it liable to the duties levied on other trade with non-EEC 
territories.19
The significance of the Protocol should not be over-estimated. It shows that 
the border v^ as treated in a unique fashion; nevertheless the differences are 
limited and the meaning of the Protocol has been discussed in the case law of 
the European Court of Justice. In the Swine Bellies Case29. thePlantiffs had 
contended that the Protocol had the effect of attributing to goods imported from 
the GDR into ERG the character of goods originating in  an EEC country. This 
view was challenged, both by the Eederal German Government and the 
European Commission. The Court held, inter alia, that the Protocol did not treat 
the GDR as part of the EEC or give goods produced therein the status of EEC 
products. It merely permitted the ERG to continue to allow goods from the GDR to 
circulate freely in  the ERG without payment of customs duties.
Thus, it was made very clear that the inner-German frontier exists with 
regard to the European Community, but that the normal restrictions which 
would otherwise apply had been partially amended by the Protocol. According 
to the judgment in  the Swine Bellies Case, "a special system was applied to the 
GDR which was treated neither as a Member State nor a third country.” The fact 
that European Community law accords this unusual status to the GDR, and that 
the inner-German border is accorded a separate status for limited purposes, is a 
symptom of the policy of the ¥est Germans, that the GDR is not a foreign State. 
Even in 1972, when the ERG had already recognized the GDR as a separate State,
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this theory was maintained/5* and the FRG continues to refuse to establish fu ll 
diplomatic relations with the GDR. The opinion of Judge Reischl supports the 
notion that the Protocol is a consequence of FRG policy with regard to the 
German question:
“Its sole function is - and this leads certainly to a restrictive inter­
pretation - to provide for the special relationship between the FRG 
and the GDR, that is, to avoid the division of Germany being deepened 
by the application of Community law to German internal trade."22
i
The inner-German border, which in itia lly  had been a demarcation line 
between the zones of occupation in Germany, has acquired in practice the 
attributes of a frontier between States. In  fact, it is extraordinarily well defined 
and demarcated, at least on the GDR side. This is because, first of all, the GDR 
having striven for nearly twenty five years to obtain recognition by the 
international community (other than the Soviet-bloc States), seemed to go to 
exaggerated lengths to display its separate statehood. Secondly, while the GDR 
strived to achieve legitimacy, the FRG sought to encourage the maintenance of a 
sense of national unity in  both German States. This wras done through political 
means and legal. For example, maps would depict Germany as one State, 
including East Prussia2  ^ As for legal means, the Grundgesetz obliged the 
Federal Government to adopt policies which would not harm the chances of 
bringing about German unity.
In  Article 116. the Grundgesetz defines as German for the purposes of the 
Constitution inter alia all those who possess German citizenship. This
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particular lav  has caused friction betveen the two German States, since it had 
the effect that citizens of the GDR and fRG are German citizens alike,24 and 
possess the same rights and duties. This is one of the main reasons for the 
strong fortification on the GDR side of the border, and may be regarded as 
recognition by the GDR (though not for purposes of public international lav ) of 
the unique nature of its border vith  the FRG. It is just because its citizens enjoy 
so many rights in  the Federal Republic (in particular, as German citizens, the 
right of permanent residence there), that the GDR has sought to exercise 
complete control over movement betveen the tvo States. By this is not meant 
legal controls - since GDR citizens have the right to a passport, theoretically 
they may travel in  the ¥est. In  any case, the GDR uses other justifications to 
refuse permission for official travel to the ¥est. The type of control considered 
here is physical control, since persons living in the GDR are liable to ignore 
lavs v ith  regard to foreign travel if  not physically restrained. Thus the border 
is protected from violation by fences, vails, armed guards, minefields, automatic 
firing devices, guard dogs, trip vires and electric fences, a protection the 
efficacy of vhich is being steadily improved.2  ^ The desire to prevent violation 
from vith in  of its border vith  ¥est Germany is practical acknovledgement that 
a special situation exists.
It has been seen that the FRG-GDR border emerged despite the expressed 
intentions of the Occupying Rovers to maintain one German State. As joint 
control over Germany and Berlin ceased, the tvo German States came into 
existence and, v ith  them, the de facto border, vhich has gradually come to 
acquire the character of permanence vith  the acceptance of tvo German States
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and the reference in international agreements to the border, both specifically 
and in more general terms. Until the Federal Republic embarked on its 
Ostpolitik in  the late 1960‘s, there was no question of any ¥est German 
recognition of the GDR and therefore the inner-German border was not a 
subject for discussion. However, as the two States drew nearer to contacts at 
State level, it was clear that for the Ostpolitik to achieve its aims, there would 
have to be some concession towards the GDR. Eor that State, its primary aim was 
to achieve international legitimacy through recognition by States which 
hitherto had withheld it, in particular the Federal Republic. This involved 
recognition, not only of the GDR, but of the GDR within its present existing 
borders. Thus, the GDR suggested as Article II of  its Draft Treaty on the 
Establishment of Equal Relations Between the GDR and the FRG of 17 December 
1969:
“The parties to the treaty mutually recognise their present territorial 
holding within the existing borders and the invidability thereof.
They recognise the borders in Europe fixed as a result of ¥orld ¥a r II, 
in  particular those between the German Democratic Republic and the 
Federal Republic of Germany as well as the frontier on the Oder and 
Neisse between the German Democratic Republic and the People’s 
Republic of Poland."26
The treaty which was eventually ratified by the FRG and GDR with regard to 
their mutual relations, which w ill be discussed later, differed substantially from 
the Draft submitted by the East Germans. Article II. quoted above, as well as the
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rest of the treaty, amount to a summary of GDR foreign policy with regard to the 
German question as a whole (including Berlin, or rather, ¥est Berlin), and as 
such vas hound to he unacceptable to the federal Republic. However, the Draft 
Treaty is worthy of attention, simply because it allows us to see the priorities of 
the GDR in  the conduct of its relations with the fRG.
The frontier did finally appear in a treaty with a¥estem  State when the ERG 
and the Soviet Union signed the Moscow Treaty on 12 August 1970 27 It had been 
mentioned in earlier valid international documents, as opposed to draft treaties 
and agreements, but these involved only the socialist States, which had already 
recognised the GDR within its existing frontiers. Thus the GDR and the Soviet 
Union in 1964 could “solemnly declare that the integrity of the state frontiers of 
the GDR is one of the basic factors of European security. They confirm their 
firm  determination jointly to guarantee the inviolability of these frontiers in  
accordance with the ¥arsaw Treaty of friendship, co-operation and mutual 
assistance."28 furthermore, in  1967, the Communist Declaration on European 
Peace and Security called for "recognition of the inviolability of the present 
European frontiers especially those on the Oder and the Neisse, as well as the 
frontiers between the two German States ...,"29 This Declaration could only have 
been directed at ¥estern States, given that the socialist States had already 
recognised the inviolability of the frontiers in question. It should be noted that 
these instruments did not actually refer to recognition of frontiers, but rather 
the guarantee of their inviolability, which in  eastern Europe however has been 
interpreted as the prohibition also of peaceful change of frontiers.
The fRG-Soviet Treaty xras the first one involving a ¥estern State, in  which
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the inner-German frontier was accorded the same status as other European 
frontiers. In  Article 3. the parties declare that they regard the frontiers of all 
States in Europe as inviolable, “including the Oder-Neisse line vhich forms the 
Western frontier of the People’s Republic of Poland and the frontier between 
the FRG and the GDR." These two frontiers were deliberately named, so 
removing any doubts that they are included within the ambit of the Article. The 
inner-German border is referred to here in a section dealing with all States in  
Europe. The FRG ratified this treaty. Therefore, it not only recognised that the 
GDR was one of the States in Europe, it made a declaration that the GDR’s 
frontiers actually exist. This might seem to be obvious to anyone who has ever 
travelled from one German State to the other; nevertheless it vras significant 
that the Federal Republic now stated that the GDR actually existed within its 
frontiers - a substantial shift from the times when it insisted that there was 
only one Germany. This Treaty is relevant to an evaluation of the legal status of 
the border. Apart from showing a change in  the policy of the Federal Republic, 
the frontier is classed along with all other European frontiers as being subject 
to certain conditions - that is, they are inviolable. The parties also declared that 
they have no territorial claims against anybody, nor would they assert such 
claims in future. (Article 3). If  this is taken along with the commitment to 
inviolability of frontiers, then it makes the GDR’s frontiers more secure, in  that 
they are being guaranteed in treaty form by its “protector", the USSR, and the 
main source of its insecurity, the Federal Republic. Nevertheless, the treaty 
does not lim it the ability of the parties to alter their frontiers by peaceful means 
and therefore, peaceful alteration of the inner-German border, even to the 
extent of its total removal, is not thereby prohibited. This was made clear by the 
Federal Republic in a Letter^0 to the USSR, which stated:
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"this Treaty does not conflict with the political objective of the FRG 
to work for a state of peace in  Europe in vhich the German nation 
w ill recover its unity in  free self-determination
Thus by 1970, although it had still not achieved recognition by the 
non-communist world, the GDR, within the borders vhich had always 
surrounded it, was slowly but surely coming to be accepted as a German State.
(iii) The Basic Treaty
It has been said that "The Treaty, by which the Parties agree to develop 
normal, good-neighbourly relations, shows the complete singularity and 
abnormality of the German situation in every provision."^ In fact, relations 
between the two States are hardly normal, either in  the practical or the legal 
sense; with their common border being one of the most heavily fortified in the 
world, with private contacts between the tvo States being on the whole 
one-way from ¥est to East Germany (this in  itself being a reflection of the 
unique legal situation). In  the legal sense, one party, the Eederal Republic, 
claims that the other is not even a foreign State It is difficult to conceive of a
more abnormal theory in the post-colonial era. If  intra-German relations are 
"normal", what consequences does this have for the relationship between the 
Eederal Republic and all other States which are definitely foreign to it? ^  
Perhaps they are supranormal. Erom the GDR perspective, relations with the 
ERG are normal, in that it regards ¥est Germany as a foreign State, like any 
other State.
However, the Basic Treaty (Grundvertrag ffi can be seen as an attempt by the
144
tvo German States to put their mutual relations on as normal a basis as possible, 
given their differing stances towards many legal issues, vhich are reflected in  
the text of the treaty.
In  the treaty itself, there is a general statement about inviolability of 
frontiers and respect for the territorial integrity and sovereignty of all States 
in  Europe vith in  their present frontiers being a basic condition for peace 
(Preamble). This is interesting for the fact that inviolability of frontiers and 
respect for territorial integrity and sovereignty are treated as part of one 
condition, rather than as separate elements. In Article 3. paragraph 2:
"They reaffirm  the inviolability nov and in the future of the frontier 
existing betv/een them and undertake fu lly to respect each other’s 
territorial integrity.”
This is the only place in the Treaty vhere the inner-German border is actually 
m e n t i o n e d  . 3 5  i n  fact, the Eederal Republic agreed to no more in Article \  
paragraph 2 of the Grundvertrag than it did in Article 3 of the Moscov Treaty,^ 
in vhich it also promised that it regarded its border vith  the GDR as inviolable. 
The GDR-ERG Basic Treaty vas signed at a time^7 vhen the Moscov Treaty vas 
already ratified - thus there can be no doubt about the formal commitment of 
Yest Germany to the inviolability of its border vith  the GDR. The Basic Treaty is 
not the first treaty to have been concluded directly betveen the tvo German 
States - bilateral agreements at State level had already been concluded v ith  
regard to traffic questions^8 - but it is the first treaty betveen the tvo States 
vhich attempted to establish the basis of a practical relationship betveen the 
tvo States on a general level.
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Thus far, it has been seen that, in  comparison with the Oder-Neisse frontier, 
there has been little controversy as to vhere the inner-German frontier ought 
to be situated. ¥here the frontier is mentioned, it has been in terms of its 
inviolability - but not in terms of recognition of the frontier as it exists, vhich 
characterises the discussion of the Oder-Neisse line. As stated at the beginning 
of this chapter, there is no doubt about the situation on the ground of the 
GDR-FRG border, but the legal problem arises in connection vith  the question 
vhether the border should exist at all, and this in  turn depends upon the legal 
status of the GDR and FRG. In contrast, vhile doubts vere discussed about the 
geography of the Polish-German border, it has not been seriously suggested 
that it should not exist at all. Hovever, it is precisely such doubts vhich have 
been raised about the inner-German border, usually in the context of debate on 
the status of the tvo German States. Much of the discussion is to be found vith in  
the Yest German legal system, and is therefore of limited value to a discussion 
about the international legal status of the border. But the practice of the Four 
Povers, vhich ultimately have the retained authority to decide on the frontiers 
of “Germany", and the practice of the tvo German States, both v ith  regard to 
their ovn status and that of “Germany", do enable the draving of conclusions 
about the legal status of the GDR-FRG border. The study so far has revealed more 
about certain characteristics of this border than its actual legal nature, vhich 
can only be ascertained by a study of the status of the tvo German States and 
Germany, if  it exists.
As fat' as the Four Povers are concerned, the origin of their authority v ith  
regard to Germany as a vhole is to be found in the instruments dravn up by
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them in 1944 and 1945. The actual assumption of authority is in  the declaration 
of the Allies v ith  regard to the defeat of Germany^9, vh ile the methods of 
exercise of that authority exist in various documents, perhaps most notably, and 
of greatest significance, the Potsdam Agreement.49
¥hen the tvo German States came into being in 1949, and vhen they gained 
their fu ll independence (subject to certain reserved rights of the Occupying 
Povers) in the mid-1950's, a number of statements of policy vere made by the 
Four Povers, and treaties vere entered into vith  the German States, vhich 
purported to define the relations inter se of the States concerned and, to some 
extent, to address themselves to the German question. These instruments are 
still in  existence, and there have been no further Four-Pover agreements v ith  
regard to Germany’s legal status since. The States concerned have issued 
statements of policy and have concluded bilateral treaties, and these are of some 
value (for example, the Moscov Treaty betveen USSR and FRG) in any 
evaluation of Germany’s present legal status. Hovever, the tvo German States 
(relatively) recently concluded the Grundvertrag. vhich is in  force, and events 
surrounding the conclusion of this treaty give a clear picture of the ¥est 
German position vith  regard to the status of Germany and the inner-German 
frontier. ¥e  shall therefore analyse the legal positions of the tvo German 
States and compare these vith  the policies of the Four Povers. From this study, 
it is hoped to establish to vhat extent, i f  any, ’’Germany” still exists and, if  so, 
vith in vhich borders. Second, the meaning of ’’Germany” will be clarified - is 
it simply tvo German States, the GDR and FRG, or is there another entity?
(iv) The Ruling of the Federal Constitutional Court
Prior to the ratification by the Federal Republic of the Grundvertrag. the
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Bavarian State Government applied to the Federal Constitutional Court for a 
declaration that the Federal lav/concerning the Treaty was not compatible with 
the Grundgesetz and v/as consequently void.41 The Federal Government applied 
to the same court for a declaration that the lav/in question was compatible v/ith 
the Grundgesetz. This was an attempt to halt the process of entering into force 
of the treaty and was not apparently without precedent in  the Federal 
Republic.42 The Court decided that the law, and therefore the treaty itself, v/as 
compatible with the Grundgesetz. Its decision was unanimous. However, the 
Court also held that the treaty could only be compatible with the Basic law, in  
the context of that case, if  the interpretation given by the Court to the treaty 
was accepted. This is of importance because the Court's decisions are binding 
for all federal and State authorities4 ;^ and therefore the decision, which finds 
the Grundvertrag and the Grundgesetz compatible, but only according to the 
Court's interpretation, may bind the Federal Government and may therefore be 
taken as a statement of ¥est German policy with regard to the legal status of the 
two German States, and the other related issues discussed by the Court.
The particular interpretation to which the Court resorted in order to achieve 
consistency in the various aspects of its decision is not on the face of it easily 
acceptable, except perhaps for the Federal Government, which must have been 
relieved to have overcome yet another hurdle in the development and 
advancement of its Ostpolitik. The Court addressed itself directly to the border 
between the two States, and concluded that there are borders of different legal 
quality44 - a statement with which this writer agrees. Had the Court left it at 
that, it would not have revealed as much of its reasoning with regard to the 
Basic Treaty, but neither would the Court have developed its theory to this 
fascinating conclusion:
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Tor the question whether recognition of the border between the two 
states as a state border is compatible with the Basic Law, it is decisive 
to qualify it as a constitutional border between two states whose 
“peculiarity” it is that they exist on the foundation of the still existing 
state "Germany as a whole", hence to treat it as a constitutional border 
similar to those running between the Lander of the FRG."^
From the wording used, it is clear that the Court was treating the inner-German 
border as similar to a border running between ¥est German Lander in the legal, 
as opposed to factual sense. Whether it is permissible simply to distinguish 
between the legal and practical circumstances of a border, in  order to ignore 
one or the other, when this happens to be necessary to make a theory 
applicable, was not discussed by the Court. In this instance, to compare the 
inner-German frontier with an inner-West German Land frontier as they exist 
in reality would not be credible. It is not possible for the inner-German border 
to be crossed without formality, as it is within West Germany - this is a factual 
difference wiiich highlights the dissimilarities of the frontiers concerned. 
Moreover, this factual difference has its origin in law/ - now, according to the 
GDR, it is an inter-State frontier, in common with the frontiers between, on the 
one hand, the GDR, and on the other, Poland and Czechoslovakia. However, prior 
to the existence of East and West Germany, the line dividing the Soviet zone of 
occupation from the other zones was an inter-zonal frontier, and as such v/as 
still different from the inter-Land border.
In  other words, the comparison made by the Federal Constitutional Court
149
cannot be intended to apply to the manner in vhich the frontiers operate in  
fact. The Court refers to a "constitutional border", similar to those running 
betveen the Lander of the FRG. The first problem vith  this is the vord similar. 
Does it mean that the border is the same? Presumably not, as it vould be much 
less ambiguous to say so. It can mean that the tvo types of frontier have some
characteristics in common - but if  this be the case, hovare the frontiers similar 
to each other, and in  vhich vays do they differ? According to the Basic Treaty, 
Article 3, the tvo States:
i
“....reaffirm  the inviolability nov and in the future of the frontier 
existing betveen them and undertake fu lly to respect each other’s 
territorial integrity."
Here the Federal Republic has clearly recognised that its border v ith  the GDR is 
"inviolable" - a vord found generally only in  treaties dealing vith  
international frontiers.46 Yet there is no suggestion that the Yest German land 
frontiers are inviolable. Yho is to violate them (for the purposes of 
international lav)? If  a foreign army is to invade the FRG, any violation v ill 
occur vhen the national frontier of that State has been crossed, and any 
advance across a Land as opposed to State, border v ill be a continuation of the 
violation of the State frontier. This may be vieved from another perspective. If  
the Yest German army holds manoeuvres vith in  Yest Germany, and during that 
event that army should deliberately cross the Land border from 
Baden-Yurttemburg into Bavaria* this v ill be a lavful act under international 
lav. If, vithout the permission of the GDR authorities, the same army crosses
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the State frontier from Bavaria in  the federal Republic to the GDR, a violation of 
the GDR frontier wall have occurred in  contravention, not only of the 
Grundvertrag. but also the Helsinki fin al Act and Article 2 (4) of the Charter of 
the United Nations.47 This shows how the sim ilarity of the frontiers claimed by 
the Court can be strained. However, the Court attempted to answer just this type 
of criticism by maintaining that the border may be regarded as similar to a Land 
frontier, because the two States “exist on the foundation of the still existing 
State “Germany as a whole"..."4® In other words, the Court considered that, 
despite the differences between the two kinds of frontier which it claimed to be 
similar, they could be regarded as possessing common characteristics as a 
consequence of what the Court saw as their joint, single foundation - the 
still-existing all German State. Indeed, if  the two States have so much to connect 
them, can they declare their common frontier to be inviolable? The Court seems 
to say that, for some purposes, it w ill attribute international characteristics to 
the inner-German frontier in  the Treaty with the GDR; on the other hand, this 
may cause difficulties in maintaining consistency between certain obligations, 
as undertaken in the Grundvertrag. to the GDR, and the fRG Grundgesetz. which 
restricts the freedom of action of the federal Government in the aims which it 
must or may pursue with regard to the whole of Germany. In  order therefore to 
maintain its legal position with regard to the whole of Germany, it chooses to 
attribute a peculiar legal status to the border which the fRG shares with its 
treaty partner, being aware that the partner w ill not agree with this 
interpretation of status.
The Court's interpretation is clever, if  only because it is difficult to dispute
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this interpretation in terms purely of the Grundvertrag. If  one criticizes the 
Court for accepting the provisions of the treaty, including the inviolability of 
the inner-German frontier, while simultaneously it describes the frontier as 
being similar to a ¥est German Land frontier, the Court can simply retort that 
everything is consistent if  its interpretation is accepted. Thus it is immediately 
necessary to consider whether Germany as a ’whole still exists (as the Court 
maintains), and if  it does so, whether the GDR stands in the relationship to Yest 
Germany through its assumed connection vith  the all-German State. But where 
is this all-German State? Yhat is its population; where are its borders; where 
does its government have its seat of power? One more problem, of course, is that 
the GDR totally rejects any possibility of its having some constitutional 
connection vith  the Federal Republic and, for that matter, v ith  the all-German 
State. One of the peculiar features of the Basic Treaty is the statement by the 
parties that, failing to agree on certain questions, they nevertheless agree to 
disagree:49
"Proceeding from the historical facts and vithout prejudice to the 
different views of the Federal Republic of Germany and the 
German Democratic Republic on fundamental questions, including the 
national question ...." (Preamble).
The judgment of the Court, in order to make sense, must be read as a viiole, 
and this means accepting the interpretation of the Court of the legal status of 
the FRG-GDR border. For purposes of Yest German municipal law alone, this 
may be feasible. However, this does not mean that the border must be regarded 
under international law as similar in status to a Yest German Land border. The
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Court itself admitted that the GDR and FRG are States under international law, yet 
declined to recognise their common border as a State border in  the normal 
sense. Does international law recognize, even if  only v ith  regard to the 
inner-German border, the concept of a frontier between two States which may 
in law have a status similar to that of a Yest German Land frontier?
One weakness of the arguments put forward by the Court as its judgment is 
that, should certain elements of the judgment be shown to be erroneous for the 
purposes of international law then the whole judgment w ill be open to question.
i
If  the conclusion is reached that the frontier separating the GDR from FRG is 
not, in law, similar to a Land frontier within the latter State, due to the 
non-existence of the all-German State, then the Court’s views w ill be without 
foundation. Indeed, in the view of this writer, a great weakness of the judgment 
is this equation of the Land and State border; even ignoring the factual 
differences which demean the credibility of such a comparison, the agreement 
by the Parties that the border is inviolable is evidence that there are legal 
dissimilarities in status. It is no answer to show that the Court only judged these 
borders to be ’’similar”, on the particular basis of the still existing German State; 
the Court was putting forward a theory, while the concept of inviolability, 
applying to the same border (in the Grundvertrag). and to that border plus 
other borders of an indisputably international character (in the Moscow 
Treaty), is no mere theory. It is found in the above-mentioned treaties, ratified 
by, inter alia, the Federal Republic of Germany.
Is the FRG-GDR border an inter-State border? The Court classified it as a 
border between States?® Yhy should the wording have been so cumbersome?
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The Court may have used this peculiar vording in order to imply that there v/as 
some difference betv/een this frontier and others. It described the difference of 
this border by qualifying its classification, v/ith the evaluation that the border 
exists on the all-German foundation. If  it is a border betv/een States, or an 
inter-State border (if that is something else), hov can it be similar to a Land 
border? According to the Court, the unique circumstances of “Germany", from 
the legal perspective, can permit such apparent contradictions and 
inconsistencies. In the viev of this v/riter, to claim for the purposes of 
international lav  that any inconsistency or contradiction in this field can be 
explained by resorting to the "unique circumstances" justification, is to avoid 
the issue. This may have been, albeit regrettably, permissible on the part of the 
fRG and GDR vhen, in the Basic Treaty, they agreed to disagree?1 This vas 
after all the only apparent means of achieving substantive progress in their 
mutual relations. It is not acceptable that a national Court should seek to square 
circles and deflect criticism by attributing its constitutional (in terms of the 
¥est German constitution) gymnastics to the, sic, special circumstances of 
Germany. If  this be accepted, it is a tacit admission that the situation in central 
Europe is tantamount to a legal impasse, and that all the treaties of the early 
1970*s discussed in this thesis are of minor significance for the permanent 
situation in Europe. In  addition, it v/ould constitute a denial of potential for the 
international legal development of the territorial question in Europe and a 
block to further efforts in  this area. The alternative is to establish, according to 
international lav/, the status of the tv/o German States and their frontiers and 
the extent to vhich, if  at all, “Germany" exists. This does not constitute an 
assertion that the unique circumstances of Germany should be ignored: vhere
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relevant, the peculiar legal characteristics must be taken into account; 
otherwise, the problems which exist w ill not avail themselves of any solutions; 
but nor must these unique circumstances be invoked as a justification for 
avoiding a legal conslusion which for some may, politically, be inconvenient. 
International law is not restricted in its scope by the Grundgesetz.
(v) The Position of the GDR
The GDR it must be stressed does not accept the judgment of the Federal 
Constitutional Court concerning the status of its western frontier. The position 
of the GDR was that the two German States were separate States with no more in  
common, legally, than with any other States. In  the 1969 Draft Treaty on the 
Establishment of Equal Relations between the GDR and FRG, proposed by the 
GDR, Article I provided, in  part:
“The parties to the treaty agree to the establishment of normal equal
relations  Their mutual relations are based in particular on the
principles of sovereign equality, territorial integrity, inviolability 
of state frontiers....” ^
This was perhaps an expression of the GDR's ideal position vis-a-vis the German 
question (i.e. that basically, there is no German question), but it gives an 
indication of that country's attitude towards its western border, showing its 
belief that the border was no different legally from other borders, given that 
the two entities separated by the disputed line were, if  the treaty be adopted, 
typical State subjects of international law being bound by the same principles 
as other States.
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The attitude of the GDR was repeated, in  foreign policy terms, by Erich 
Honecker in a speech given in 1971:
"3. The GDR declares its readiness to establish normal diplomatic 
relations with all States. ¥e proceed in this from the basis of equal 
rights for all States and are guided by the natural principle that 
every State respects the sovereignty of the GDR in  the same way as 
the GDR for its part fu lly respects the sovereignty of other States.
4. The GDR further advocates the establishment of normal relations 
in conformity with the rules of international law with the FRG also...“^
The fact that the Federal Republic is here singled out might lead the reader to 
conclude that that country was actually being accorded special attention, 
perhaps inconsistent with the claim that the GDR regards it simply as another 
State. However, it is suggested that a more accurate interpretation is that 
Honecker was simply emphasising that the Federal Republic was included in  the 
ambit of those States with which the GDR was prepared to establish normal 
relations. The implications behind having normal relations with ¥est Germany 
included attaching to their common border the label "inter-State frontier".
The Federal Republic does seem to recognise the GDR's western frontier in  
the Grundvertrag. In Article 3, -para 2, it is provided that the parties
"...affirm the inviolability now' and in the future of the border 
existing between them and undertake fu lly to respect their 
territorial integrity."^
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The concept of inviolability of frontiers has long been regarded by the socialist 
States and socialist international lawyers^ as one of the principles of 
international law, applying in relations between States and has appeared in  
treaties involving Western States (such as the German eastern treaties) and in  
international agreements (for example, the Helsinki Final Act). Respect for 
territorial integrity^6 is sufficiently important to be one of the obligations in  
Article 2 (4) of the United Nations Charter:
"All Members shall refrain in their international relations from
I
the threat or use of force against the territorial in tegrity... of any 
state.”
This provision is binding upon almost every State due to the fact that most 
States are members of the United Nations. Moreover, the prohibition of the 
threat or use of force, and, insofar as it is protected by this prohibition, the 
associated protection of territorial integrity, is probably one example of jus 
cogens.^  More recently, the respect for territorial integrity has been declared 
a principle of international law by the General Assembly.^ 8
Given the clear expression of these concepts in the Grundvertrasr and 
therefore their endorsement by the parties as rules governing their mutual 
relations, and taking into account the established nature of these rules as rules 
of international law' and their use with regard to State frontiers and territory, it 
must be concluded that the Federal Republic regards and accepts the GDR 
territory, and the frontier of that territory where it meets the Federal Republic,
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as being governed by the same roles of international lav/ as other territories 
and frontiers and, despite its reservations, treats it as an inter-State frontier.
(v i) Assessment of the FRG-GDR Frontier after 1973.
There v-mild appear to be a v/idely held viev' that the border is to be regarded 
85 being governed by international lav/, and therefore in this sense the GDR has 
been successful in attempting to gain recognition of the international 
character of the frontier by the federal Republic. Among West Germans, 
hov/ever, opinions vary. Geek, for example, in summarising the provisions of 
the Grundvertrag. notes that it includes ”a recognition of territorial 
frontiers’’^ 0 and describes this as ”a success of the German Democratic 
Republic.”60 Frov/ein v/rites that even if  the border vdth the GDR is marked as 
the inner-German border, nevertheless it should be clear that it possesses an 
international lav' quality;61 although legal relations may continue to exist 
between the w o  German States and there maybe some special relationship, yet 
the border is still an international one. Frov/ein concludes that the 
international legal position concerning the frontier is that it is an 
international legal frontier between tv/o independent subjects of international 
lav/.62 But it should be noted that even in saying this, he also points out the 
peculiarities of the problem.
Blumenv/itz adopted a different stance. He describes the Basic Treaty as the 
most controversial of the Eastern treaties concluded by the Federal Republic.60 
He mentions the border provisions contained in Article 3, paragraph 2 of the 
treaty, but concludes that, for the GDR, the most important aim in the context of
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the detente and normalisation process vas to become a member of the United 
Nations.64 Another viev, vhile by no means denying the special importance to 
the GDR of acquiring membership of the UU„ nevertheless accords at least 
equal status to the policy of obtaining international recognition by the Federal 
Republic of its sovereign statehood and all of the consequences flov/ing 
therefrom, v/ith regard for example to borders, citizenship and reunification 6  ^
This gives some indication of the diverse opinion in  the Federal Republic on all 
aspects of the East-¥est German legal relationship. Blumenv/its goes on to claim 
that the Eastern treaties and the CSCE Final Act contain no guarantee (Garantie) 
for the frontiers in central Europe and, in particular, that for the tv/o German 
States, there exists no prohibition of addition or accession (Anschlussverbot).66 
Yet one has to question the intention behind such an assertion. Fev vould 
disagree that all States have a right to alter their common borders by mutual 
consent using peaceful means. This right is expressly mentioned in the CSCE 
Final Act, as part of the first often principles guiding the relations between the 
participating States,67 therefore, regardless of the legal status of that 
instrument, it may safety be assumed that none of the participating States 
v/ould argue against the validity under international lav  of such a right - given 
that it is classed as one of the main principles guiding the inter-State relations 
and quite separately from the right of States under international law to alter 
their frontiers, if  they desire, as a manifestation of sovereignty. It must be 
taken into consideration that one of the most important aspects of the Eastern 
treaties, for the USSR, Poland and the GDR, vas the agreement of the Federal 
Republic that the vestem frontiers of Poland and the GDR vere subject to the 
rules of international lav  (even if  not recognised by the FRG as international
159
frontiers). This agreement of the ERG was intended to contribute to the stability 
of these frontiers, and the comment that the treaties and the CSCE Einal Act 
contain no guarantee, taking into consideration both the terms of these 
instruments and the conditions in  which they were negotiated and finally  
agreed upon, suggests either a failure to apply appropriate weight to the 
relevant provisions or else an attempt to disregard the true nature of the 
treaties. Both the treaties and the Final Act are concerned with establishing 
some basis or foundation for the future relations between the participating 
States. One of the essential components of that foundation is the acceptance of 
frontiers and the strengthening of their security. Thus to assert that they 
contain no guarantee for the existing frontiers is to undermine the whole basis 
of these instruments: while they explicitly or im plicitly acknowledge the right 
of all States to change their borders, they nevertheless at the same time attempt 
to establish a sound basis - a guarantee, perhaps - for the present and future 
stability. It is accordingly the view of this writer that the Eastern treaties and 
the CSCE Final Act do provide, subject to the right to alter borders by peaceful 
means and under mutual agreement, some guaranee for the present borders in  
central Europe, since they contain expressions of consent to certain frontiers 
by States which previously had withheld their agreement or approval; and 
because to say that they contain no guarantee, is to undermine these 
agreements as a whole. This need for stability and security has been 
acknowledged and recognized even by Chancellors of the Federal Republic. In  
1966, Kiesinger, while stressing the necessity to achieve a final settlement of 
boundaries with a reunified Germany, still felt able to mention the Polish need 
for greater security:
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"Large sectors of the German people very much w it  reconciliation 
with Poland whose sorrowful history we have not forgotten and whose 
desire ultimately to live in a territory with secure boundaries we now, 
in  view of the present lot of our own divided people, understand 
better than in former times....
Chancellor Kohl has also emphasised, in the context of a debate on the Federal 
Republic’s relations with its neighbouring States to the east, that the borders of 
all States in Europe are inviolable. Concerning in particular the ¥arsaw Treaty, 
Kohl stressed that the Federal Republic remained committed to the treaty in its 
fu ll sense.®* It is difficult to find in Kiesinger’s statement the sentiment which 
would serve to deny from the future treaties, as Blumenwitz seeks to do, the 
security sought; while Kohl makes it clear that the Federal Republic does adhere 
to the Warsaw Treaty in  fu ll, including therefore those parts which attempt to 
give stability to the Oder-Neisse line.
In the context of the Gnmdvertrag, the phrase "of all States in Europe" (aller 
Staaten in Europe), which is taken from the Preamble of the treaty, may also 
have some special significance for the status of the inner-German border. Ress 
notes that the question whether or not the common border of the two German 
States can be equated with those of all States in Europe in  their legal quality, 
appears debatable (and not only in light of the judgment of the Federal 
Constitutional Court, which begins from the assumption that this border is 
subject to municipal law)7® Ress continues, however, by saying that the 
equation of the FRG -GDR border with those of all other States in Europe, which
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occurs in  the Preamble, implies the interpretation that this particular border, 
and not only those of both States with third States, is to be regarded as a matter 
of international law?* By including this clause in the Preamble, the Parties, it 
is argued, showed their w ill to regard the existing demarcation line as a State 
frontier 72 Thus, despite the differing legal positions with regard to the 
German question, provision for which is made in the Treaty, the two States have 
recognised their common border as a State frontier. This writer agrees with the 
analysis of Ress with regard to the effect of the Grundvertrasf on the status of 
the inner-German frontier. It is consistent with the view' expressed above, that 
any characterisation of the border as similar to one between tv'o Lander of the 
Federal Republic, regardless of its validity under the lav/ of ¥est Germany, 
cannot apply to the border for purposes of international law. In  so far as the 
Grundvertrag concerns itself with the frontier between ¥est and East Germany, 
it may be regarded as a success for the GDR, in that it amounts to an 
achievement of one of its primary policy objectives - the acceptance by the 
Federal Republic that the frontier is a matter of international law, like other 
inter-State frontiers, is evidence that the two German States are separate 
entities in the same v'ay that any two other States are, usually, separate legal 
entities. In other words, the separateness of the two States, which is a 
foundation of the GBR‘s foreign policy, is highlighted by the border provisions. 
On the other hand, the treaty in some way also reflects the policy of the Federal 
Republic, of emphasizing the unique nature of the relationship - that, despite 
the acknowledged differences, there remain links, even legal ones, between the 
two parts of one German nation. Thus, in the Preamble the Parties are described 
as:
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"Proceeding from the historical facts and without prejudice to the 
differing views of the FRG and the GDR on questions of principle, 
including the national question ..."7^
Related to this is Article 9 of the Treaty, in  which the Parties agree that the 
Treaty does not affect any treaties or agreements previously concluded by them 
or concerning them. Thus the fu ll validity of the Potsdam Agreement is 
maintained, according to the West German interpretation of which there must 
still take place a peace settlement involving a reunified Germany, before the 
regime in Europe may be regarded as finally settled. It is in  this context that the 
treaties concluded by the Federal Republic with its eastern neighbours have 
been described as a "regime interm ediate."7  ^ Such an analysis would not find a 
sympathetic hearing in the GDR. Although it is true that the Eastern treaties, 
whether individually or collectively, do not form a substitute for a peace 
settlement, they do serve to give nevertheless a settled character to the existing 
situation in central Europe. While according to the Eederal Republic and the 
Western Powers a peace settlement remains outstanding, the requisite 
precondition for such a settlement (an all-German Government) does not exist 
nor is expected to exist in  the foreseeable future (i.e., as long as Europe is 
divided into two blocs). The Eastern treaties, which take account of the existing 
geopolitical realities of central Europe, do serve to establish or to relaunch 
relations between the Parties on anew basis, taking account of the war (in the 
FRG treaties with Czechoslovakia and Poland) or events which occurred as a 
result of the war (in the treaties of the FRG with the Soviet Union and the GDR). 
The treaties all have a fundamental character, in  that in each case they serve 
either as the basis for normalization of relations, the basis for establishment of
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any formal relationship at all, or the redefinition of an existing one. Thus the 
treaties are not self-executory; they form part of a regime for existing States 
and frontiers which are as permanent and firmly-established as many "normal” 
States. The only difference is that, with regard to central Europe, the Potsdam 
Agreement remains in force and, potentially, may play a role in  the future 
alteration of the existing frontiers and States. It has already been noted that, 
generally. States may alter their own frontiers or even their status as States, as 
an expression of their sovereignty. The Potsdam Agreement provides for a 
specific framework in which such events might occur. Certainly, the 
sovereignty of the two German States may be limited for certain purposes; it is 
also true that the Potsdam Agreement does not constitute an expression of the 
sovereign w ill of Germany. But it does express the w ill of the UK, USA and USSR, 
which at that time had the right under international lav  to make the decisions 
which were taken with regard to Germany.
In taking account of the existing situation in Europe, the Eastern treaties 
form a permanent regime for the parties involved. There does remain a formal 
possibility of fundamental change (through the realization of certain 
provisions of the Potsdam Agreement), which is formally separate from and 
independent of these treaties. However, a realistic assessment of the situation 
shows consistent development away from the aims of the Potsdam Agreement 
towards a regime which was then unforeseen. In  the absence of genuine 
possibility of their realization, the relevant provisions of the Potsdam 
Agreement, despite persistent and consistent reservation of rights and 
obligations, seem to exist only formally. Just as there exists under general
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international lav  the right to alter frontiers or status, so for the States involved 
there remain these additional specific possibilities. But an assessment of the 
reality of the situation and observation of how it has evolved indicates a steady 
movement tov/ards the present regime. Nominally, there might always remain 
the possibility of change under the conditions specified at Potsdam, while the 
“regime intermediate" becomes ever more firm ly entrenched. It w ill be just as 
permanent as other border regimes or States. Is it to be regarded as fatal, that 
there exists a specific instrument which may serve ultimately to weaken the 
viability of the existing system? In other words, this writer does not dispute
i
that the Potsdam Agreement remains in force and that it may lawfully alter the 
regime established or confirmed by the Eastern treaties, and in this case one is 
perhaps justified in calling it a "regime intermediate": but despite this 
characterization as intermediate, the regime in reality is as permanent as most 
others and should be regarded as capable of such a degree of permanency and to 
be sufficiently normal as to render the term "intermediaire" misleading. The 
regime may be intermediate, but it could be permanent, in  which case it would 
be incorrect to define it in this way. Either course may be permanent and 
definitive (whether reunifying Germany and organising a peace settlement or 
maintaining the existing regime). Hie difference is that the latter seems to be 
subject to the existence or not of the former. This would seem to weaken the 
assertion that the present regime actually is not "intermediaire". Against this 
should be considered the strength of the present regime of frontiers and States 
in central Europe and the likelihood of it continuing. Moreover, in  this context, 
one may find the attitude of the USSR to be of value. That State is a Party to the 
Potsdam Agreement; it is also a Party to one of the Eastern Treaties and.
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although the continuing unaffected validity of all treaties or arrangements 
previously concluded t>y the Parties is explicitly provided for,7-* the fact that the 
Soviet Union v/as prepared to enter into such an agreement v/ith the federal 
Republic hardly indicates a desire on the part of the former State to speed up the 
performance in fu ll of the Potsdam Agreement.
Clearly it has to be acknovdedged that there do exist fundamental 
disagreements between concerned States vdth regard to hov/ the situation in  
central Europe ought to evolve. The status of the ERG-GDR border in this context 
is one of the most confused elements: it maybe a normal international frontier; 
it may be a frontier betv/een States which are not foreign to one another; it 
may form part of a regime intermediaire: these are some of the viev/s expressed 
on this matter. Then there is the conclusion of the federal Constitutional Court, 
and this ruling may be of greater value to the international lav/yer in arriving  
at a definition of this frontier for purposes of international lav/ than at first 
anticipated.
(v ii) The Dual Status of the fRG-GDR frontier
Although this characterisation by the federal Constitutional Court of the 
inner German frontier as similar to a Land frontier cannot be regarded as 
authoritative for purposes of international lavr, it is nevertheless instructive. 
In fact, it is necessary to classify the border tv/ice. firstly, as the line betv/een 
two States, it is orima facie an international frontier, in so far as one does not 
look beyond the existence of the tvo States to the basis of their presence in  
central Europe. Hov/ever, if  one then looks at the border in the German context
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-  in  light of the continued existence, for certain purposes at least, of Germany - 
then its character appears to change. In  1945 the line divided the Western 
occupation zones from that of the Soviet Union. But eventually, the occupation 
regimes were dismantled and so the line could no longer be classified as an 
internal division of occupation zones. However, it is in  this rather artificial 
context that some sim ilarity to the Land frontier must be acknowledged. In  so 
far as Germany continues to exist -  in  the eyes of the Western Powers - then, 
with regard to rights and responsibilities relating to Berlin and Germany as a 
whole, the ’’border" is, arguably, comparable with a Land border. But the 
significance of this classification lies not in  the relationship between West and 
East Germany, but in  the relationship between the UK, USA and Erance, on the 
one hand, and the Soviet Union on the other, as the Four Powers responsible for 
Germany. For these States, acting in this capacity, the frontier is not an 
international frontier. The Soviet Union, despite maintaining that Germany 
does not exist, nevertheless enjoys certain rights and accepts some 
responsibilities in  this respect, that is, as one of the Four Powers, and takes 
advantage of its status in certain situations.76 The border serves to show the 
Four Powers where their respective authorities extended to during the period of 
occupation; since the occupation regimes no longer operate, its remaining 
function is to delimit the former occupation zones for the purposes of the 
residual power possessed by the four States. Since the residual power is 
concerned with Germany as a whole, the border in this all-German context is 
for the UK, USA and France, simply that point at which the USSR could lawfully 
exercise supreme authority in Germany, where only that part of the country 
v/as concerned, and where as a consequence their own authority ceases, except
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for all-German matters. The opposite position of course holds true for the Soviet 
Union.
In this limited sense, in  the context of the still-existing German State only, 
the dividing line loses its character as a border and reverts to being an internal 
division. This definition is to be distinguished from that of the Federal 
Constitutional Court, since that tribunal held that the border could be compared 
to a ’lan d” border - i.e., an internal as opposed to international frontier - in  its 
role as the frontier between the Federal Republic and the Democratic Republic. 
It is suggested that in fact the opposite holds true: the border is indeed an 
international one in so far as it separates ¥est from East Germany. 
Nevertheless, as the dividing line in the still-existing German State, it cannot be 
an international frontier; in such a situation it may validly be compared to a 
Land frontier, in that both constitute internal divisions of States (it is yet 
another matter whether or not these States actually exist).
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FOOTNOTES
1. This definition is subject to various exceptions and modifications. Thus, 
certain aspects of State sovereignty may be lawfully exercised outside the 
national territory, with lawful consequences. A State's diplomatic missions 
abroad have certain privileges which mean that the host State is limited in  
the actions which may be taken with regard to the Embassy. Article 22 of 
the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations of 1961 provides, in  Para­
graph One:
"The premises of the mission shall be inviolable. The agents of the 
receiving State may not enter them, except with the consent of the 
head of the mission.”
Most European States agreed in the Helsinki Final Act that their frontiers 
are inviolable. In  addition, all States have rules or laws governing 
immigration by foreigners, so that they may not enter the State lawfully 
without permission. The analogy should not, however, be extended too 
far. Had Iran carried out any unauthorised incursions into the territory 
of the USA, it is likely that the USA v'ould have responded m ilitarily.
The Iranian invasion and subsequent occupation of the US Embassy 
compound in Tehran brought no m ilitary response from the USA, 
other than the use of its armed forces in the failed attempt to rescue the 
American hostages.
The ILC, commenting on its Draft Articles with regard to the Vienna 
Convention, said:
“Among the theories that have exercised an influence on the 
development of diplomatic privileges and immunities, the 
Commission w ill mention the "extraterritoriality" theory, 
according to which the premises of the mission represent a 
sort of extension of the territory of the sending State."
1958 YILC, Vol. II, p. 94.
But this is very much a limited extension. The above-quoted theory is only 
one mentioned by the Commission, and the Convention itself provides 
that its Articles offer "priveleges and immunities" (Preamble). A State 
does not possess its sovereignty by privelege but by right. Yhether by 
custom or convention, the position of diplomatic missions and their 
staffs is one of privilege and immunity which allow/s certain sovereign 
aspects or functions to exist outside the national territory - but in a 
very limited manner for restricted purposes.
Another restriction upon the definition is that the effective sovereignty 
of a State may be reduced by the actual control over part of its territory by 
another powrer, such as an internal opposition group or a foreign army. 
¥h ile the effective sovereignty does not reach to the State frontier, the
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frontier may, and probably does, continue to exist. An example of this 
is the situation of Angola, where large areas of territory, controlled by 
UNITA, are outside the effective control of the government. That 
country's borders are not regarded as thereby altered.
In addition, the definition may not fit all situations - the frontier may 
not be clearly established in the sense of exercise of sovereignty, and it 
may be necessary to establish viio has sovereignty where a dispute exists; 
Mex Huber's views, as expressed in  the Island of Palmas Case (Permanent 
Court of Arbitration, 2 R.I.A A. 829) are of great importance:
"If, however, no conventional line of sufficient topographical 
precision exists or if  there are gaps in the frontiers otherwise 
established, or if  a conventional line leaves room for doubt, or 
i f .... the question arises whether a title is valid ergaomnes. the 
actual continuous and peaceful display of State functions is in  
case of dispute the sound and natural criterion of territorial 
sovereignty."
i
Brownlie (Principles of Public International Law, Oxford, (3rd ed.)
1979, at pp. 127-128) expresses a further modification of 
the idea of frontiers lim iting sovereignty, in  the sense that the 
frontier may carry out this function, even though it is not accepted by 
all relevant States as the frontier:
"Frontiers which are "de facto", either because of the absence of 
demarcation or because of the presence of an unsettled territorial 
dispute, may nevertheless be accepted as the legal lim it of sovereignty 
for some purposes, for example those of civil or criminal jurisdiction, 
nationality law, and the prohibition of unpermitted intrusion with or 
without the use of arms."
(Footnotes omitted).
2. Sovereignty: “By and large the term denotes the legal competence which a 
state enjoys in respect of its territory."
Brownlie, Note 1, supra, at p. 126.
"Sovereignty in the relations betv/een States signifies independence. 
Independence in regard to a portion of the globe is the right to 
exercise therein, to the exclusion of any other State, the functions 
of a State."
- Max Huber in his arbitration in the Island of Palmas Case
In vievr of the powers retained by the UK, USA, USSR and France with 
regard to'Uermany as a whole" and the delimitation of its external frontier 
at afuture peace conference, there may be questions as to the extent of their 
independence. It might be argued that most ¥arsawr Pact and NATO States 
are also less independent because of their commitments to these groups 
(or to the Soviet Union and USA); or that Member States of COMECON and 
the European Community are, through their commitments to these 
organisations, less free in  their scope for unilateral action. But there is 
an important substantive difference: all commitments assumed or under­
takings made by States with regard to these organisations were, at least
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nominally, voluntary. The States involved may withdraw, should 
they wish (cf loosening of ties between France and NATO). The GDR and 
FRG (and Germany, should it exist) are on the other hand involved in  a 
relationship with the Four Powers which is not based on treaty or 
agreement, but rather finds its origin in the assumption by the Powers 
of supreme authority with regard to Germany. The GDR and FRG 
cannot unilaterally suspend the applicability of this authority.
Yhile in 1954 the three Western Powers handed over most of their 
authority with regard to the western zones of Germany to the Federal 
Republic, certain rights of the Powers were retained in the relevant 
treaty. The FRG cannot, by denouncing the treaty, suspend the 
rights of the Powers. This is because, while they are given expression 
in  the treaty, they do not derive their validity from the treaty, but 
from the assumption by the Allies of supreme authority with regard 
to Germany in  1945.
3. CMND 1552, Doc. No. 1, p. 27.
4. The Morgenthau Plan of 6 September 1944 provided, inter alia, for the i 
conversion of defeated Germany into an agrarian State, and proposed 
the division of Germany.
5. H.C. Debates. Vol. 467. col. 1597-1598 (21 July 1949).
Churchill: “.... the Morgenthau Agreement.... it was initiated by 
President Roosevelt and by me, and it undoubtedly proposed treatment 
of Germany which was a harsh treatment, in  respect of largely 
lim iting her to being an agricultural country. But that wras not a 
decision taken over the heads of the Cabinet. It was not one that 
ever reached the Cabinet. It never reached the Cabinet because
it wes only ad referendum: it was disapproved by the State 
Department on the one hand and by my right hon. Friend and 
the Foreign Office Committee on the other, and it just dropped 
on one side. I must say that it never required a Cabinet negative; 
it never had any validity of any sort or kind.
Nevertheless I must say that I do not agree with this paper, for 
which I none the less bear a responsibility. I do not agree with it, 
but I can only say that when fighting for life  in  a fierce struggle 
with an enemy I feel quite differently towards him than when that 
enemy is beaten to the ground and is suing for mercy."
Churchill had initialled the agreement but changed his mind later, to 
the extent of criticizing the Poles for wanting so much of Germany, while 
if  the Morgenthau Plan had been put into operation, it would have caused 
enormous changes in the character of Germany.
Further, it has been suggested* that the Morgenthau Plan could be seen 
in  many of its aspects in the Directive of the United States Joint Chiefs 
of Staff to the Commander-in-Chief of the US Forces of Occupation re­
garding the M ilitary Government of Germany (JCS1067, Documents 
on Germany under Occupation 1945-1954, p. 13).
*Hubatsch (ed.): The German Question, New York, 1967 at p.19.
6. Documents on British Policy Overseas. (1984).
Series 1, Vol. 1,1945, Doc. No. 603.
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7. Part II, A.9 (iv).
8. Potsdam Protocol, Part II, A .I.
9. CMND 1552, Doc.No. 2, p. 29.
CMND1552, No. 4, p. 34 - The Yalta Agreement where it was agreed that 
a zone of occupation be allotted to France.
10. CMND 1552, Doc. No. 12, p. 45.
11. R. v. Eottrill, ex t>arte Kuechenmeister 
(1946) 1 All ER 635.
12. This was the policy known as the Hallstein Doctrine.
13. Extract from Policy Statement by Brandt to the Bundestag.
28 October 1969
CMND 6201. Doc. No. 104, p. 204.
14. The Treaty of Rome, creating the European Economic Community, was signed 
in  1957. The ERG is one of the original six Member States.
15. Treaties establishing the European Communities, pp.429-431.
Office for Official Publications of the European Communities (1973).
16. EEC Treaty, Article 239.
17. Protocol on German Internal Trade, Paragraph 1.
18. It is necessary to distinguish here between common borders of EEC Member 
States, which were for purposes of EEC trade, especially in the form of free 
movement of goods and persons, modified by the Treaty of Rome, and 
borders between Member States and Non-Member States. It is in  the context 
of treatment of borders with regard to Non-Member States that the GDR-ERG 
border is considered.
19. The ERG legislation includes many cases of provision for GDR citizens as if  
they were not foreigners, such as the ERG law on citizenship.
20. Norddeutsches Vieh-Und Vleischkontor GMBH v Hauptzollamt-Ausfuhrer- 
stattung, Hamburg-Jonas.
(Swine Bellies Case), No. 14/74.
1974 E.C.J. Reports 899.
21. During the ratification procedure of the GDR-ERG Basic Treaty, the Eederal 
Government insisted that the two states were not foreign to each other. This 
view is not shared by the GDR.
22. Note 20, supra, at p. 913.
23. This policy was developed to the extent of weather forecasts for "East 
Prussia" being broadcast.
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24. The citizenship lav  in force in the Federal Republic is the citizenship lav  of 
1913. Thus, reference is not made as such to FRG and GDR. The lav  has been 
much amended, especially during and after the Hitler dictatorship, but has 
the effect of creating one German citizenship, vhich applies to Germans 
born in GDR as veil as FRG.
23- “ a nev border fence (is) being erected behind the old one vhich experts
say is virtually impossible to scale.
The 10 ft. high electrically charged barricade is set back some 500 yards 
from the main fence and consists of metal railings vith  razor-sharp edges 
designed to cut the hands of anyone attempting to climb i t ...."
The Times, 28/3/84 - "E. Germans build electric fence."
26. Doeker, Bruckner: The Federal Republic of Germany and the German 
Democratic Republic in  International Relations, Vol. I, Dobbs Ferry,
N.Y. (1979), at p. 371.
27. 1970 9 ILM 1026-1027.
28. Treaty of Friendship, Mutual Assistance and Cooperation betveen the USSR 
and GDR, 12 June 1964, Article 4, CMND 6201, Doc. No. 46, p. 107.
29. Declaration on European Peace and Security issued at the Karlovy Vary 
Communist Conference, 26 April 1967.
30. Letter concerning German Reunification from the ¥est German Foreign 
Minister to the Soviet Foreign Minister, 12 August 1970.
CMND 6201, No. 125.
"...dieser Vertrag nicht im Widerspruch zu dem politischen Ziel 
der Bundesrepublik Deutschland steht, auf einen Zustand des 
Friedens in Europa hinzuvirken, in dem das deutsche Volk in freier 
Selbstbestimmung seine Einheit viedererlangt."
In: Verdross, Simma, Geiger: Territoriale Souveranitat und Gebietshoheit. 
Zur volkerrechtlichen Lage der Oder-Neisse-Gebiete.
(Territorial Sovereignty and Gebietshoheit. On the International Legal 
Status of the Oder-Neisse Territories).
Bonn 1980, at p. 127.
31. Frovein: Legal Problems of the German Ostpolitik.
1974 23ICLQ105 at 114.
32. See pp. 134-135 end Note 13, supra.
33. Frovein (Note 31 supra, at 115) suggests as a precedent the relationship 
betveen the UK and Ireland. Hovever, there are legal differences in the 
manner in vhich Ireland came into existence as a separate State, in  
comparison v ith  GDR and FRG.
34. 1973 12 ILM 16 (English text)
BGB1 1973 H  p. 423 (German text).
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35- "Sie bekraftigen die Unverletzlichkeit der zvischen ihnen
bestehenden Grenze jetzt und in der Zukunft imd verpflichten sich zur 
uneingeschrankten Achtung ihrer territorialen Integritat.
There exists also a Supplementary Protocol to the Treaty, Part I of vhich 
also refers to the Parties' common border. Hovever, this deals v ith  
practical details, including marking of the border, draving up of 
necessary documentation on the course of the frontier and regulation 
of other problems connected vith  the course of the frontier.
36. See pp. 141-143, supra.
37. The Moscov Treaty vas ratified on 17 May 1972. The Grundvertrag vas 
initialled on 8 November 1972, signed on 21 December 1972, and 
ratified on 20 June 1973.
38. The treaties are:
(a) Agreement betveen the Government of the FRG and the Government 
of the GDR on Transit Traffic of Civilian Persons and Goods betveen the 
ERG and Berlin (¥est). 17 December 1972.
(b) Treaty betveen the FRG and the GDR on Traffic Questions. 26 May 
1972.
39. "The Governments of the United Kingdom, the United States of America 
and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and the Provisional 
Government of the French Republic, hereby assume supreme authority 
vith  respect to Germany, including all the povers possessed by the 
German Government, the High Command and any State, municipal or 
local government or authority....”
Declaration re Unconditional Surrender of Germany,
Preamble, Paragraph 5.
CMND 1552, No. 7., p. 38.
40. See Note 6, supra.
41. Applications of Bavarian State Government and Federal German 
Government. 1973. NJ¥ 1539.
1976 70 AJIL147 (English summary, with quotations)
42. "In effect, Bavaria vas challenging the treaty itself. Attacks against 
international treaties vere nothing nev to the Federal Constitutional 
Court. Yhen still an opposition party, the Social Democrats had also 
used lav suits as a legal vehicle against treaties they opposed politically." 
Geek: Germany and Contemporary International Lav.
1974 9 TILJ 263, at 273.
43. Statute of the Constitutional Court - Bundesverfassungsgerichtsgesetz, 
section 31.
There may be some general limits on the binding effect of the decisions 
of the Constitutional Court - the vording certainly has binding effect 
(i.e. the tenor of the decisions), but the reasoning probably does not.
This may be affected by any particular importance attached by the 
Court to its reasoning, such as in the present case.
See: Geek, Note 42, supra, at 275.
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44. Note 41, supra. 1973 NJ¥ 1542 col. 2.
1976 70 AJIL147, at 152.
45. Note 41, supra, at 153.
46. Eor example, the Warsaw Treaty, Article I (2), in  vhich the FRG and Poland 
undertake an obligation and express opinions identical to Article 3 of the 
Grundvertrag. There vas much opposition to the ratification of the ¥arsav 
Treaty, but the Oder-Neisse Line has not as yet been compared realistically 
to a Land frontier, such as exists vith in  the Federal Republic.
47. Gelberg: The Case of the Treaty Concerning the Bases of Relations betveen 
the GDR and the FRG. (Remarks on the Judgment Pronounced by the 
Federal Constitutional Court on July 31, 1973).
1974 15 P¥A 259 at 267.
48. Note 41, supra, at 153.
49. One leading ¥est German commentator rightly points out:
"The Treaty on the Basis of Relations is a relatively complicated 
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CHAPTER FIVE
The Status of Germany
(i) From 1945 to 1949
From the Declaration Regarding the Defeat of Germany and the Assumption 
of Supreme Authority with respect to Germany by the Allies,* it is clear that this 
assumption of authority did not effect the annexation of Germany, in  the view 
of the Occupying Powers. They intended that Germany should continue to exist 
as a State and participate in  a peace settlement with its former adversaries. 
Naturally, if  they had annexed that State, the Four Powers would have had no 
German State with which to make peace and would presumably have been liable 
for reparations payments. Had Germany ceased to exist, in  1945 or at any time 
since, for example, when the GDR and FRG came into existence, then it follows 
that any possible claim that could be made against Poland with regard to the 
territories w'hich it gained in 1945 would either lapse or devolve upon the two 
German States. Since they have both recognized, in  the Zgorzelec and ¥arsaw 
Treaties, the western Polish frontier on the Oder-Neisse line, it would appear 
that there would be no legal problem to be settled. That is, if  there is no 
"Germany", there can be no peace settlement as provided for by the Potsdam 
Agreement, at which the western Polish frontier finally would be determined; 
the issue is simply closed because the course of events foreseen at that time has 
not transpired. There is the problem whether or not, in  that event, a reunified 
Germany, based upon the territory of FRG and GDR, would share any identity 
with the German Reich - in  which case, could a peace settlement take place with 
that Germany? Alternatively if  Germany has survived since 1945, either
because of or despite the existence of the GDR and FRG, is its potential freedom of 
negotiation at a future peace settlement restricted in any way by the 
agreements voluntarily entered into by these two States?
Germany was not annexed, then, if  the statement of the Four Powers be 
accepted. In that case, what was its status? Kelsen, in  the first of two articles on 
the subject^ 2 suggested, prior to the end of the war, that there were two 
possibilities1 belligerent occupation and the establishment of a condominium. 
There is overwhelming authority to establish the position that belligerent 
occupation by itself cannot transfer sovereignty over land? As stated by 
Jennings,* if  debellatio follows the belligerent occupation, then a transfer of 
sovereignty may occur. But again, there is a divergence of opinion over the 
exact scope of the term debellatio: while the majority seems to take the view 
that it is the same as subjugation and closely connected with annexation, and 
that, in  this latter sense, it means conquest followed by annexation, there 
appears to be, if  not a school of thought, at least a classroom consensus among 
West German writers, that debellatio can be distinguished from annexation.^  It 
is because this minority view is taken with particular regard to the German 
question, that it is of some interest to this study. According to Meyn, deballatio 
may occur, in  the view of the minority, without even annexation or devolution 
of sovereignty, but simply through the total defeat of the conquered State, 
which would include the overthrow of its government. This would reduce 
debellatio to a factual situation, without the legal consequences suggested by 
Jennings. This in turn would permit the argument that, while Germany may 
have been subject to a debellatio. this itself has no legal consequences for the 
State of Germany, which continues therefore to exist. The reasoning behind
this interpretation of the meaning of debellatio is however unclear. Given the 
statement by the Four Powers, that they did not intend to annex Germany, then, 
t>rima facie, by adopting the majority view, that debellatio requires not only the 
total m ilitary defeat of a State but also its annexation, a strict interpretation 
would show that there could not have taken place with regard to Germany a 
debellatio. the consequence being that it still exists - that is, without prejudice to 
separate legal considerations which may affect the legal existence of Germany. 
Nor, by comparison, could debellatio have occurred in the case of Poland in 1939 
- although the whole of its State territory was occupied by the Soviet Union and 
Germany, nevertheless the State continued to function.6 Occupation itself is a 
temporary state  ^of affairs which allows the occupier only limited rights with 
regard to the occupied State.
Kelsen foresaw certain practical problems which might arise with regard to 
Germany in the event of a status of belligerent occupation being established. 
He pointed out that States occupying on this basis would have their subsequent 
freedom of action restricted by the legal scope of this situation, because its 
temporary and provisional nature would not be appropriate as a legal basis for 
effecting the fundamental alterations in the German political system which the 
Allies intended. Kelsen considered also the possibility of basing an occupation 
of Germany in a treaty, such as a peacy treaty, yet saw practical problems in  
such an alternative:
"Any international treaty concluded by a German government 
under the pressure of m ilitary occupation w ill certainly be declared 
null and void by German nationalistic propoganda. It is uesless, nay.
dangerous to settle national and international problems, aroused by a 
conflict of the dimensions of a ¥orld ¥ar, by a peace treaty imposed 
upon the defeated State."®
Little credence was given to this view. In the Potsdam Agreement, the parties 
agree that there should be prepared a peace settlement for Germany "to be 
accepted by the Government of Germany."9 Kelsen believed that any peace 
treaty thus imposed upon the defeated Germany, while legally valid, would be 
politically farcical and basically flawed because there would be an absence of 
genuine consent on the part of one side. However, he suggested that the 
problems outlined above could be avoided by establishing in  defeated Germany a 
condominium of the UK, USA and the USSR. This would entail, firstly, a 
debellatio of Germany, which is here defined as "the elimination of any possible 
resistance on the part of the defeated state, so that wartime precariousness has 
ceased to exist and the conquest of the territory is firm ly established." There is 
no mention here of annexation, but Kelsen subsequently suggests that the 
sovereignty of Germany would be “restored". For sovereignty to be restored, it 
must, logically, have been taken away, and therefore it may be assumed that 
Kelsen‘s debellatio would entail the transfer of sovereignty from Germany to 
the condominium powers. However, according to the Allies, in their declaration 
regarding the defeat of Germany, they did not annex that State, so it would 
appear that Kelsen’s theory, depending upon a transfer of sovereignty which 
would occur through annexation, was not acceptable. This is not to suggest that 
the legal reasoning of Kelsen was entirely flawed; rather, the Allies 
deliberately adopted a course of action which was not anticipated by Kelsen 
because there was no obvious precedent - that is, assumption of supreme
authority short of sovereignty, the defeated State remaining in existence.
Kelsen's views are worthy of discussion here because they show how the 
legal and political situation in Germany might have developed and allow a 
comparison to be made between the reality which exists, which is sometimes 
described as sui generis, and that which could have developed on the basis of 
legal precedent*®. It is quite correctly stated that his views as discussed above 
were de lege ferenda. * * Allied practice did not subsequently follow his 
suggestions, but had they followed the existing practice to its logical conclusion, 
it is submitted that they would have found that Germany had ceased to exist as a 
State: its armies were completely defeated, its government destroyed, total 
authority to deal with German territory as the Allies saw fit was assumed:
"The Governments (of the Four powers) w ill hereafter determine 
the boundaries of Germany or any part thereof and the status of 
Germany or of any area at present being part of German territory."*^
All of these factors, taken together, amount to a de facto debellatio of Germany 
and it is only the statement by the Four Powers that they were not actually 
annexing Germany which prevents the conclusion that they were in  fact 
annexing it and taking over sovereignty. It was this statement which 
constituted the break with precedent and which formed the basis of the 
subsequent practice of the Allies. Otherwise, it seems that Kelsen correctly had 
anticipated future legal development with regard to Germany.
It is necessary at this stage to consider the next comment by Kelsen on this
subject,*^ because it is here that his views actually clash with the expressed 
views of the Four Powers. He states that, by abolishing the last German 
Government, "the victorious powers have destroyed the existence of Germany as 
a sovereign State."** But the Allies made it clear that they were not annexing 
Germany, hence the powers which they had assumed did not amount to 
sovereignty over Germany, and thus one must dispute Kelsen’s assertion. 
Kelsen's theory that the German State was destroyed attributes an unjustified 
importance to the act of capitulation by Germany. Without annexation by the 
Four Powers, capitulation remains just that; it could not lead to legal effects 
which, by itself, it cannot have.*5 Definitely Germany continued to exist as a 
State after the defeat of 1945, because the Allies, having the power to bring 
about debellatio. consciously decided to maintain its existence. This they could 
also do - the power to cause the State to cease to exist includes the power to carry 
out lesser deeds, such as removing certain facets of independent statehood, 
while permitting the shell to remain.*® However, the fact that Germany 
survived the m ilitary and political defeat of 1945 does not mean that the Reich 
necessarily continues to exist some forty years later.
Kelsen argued at length his theory that the actions of the Allies, in  particular 
their assumption of supreme authority, have placed Germany under the joined 
sovereignty of the occupant powers, and he disparaged the terminology 
employed by the Allies,*^ in order to show that the real situation was different 
from that claimed. However, the practice of the occupant powers was to show 
that they still regarded Germany as a State.*8 The view has been put forward 
that, given that Germany still existed, then the United Kingdom was still at war 
with that State. This was also a view taken in R v  Bottrill. ex parte
Kuechenmeister.*9 If  Germany had actually ceased to exist and joined 
sovereingnty been taken over by the occupant powers, then the possibility 
arises that the UK was at war with itself. However, the statement of the Court 
with regard to the state of war was in  a municipal law context. Kelsen himself 
argued that, because a state of war could only exist between belligerent States, 
and Germany had ceased to exist as a State, the state of war could not exist with 
regard to Germany, so his argument here is consistent. Nevertheless, the 
conclusion must be that the Four Powers developed international law in  
creating their control machinery in Germany, because they deliberately 
avoided the course upon to them, as expounded by Kelsen, of establishing a 
condominium, but rather opted to create in Germany a completely new situation. 
Their explicit statement that they were not annexing Germany, followed by 
practice, provides the legal basis for their course of action and the confirmation 
that they intended to follow that course. If  the Four Powers had genuinely 
intended to acquire sovereignty, then it would be reasonable to suppose that 
such an intention would be clearly expressed. This view has been taken by 
Mann,2® who added that other factors counted against Allied assumption of 
sovereignty. These were, inter a lia  that the Communique issued following the 
Yalta Conference, which outlined intentions with regard to Germany, contained 
no hint of such an intention. This is one more negative justification, but of 
greater interest is Mann’s point that supreme authority was assumed by the 
Governments of France, UK, USA and USSR, and not by the States as such. The 
suggestion here is that the assumption of supreme authority took place, not to 
acquire sovereignty, but to establish governmental control.
While the various factors affecting the continued existence of Germany as a
State which have been discussed above are not the only relevant ones, they do 
highlight the basic disagreement among writers in  the immediate post-war 
period - whether or not Germany still existed as a State. Having established that 
German statehood, albeit in  a very limited form, still existed in 1945, it is 
necessary to consider whether or not it survived another critical date: 1949, 
when the two German States came into existence, because it is through this 
analysis, and through an examination of which rights and duties of the German 
State are also possessed by the GDR and ERG, that a conclusion may be reached as 
to whether or not a peace settlement w ill require any further action with 
regard to the Oder-Neisse line, while the status of the inner-German border 
depends upon the status of Germany.
(ii) The Status of Germany Following the Creation of the ERG and the GDR 
The Federal Republic came into existence in 1949, though its change of status 
from that of occupied territory to independent State was a gradual process 
which continued until 1955, when the Paris Protocol on the Termination of the 
Occupation Regime in the Federal Republic of Germany, signed in October 1954, 
came into effect. Given the wide range of powers retained by the UK, USA and 
France, it is possible that the ERG is not a fu lly  independent State; nevertheless, 
it may be regarded as a State for most purposes: many of the powers retained by 
the former occupant States exist with regard to Germany as a whole, and not the 
Federal Republic. The three western zones of occupation had already been 
joined together into a single unit - Trizonia - under the Washington Trizone 
Agreement of 8 April 1949. The draft Grundgesetz was approved, subject to 
certain reservations, and the Occupation Statute promulgated.21 This sets out 
the powers which the Federal State and the participating Lander shall have
(Paragraph 1). stipulating that these w ill be “in  accordance with the Basic 
Law.” As the Basic Law was subject to the veto of the three Allies, so the 
Occupation Statute makes it clear that there exist limitations to the 
independence of the German authorities. Paragraph 2 sets out in  detail those 
powers which are specifically reserved in order to ensure the accomplishment 
of the basic purposes of the occupation, including control over the foreign 
relations of the Federal Republic and its capacity to enter into international 
agreements. The Western Allies set up the Allied High Commission for 
Germany,22 through which they exercised their supreme authority, on the 20 
June 1949. This was to come into existence on the 21 September 1949, when 
simultaneously its Charter came into effect and the Federal Republic came into 
being. All authority which previously was vested in or exercized by the 
Commanders-in-Chief of the occupation forces was transferred to the three 
High Commissioners (Paragraph 2). except for certain m ilitary powers, which 
were to remain in the hands of the Commanders-in-Chief. Previously, supreme 
control had been exercised by them2 .^
Was the Federal Republic a new State, or was it at least partially identical with 
the Reich? It has been maintained in West Germany that the Federal Republic is 
identical with Germany.2*  In itially, this was taken to mean that it was legally 
the same entity and hence only its Government was entitled to speak for the 
German people and to act for Germany under international law. At a later date 
the idea of partial identity appeared, in  consideration of the fact that, 
territorially, the Reich and the Federal Republic were unquestionably different. 
However, the UK, USA and France were careful not to state that they regarded 
the Federal Republic as identical, when making statements with regard to the
German question:
"Pending the unification of Germany, the three Governments consider 
the Government of the federal Republic as the only German Government 
freely and legitimately constituted and therefore entitled to speak for 
Germany as the representative of the German people in international 
affairs."^
This statement is notable because, despite describing the ERG Government in  
this way, the Western Powers did not thereby actually recognize it as the de 
jure Government of G e r m a n y . ^  The Federal Government is described as being 
entitled to speak for the German people (this does not mean that this statement 
was correct in law), but no mention is made of any identity between FRG and 
Germany, which could provide a legal basis for such representation. Instead, 
this right of the Federal Republic is based upon its having been “freely and 
legitimately constituted". Another statement, a Joint Declaration by the Allied 
High Commission on the status of East Germany, issued on 8 April 1954,^  
reiterates the recognition by the Western Allies of the Federal Government as 
the only legally constituted and freely elected German Government. However, 
one apparent inconsistency which appears here is that the Allies mention their 
“determination to work for the reunification of Germany." Reunification and 
unification seem to be employed synonymously, given that there was no major 
constitutional development with regard to the unification of Germany during 
the period between these two statements. There was a regular repetition of 
these Allied statements,^  but it was never specified unequivocally that the 
three Western Powers regarded the FRG as identical with Germany, even when
the Federal Republic was putting forward this view. A forceful case has been 
made in  support of Allied recognition of this identity,2  ^although the writer 
acknowledges the apparent ambiguity of the Allied statements. There is cited 
one letter written by the Allied High Commissioners to the Federal Chancellor as 
explaining the Western position so as to establish identity between the Reich 
and the FRG. This letter stated, inter alia:
"...pending a final peace settlement and without prejudice to its terms, 
the Federal Government is the only Government entitled to assume the 
rights and fu lfil the obligations of the former German Reich.
The writer goes on to comment that this does "seem to indicate that the Federal 
RepubHc is, or stands in  the shoes of or represents, Germany to the exclusion of 
all other contenders."^ But both of these statements are flawed by their 
ambiguity: they both avoid use of the term "identity". One has to question why 
this term was not actually used, since its inclusion would have made the legal 
situation less apparently equivocal - though that is not to say that, had the 
Western Allies regarded FRG and the Reich as identical, that this would have 
been a correct legal judgment. It is true that the High Commission indicated 
that only the Federal Government could take on the relevant rights and 
obligations, but this in  itself does not necessarily mean that they saw identity as 
existing. Given that there had to be some exercise of rights and obligations in  
order for the territory to function, the Federal Government, which had come 
into existence through the decision of the Western Powers to create a State or 
State-like entity on the territory of their occupation zones, was allocated the 
appropriate power by the UK, USA and France as a manifestation of their
supreme authority with regard to Germa ny Th e  FRG came into existence only 
through the initiative of these States and with their consent; it could not have 
done so otherwise. Its Government was elected under conditions and according 
to rules approved by the same States. It may be regarded as a substitute, albeit 
temporary, for the German State which may or might have come into existence. 
But it does not thereby become identical with the Reich. This writer fails to 
understand why such great significance is attached to the fact that the Federal 
Government was "freely elected". This may have made it easier for it to govern 
in  that it allowed greater internal legitimacy - there was no national uprising 
during the early years of the existence of West Germany such as occurred in  
East Germany in  1953, but effective government can undoubtedly be achieved 
by coercion. On the other hand, if  we are going to apply the criterion of being 
freely elected, whatever that actually means, as a measure of legitimacy, for 
purposes of international law, then the Federal Republic undoubtedly could not 
and cannot represent the German people, since the elections for its Government 
were held only among a portion of the German people who would have been 
entitled to vote.
Why did the above-quoted writer avoid using the term "identity"? A reading 
of the whole passage gives the impression that, while the evidence so 
thoroughly amassed and cited could, if  the whole hypothesis be accepted, 
indicate identity between the Reich and the Federal Republic, nevertheless it is 
not conclusive; in the opinion of this writer, it is not even very persuasive. 
The Western Powers had repeated opportunities to affirm  that identity did 
indeed exist, yet consistently avoided so-doing. Even the view, that only the 
Federal Government is entitled to assume the rights and fu ll responsibilities of
the Reich, can be construed as a delegation of authority by the Allies, as has 
already been indicated.^
Subsequent practice has shown that, regardless of their attitudes until 1970, 
the Western Powers have certainly moved ground with regard to the question 
whether or not only the Federal Republic may represent the German people; 
and if  these States clearly do not consider the FRG to have this quality, then it 
cannot be used as a basis for the identity of the Reich and FRG. Thus following 
the signing of the Grundvertrag by the GDR and FRG in  1972, the UK, USA and 
France eventually entered into diplomatic relations with the “so-called German 
Democratic Republic."^ Having recognized that such a State existed, there 
followed automatically certain legal consequences. The Federal Republic is no 
longer the only State which is considered to be entitled to represent the German 
people in international affairs. The recognition of the GDR by FRG is to be 
found in the Grundvertrag.
Until then, the FRG had not recognized the GDR. Thus the FRG Courts had 
declined to accord protection to GDR trademarks (though the GDR claimed they 
were entitled to protection under a treaty by which the FRG was bound). The 
Court said that, because of the non-recognition, any accession to this treaty by 
the GDR could not have any legal effect vis-a-vis the FRG.^  Doubts have been 
raised as to the quality of the recognition contained in  the Grundvertrag. Thus 
West Germany declined to establish an embassy in  the GDR, or to permit that 
State to establish one in Bonn, on the ground that the GDR is not a foreign State. 
Yet it is surely correct to state that "all the attributes of statehood were formally 
declared as existing for the GDR by the Federal Republic."^6 Thus the FRG
formally renounced its pretension to be the sole representative of the German 
people (Article 4) The parties agreed that the jurisdiction of each is confined to 
its own territory (Article 6); there was an undertaking to respect the territorial 
integrity of each party and a reaffirmation of the inviolability of their 
frontiers.
West Germany still maintains that the relationship with East Germany is a 
special one, and it has refused, despite pressure from the GDR, to "upgrade" the 
special missions to embassy status. There remains in the ERG a citizenship law 
which deals with German citizenship, and includes persons who are GDR 
citizens under GDR law; again, this is a source of dispute between the two States 
which probably w ill not be settled without a compromise by both States or 
substantial concession by the Eederal Republic, since they go to the heart of the 
still-existing though modified policy of the ERG; even if  the GDR is a State, it is 
not foreign; therefore, it is not possible to establish fu ll diplomatic relations 
because there is one German nation, there is one German citizenship, and it 
must be available to all Germans. But even the Federal Republic has accepted 
that there must be appropriate recognition of the separate GDR citizenship, if  
the GDR itself is a State. Therefore, while any GDR citizen on the territory of the 
Federal Republic is German under the Federal citizenship law, still the GDR 
passport, which is evidence of citizenship, is also acceptable for travel to and 
through the FRG.
The conclusion seems to be that the Western Powers have not treated the 
Federal Republic as identical with Germany, while the development of relations 
between the GDR and FRG during the 1970s resulted in the renunciation by the
latter State of many of its claims, in  particular the Hallstein Doctrine, according 
to which the Federal Republic considered it an unfriendly act on the part of any 
State when it entered into diplomatic relations with the GDR. As a result, 
diplomatic relations were cut with any State which did enter, or refused to cease, 
its own relations with the GDR. One notable exception under this policy was the 
Soviet Union, with which the FRG maintained relations from 1955, the year in  
which the Hallstein Doctrine first came into effect. As the Federal Republic 
came to perceive the long-term limitations of the Hallstein Doctrine, the policy 
gradually altered and improved relations with the States of Eastern Europe were 
sought actively. This entailed the adoption of the “congenital defect theory" 
(Geburtsfehlertheorie) "... according to which the East European states, by 
virtue of their location within the Soviet sphere of influence, had no option but 
to recognize East Germany. The possible sanctions of the Hallstein Doctrine 
would no longer be applied to such States."^7
The Soviet Union has never regarded the Federal Republic as identical, to ta lly  
or pa rtia lly , w ith  Germany. The position o f the USSR seems to be that, despite 
its acknowledgment that it  shares jo in t righ ts and responsibilities w ith  the 
Western Powers which date back to 1945, the German Reich no longer exists.^ 
Two successor States have been established on the te rrito ry  o f the form er 
German Reich, according to both the GDR and the USSR 9^-
In  the GDR, o ffic ia l positions w ith  regard to Germany have not been 
consistent. The GDR regarded its e lf o rig in a lly  as the on ly representative o f the 
German nation and, in  the Zgorzelec Treaty w ith  Poland, cooperation between 
the two States is described as "cooperation between the German and Polish
nations."^
However, the GDR seems to have altered its position with regard to this matter 
soon after the signature of the Zgorzelec Treaty. In  October 1951, the Supreme 
Court of the GDR took the view that the East German State could not be identified 
with the Reich. The GDR was seen as something separated Subsequently, the 
concept of two separate German States gained popularity in the GDR and became 
the official policy of that country, during the mid-1950‘s. The present position 
is that the Reich collapsed in 1945, but “Germany" continued to exist until 1949 
within the new frontiers established at P o t s d a m . ^  Since 1949, the GDR and the 
FRG are the successor States of the Reich This is the so-called dual-State 
theory. This theory holds that "Germany was eliminated in 1945 and was 
succeeded by two states. Neither new state was identical with the German Reich, 
nor was either connected with the other under the German Reich as a common 
roof. Neither state was more closely related to the other than to any third 
state."'**
This theory as stated cannot apply to the legal situation as established with 
regard to Germany, which is that it survived the defeat of 1945. This is not to say 
that there do not exist two German States; the Grundvertrag provides evidence 
of their existence, although according to the ¥est German view as outlined 
above, this treaty does take account of the special relationship which it believes 
exists. The dual-State theory precludes the possibility of such a special 
relationship, neither between the two German States, nor between either or 
both of these and Germany - since Germany is deemed not to exist, it is 
impossible to have a special relationship with it. A third theory is the roof
t h e o r y  * 5  This allows for the continued existence of Germany, but without the 
normal State organs or capacity to act. Neither German State can claim total 
identity with Germany, yet they are not foreign to one another. This seems to 
reflect the more moderate Deutschlandpolitik of the Federal Republic, closely 
linked to the Qstpolitik. However this theory also has weaknesses, since it 
requires acceptance of the idea that a State may exist without any apparent 
capacity for acting whatsoever *^ It has already been concluded that Germany 
survived the events of 1945 and continued to exist as a State,*^ yet it seems to be 
accepted that among the criteria of statehood, independence is of great 
importance.*^ The absence of a sufficient degree of independence may 
preclude statehood. Since the Allies took over supreme authority with regard to 
Germany, t>rima facie it has no independence and, although the Allies did not 
wish to annex it, nevertheless it might appear, through the loss of 
independence, to have ceased to exist. If  this be the case then Kelsen was 
correct in  his suggestion that there had occurred debellatio. However, it is 
submitted that, despite the apparent loss of independence, Germany still existed 
immediately after assumption of supreme authority by the Four Powers. The 
clear intention of the Allies was to maintain the existence of Germany. To 
suggest that it ceased then to exist would render the declaration of 
non-intention to annex meaningless. This is consistent with the earlier 
suggestion that the action of the victorious Powers was a deliberate departure 
from precedent, which subsequently has been accepted as such. Moreover, and 
as a consequence of the first point, the regime set up in Germany in  1945 was 
temporary, and therefore did not bring about the dissolution of the old State *^
The regime set up in Germany in 1945 as a temporary measure was intended
to govern the country and prepare it to accept a peace settlement once a German 
Government had been established for this purpose. This settlement was to have 
provided the framework for the relationship between Germany and the Allied 
States, including a final delimitation of the German-Polish border . Because such 
a peace settlement has never occurred, the theory has been developed that 
there still exists a State of Germany, to which the two German States are related, 
although it lacks capacity to act in the international sphere and does not 
function, due to the absence of State organs.
However, a new situation has arisen in Germany which was not foreseen 
when the Powers made their declaration about the defeat of Germany and the 
assumption of supreme authority. Two States have come into existence whose 
territory happens to be that of part of pre-war Germany. These two States 
appeared because the temporary regime which had been established had 
acquired a permanent character, indeed had evolved in  the opposite direction 
from that intended: instead of the various occupation zones being governed 
jointly in  matters affecting Germany as a whole, which had been the procedure 
specified,^  there occurred a division between the Soviet zone, on the one 
hand, and the Western zones on the other, which eventually resulted in each 
side declaring its part of Germany to be a State. It may be argued that each 
side has repeatedly maintained, over a long period of time, its desire to bring 
about a united German State; yet their actions indicate otherwise. And even if  
there exists a genuine w ill to create, or recreate, a single German State, it may 
not be identical with the Reich. The recognition accorded to the GDR by the 
Western Allies and by the Soviet Union to the FRG is an acknowledgement that 
the temporary regime set up by them has evolved into a permanent division of
Germany, which is manifested most clearly in  the existence of the GDR and FRG.
In light of these facts, it is necessary to consider whether the Four Powers 
wanted "Germany” to continue to exist. Since they have acted as if  there were 
no Germany, by recognizing the two new States, neither of which is identical 
with Germany, then one may question whether the Germany which survived 
the defeat of 1945 continues to survive. There is room for the view that the 
existing joint rights and responsibilities of the Four Powers must apply to a joint 
territory - Germany. But is this actually so? Or is it rather the competence of 
the Four Powers which is all-German rather than a State? *^ All four former 
occupying Powers retained certain rights and duties with regard to Germany as 
a whole and to Berlin - where the joint control continues to function. But these 
rights are based not on any agreement with the GDR or FRG; they originate in  
the defeat of Germany and assumption of supreme authority. If  the GDR and FRG 
were to cease to exist, by creating a new all-German State from the two existing 
States, the competence of the Four Powers with regard to Germany would 
remain, since its legal basis is quite separate. On this point there can be no 
doubt, since any attempt by the FRG to alter its legal status would have to gain 
the approval of the UK, USA and FranceP2 while a similar control would exist 
for the USSR with regard to the GDRp^
Despite the policies of the Four Powers, which deny the existence of identity 
between the Federal Republic and the Reich, ¥est Germany continues to 
maintain that there is partial identity between the twoP* that is, that identity 
exists on a reduced territory. But this means that the identity is partial only in  
its geographical application, while the quality or content of it is unchanged. In
the face of an apparent contradiction of legal opinion, it is suggested that, while 
the Eederal Republic is entitled to hold its own views about the status of itself 
and any German State, the ¥estem Powers may also adopt their own stance, or 
stances. Since these States possess not only the authority but also the duty to 
make certain decisions with regard to the Federal Republic in  the all-German 
context, which is a right that takes precedence over a conflicting attitude of the 
FRG, then in the event of such conflict of opinion, that of the ¥estem Powers 
must prevail. Such conflicts have already occurred. ¥hen the Germans in  the 
¥estem zones, at the request of the ¥estern Powers, drafted their Grundgesetz 
in 1949, it was clear that it would not automatically be brought into effect. These 
States had to approve the draft Constitution. Approval was duly given, but only 
subject to certain reservations, for example with regard to Berlin. This had the 
effect of precluding Berlin from being treated as a normal Land of  the FRG, 
which would have been the effect had the draft Grundgesetz been given effect 
in the form which the Germans had w i s h e d . ^  This of course was based on the 
ground that Berlin was a separate entity from the rest of Germany. Berlin was 
and remains under Four-Power occupation (or ¥est Berlin does, according to 
the USSR).
The authority retained by the Four Powers w ith  regard to Germany is 
exercised not on ly w ith  regard to the German State which existed in  1945. The 
German States which have appeared did so on ly w ith  the consent o f the Four 
Powers, albeit that consent was not forthcom ing simultaneously. The 
recognition o f the GDR by the ¥estern Powers did not entail any express or tacit 
renunciation o f capacity to determine the fate o f "Germany". That capacity may 
be construed as pertain ing to a future Germany not identical to that State
defeated in  1945; but i f  Germany s till exists, then o f course the Four Power 
capacity w ill apply to it. The terms o f the Declaration regarding the defeat o f 
Germany and the assumption o f supreme authority seem to include the 
possibility o f the demise o f the Reich and the creation o f one or more States 
upon its te rrito ry :
"The Governments of (the Four Powers) w ill hereafter determine the 
boundaries of Germany or any part thereof and the status of Germany 
or of any area at present being part of German territory.”^
This statement indicates that the Four Powers could cause the demise of the 
German State, while retaining their competence to attach to that territory a 
different status. Even if  the terns of recognition accorded by each State to the
GDR differ, nevertheless recognition itself entails certain legal consequences,^  
and the common elements in the practice of each State may be regarded as 
having the effect of joint action over an extended period. This does not mean 
that there is a "back-door" method of avoiding or ending joint obligations 
among the Four Powers - it has been made clear that any attempt unilaterally to 
alter such obligations w ill not be law ful^- Joint action in the context of 
Germany means action taken by all Four Powers together, not separate 
unilateral acts having the same effect - but where the Four Powers have, on 
different occasions, acted in such a way as to cause practical developments in  
the situation in Germany, whether unilaterally or as a group, subsequent 
similar acts by other Powers, when added to the earlier ones, may result in  a 
new situation which adds another element to the legal rules in  existence - thus, 
in the case of the GDR, the recognition which ultimately it received from all
Four Powers had legal consequences. Nevertheless, the express retention of 
joint rights and duties from 1945 means that the recognition must be construed 
in  that context. Thus even separate but similar or identical acts by the Four 
Powers w ill not alter their joint capacity if  that capacity is maintained. 
Recognition of the GDR could not alter capacity of the ¥estern Powers thus 
maintained (just as approval by the ¥estern Powers of the FRG recognition of 
the Oder-Neisse line did not alter the expressly retained capacity of the Powers).
It should be borne in mind that what is politically inconceivable in 1949 or 
1955 may become highly desirable in 1974, and the political events may have 
international legal consequences which were not anticipated, or, i f  anticipated, 
considered to be untenable, either for purely political reasons or perceived 
legal obstacles. This is not to say that the two are necessarily separate.
The campaign by the GDR to achieve recognition by the ¥estem Powers has 
already been discussed. The attitude of these States ranged from denunciation of 
the new “State” to eventual acknowledgment of its status as an equal with the 
Federal Republic, when the Four Powers agreed to support the applications by 
the two German States for membership of the United Nations. But the Soviet 
Union and the other socialist States have regarded East Germany as a State since 
1949. The GDR was proclaimed to be a State as of 7 October of that year, following 
the formation of a People’s Council some months previously, which had drawn 
up a Constitution (adopted in March 1949) and which on the 7 October 
transformed itself into a parliament. A Soviet Control Commission was formed, 
to take over and carry out the functions of the Soviet M ilitary Administration,^  
in so far as these were not transferred to the Provisional Government of the
GDR. Recognition by the other socialist States was prompt. The opinion has 
been expressed that the attitude of the Western Allies, that only the Federal 
Government was entitled to speak for Germany, was purely political and a legal 
farce, and was eventually exposed as such by the apparent recognition accorded 
to each other by the GDR and FRG in the Grundvertrag T h is  judgment is 
probably too harsh as far as the Western Allies are concerned. In  retrospect, 
the view that only the Federal Government could represent the German people 
does seem to have been flawed from the beginning, but to describe this as a 
legal farce seems to impute bad faith to the conduct of the Western States, while 
in  the view of this writer such an element was not present. Like all other States, 
the UK, USA and France had political motivation for promoting their ends, in  
this case the exclusivity of the Federal Republic, as had the USSR with regard to 
East Germany. The reasons of the two sides were not necessarily similar; nor 
were the Western Allies invariably united in  their approach towards the 
German question.
The Western States and the Federal Republic also had political reasons for 
entering into, or improving, relations with the GDR. West Germany wished to 
achieve a general improvement in its relations with the East. This necessarily 
entailed a renunciation of the Hallstein Doctrine, while it was necessary to 
reach an accommodation of sorts with the GDR in order to promote all-Germany 
policies, including increased contacts between its own citizenry and private 
citizens living in  the GDR. Once the FRG accepted that the GDR represented its 
own people, it remained open to the Western Powers to ignore this development 
and not to adjust to it in  any way. However, they chose to accept the new 
situation. Their policy towards the GDR was a consequence of their policy
towards West Germany. I f  the FRG could accept the existence of the GDR, it was 
almost natural that the Western Powers would follow suit: to claim that only the 
Federal Government may represent the German people when the Federal 
Government believed otherwise would indeed create problems. Nor is it likely 
that West German policy in  this area would be altered without any exchange of 
views with the Western Allies. In  addition, it was clear to the Western Powers 
that the commitment of the Soviet Union towards the GDR was unlikely to be 
reduced in the foreseeable future. A situation had arisen which, though not 
anticipated, constituted a new reality in central Europe, and which it was 
beyond the competence of one side or the other unilaterally to change. 
Furthermore, while, with hindsight, the view may be taken, that it was not valid 
under international law to treat the Federal Government as the only one entitled 
to represent the Germans, at that time, when there remained uncertainty about 
the future of Germany, the Allies may genuinely, if  mistakenly, have believed 
that the Federal Government did possess the controversial right attributed to it. 
The wording was certainly unfortunate. When the Western Powers spoke of 
"Germany", they did not specify what exactly they meant. It could have 
included those areas taken over by Poland, or simply the territory of the four 
zones of occupation plus Berlin, or even excluding Berlin, in  view of its separate 
status.
Neither the FRG nor the GDR is identical with the Reich. The Federal 
Republic considers itself as partially identical, but this perception of its 
situation is not shared by the rest of the international community; most 
important, none of the Four Powers accepts the existence of such identity. If  we 
take the Reich as it existed in  1937 (that is, prior to German territorial expansion
immediately before and during World War II) , then the territory of that Reich is 
now subject to the jurisdiction of seven States: ERG, GDR, Poland (territories east 
of the Oder and Neisse rivers, including part of East Prussia), USSR (part of East 
Prussia and occupation of Berlin), France, UK and USA (occupation of Berlin). 
Two German States exercise sovereignty, albeit limited, over the greater area of 
the Reich territory with the consent and approval of the Four Powers. 
Generally, two States cannot simultaneously possess sovereignty with regard to 
the same territory?* though the condominium - which is not the status of 
Germany - is one exception to this rule. If  the Reich does exist, then it may be 
competing with the Federal Republic for its territory, since the two are not 
identical. But the existence of FRG as a State is not open to question. It has 
clearly defined borders within which there is no room for the Reich. The 
recognition of East and West Germany as States by the Four Powers plus the 
clear rejection by these countries of any question of identity between the Reich 
and either German State would seem to leave no possibility for the continued 
existence of the German Empire. It was within the power of the Four Allies to 
maintain its existence, as they appeared to do in  1945, but their subsequent 
actions, taken under their supreme authority, indicate that they adopted a 
different course. The competence of the Four Powers remains - since any 
developments or changes in the legal status of Germany have taken place only 
with their approval, or at their instigation, and subject to their maintaining 
their residual rights and obligations with regard to Germany as a whole.
The border question must be affected by this conclusion. If  there is no 
Germany, the Gder-Neisse line may be regarded as the permanent frontier 
between Poland and the GDR. But what of the provision in the Potsdam
Agreement, that this question can only t>e settled at the peace settlement?
(iii) The Present Status of Germany
The State of Germany, despite appearances, cannot be deemed to have ceased 
to exist. Although the actions of the Four Powers, in  their recognition of the 
two German States, seem to indicate a policy of favouring the present situation 
at the expense of the regime created in 1945, nevertheless there exists evidence 
that the UK, at least, continues to regard Germany as a State. In  R v Secretary of 
State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs - ex parte Trawnik and Reimelt?2 
the Secretary of State issued a certificate under Section 21 of the State Immunity 
Act 1978 certifying that Germany is a State (for the purposes of Part I of the Act) 
with its own government comprised of, inter alia, members of the Allied 
Kommandatura of Berlin. In  other words, despite its recognition of both 
German States, the UK maintains the continued existence of a third German 
State. Given the UK’s position as a country with ultimate shared responsibility 
for the status of Germany, appropriate account must be taken of the certificate, 
which is conclusive with regard to its c o n t e n t s ? ^  The case in question 
concerned the attempts of West Berlin residents to prevent the creation of a 
firin g  range for the use of British soldiers in West Berlin; thus it involved 
issues of the status of British forces in Berlin, which is part of the wider 
question - what is the status of Germany? The certificate therefore should be 
accorded appropriate weight in any evaluation.
It has been pointed out that executive certificates in the UK certify as to facts 
and not to law?* yet determination of facts may itself involve legal 
assessments?  ^ This is no less true where Germany is concerned. The Foreign
Secretary issued the certificate on a question which involved not only the 
factual question whether Germany was a State in  the view of the UK. 
Underlying this was the fact that the UK has a special authority with regard to 
the question whether or not Germany exists. By stating, as a matter of fact, that 
Germany exists, the UK confirmed a situation that is based on its own assessment 
of itself as one of Four Powers having joint capacity with regard to Germany as 
a whole. Even if  it were argued that the certificate does not attest to Germany’s 
status as a State, but rather, the fact that the UK has recognized that status, it 
must not be forgotten that the UK is itself responsible for the maintenance of 
that status. This adds to the value of the certificate as evidence for the 
continued existence of Germany. Yet, if  Germany continues to exist as a State, 
does it do so despite lacking any stable population or defined frontiers? While 
the Foreign Secretary’s certificate does make some mention of government, if  
only with regard to Berlin, it is silent on the other factors. It is very tempting 
in such a situation to resort to the sui generis justification. This entails an 
acceptance of all the existing inconsistencies and ambiguities of the situation, 
without fu lly attempting to resolve it.
However, the statement by the UK that Germany still exists is not necessarily 
legally inconsistent with the UK’s recognition of two new German States, if  one 
accepts the notion of different States for different purposes. Thus Germany is 
deemed to continue to exist, insofar as matters relating to Berlin and Germany as 
a whole are concerned (such as the Trawnik case). On the other hand, in  all 
other situations, the reality of two separate German States is recognized. In  
view of the fact that the UK was responsible for the creation of the Federal 
Republic, along with France and the USA, and its statement of 1985 concerning
the continued existence of Germany was made in awareness of this, the UK, in  
the absence of evidence to the contrary, should i t  is suggested, be presumed to 
regard the simultaneous existence of Germany and the FRG as compatible under 
international law. This may be possible, if  it is accepted that they exist for 
separate purposes - i.e., neither enjoys the fu ll international legal capacity of 
“normal” States. In  this context, Frowein’s hypothesis - that the reality of 
Germany may amount to no more than a Four Power competence^ - offers a 
potential solution. This view has it that the situation of Germany has so altered 
that, even if  that State’s existence is formally maintained, as it is by the UK, the 
reality of the post-war developments is that most of the functions of that State 
have been assumed by the GDR and FRG?? so that nothing remains of the 
German State except the competence of the Four Powers with respect to Berlin 
and Germany as a whole. Indeed, to assert that Germany exists as a State, without 
qualification, would be too far-fetched. Germany can only exist in  the restricted 
sense of an entity which has very little, if  any, capacity, to act. The fact that the 
Trawnik case, in which the UK asserted that Germany is a State, could take place 
in  the UK courts is itself a manifestation of the most unusual legal status of 
Germany. Trawnik had in  the first instance attempted to raise the issue in  the 
West Berlin courts but following his failure had turned to the UK courts?® If  
Germany existed as a State in the sense normally understood according to 
international law, the circumstances which caused him to turn to the UK courts 
would not have arisen. It was because the West Berlin court had no jurisdiction 
over British forces, unless accorded it by the Kommandatura, that no remedy 
was available in Germany. The competence of the UK court arose as a result of 
the fact that Berlin is still an occupied city. The occupation regime is one 
remnant of the old German State deemed by the UK still to be in  existence.
Therefore, because, for certain limited purposes, including the occupation of 
Berlin, Germany still exists, the Travnik case, in  vhich the UK reiterated the 
existence of Germany, could arise.
In  this context, it cannot be stressed strongly enough that the ERG came into 
existence at the initiative of the three Western Rovers. Therefore, vhile  
maintaining that Germany continues to exist, the UK vas simultaneously 
agreeing to the assumption by the Eederal Republic of the attributes of an 
independent State, subject to the reserved rights and duties of the Western 
Rovers. The UK must then be deemed to regard the existence of these States 
simultaneously as consistent with international lav. The UK has ailoved or 
consented to the Eederal Republic developing into a State in  its ovn right at the 
expense of Germany, vhose attributes as a State have gradually diminished. In  
this vay the State of Germany has, vhile continuing to exist, been reduced to no 
more than a shell for the remaining rights and responsibilities of the Eour 
Povers.
It should be acknovledged that even this interpretation of the Travnik Case 
does in fact take account of the sui generis nature of the German problem, in  
that the peculiar characteristics of Germany are admitted as a precondition for 
explaining the simultaneous existence of the Eederal Republic and the Reich. 
Any serious attempt to clarify the legal problems in  this area must take account 
of the peculiar situation; in this sense, this interpretation does so. Hovever, the 
sui generis aspect is not employed as an excuse to avoid analysis of the legal 
issue; rather, it is accepted as part of that analysis vhich nevertheless purports 
to deal v ith  the problem.
If  the continued existence of Germany is accepted according to this 
interpretation, then the possibility of competing jurisdiction should not arise; 
the Federal Republic has clear limitations imposed upon its freedom of action in  
areas where the Four Powers still fu lfil a r o l^  and where there is any dispute 
with regard to the limits of the jurisdictions, the Four Powers, because of their 
retained rights, have the final say. Indeed, where the Federal Republic has 
taken any action which might have been considered as affecting the rights and 
responsibilities of the Four Powers, the UK at least has regularly expressed an 
opinion about the consistency of the proposed action with these rights and 
responsibilities, for example following the initialling of the Warsaw Treaty.^
The Germany which continues to exist only according to the policy of the 
Western Powers (the Soviet Union seems to maintain that Germany no longer 
exists, that there is no German question^) leads a very tenuous existence. The 
FRG and GDR carry on the normal functions of States while Germany is, as it 
were, on ice until it can be reconstituted by the unification of East and West 
Germany. The next issue is, what w ill be the status of the reconstituted 
Germany? While such a possibility could not even be described as remote, 
nevertheless the question has to be considered if  a comprehensive evaluation of 
the status of the Polish-German border is to be arrived at.
It may justifiably be asked why it is assumed that Germany continues to exist, 
if  the Soviet Union rejects the notion. It may justifiably be responded that the 
Soviet Union, which decided with the UK and USA to maintain the existence of 
Germany in 1945 by not annexing it, cannot unilaterally alter the position and
claim that Germany no longer exists. To do so could only have legal effect if  the 
other Powers either agreed to the change in policy, or failed to oppose it. Yet 
the Four Powers have altered the status of Germany by the creation of two new 
States on German territory and the recognition of them by each of the Powers. 
Their actions, though not performed in this respect simultaneously, have 
affected Germany's status.
It has been suggested that, if  an international court had to decide whether an 
international law subject - the German Reich - could be regarded as existing in  
addition to the FRG and GDR, then its decision could hardly lead to an answer in  
the affirmative.*^ This is consistent with the view expressed above, that the 
Reich’s existence can only be justified in the exceptional circumstances 
constituted by the retained rights and responsibilities of the Four Powers. But 
the writer also stresses that the judgment of such a court would have to be 
independent of the possible legal relations, which continue to exist, as a result 
of the capitulation by Germany in  1945?  ^ This is explained by the competence 
retained by the Powers to have a say in the eventual general settlement of the 
German question?* While this assessment is similar to the view of this writer, 
nevertheless it is suggested that, despite the differing attitudes of the involved 
States with regard to their rights and responsibilities?^ the evidence for the 
continued existence of Germany in some form is sufficiently strong that subject 
to attachment of primary importance to the legal acts of the Four Powers in  this 
respect, one must acknowledge this existence. But its existence is not absolute or 
unconditional; Germany remains with us only for certain purposes connected 
with the unfulfilled provisions of the post-war agreements. The question poses 
itself - does this mean effectively, that only a competence remains, common to
the Four Powers 3; or rather, does Germany genuinely exist, but only for limited 
purposes. This may be a matter simply of choosing different words to describe 
identical interpretations of the situation of Germany. But in  the opinion of this 
writer, there is a significant difference. In  the possibility postulated by 
Frowein (which is not necessarily his own view), it may be that only 
competences in  fact remain to the Four Powers. Yet on the other hand, the Four 
Power control over Berlin and the maintenance of m ilitary missions by the Four 
Powers in the others* zones, or former zones, of occupation constitutes a 
maintenance of the policy of continued existence with regard to Germany, in  
tangible form.
In fact, Germany at present bears some resemblance to a body on a 
life-support machine. Nothing is being done to the body for fear of the 
consequences, and the longer it remains on the machine, the greater is the lack 
of effective w ill to take action. Yet the machine cannot simply be switched off; 
the Four Powers’ rights with regard to Germany as a whole would cease to exist 
if  Germany ceased to exist, unless they could find some other basis for their 
retention. The obvious alternative - to resuscitate the patient - is perhaps even 
more risky; it would be no straightforward task for even the Superpowers to 
cope with arescurgent Germany, no matter what restrictions were placed on its 
m ilitary capacity, if  the country were to be unified, especially after nearly 
forty years of the Federal Republic and the German Democratic Republic. The 
present system allows the Four Powers a substantial level of control over 
Germany; they are responsible for the country as a whole while permitting the 
GDR and FRG to function, for most purposes, more or less independently, at least 
nominally. However, it is suggested that this fear of a unified German State,
being based to a large extent on the experience of two ¥orld ¥ars in  the space 
of about th irty years, is declining and should continue to do so. In  these 
circumstances, even if  the external conditions do not permit the existence of a 
single German State, the fear of and antipathy towards such a development may 
subside. In  the event of a change in the status quo, the conditions favourable 
towards one Germany may become ascendant.
The importance of the German question (that aspect of it which is concerned 
with the frontiers of Poland and Germany) lies, not essentially in  the nature of 
the existence of the German Reich; whether the Reich is a State, whether it is a 
subject of international law, whether it is in  existence merely as a 
manifestation of Four Power competence. Its importance for frontier matters 
lies in the relationships, if  any, which exist between the Federal Republic and 
the Democratic Republic, on the one hand, and the Reich on the other. It is 
enough to have established that for matters concerning Germany as a whole, 
including the frontier between Poland and Germany which under the Potsdam 
Agreement remains formally unsettled, there remains at least a Four Power 
competence. This competence, or the State to which it applies, must be related to 
the rights and duties of the FRG and GDR where these are concerned with the 
same things, in  the event of a unified German State coming into existence. 
These are the issues of identity and continuity which are discussed below.
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CHAPTER SIX
The Status, Rights and Duties of a Euture Unified German State.
(i) The Continued Existence of the German Question
One view has it that there is no practical purpose in attempting to define the 
status, rights and duties of a unified Germany, because the possibility of such an 
alteration of the present system in  central Europe is so remote that there is hardly 
any chance for any conclusions which may be reached to be tested against actual 
events.1 This writer is not in sympathy with this opinion, because, while 
acknowledging that the foreseeable future offers no perspective for any 
fundamental legal and political developments in Germany, and therefore 
accepting the regulatory character for the present situation of the post-war 
agreements including the treaties and agreements of 1970-1973, nevertheless 
there does remain, it is suggested, uncertainty with regard to the status of 
Germany, and inextricably linked to this is the question of the Polish-German 
border. This writer does not believe that the "German problem" is finalised.
Briefly, it maybe asserted that two German States w ill continue to exist within 
the existing geopolitical structure. The only possibility of any change, whether 
for the better or worse, in this structure, it is suggested, is through fundamental 
change in the Soviet Union -  and this would have to be a change which would, 
coincidentally, bring into power a government or ruling body with a different 
assessment of, and attitude towards, the strategic interests of the USSR. This 
evaluation applies only in the event of peaceful change in the Soviet Union, by
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vhich is meant peaceful externally of that country; events vithin may follov a 
different course.
A fundamental change in the political and legal environment of the tvo 
German States then, it is agreed, is at present most unlikely. In the opinion of this 
vriter, it is also both possible and inevitable, the premise for this statement being 
that the Soviet Union cannot survive in its present form indefinitely. It is also 
possible that the Soviet Union could, vithout the impetus of internal political 
change, agree to a peace settlement as envisaged at Potsdam, concluded vith an
I
all-German Government freely elected - a condition regarded by the Western 
Povers as essential. This is perhaps even less likely to occur than the first 
possibility postulated.
Given that there may be a change in the position of the tvo German States, it is, 
in the viev of this vriter, an intrinsic aspect of the German question, to establish 
vhat v ill be the status of Germany, vhat rights and duties v ill it have and vithin  
vhich borders it is to be confined.
(ii) The Status of a Unified Germany
In the event of a single German State - active as a subject of international lav, 
as distinct from the present Germany vhich, in most senses, is inactive - 
appearing on the international scene, its status v ill depend on the position taken 
by the Four Povers. They, in exercise of their supreme authority, may decide to 
form a confederation of the Federal and Democratic Republics, or elect for a closer 
form of unification. The form of unification is not the most vital in this context, 
hovever. Of greater significance vould be the political position of the Povers
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concerning Germany, because, subject to legal restrictions placed upon them by 
their ovn commitments, they could impose conditions upon the German State vith  
regard to certain matters of domestic and foreign policy - just as Austria bound 
itself to neutrality at the behest of the USSR prior to the removal of foreign troops 
in 1955. Therefore, there does exist, in any attempt to define the future status of 
Germany, this element of unpredictability vhich may apply moreover to a 
discussion of its rights and obligations. Hovever, useful and accurate conclusions 
can be dravn from the existing treaties, agreements and statements of the 
relevant States, and a proper legal assessment arrived at thereby.
The first issue is vhether or not the unified Germany vould constitute a 
continuation of the Germany vhich surrendered to the Allies in 1945, or vould it 
actually form an entirely nev State. It should be noted here that the united 
German State vould certainly not exercise at this stage de facto control^ over any 
territory apart from, probably, the territory of the GDR and the ERG and perhaps 
that of Berlin. This is because, even if  a decision to alter the Polish-German 
frontier from its present position vere to be taken, this could only be taken in the 
context of the peace settlement at vhich that frontier is finally to be settled. 
Since the peace settlement vhich vould include this matter is to be concluded by 
the Allies and Germany, it follovs that the Germany at the peace settlement could 
not be in possession of any territories east of the Oder-Neisse line. Therefore, 
even if  the unified Germany is a continuation of the Germany of 1945, at least 
until the conclusion of the peace settlement it vould be limited territorially to the 
external frontiers of the GDR and the ERG, albeit perhaps temporarily.
It has already been established that the Four Povers and both German States
have different vievs concerning the existence of Germany. Under present 
conditions, there is no reason vhy their varying stances vould t>e altered but 
clearly, agreement must be reached betveen all the concerned States about the 
status of Germany. While the federal Republic may have "agreed to disagree" 
vith the GDR in the Grundvertrag, such accommodations vould be quite 
inappropriate to any attempted union - i f  it should be desired to re-establish 
Germany as a unitary State, the parties must achieve a consensus about vhat that 
State is. Here is anticipated the fusion of tvo entities vhich have folloved very 
different policies since they came into existence. Although they may disagree 
(by agreement) about their mutual relations, it is essential that their fusion be 
based on distinct foundations. Firstly, it is difficult to imagine hov, in practice, 
one State could be created unless there vas agreement on exactly vhat vas being 
created. Secondly, there must be legal certainty. The central issue of this vork - 
the disputed legal status of the Oder-Neisse line - is controversial because of the 
unsettled status of Germany and issues arising from the failure to conclude the 
peace settlement envisaged at Potsdam. It is no solution to the problem to 
substitute one nebulous entity vith another.
In the absence of any present consensus about the continued existence of the 
Reich, the folloving points are of relevance. If  a unified Germany is a 
continuation of the Reich, if  it is identical - then it v ill automatically be invested 
vith those rights and duties possessed by the latter. Marek stresses the 
inseparability of continuity and identity in this context. Referring to her ovn 
definitions, she vrites:
"...the tvo notions of identity and continuity cannot be separated.
There can obviously be no continuity vithout identity, since this 
vould imply the logical absurdity of a predicate vithout a subject 
to vhich it could apply. It could, hovever, be asked vhether the 
reverse might not, in certain circumstances, be true, vhether 
there might not be identity of a State vithout its continuity. Unless 
the possibility of legal miracles is admitted, the question must be 
ansvered emphatically in the negative: there is no legal resurrection 
in international lav. Once a State has become extinct, it cannot 
resume a continued existence. There may veil be a historical 
revival of an extinct State, but not of a pre-existing legal entity."^
This extract is relevant to the German problem. If  there is no continuity - if  
Germany had ceased to exist - there could be no question of identity of any rights 
and duties. Even if  this is the position of the USSR, regard must be had also to the 
Western Povers. The UK maintains the continued existence of Germany - there 
has been no break, despite the developments since 1949 - therefore there remains 
some scope for a unified Germany possessing the surviving rights and duties of 
defeated Germany. Had ail the empovered States agreed upon the cessation of 
Germany's existence, then the matter of vhich rights and duties vould adhere to a 
unified Germany could be decided on the basis of the lav of state succession.^  The 
discussion on State succession v ill shov the position of Germany vere all the 
States agreed that it had ceased to exist. The study of identity and continuity is 
intended to shed some light on the position of Germany according to the UK legal 
perspective.
Marek defines State identityas “the identity of its international rights and
obligations, as before and after the event vhich called such identity in question, 
and solely on the basis of the customary norm “pacta sunt servanda"".^  The 
continuity is simply the continuation in existence of the same entity. If  the ne v  
Germany is to be identical vith the old, the question arises, vithin vhich 
frontiers such identity exists; vithin vhich area the rights and duties 
appropriate to such a status may be exercised.
Folloving the conclusion reached earlier, that there continues to exist a 
Four-Pover competence vhich supports the theory of Germany surviving6 until
I
the present day, there is certainly room for the conclusion that all Four Povers do 
at least agree that they retain that competence vith regard to the German 
territory on vhich the tvo former zones of occupation are situated. Such common 
ground offers perhaps alovest common denominator from vhich negotiations on 
the future of Germany might proceed. Even if  the Soviet Union vould deny the 
existence of Germany, it v ill not dispute that it retains certain functions - vhich, 
indeed, it carries out conscientiously; although it is suggested that agreement 
among all concerned parties vould be essential about the status of the German 
State at a peace settlement*7, such consensus is not necessary at the beginning. 
Indeed, to seek it might result in progress being halted at a preliminary stage and 
the abandonment of any attempt to define the eastern frontier of Germany.
That the Povers do not hold identical vievs on Germany is a state of affairs 
vhich does not deny all legal remedies. Their authority is based on a joint 
assessment, expressed in 1945, that they did not annex Germany, vhich therefore 
continued to exist. It is from 1949, vith the purported creation of tvo States, that 
the substantive differences vere given a tangible form vhich, vith hindsight.
vould appear to have been virtually irrevocable. Each side made claims on behalf 
of its ovn "Germany", and, at least at the outset, asserted that its Germany vas 
the true German State. Since then both States have become firm ly established, 
vith perhaps on occasion more than a little help from their friends, and like all 
States have themselves participated as subjects of international lav, in the 
international arena. The only formal limitation has been the retained rights and 
obligations vith regard to "Germany as a vhole". Thus East and West Germany 
have become progressively more integrated into their respective economic and 
military alliances, at least in the first years of their existence perceiving their 
fundamental interests - survival and protection from the other side, as being 
guaranteed most effectively through very close ties vith their blocs and, 
especially, their ovn superpovers.8 In particular, Adenauer and Ulbricht in the 
first years sav the basic interests and needs of their States as being met through 
close cooperation vith the USA and USSR, though it is probably fair to assert that 
Adenauer had also a perception of the need for the Federal Republic to maintain 
close ties vith France and other vestem countries - hence the West German 
enthusiasm for the European Communities, of vhich the USA vas not a member. 
This perception of the need for a very close link vith either the USA or USSR 
inspired a loyalty among West and East German leaders tovards the superpovers 
vhich vas not alvays reciprocated. In other vords, vhile the GDR considered its 
primary interest (in terms of foreign policy and security) to be a close link vith  
the USSR, the latter State of course took into account its ovn, often different 
interests vhere the GDR vas concerned. Thus, it concluded the 1970 Treaty vith  
the FRG in the face of strong opposition from East Germany, vhich may have felt 
its ovn position vas threatened by any improvement in relations betveen these
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two States.9 The Federal Republic also had to accept that, from a US perspective, it 
was only one aspect of US foreign policy and its position at any given time would 
depend, not only on how cold was the political climate in Europe, but how hot 
were other areas of conflict, or potential areas, in which the USA had an 
interest19.
Although the integration of each German State into its own bloc has served to 
deepen the division of Germany, nevertheless the adoption by the Federal 
Republic of an Qstt>olitik which, as is shown by the commitments made by the 
Federal Republic in the treaties which it eventually concluded, accepted many of 
the legal demands of the socialist countries, eventually resulted even in the 
successful negotiation of the treaty between the GDR and FRG on the basis of their 
mutual relations (which, of course, required the GDR to adopt a different 
Westpolitik from its previous stance - for example, it agreed that the FRG could 
continue to maintain that the two States were not foreign to one another, 
although the GDR itself does not accept this view). Therefore, there came into 
existence an awareness on both sides that while fundamental differences existed, 
these need not necessarily prevent the adoption of measures which were 
regarded as mutually beneficial and acceptable. The result of this was the series 
of treaties between the Federal Republic and the socialist States and the Four 
Power Agreement on Berlin. Some of these agreements are relevant to the status, 
rights and duties of a united German State. Thus the status of Germany should not 
be decided simply by reference to the retained rights and responsibilities of the 
Four Powers with regard to Germany as a whole; this as already indicated would 
be unhelpful anyway because of disagreement on the issue. The two German 
States have created for themselves, with the approval of the Allies, and have been
given by the Allies, rights and responsibilities which do not prima facie govern 
the status of Germany as a whole - since that is reserved to the Four Powers - but 
which may or will restrict or direct the policies and legal positions adopted by a 
united German State at a future peace settlement, with regard to particular issues, 
including its eastern frontier.
Any rights or duties of the unified Germany which it may acquire from the 
Federal and Democratic Republics will depend on its relationship to them. Those 
passing from the Germany of 1945 would be those few which have survived the 
creation of what eventually became the two German States, in 1949. The Yestem 
Allies gave West Germany, over a five-year period, control over an increasingly 
large and diverse section of its own affairs, eventually retaining in the 
Deutschlandvertrag of 1954 only those rights and duties which they held in 
common with the USSR and which they could not, or would not, alienate.11 The 
USSR concluded on 20 September 1955 its own treaty with the GDR,1^  - a treaty 
concerning relations between the Parties - in which they “solemnly reaffirm  
that the relations between them are based on full equality, respect for each 
other's sovereignty, and non-intervention in each other’s domestic affairs" 
(Article 1). The GDR apparently was also becoming a fully independent State, but 
there remained in the text of the treaty evidence of a residual competence of the 
USSR, which might affect the freedom of action of East Germany.1^  First of all, 
the Preamble mentions, inter alia "... the obligations of the Soviet Union and of 
the German Democratic Republic under existing international agreements 
relating to Germany as a whole....“ In other words, the Parties are acknowledging 
that their freedom of action is not unlimited and the reason for these limitations 
is the fact that three other States - the UK, USA and France - retain certain rights
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over the vhole of Germany and Berlin, the eastern sector of vhich the GDR claims 
as its capital city, and the justification for these rights can t>e only the continued 
existence of, or competence vith regard to, Germany. Article 4 of  the treaty also 
acknowledges the peculiarity of the situation of the apparently independent State 
the GDR:
"The Soviet forces nov stationed in the territory of the German 
Democratic Republic in accordance vith  existing international 
agreements shall temporarily remain in the German Democratic 
Republic, vith the consent of its Government
Tvo points are vorthy of note here: "temporarily" does not necessarily imply or 
mean that the situation v ill soon change, vhether in fact, in lav or both. In 
international lav, a "temporary" situation can easily acquire a permanent 
character. This is typical of the German situation itself: the division of Germany 
is novadays depicted as a permanent settlement the unilateral alteration of vhich 
vould have unvelcome consequences for vorld peace. While this may be true, 
nevertheless it is also the case that the USSR and the GDR supported the 
reunification of Germany (and therefore the temporary character as a State of 
the GDR). This aspect of their Germany policy at the time is moreover enunciated 
in Article 6 of the 1955 Treaty:
'This Treaty shall remain in force until Germany is re-united 
as a peaceful and democratic State, or until the Contracting 
Parties agree that the Treaty should be amended or terminated."
To describe a situation as "temporary" may indicate the attitude of the Parties 
tovards a particular fact or state of affairs; it does not mean that the situation 
must change; nor does it necessarily detract from the merits of a particular 
situation. The same holds true for the Federal Republic, vhich in the Bundestag 
Resolution attempted unsuccessfully to demean the treaties vith the Soviet Union 
and Poland by describing them as elements of a "modus vivendi" (Paragraph 1) 
vhich the FRG sought to establish vith the East. These treaties are only 
temporary in the sense that nothing ever remains the same if  enough time 
passes; the Federal Republic may cease to exist through reunification of 
Germany. On the other hand, Poland could also cease to exist, a development for 
vhich there is vell-established historical precedent.
The second point is that, according to Article 4, the Soviet forces stationed in 
the territory of the GDR do so vith the consent of the GDR Government. This 
implies that the presence of these forces is somehov dependent upon this 
consent. This, hovever, is not the case. Firstly, although the GDR Government is 
said to give its consent, at least according to the actual vording of the treaty, it is 
novhere stated that this consent must be obtained in order to legitimize the 
presence of Soviet forces in the GDR. Had the relevant article stipulated that the 
Soviet forces remained only vith the consent of the GDR, the meaning vould be 
quite different, and it could then be maintained that an attempt had been made to 
deny this aspect, at least, of the USSR's residual competence. Secondly, even if  the 
Soviet forces do happen to have the consent of the GDR authorities for their 
presence there, such consent is unnecessary insofar as these forces are present 
in the GDR, by virtue of the USSR's status as one of the Four Povers, carrying out
functions under the residual authority of the USSR as one of the Four Powers, 
with obligations and rights vis-a-vis the other three Powers. Thirdly, as a matter 
of fact if  not law, it is not anticipated that the DDR will withdraw its consent to the 
presence of Soviet forces on its territory.
In other words, despite the rhetoric of the USSR-GDR treaty, the concept of one 
Germany - however amorphous its form - survived the establishment of a 
fully-independent East Germany. It also survived the establishment of the Federal 
Republic as a fully independent State, which meant the division of its rights and 
duties between the Four Powers, on the one hand, and the two German States on 
the other. This Germany - or this collection of rights and responsibilities - is all 
that remains to the Four Powers following the erosion of their supreme authority 
by giving to the GDR and the FRG so many of the functions of State which they, 
the Four Powers, had exercised since 1945.
The Soviet and Yestern views of what actually remains of Germany were not 
identical; they did recognise a "common responsibility for the settlement of the 
German question and the reunification of Germany"14' but it would appear that 
the USSR was at one time prepared to regard as no longer applicable some of the 
Allied agreements which were essential for the maintenance of the position of 
the three Yestern Powers in Berlin and Germany: the agreements of 1944 and 
1945 on the zones of occupation and the administration of Greater Berlin and on 
the control mechanism in Germany.1 ^  This dispute was unresolved following 
rejection by the Yestern Powers of the Soviet view. Nevertheless, there does exist 
an agreed common responsibility for Germany among all Four Powers.
In the event of Germany in its unified form being identical with the Germany 
of the immediate post-war years, it would not of course take over all rights and 
responsibilities of the Four Powers. Since these are concerned largely with 
actions which the Allies might be involved in with regard to Germany - in  
particular, the reunification and the peace settlement, it is evident that it would 
once more have certain acts carried out concerning it. Just as Germany in  
1945-49 had no right to demand a peace settlement, nor would it be able to do so in  
future. This is the prerogative of the Allies. And if  this Germany were a new 
State, it would still be subject to the exercise by the Four Powers of their
i
competence with regard to it, since they had supreme authority and have 
expressly retained that competence. It may thus be concluded that, regardless of 
whether or not the single German State continues to exist, the position of the Four 
Powers would not be affected with regard to their residual authority. Indeed, 
despite their differences of opinion on the subject, all Four Powers, in a joint 
declaration in 1972 concerning the application of East and ¥est Germany for 
membership of the United Nations, stated that their rights and responsibilities 
would not be affected by this membership.1  ^ Thus while there may be an absence 
of consensus with regard to its scope, the existence of joint authority was 
acknowledged simultaneously by all Four Powers nearly thirty years after its 
assumption.
Despite the failure of the Four Powers to agree exactly to what their joint 
authority pertains, it is possible to offer a legal assessment of it. It is accepted that 
Germany survived its defeat in 1945; in the absence of evidence to the contrary 
then, it must continue to exist. Such evidence must be sought in the actions of the 
Four Powers since it is they that have the right to alter the status of Germany.
The Soviet Union seems to regard Germany as no longer existing, but, to have 
binding effect with regard to the other three States, they must agree to such an 
opinion - which does, after all, constitute a drastic change in attitude. The UK, at 
least, certainly does not accept the Soviet position.17 And this in itself should be 
enough to justify the continuation of the German State, since it would appear that 
the UK is merely maintaining the position agreed upon by all Four Powers at the 
end of the war, which may not be changed unilaterally or even with the 
agreement of three of the four Powers; their authority over Germany, including 
the power to determine its future status, was not to be exercised by majority vote.
i
Yhile there is evidence to show that Germany has ceased to exist, none of it 
contains any Four-Power declaration to that effect.1® Nor is it sufficient to assert 
frequently and consistently that a particular state of affairs no longer holds true 
if  the other concerned States from the beginning, and consistently, deny the 
assertion. Herein lies the weakness of this theoretical judgment - although 
correct, it is believed, in theory, it nevertheless is most unlikely to alter the 
attitude of the Soviet Union, either because it believes its legal assessment to be 
the correct one, or because it is unlikely to be prepared to accept the loss of 
political face entailed by a public reappraisal of its stanceFurtherm ore, even 
i f  the Soviet Union can be deemed to be unable unilaterally to alter its attitude to 
the continued existence of the German State, it could withhold its agreement to the 
position of the other Powers in the event of some proposed joint action with 
regai'd to Germany, for example because it finds their position unacceptable. This 
suggests another reason for accepting the lack of consensus among the Four 
Powers so that it may not be used as a justification to inhibit agreement on the 
reunified Germany.
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It is suggested that the correct approach in assessing the status of Germany is 
to go hack to the time when the Tour Powers actually found themselves in  
agreement -1945. The various statements and acts cited above purporting to deny 
the existence of Germany cannot override the consistent maintenance of that 
¥existence by States with the authority to do so. In theory Germany exists, then. 
Yet the Soviet Union does not accept it. It has altered its position and therefore 
the effective status of Germany in public international law is less certain; to draw 
conclusions in such circumstances entails a choice between what are believed to 
be contradictory stances. To support the UK view is to deny the change in policy 
by the USSR, to take the opposite position is to assert that a State can be obliged 
(through neither customary international law nor ius cogens) to acknowledge 
not only a change but a fundamental change against its own volition in the status 
of another subject of international law for which these States are responsible, 
albeit in association with the USA and France. It is for this reason that no third 
way can or should be sought. The UK is upholding the rule of international law 
and to look for a compromise solution would be to demean that rule. The Soviet 
Union has taken a stance that is not legally supportable yet its stance will remain 
tenable as long as it chooses to maintain it. In this context, the acknowledgment 
in 1972 by the USSR that it retained joint capacity with regard to Berlin confuses 
the picture further. Therefore, the actual status of Germany is ambiguous in the 
extreme because of the failure of the responsible States to remain in accord with 
regard to the exercise of their joint rights and duties.
It is not unforeseeable that the USSR, despite its public utterances on the 
subject, may, at a later date, alter its attitude concerning the continued existence 
of Germany, should such a move appear to be expedient. It has in the past acted in
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such a way os to contradict earlier legal claims. A notable case is that of Poland in 
1939. On 17 September 1939 the USSR invaded and subsequently occupied Eastern 
Poland, up to a line previously agreed upon, by Ribbentrop and Molotov for 
Germany and the USSR, in the secret Protocol to the Non-Aggression pact 
concluded by the two States.20 While the USSR has denied the existence of this 
Protocol it is generally accepted in the West that an agreement to partition Poland 
twas indeed entered into.21 The point is that the Soviet Union justified its 
intervention in Poland on the ground that Poland as a State had ceased to exist 
along with the Polish Government and therefore the Soviet army entered the 
territory of what had been Poland in order to safeguard the lives and property of 
the Ukrainian and White Ruthenian populations in that country.22 The Soviet 
Union maintained its presence in eastern Poland, which had been incorporated 
into the USSR, until the attack by Germany in 1941. Yet it is most likely that 
Poland survived as a State in 1939, despite the whole of its territory being 
occupied by German and Soviet forces: its armed forces continued the war, a 
Polish Government in Exile, provision for which was made in the Polish 
Constitution, functioned continuously - and it is accepted that a State does not 
cease to exist merely by dint of its whole territory having become occupied by the 
forces of the other side; debellatio is required first.2^
Therefore, the position was that the USSR had attempted to justify its unlawful 
action by recourse to the claim that Poland had ceased to exist24 Notwithstanding 
such a position, the USSR entered into diplomatic relations with Poland once again 
following the attack by Germany. Yet the State with which it entered into 
relations was identical under international lav/with the one which, according to
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the USSR, had ceased to exist. In other words, the Soviet Union blatantly altered 
its position because the prevailing political and strategic considerations made 
such a move expedient, if  not even desirable. If  Poland had ceased to exist in 1939, 
it would have been impossible for the Soviet Union in 1941 to conclude, as it did on 
30 July, a Pact with Poland, on, inter alia, the restoration of diplomatic relations 2  ^
By acknowledging the Polish State in this Pact, the USSR incidentally destroyed 
the alleged legal basis for its action two years earlier.
¥hile it is hoped that it will not require another war and invasion to 
precipitate such a fundamental change in attitude with regard to the continued 
existence of the German State, nevertheless it may justifiably be asserted that the 
Soviet Union can be induced - perhaps especially if  it perceives its ov/n interest 
being served - to alter its view's on even very basic matters.
The difficulty in characterizing the Soviet position is that it does continue to 
exercise certain functions pertaining to Germany as a whole. There do exist 
recent statements by Soviet commentators on the German question, to the effect 
that the German question no longer exists26 The Soviet Union regards the 
question as resolved, which means that it sees the present situation, where two 
German States coexist and many of the problems or outstanding matters which 
should have been settled by the peace settlement have been regulated by bilateral 
treaties, as final. One possible interpretation of this attitude is that there is no 
scope, from the Soviet perspective, for Germany continuing to exist for the 
purposes of a peace settlement. And while it does continue to exercise rights and 
responsibilities derived from the actions of the Four Powers following the defeat 
of Germany, there is room for the view that such exercise is necessary, not to
preserve the USSR’s position at a peace settlement but for the maintenance of the 
status quo: while ambiguities may be present, nevertheless a final situation has 
been arrived at which allows the existence of two separate German States and ¥est 
Berlin.
This points to characterization of the Soviet position in terms of the whole of 
Germany having been replaced by the FRG and the GDR plus West Berlin (since it 
regards East Berlin as forming a part of the GDR).27 In this sense, it is proper 
to regard these two States as successor States which have inherited from Germany 
the obligation to permit the exercise by the Four Powers of those functions which 
comprise their rights and duties pertaining to Berlin (or ¥est Berlin) and 
Germany as a whole. Although the two German States are independent, still they 
have accepted since their foundation, albeit with occasional attempts by the GDR 
to question the authority of the ¥estern Powers, that certain legal restrictions 
inhibit their freedom of action but simultaneously allow them such independence 
as they have. The rights and obligations of the Four Powers both provide a basis 
for the present situation and help to maintain its existence to the extent that they 
cannot in practice be separated from the present German structure of two States. 
It is certainly the case that these rights and obligations of the Four Powers were 
not intended to become permanent, but then neither of the two German States 
formally anticipated at the commencement of their existence that they would 
develop separately - as is evident in the first constitutions of both. The 
conclusion in the years 1970-1973 of the treaties between the FRG and its 
immediate eastern neighbours plus Poland and the Soviet Union serves only to 
strengthen the legal foundation of the geopolitical status quo. In other words, 
although the original justification for the maintenance of such an intrusive
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presence in Germany by the Four Powers was certainly the peace settlement later 
developments in the Soviet perception of its own role rendered that justification 
less relevant; but the status quo which had filled the vacuum depended also on the 
continued maintenance by each side of its position, which in turn meant that 
basic stances could not be changed or even modified without extreme caution.
The next, logical step in the Soviet attitude towards Germany could be that, 
since the German question has been resolved, a reunified Germany would only be 
able to appear in the context of the "resolved" situation: the issues and problems 
facing the 1945 Germany would not be those confronting the new unitary State. 
One consequence of such a policy would be that, despite the apparent clarity of 
the Potsdam Agreement, the matter of Germany's frontier would not arise - 
having been resolved! Such a development in the policy of the USSR, in the event 
of there arising moves towards reunification in Germany, is not unforeseeable, 
but it would be unlikely to receive a warm reception from the Western Powers 
which, even if  they show no desire to alter the external de facto, perhaps de jure, 
German boundaries, are unlikely to be prepared to negate suddenly the legal 
position held since 1945, that the peace settlement is the proper occasion on 
which to finalise certain provisional arrangements or to demand that they be 
changed. Indeed, the general position of the socialist States with regard to the 
specific issues of the Polish-German frontier is that the question was resolved at 
Potsdam and therefore would not arise in the event of a reunification of 
Germany.28
The conclusion must be that under present conditions. there is insufficient
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evidence to justify a definitive statement concerning the identity or lack of it, 
between a future unified German State and the Germany of 1945-1949. This 
conclusion assumes that the Soviet Union will not alter its existing view that 
Germany has failed to survive the creation of the FRG and the GDR. In the event 
of any developments in Soviet or ¥estem policy towards the question, the 
practice of the responsible States may enable a more definite assessment. 
Notwithstanding this judgment, it is appropriate to reiterate at this point that the 
practice of the UK, which, it is believed, has been consistent in maintaining the 
original joint decisions of the Four Powers with regard to the survival of 
Germany, does indicate that Germany still exists.
(iii) The Rights and Duties of the United German State
In the event of a united German State becoming active once more on the 
international plane, the present position concerning its rights and duties can be 
deduced from the preceding discussion: regardless of identity being agreed to 
exist with the Germany of 1945, the position of the Four Powers, in terms of their 
own capacity, will be unaltered. This follows from the conclusion that, despite the 
differing views of the UK and USSR, both States have agreed along with France 
and the USA that their rights and duties, as they see them, continue to exist. The 
difficulty is of course that the USSR, although in the opinion of this writer 
having adopted a legally unjustifiable stance with regard to certain aspects of the 
German question, does create uncertainty as to the actual final exercise by the 
Four Powers of their functions with regard to a united Germany. However, it may 
be stated that, formally, there is unlikely to be any impediment to the exercise by 
all Four Powers of their right to decide upon the course of the eastern border of
Germany, as agreed at Potsdam by the UK, USA and the USSR and, subsequently 
France. Even if  the Soviet Union should take the view that the frontier, for 
whatever reason, has already been settled finally, it would still be open to it to 
argue that, in continuing to espouse this line, it is nevertheless participating in 
"the final delimitation of the western frontier of Poland". This would, 
incidentally, be in accordance with the argument frequently put forward in the 
socialist countries that delimitation in this particular situation means no more 
than the formal and detailed enactment of a binding decision of principle?^ 
Therefore, while it might be open to the Soviet Union to argue that no decision 
should be taken with regard to the Polish-German frontier, on the ground that 
there is nothing to be decided, there would appear to be no formal bar to its 
participating with the ¥estern Powers in the final delimitation, without thereby 
compromising its position.
It is impossible to predict exactly how the Four Powers would decide on the 
scope of their joint authority, given their present discord, but there is no reason 
why they could not reach agreement on the most important substantive issues; 
the lack of consensus which is evident now relates to the division of Germany in 
the first place. Reunification could not occur without substantial movement in 
the direction of policies which would be acceptable to all Four Powers. Such 
non-legal criteria defy advance judgment because of the unpredictability of 
foreign policy. However, it is believed that the two factors - legal stances and 
foreign policy - even if  they are entirely separable, do go together in the German 
situation to a great extent, perhaps even more than usual, because the two German 
States are in “the front line" of the division of Europe. Thus it should be 
anticipated that the political will which would have to accompany any movement
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towards a legal solution to the German question would assist the States concerned 
to reach agreement on the extent of their joint authority/to which, with regard to 
the Polish-German frontier, there is, as has been shown, no formal bar.
A similar argument to that which has been employed to show how the Soviet 
Union might agree to participating in a final delimitation of the Polish-German 
frontier has been used previously to show how the Western Powers could exercise 
their right to decide on the Polish-German frontier at the peace settlement .3° It
is suggested that, by approving the recognition by the FRG of the Oder-Neisse
)
Line as the western frontier of Poland, the UK, and any other of the Four Powers 
if  they have expressed the same substantive approval, would be obliged at a peace 
settlement to recognise the Oder-Neisse line. That is, they still have the right to 
decide on the delimitation at the peace settlement, but their freedom of choice, 
such as it is, would be restricted and, actually, negated because the previous 
declarations of approval of the West German recognition of the Oder-Neisse line 
would have the effect of obliging the States concerned to approve the existing 
frontier. This is not the view of this writer^
The Soviet position can be differentiated because that State would be in the 
situation of being able to follow the letter of the Potsdam Agreement, if  it chose. 
In other words, its freedom of action is maintained. The Western States, on the 
other hand, would, according to the above argument, be bound by their approval 
to adopt a particular course at the peace settlement. It should in fairness be 
pointed out that the Soviet Union would also be obliged to agree to the Oder-Neisse 
line were the above argument accepted.
Even if  the Soviet Union argued that the frontier question were resolved, this
could also t>e taken as that State’s contribution to the delimitation of the frontier. 
There is, therefore, taking into account also the views of the Western Powers, 
what this writer considers to be conclusive evidence that the frontier question is 
a proper matter for the peace settlement - at the very least there is required from 
the Four Powers a formal agreement that the delimitation has already occurred.
It has been argued that "...the decision to change the eastern frontier of 
Germany was taken by a German Government It is further correctly stated 
that that Government was composed not of Germans but of the Supreme 
Commanders of the victorious Powers. The German people, it is concluded, cannot 
in the event of an all-German Government coming into existence, argue that they 
are not bound to accept the decision of the German Government when it was 
composed of the Supreme Commanders 7$ While this argument is also valid, the 
result postulated, that therefore Germany (since the German people would not in 
this context have any international legal personality) would be obliged to accept 
the Potsdam provisions with regard to the Polish-German frontier and therefore 
not to question the frontier, is incorrect. It is certainly the case that the relevant 
provision would bind Germany. But it is not the case that the Potsdam Agreement 
by itself has the effect attributed to it - that of allowing Poland administration in 
the sense of full sovereignty.^
Given the unsatisfactory nature of the Four Power positions with regard to the 
status of Germany, that is, unsatisfactory in that the evident differences do not 
allow a definite judgment to be made on the legal position which could be 
acceptable to all, it is now'necessary to consider to what extent the legal morass of 
the realt>olitik acted out since 1945 can be clarified by the results of the Qstpolitik.
In other words, which obligations and rights of the two German States may have a 
bearing on the German question and in particular the Oder-Heisse line?
The GDR and FRG have both recognised that the State territory of Poland 
extends to the Oder-Neisse line, which is its western frontier .35 The GDR 
recognised this situation as final and irrevocable, while the FRG accepts the 
situation for itself but maintains that a unified Germany would not be bound to 
accept the situation as a result of its (the Federal Republic's) recognition.
However, a united German State would certainly possess some of the rights and 
duties which presently pertain to the two German States. If  Germany has not 
survived the creation of two new republics on the territory of the occupation 
2ones, then they are successor States, each with the wide range of capacities 
allowed to them by the Four Powers. In this case, should unification occur, the 
new State would also be a successor State and it would be necessary to consider 
which rights and duties it would inherit. If  Germany has survived, while it is 
known from the official statements of the Four Powers that neither the Federal 
Republic nor the Democratic Republic has been regarded as identical with it, 
nevertheless its capacity to act was suspended for an indefinite period and most of 
its functions as a State were passed on to the GDR (by the Soviet Union) and the 
FRG (by the Vestern Powers).
It is in such a situation that the complexity of the legal developments and 
different policies of the Four Powers combine to inhibit assessment of the 
problem as one might a "normal" case of State succession. But what actually 
happened? Germany continued to exist in its “potential" capacity, but many of its
attributes as a State were permitted to devolve to the GDR and FRG, sufficient 
indeed for both to receive, admittedly over a period of twenty five years, from 
1949 to 1974, virtually universal recognition by the other States of the world. This 
process by which the rights and duties of one were taken up by two new/ entities 
on the international scene was in effect a state succession. The only factor which 
prevents the characterisation of the process by that term is that Germany was 
deemed still to exist. There occurred no complete replacement of one subject of 
international lav/ by another or others such as would have been accompanied by 
a change of sovereignty:96 for most purposes, the two republics enjoyed, 
eventually, complete nominal independence, but with regard to Berlin and 
Germany as a whole, of course, they could not override the standpoint of the Four 
Powders which had created them in the first place. In other words, there was 
substitution of sovereignty for most purposes: the Four Powers, using their 
supreme authority, permitted it to pass from Germany,97 albeit without joint 
agreement at the time, but they retained certain rights and duties which justify a 
conclusion that Germany had not disappeared from the international scene yet. It 
is yet another aspect of the unique character of Germany that the Four Powders did 
not themselves acquire sovereignty over Germany. They specifically refused to 
annex it, though annexation wras one alternative available to them in 1945?8 It 
was this refusal to acquire sovereignty, combined with the political failure99 of 
the breakdown of cooperation by the occupation authorities, which gave rise to 
the events of 1949 and the exacerbation of already complex legal problems by the 
appearance of two claimants, each purporting to be the "rear Germany. By 1955, 
all that remained of the sovereign German State wfas that part of it with regard to 
which the Allies had not relinquished their supreme authority: Berlin and 
Germany as a whole, which meant the retention of the right to decide on the
borders and status of Germany if and when reunification should occur.
The sovereign status of Germany was thus reduced to a potential status: 
potential in the sense that it was inactive, but not non-existent. If, therefore, this 
sovereign status continued to exist, there could have been no full transfer of 
sovereignty and hence the reluctance to characterize what was definitely a 
widespread and thorough devolution of rights and obligations to the FRG and the 
GDR as an instance of State succession. A partial transfer of rights and duties 
cannot be termed a change of sovereignty. Sovereignty has been split with 
regard to the territory at present wdthin the frontiers of the two German States. 
There is no competition among the jurisdictions, though, because of the 
restrictions placed upon the freedom of action of the two republics by the Allies. 
Any attempt to act in the name of the German State by either of those entities on 
which devolved most of its active capacity would constitute an infringement of 
the supreme authority which the Allies retained. The Federal Republic and 
Democratic Republic are sovereign States but with limitations placed on their 
freedom of action in certain situations.
Such a concept as cited above - the limitation on the freedom of action - is 
nothing new'. All States are subject to such limitations: international law 
prohibits recourse to the use offeree as a means of settling disputes - one specific 
example of the freedom of States being limited regardless of their own washes 
(while at one time it could be argued that States were only subject to this 
limitation because they chose to be, such no longer holds true; all States are 
bound by the above rule irrespective of their own wishes in the matter by virtue 
of its status as iuscogens)40. States can be obliged, and have so been, to follow/ a
certain policy as a condition of their existence, their freedom of action being 
limited by treaty, as with Belgium in 1839** - one example of limitations being 
imposed upon one State, quite lawfully, by others, rather than applying to the 
whole international community. The significant difference about the situation in 
Germany is this, that the method of limiting it is quite unique. While other States 
can be and have been obliged to behave in certain ways, it is not the case that 
their sovereignty was limited by virtue of another power or powers possessing 
over all or part of the same territory. The restrictions which apply to the FRG and 
the GDR concerning the retained authority of the Four Powers are, in themselves, 
arguably no more intrusive than the binding of Belgium to neutrality in the 19th 
century or the Austrian example in the 20th century, whereby Austria actually 
agreed to bind itself to neutrality.^ However, if  Austria maintains its 
commitment to neutrality, its sovereignty is otherwise no more restricted than 
that of the vast majority of the other States in the international community. In 
the case of West and East Germany, they will never have the same measure of 
control over their territory which is enjoyed by Austria, because they are 
restricted even within their own territories by what is probably a simultaneous 
sovereignty, existing in the German State and manifested by the exercise of 
supreme authority on the territory of the two new Germanies by the Four Powers. 
While the two jurisdictions do not compete, since they each have quite separate 
applications, they can coexist. Again, it is not a novel situation for one State to 
have certain rights on the territory of another, but this would usually be by 
mutual agreement of the States concerned*9 and not, as is the case in West and 
East Germany, by virtue of the dictate of a completely different sovereign power. 
In other words, the "normal" or standard situation would be for one State to allow 
the other the right to use its territory for certain purposes. Even if  this
permission were granted by the granting State because such a concession had 
been fundamental - for example, to ensure its coming into existence as an 
independent State and as a condition thereof, this would still not be identical to 
the situation in which the FRG and GDR find themselves, because the granting 
State in this hypothesis would still be fully sovereign, that is, the only sovereign 
entity on that territory. West and East Germany have to coexist within their own 
territories with another sovereign authority. Herein lies the basic substantive 
singularity of the German issue.
Is the concept of potential capacity, such as the State of Germany would appear 
to possess, quite unique? The answer, as so often with Germany, is maybe. It is 
ironic that among those who would ridicule the concept of Germany continuing to 
exist, even if  only for certain limited purposes, are some Polish international 
lawyers**. For it was the Polish Supreme Court, admittedly in a Poland which, far 
from being socialist and allied to the USSR was arguably democratic, independent 
(politically as well as legally) and had only two years previously fought and won a 
war against the Soviet Union,*9 that felt able to rule that the assumption that the 
Polish State ceased to exist, after the third partition of Poland in 1795, was 
recognized as "a historical and legal error.”*6 The Court further stated:
"The Republic as a State existed even after the partitions, 
although in a potential status " *7
So the concept of potential capacity or status is not quite as far-fetched as some 
would suggest, though it may not have been an accurate assessment by the Polish 
Supreme Court, in terms of public international law, to claim that the Polish State
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had enjoyed such a status.48 The actual wording used is not so important here, 
because the meaning and effect are very similar indeed. The Polish court was 
suggesting that the Polish State continued to exist despite the fact that, over the 
whole of its territory (whatever its dimensions), sovereignty was being exercised 
by three other States: the Russian Empire, Prussia and Austria-Hungary. The 
only difference with Poland was that, as a potential State, like Germany it was 
completely inactive, but with Germany there exists tangible evidence of its status 
in the form of the occupation of Berlin and the exercise of certain rights with 
regard to the whole of Germany.
Although it has been concluded that there occurred no State succession in the 
usual sense according to which that term is understood, because there was no 
complete replacement of one subject by another or others, nevertheless the legal 
existence of twro, non-competing sovereign powers on German territory 
(Germany on the one hand and, on the other, the ERG and GDR) was brought about 
by the devolution of certain capacities from the former to the latter. In this sense 
there was a State succession from Germany, though it wras not universally 
characterised as such when the crucial events were talcing place, from 1949 to 
1955- Each of the newr German States v/as regarded as being not identical with 
Germany. Hew entities came into being with sovereign power, subject to the 
exceptional limitations discussed in the preceding pages. These exceptional 
limitations are not open to question because they are manifestations of an equally 
exceptional, but legally valid, right of supreme authority enjoyed by the 
responsible States.
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If  it is possible, as is the view' of this YTiter, for two, non-competing 
sovereignties to exist with regard to one territory, then it should it>so facto be 
conceivable that State succession may occur with regard to one of these 
sovereignties (the category of the GDR and ERG) without thereby affecting the 
other. The succeeding State or States wuuld of course be bound to accept the 
limitations upon their freedom of action which exist as a result of the four Power 
supreme authority, which represents the sovereignty of Germany.
The idea postulated here is that of partial State succession. 0 ‘C onnell^  
discussed this in the context of one State acquiring part of another State, through, 
for instance, annexation or cession, so that the territory of one is increased at the 
expense of the other, but the international legal personality of neither is 
affected: they remain the same States. ¥ith  regard to modern Germany, however, 
what is involved is an altogether different form of succession, because the 
capacity which wras passed from Germany was not total capacity with regard to 
part of its territory, but partial capacity with regal'd to all of its territory (that is, 
minus those areas which had been placed under Polish administration or Soviet 
control, to the East of the Soviet occupation zone).
The fact that this capacity was actually passed onto two States should not be 
permitted to confuse the issue: this occurred because by that time, there were two 
separate de facto authorities in Germany: the ¥estem Powers and the USSR. 
Although each side did not accord immediate approval to the actions of the other, 
this was eventually forthcoming. The division of this capacity into two parts of 
Germany may be regarded, for this purpose, as not expressing any division in the 
legal character of the capacity which flowed from Germany to the two newr States.
They each inherited the same kind of partial authority over their own segments 
of the German territory though the practical extent of it may have differed.
The practical consequence of this situation is that, if  Germany still exists, a 
reunified German State would, despite this existence, succeed to those rights and 
duties of the two German States which should be inherited according to the 
general lav/ of State succession. It would not be prevented (or saved) by the mere 
existence of the Germany of 1945 from being subject to the rights and duties of 
the GDR and ERG with regal’d to the Polish-German frontier. However, since the 
final decisions on the status of Germany and its frontiers are to be made by the 
Eour Powers in exercise of their supreme authority, the commitments of the 
reunified Germany could not override those of the Eour Powers with regal’d to 
these matters; only subsequent action by the Eour Powers could limit their 
freedom of action: if  they have made any statements or taken any action which 
would have the effect of restricting their final decisions on the status and 
frontiers of Germany. This reunified German State could only come into existence 
in the context of the residual Eour Power authority, assuming that they v/ill take 
no action to bring about the demise of that authority in the meantime. Because 
neither of the two presently active German States is identical with Germany, the 
new German State would also probably not enjoy that status. The fact that the ERG 
and GDR derived from the old Germany would not of itself entail an automatic 
fusion of the new entity with the old; this is because the development of the 
Eederal and Democratic Republics since 1949 has entailed the acquisition of rights 
and duties such as to create a quite unforeseen, new but nevertheless legally valid 
state of affairs. Even if  the ¥estern Powers and the USSR did not originally 
intend the entities which they set up in their respective zones of occupation to do
so, these have nevertheless acquired the status of sovereign States, with the 
consent of the Four Powers.
However, the "new" Germany would still t>e subject to the residual authority of 
the Four Powers. Indeed, the actual act of reunification could only occur with 
their consent, because this would be seen as a development which has to be 
regulated by them, since it concerns Germany as a whole. Otherwise, it is 
conceivable, legally, that reunification might take place without the involvement 
uof the Four Powers, since it might be argued that, if  neither the GDR nor the FRG 
nor a reunified Germany is identical with the "old” Germany, then why should it 
be bound by Four Power limitations which apply to the Germany of 1945?
In other words, in order to ensure that they could exercise fully their rights 
and duties with regard to the future unified German State, the Four Powers would 
require to be fully involved in the unification of the Federal and Democratic 
Republics, so that the entity thereby created would be bound explicitly to accept 
the supreme authority of the Powers. The whole point of Germany continuing to 
exist simultaneously with the FRG and the GDR is to preserve the position of the 
Four Powers. It would defeat the purpose of continuing to maintain such a 
complex and troublesome status quo if  the two German States could simply unite 
outwith the context of the retained rights and responsibilities of the Four Powers. 
These two States are separate subjects of international law but they do not have, 
indeed cannot have, authority to deal in matters relating to Germany as a whole. 
Thus a reunified Germany would also be unable so to deal; such capacity is not 
acquired out of thin air. It follows from this that the reunification of Germany 
must also be deemed a matter falling within the ambit of the term "Germany as a 
whole."
¥hile neither the FRG nor the GDR is identical with Germany, nevertheless, 
they remain subject to Allied capacity with regard to Germany as a whole. The 
Allied capacity is derived from the supreme authority assumed with regard to the 
sovereign German State. Although they are not identical with Germany, the FRG 
and the GDR are both connected with it, in that the capacity retained by the Allies 
after they created these two States applies also to them: they accepted this in 
treaties with the Four Powers when they were given independence. Thus there 
exists this legal link between Germany and the FRG and GDR, which, were they to 
unite, would render capable of execution the outstanding rights and 
responsibilities of the Four Powers.
It may be stated that, despite its non-identity with the Germany of 1945, the 
reunified State v/ill be restricted and bound by the same Four Power capacity as 
the old Germany. Furthermore, it is the case that, even if  Germany has survived 
the creation of two German States (the ¥estern view), the law relating to State 
succession will nevertheless play a role in ascertaining what rights and duties 
will apply to the reunified German State, because of the separate status of East and 
¥est Germany under international law. If  the Soviet view' be accepted, that 
Germany ceased to exist, then clearly the rules of State succession have a role to 
play. In either case, then, a reunified Germany will itself be bound by two 
separate sets of rights and duties: those inherited from East and ¥est Germany 
and those applicable by virtue of the supreme authority of the Four Powers. Since 
this authority applies at present to both German republics, they would also pass it 
on to the succeeding, unified Germany. The Four Power authority then applies 
directly to Germany through their right to deal with Germany as a v/hole, and it is 
inherited from the two presently active German States.
Once again, the problem which may arise is the attitude of the Soviet Union. 
¥hile the differing legal positions of the Four Powers can be reconciled 
according to the arguments given above, there remains the conflict of opinion 
over what are the residual competences of the Powers. However, in light of the 
above discussion, it is at least possible for a unification of Germany to occur, 
placing heavy emphasis on the rules of State succession, so that the existing 
differences might be dealt with as a matter of fact, rather than either side 
demanding concessions from the other concerning legal stances. Eventually, all 
Four Powers would have to reach agreement about Germany, but there is no 
reason why the debate cannot be confined to an evaluation of their joint 
capacities instead of the necessarily divisive issue of whether or not Germany has 
existed continuously since 1945, despite the political and legal evolution of the 
situation.
(iv) The Law relating to State Succession
The law of state succession will be relevant with regard to the German problem 
in two aspects:
1. the consequences of unification or uniting of two States to create a 
third State from the perspective of succession to treaties;
2. the particular rules relating to boundary treaties, or territory affected 
by such treaties, in the event of a succession of States.
As will be shown later, these two aspects are not always separable and both are 
relevant to a consideration of the obligations of Germany vis-a-vis Poland when it 
succeeds the FRG and the GDR as a result of unification.
Before this question can be discussed, it is advisable to decide what is meant by 
the term “State succession" and what are the relevant rules of State succession. 
The meaning of the term “State succession.” Article 2 (1) (b) of the Vienna 
Convention on Succession of States in Respect of Treaties^0 (hereinafter referred 
to as VCSSRT) provides:
” "succession of States" means the replacement of one State 
by another in the responsibility for the international 
relations of the territory,"
This definition is the same as that adopted by the International Law Commission as 
part of its Draft Articles on Succession of States in Respect of Treaties at its 26th 
SessionP1 In the accompanying commentary, the ILC noted that “...the term is 
used as referring exclusively to the fact of the replacement of one State by 
another in the responsibility for the international relations of territory, leaving 
aside any connotation of inheritance of rights or obligations on the occurrence 
of that e v e n t  In other words, the devolution of rights and obligations will be 
dependent upon other particular rules, whether contained in the Convention, 
applicable as part of customary international law' or by special agreement of the 
entitled States. It is clear from Paragraph 4 of the commentary that the term 
"responsibility" has been employed consciously as an alternative to 
"sovereignty". This is not because sovereignty is not transmitted but rather to 
take account, according to the Commission, of State practice and to allow' for the 
Convention to cover not only national territory, but also cases such as trusteeship, 
mandate, protectorate and dependent territory,^ which may not necessarily be 
subject to the kind of authority connoted by the term "sovereignty."^
An examination of the writings on the subject shows that there is complete 
agreement on the aspect of substitution or replacement of one State by another 
with regard to a territory, although some writers hesitate to use the w'ord 
■'sovereignty" when describing the kind of authority transmitted. This holds true 
for writings in both ¥est and East, contemporary and less recent. Among v/estern 
writers, McNair describes a situation where "...one State succeeds, wholly or in 
part, to the personality and the whole or part of the territory of another State. 
This is quite uncontroversial; there is no requirement that a State cease totally to 
exist for a succession to occur, while the term "personality" could include forms of 
authority other than sovereignty, although the successor State may actually 
acquire a different authority with regard to the territory from that enjoyed by its 
predecessor (for example, in the case of a newly independent State talcing over 
territory which prior to the succession w'as subject to the authority of a mandate 
pow'er). O'Connell whites of "...the factual situation which arises when one State is 
substituted for another in sovereignty over a given territory...."^ ¥hile this 
definition postulates only the substitution of one State for another with regard to 
sovereignty, which might seem on the face of it to exclude other kinds of control, 
it should be born in mind, first, that this definition is given as part of the 
introductory remarks to a massive study on the subject of State succession and, 
furthermore, the author on the same page mentions the process in somewhat 
more general terms, which might be construed so as to allowr for a wider 
definition of the scope of State succession: "...one State ceases to rule in a 
territory, while another takes its place.O 'Connell goes on to explain that an 
instance of State succession "...does not necessarily presuppose a juridical 
substitution of the acquiring State in the complex of rights and duties possessed 
by the previous sovereign."^8 In saying this his view' is almost identical to that
of the ILC in its commentary to the draft articles, where it states that the term 
"State succession" leaves aside any connotation of inheritance of rights and 
obligations on the occurrence of that event
More recently, Brownlie has written that “...State succession arises when there 
is a definitive replacement of one state by another in respect of sovereignty over 
a given territory in conformity with international law.’60 Brownlie 
acknowledges that his definition is subject to amendment in certain cases because 
it may not be sovereignty which has been enjoyed by the previous Stated 
Otherwise, his definition is in line with the tenor of the other definitions quoted. 
It is interesting that he adds the rider that the replacement of authority should be 
in conformity with international law before it will be regarded as a succession. 
Thus excluded from the ambit of state succession are acquisitions of territory by 
unlawful means. This is not to say that the other definitions given do include 
unlawful acquisitions of territory; rather, they are excluded by implication, since, 
as will be evident from the methods by which succession may occur, a succession 
of States may arise only in particular situations.
Reference has already been made to the definition favoured by Akehurst.62 He 
regards it as "...that branch of international law which deals with the legal 
consequences of a change of sovereignty over territory." In light of the above 
discussion, there is nothing to be added to this, except to note that consensus exists 
with regard to the aspect of replacement of authority.
Moving East, it is evident from the works of some Polish writers that they are 
in broad agreement with their western counterparts. Skubiszewski, for example.
"With the loss by a state of its subjecthood in international 
law are linked problems of succession."6^
While the author in this context does not actually define State succession, it is 
evident from the above statement that the notion of replacement of one State by 
another is what has been taken into account. Of course, there does not have to be 
total loss of statehood (which is mentioned here), and it is certain, from further 
references in the text to total and partial succession, that the author did not 
intend to confine the concept to that of total State succession.6  ^ Professor 
Skubiszewski has also commented specifically on the German question and the 
relevance to it of the law of State succession, and reference will be made to this 
work later.
Returning to the present day, two recently published general texts on public 
international lav/ by two leading Polish international lawyers, one the professor 
of public international law at Warsaw University, the other the director of the 
Polish Institute of International Affairs, confirm the consensus of opinion on the 
basic concept of State succession. Goralczyk writes that “Problems of succession 
of international rights and duties appeal' when a part or all of the territory of one 
State passes under the sovereign authority of another State.*^ Symonides takes 
the view that "Succession is the result of changes in territorial supremacy over 
part or all of a defined state territory."66 There is no substantive difference 
between Goralczyk’s definition and that of Akehurst. The one potentially 
different aspect of the description given by Symonides is the use of the term 
"territorial supremacy", rather than "sovereignty". The two may refer to 
different situations, just as in German, the term "Souveranitat" (sovereignty) may
define something superior to *Uebietshoheit” (territorial supreme authority). 
However, in German the two terms are sometimes used synonymously too, which 
can lead to confusion unless the writer specifies what is actually intended by the 
use of the lesser term. In the present case, the use of the term "territorial 
supremacy" perhaps serves the function of causing Symonides* definition to 
resemble more closely that adopted by the ILC and contained in the VCSSRT. The 
end result, though, is to confirm the unanimity among writers as to the general 
abstract meaning of the term "State succession.**
The next question must be: in which specific circumstances may a succession 
of States take place? Such an event may be brought about by a number of 
different political events, which do not necessarily all have the same legal 
effects.67 Among these are included the following: cession, annexation, 
formation of a union or federation, attainment of independence and partition.68 
It is not proposed to consider the legal effects of each of these, since not all of 
them are relevant to the German problem. The essential aspect which they all 
possess is that, following any of these events, there will be a different State 
exercising authority over the territory concerned.
(v) The Relevant Rules of State Succession - Status of the VCSSRT
The VCSSRT was concluded on 23 August 1978. According to Article 49, it 
requires fifteen ratifications or accessions before entering into force. By March 
1983 a total of six had been received 6  ^ None of the States whose practice is 
relevant to this study has as yet ratified the treaty, though it is of more than 
passing interest that Poland, Czechoslovakia and the GDR have signed it.70 Each
of these States posseses territory, their tenure over which has in some way been 
questioned by the Federal Republic of Germany, and the provisions of the treaty, 
were they to become binding on all of the involved States, would probably serve to 
strengthen their tenure against possible future claims by, for example, a united 
German State.
The general rule as to the temporal application of the Convention is set out in 
Article 7, para. 1"
"Without prejudice to the application of any of the rules set forth 
in the present Convention to which the effects of a succession of 
States would be subject under international law independently of 
the Convention, the Convention applies only in respect of a 
succession of States which has occurred after the entry into 
force of the Convention except as may be otherwise agreed."
So the Convention by itself applies only to successions of States which occur after 
it enters into force, with one proviso and one exception: where any of its 
provisions reflect existing law, then they wall of course not depend upon the 
Convention coming into force to be applicable to a case of succession; and States 
may actually agree to apply the rules of the Convention before it comes into 
effect. In fact, the provisions regarding the possible retroactive effect of the 
Convention have been described as the most controversial of those dealing with 
its scope.71 Paragraph 1 was to be the only provision dealing with temporal 
application had the draft articles been accepted without amendment, but this was 
unacceptable to some States. Indeed, paragraph 1 was itself included despite the
opposition of some members of the Commission 72 It has been pointed out that 
Paragraph 1 of Article 7 can itself have a limited retroactive effect7  ^This is 
because a successor State created after the Convention has come into force may 
accede to it - so that the provisions of the Convention would apply to its own case 
of succession. In this case, according to the author, there would occur a 
retroactive application of the Convention, since the succession would of course 
precede the accession to the Convention. In other words, if  the Convention has 
acquired the necessary ratifications to bring it into force, and after this a 
succession of States occurred and the new State adhered to the Convention, then 
the Convention would actually apply to that case of succession, as the new State 
has become a party to it - including Article 7, paragraph 1, which provides that 
the Convention applies to successions which take place after it has entered into 
force. And since the succession w'ould precede the moment when the Convention 
comes into force for the successor State it can be said that the Convention does in  
fact have retroactive effect. Paragraphs 2 and 3. of Article 7 provide further 
possibilities for the application of the Convention before it actually comes into 
force, the application being permanent or provisional.
The VCSSRT represents in its final form a mixture of codification of existing 
law' on the subject as well as progressive development of international law'. This 
w'as acknowledged in the Preamble to the Convention, where it is stated that the 
States Parties are:
"Convinced .... of the need for codification and progressive 
development of the rules relating to succession of States in 
respect of treaties...."
It is not proposed to consider to what extent the Convention reflects the interests 
of the so-called newly independent States at the expense of the former colonial 
powers and vice-versa. This controversy is not relevant to the situation in 
central Europe. Nevertheless, in that the rules of state succession as agreed at 
Vienna are to some extent a product of that controversy, and given that at least 
some of these rules may be applicable to a future succession of States in central 
Europe, it should be acknowledged that there will be some indirect influence on 
developments there.
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One of the important issues with regard to the status of the provisions 
contained in the VCSSRT, as opposed to the Convention itself, is that there is 
uncertainty in the matter of the rules of State succession.7^  This uncertainty 
existed prior to the adoption of the Convention and persists because of the lack of 
support accorded to it in the form of ratifications and accessions. Thus it is 
necessary still to consider each provision of the Convention separately in order to 
establish its status, taking into account also the actual effect on the law which 
may be attributed to the VCSSRT itself - due to the preparatory work for and the 
influence of the completed Convention, containing as it does a convenient 
collection of precise rules which, even if  they do not necessarily reflect previous 
State practice, may encourage adherence to the treaty.
The problem with the VCSSRT is to distinguish between what is progressive 
development and which provisions constitute codification of existing 
international law (or have become part of the corpus of customary international 
law as a result of, or since, the adoption of the Convention). The preparatory 
work of the ILC in this context is always helpful and state practice may offer some
guidance, but in either case, caution must be exercised. On the one hand, as has 
been indicated. State practice maybe equivocal. On the other, the conclusions of 
the ILC have not always been met with complete approval. Szafarz writes that 
there has been application of the principle of clean slate in the case of secession 
of States "by virtue of the hitherto prevailing customary law",7  ^t>ut that “...one 
may assume that travaux preparatoires and the Convention itself serve as 
evidence that the clean slate principle as applicable in the case of secession is no 
longer part of customary international law."76 Brownlie, however, takes the view 
that the distinctions made by the ILC in its drafts, between newly independent 
States and other appearances of new States, are not reflected in State practice.77 
He maintains that "...as a matter of general principle a new state, ex hvoothesi a 
non-party, cannot be bound by a treaty, and in addition other parties to a treaty 
are not bound to accept anew party, as it were, by operation of law."78 The point 
here is not to criticize the views of either writer, but to show that the state of the 
lav/ may not necessarily be that which is presented by the ILC. It would be 
necessary to look carefully at the relevant travaux preparatoires with regard to 
each provision.
It has been suggested that, because of the uncertainty of the present law and 
the difficulty of proving that customary law is not in accordance with the 
provisions of the Treaty, future State practice will follow, or tend to follow, the 
rules contained in the Convention.7  ^ This may help in a very gradual way to 
establish v/ith some degree of certainty the status of those provisions with regard 
to which there had existed some doubt - i.e. whether or not they have come to be 
part of customary lav/. ¥hile the Convention itself and the preparatory work may 
indeed have contributed to a consolidation of the law,80 the Convention does itself 
raise doubts with regard to customary law.
As for the balance of the VCSSRT, it has been suggested that the Convention 
contains more elements of progressive development than of codification sensu 
stricto.81 This ought to encourage further caution in characterising the treaty as 
declaratory of existing law. Among those provisions which the writer considers 
to be declaratory of well established norms is Article 11 on boundary regimes, to 
which reference will be made later. If  state practice does indeed follow the 
provisions of the Convention, then obviously it will come to reflect, increasingly, 
customary law even if  it never enters formally into force in accordance with 
Article 49.
(vi) State Succession and Germany
In considering how the German question will be affected by the rules of State 
succession, it is necessary to distinguish between the devolution of capacity from 
Germany to the two German States and the capacity which will belong to the 
unified Germany. One event is in the past; the other has yet to occur.
Different rules apply in each case. Yhen East and Yest Germany came into 
existence, first of all they were not perceived at the outset as permanent entities 
although they have since come to be so regarded. The rights and duties which 
they acquired were held by them often on a temporary basis because it was still 
anticipated that agreement might be reached on the establishment of one German 
State by the Four Powers. The whole set up was provisional and this explains why 
the Four Powers retained their own capacity with regard to Germany as a whole. 
In this sense, despite the fact that the FRG and the GDR are quite firm ly 
entrenched as individual States within their respective economic, political and
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military blocs, the situation remains provisional. The rights and duties of the 
Allies continue to exist formally and materially.
Because of the confused and unpredictable geopolitical situation in which East 
and ¥est Germany first appeared, the devolution of capacity from Germany to 
them by the Four Fowers occurred in the form of quite separate arrangements on 
either side and was accompanied by claims on both sides that the other was acting 
unlawfully Both new German States themselves became involved in extensive 
State practice with regard to the rights and obligations of the Reich, since the 
devolution of authority from the Four Powers had entailed a division of the areas 
in which either side - the GDR and FRG on the one hand and the UK, USA, USSR 
and France on the other - was competent to act, a Rind of outline of competence 
rather than specification of particular treaty rights and commitments.
The two new States had by 1955 acquired what is generally considered now to 
be full statehood, but subject to the well known provisos or reservations 
concerning Berlin and Germany as a whole. A situation had been reached in 
which there were two non-competing sovereign powers existing simultaneously 
on the same territory 8:5 For the purposes of devolution of rights and duties, this 
process has been characterised as a case of partial State succession 8  ^ Neither of 
the two German States is identical with the Reich, a fact which prevents the 
situation being classified as one of identity of one State and secession by the 
other, a theory which has been postulated in the Federal Republic of Germany 8^
The partial succession envisaged is not with regard to part of the territory, but 
rather of the sovereignty. This is a novel proposition but would appear
accurately to reflect what has occurred in Germany. The consequence is that, 
despite the ambiguity of their origins, the Federal and Democratic Republics have 
certainly succeeded to many of the rights and duties of the Reich. They are 
non-identical, successor States. The succession might be classified as de facto 
because the situation which has arisen in Germany is at variance with the 
original intentions of the Four Powers; but each of these States accepts the legal 
fact of the existence of two German States. Therefore the present situation does 
not bear the stigma of illegitimacy now, though it may have done so in the 1950’s. 
The succession is certainly ad hoc; because it has developed in a piecemeal 
fashion, quite contrary to the original plans for Germany’s post-war 
development. However, with the agreements of the 197G's, a political modus 
vivendi88 has been achieved which allows for the systematic development of the 
situation should that be perceived as a desirable objective; or, more likely in the 
short and medium term - the maintenance of the existing divisions.
In the event of the GDR and the FRG forming one German State, which rights 
and duties of its predecessors will it inherit? The role of the Four Powers in the 
reunification has been discussed. Their position would ensure that Germany 
would definitely be bound by the rights and responsibilities of the Four Powers.8*^
It is legally possible for the unification of the GDR and FRG to occur through 
the incorporation of one of these States by the other 88 Were this to happen, the 
effect would be that the incorporated State ceases to exist and the matter of 
succession would be: to which of the incorporated State's treaties does the 
incorporating State succeed? The incorporating State would continue to exist; 
there would have occurred no break in its life which would deny the identity of
the enlarged State with the pre-incorporation State. The surviving State would 
continue to be bound by its own treaties and it would inherit those of the deceased 
Stated presumably with the exception of any treaties which could not be 
performed because of a fundamental change of circumstances which renders 
performance of the treaty impossible.
With regard to the Polish-German frontier, a commitment on the part of 
Germany to accept it in its present form would certainly exist. Since both the 
Federal and Democratic Republics recognise the Oder-Neisse line as the western 
frontier of Poland, and there is no element in the recognition by either State (in 
the Warsaw and Zgorzelec Treaties) of that frontier which would be incapable of 
surviving the incorporation, Germany would in fact be obliged to maintain the 
recognition accorded to the frontier by the GDR and the FRG.
Nevertheless, the reality of the situation in Germany is such that the form of 
unification is much more likely to be that of a fusion, or uniting of the two States. 
Both States have equal status vis-a-vis the other members of the international 
community and the alliances of which each is a member serve to support their 
equality. For incorporation to take place, it would, in view of the status quo in  
central Europe, probably have to be preceded by the unquestioned political and, 
presumably, military ascendancy of one bloc over the other to the extent that its 
authority could reach out to incorporate the other German State within the 
personality of the German State which happens to be associated with the 
ascendant side. This scenario is not, in the view of this writer, as likely as that 
which presumes a peaceful drawing together of the two German States 
accompanied by the political will of the Four Powers to negotiate reunification, on
the basis of equality of West and East Germany. Indeed, given the commitments of 
all the involved States not to resort to the threat or use of force and their 
recognition of the inviolability of frontiers, plus the adverse political stances of 
the GDR and the ERG to each other, it is most likely that incorporation could not 
occur unless preceded by acts of aggression on at least one side, contrary to 
international law. Any act of incorporation would then have to be considered in 
light of that unlawful use of force and the legality of it would be open to question.
The above considerations indicate, therefore, that the peaceful reunification of 
Germany would have to take the form of a fusion, i.e. uniting, of the two States?8 
It must now be considered what will be the rights and obligations of the new, 
unified German State. These should be divided into two groups. The first consists 
of those which are binding on Germany as a whole and exercisable by the four 
Powers. It has already been explained why these would continue to apply to the 
united German State pending a peace settlement: briefly, this is because the actual 
peaceful unification itself could not take place without the participation of the 
Four Powers, who, it must be assumed, would, if  they still intended to draw up a 
peace settlement, insist that appropriate conditions be attached to the unification 
process. The second group of rights and duties would of course be those which the 
new Germany inherits from the Federal and Democratic Republics. Not only are 
these two capacities (of Germany on the one hand and the Four Powers on the 
other) separate in  the sense that they pertain to different rights and duties, they 
are separate also in status. Yhere the capacity of the Four Powers is concerned, it 
should be recalled that this constitutes all that remains of the supreme authority 
assumed by these States in 1945 and maintained without any break since. Because 
this supreme authority is a manifestation of the sovereignty of Germany, it is
superior to any capacity of the German State created from the FRG and the GDR. 
In particular, in the event of any conflict of opinion between the Four Powers 
and the United German State as to matters falling within the capacity of the Four 
Pow'ers, such as Berlin, the status of Germany as a whole and its frontiers, the 
position of the Four Powers will prevail over that of Germany. Indeed, there can 
occur no such substantive conflict, although the contrary may appear to be the 
case. If  Germany should assert that its position on a particular matter binds it, 
then indeed it may be so bound. But it can only be bound, in certain areas, subject 
to the rights and duties of the Four Powers, and these will always take precedence. 
Thus if  there arises some apparent conflict of substance, it is not actually so - it 
would be a conflict of capacity or jurisdiction; it would then be open to the Four 
Powers to insist that the particular matter falls within their own area of residual 
authority without the actual merits of the apparent dispute being discussed.
This conclusion follows logically from the view of this writer that Germany 
still exists for certain purposes and that within the ambit of the area "Germany as 
a whole", supreme authority is exercised lawfully by the Four Powers. Of course, 
this does not necessarily mean that the Allies do or would exercise their authority 
without regard for the views and commitments made by the Germans for 
themselves since 1949. They are entitled to take into account the actions of the 
FRG and the GDR, but they are certainly not bound by them unless they have 
actually assumed an obligation to be bound. Indeed, the Four Powers have also 
taken action, separately, if  not together, for the preservation of their interests as 
they perceive them even if  such measures were not popular with the German 
people; it is most unlikely that the Germans could muster a majority of their
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population to support the division of their State into two new States. ¥h ile  the 
division of Germany may have t>een reluctantly supported by a majority in the 
Federal Republic as a lesser evil than, say, unity under communism or socialist 
democracy, that is not to say they supported division as an end in itself.
So the Four Powers have in the past taken drastic action which would not meet 
with German support. But they could exercise their authority in such a way as to 
take into account the wishes of the German State end the German people. In terms 
of the Four Power agreements with regard to Germany, insofar as these are still 
valid, their discretion is unfettered by any commitments to Germany. The 
consequences of this wide authority are vital to an assessment of the legal status 
of the Oder-Neisse line following unification.
(vii) The Law Governing the Unification of Germany.
For the purposes of this study, the type of unification anticipated is one in 
which the personalities of the GDR and FRG would cease to enjoy any separate 
international legal existence. If, for instance, they were to create a 
confederation, it is likely that, for purposes of international law, they would 
maintain their separate legal personalities as well as the rights and duties which 
attach to these.91 In that event there would be no question of what capacity 
would pass onto a successor State and the position would be one of considering 
whether indeed a unification had actually occurred so as to enable the Four 
Powers to enter into a peace settlement.
Thus the type of unification envisaged is one in which “...the control of the 
external relations of all the member states has been permanently surrendered to 
a central government so that the only state which exists for international 
purposes is the state formed by the union ....“92 - in other words, a federal State or 
some even closer form of union, the essential criterion being that for 
international purposes only one State exists.
In the event of the GDR and FRG uniting so that they create one new subject of 
international law, the new State will be faced with the issue of its eastern 
frontier. The state of the law' at the present time is that it will not be bound by the 
provisions of the VCSSRT as such, because it is not in force and neither East nor 
¥est Germany is a party to it. Therefore, the matter of succession to the treaties of 
the predecessor States will fall to be decided according to customary international 
lave Even if  the GDR and the FRG conclude, as presumably they would have to 
ensure an orderly succession, an agreement as to the method of succession and 
the problem of incompatibility of existing treaties, they v'ouid still be obliged to 
unite in accordance with existing rules v'hich bind them, some of which are to be 
found in the VCSSRT.
The matter of succession by Germany may be divided into three elements: the 
general question of obligations of successor States after the uniting of States, and 
the more specific issues of succession to boundary treaties plus the right of a 
predecessor State to prevent particular treaties surviving a succession of States.
(vii) (a) Uniting of States. The relevant provision of the VCSSRT with regard to 
uniting of States is Article 31. This deals with the effects of a uniting of States in
respect of treaties in force at the date of succession, and thus would be applicable 
to the Warsaw and Zgorzelec Treaties, both of which have been ratified. The 
general rule is contained in paragraph 1:
"When two or more States unite and so form one successor State, 
any treaty in force at the date of the succession of States in 
respect of any of them continues in force in respect of the 
successor State ..."
There are two exceptions stated: a treaty will not remain in force if  the other 
State party or parties agree (subparagraph a); nor will it remain in force if  it 
appears from the treaty or is otherwise established that the application of the 
treaty in respect of the successor State would be incompatible with the object and 
purpose of the treaty or w'ould radically change the conditions for its operation 
(subparagraph b). The most cursory analysis of Poland’s State practice with 
regard to its v/estern frontier makes it possible to state beyond any doubt that it 
would not agree, other factors notwithstanding, to the lapse of the Warsaw and 
Zgorzelec Treaties in the event of reunification of Germany. The incompatibility 
exception will be considered below, as pain of the analysis of the rules of State 
succession with regard to Germany.
Article 31 appeared in the ILC's draft articles as Article 30. In its commentary, 
the Commission indicated in Paragraph 1 that the provision, wdiich v/as 
transplanted without amendment to the Convention, includes “...the case wdiere 
one State merges with another State even if  the international personality of the 
latter continues after they have united.”9  ^ Thus it wrould include Germany within
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its ambit even if  the GDR and FRG continued to exist as States after the fusion. It 
was further indicated that, for the purposes of the Convention, the succession of 
States "...does not take into account the particular form of the internal 
constitutional organisation adopted by the successor State. The uniting may lead 
to a wholly unitary State, to a federation or to any other form of constitutional 
arrangement."9  ^ In the view of the Commission, the degree of separate identity 
retained by the uniting States after the succession, wdthin the constitution of the 
new State, w'ould be irrelevant for the operation of the Convention 9  ^ Again, 
insofar as Article 31 may bind the GDR and the FRG, it would appear that almost 
any kind of framework which they might dream up for the new German State 
would still include them within the ambit of the Convention. But to what extent, if  
any, does Article 31(1) represent codification of existing law? The ILC 
commentary includes an examination of much of the relevant state practice, 
including that of Germany in one of its previous guises. After examination of the 
practice which it considered to be relevant, the ILC concluded that they appeared 
“...to indicate a rule prescribing the continuance in force ipso iure of the treaties 
of the individual constituent States, within their respective regional limits and 
subject to their compatibility with the situation resulting from the creation of the 
unified State."96 The non-possession of treaty-making power by the constituent 
States under the constitution of the new State was not considered as preventing 
the continuance in force of treaties entered into prior to the succession. 
However, the precedents with regard to federal States (as opposed to non-federal 
States, to which the ILC wras referring above), while less definite, appeared also to 
the Commission to indicate the existence of a rule prescribing the continuance in 
force it>so iure of pre-federation treaties of individual States, also wdthin their 
regional limits 97
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These conclusions had been arrived at by reference to two relatively recent 
instances of uniting of States: Egypt with Syria in 1958 and Zanzibar with 
Tanganyika in 1964. In the case of federal States, as the Commission indicated, the 
latest practice was less recent: it took into consideration the Swiss Eederal 
Constitution of 1848 and the German Federation of 1871, among others. The view 
of the Commission was that, while writers tended to distinguish between 
succession where the new State acquires a federal form and other cases of 
succession, they tended not to regard the distinction as being of any great 
significance.^8 In light of the Commission's statement earlier in the commentary 
to the same article, that the succession "does not take into account the particular 
form of the internal organization adopted by the successor State it may be 
assumed that it is in accordance with the effect of the general view of writers, it 
being another matter whether it accepted the premises for that view, that the 
federal - non-federal distinction is of little significance in this situation. 
However, it is evident that some writers consider that, in the event of a federation 
being created as a result of succession to two or more States, treaty obligations 
may lapse, so the distinction has been regarded as having, potentially, real 
influence with regard to succession.
¥ ith  regard to the German Federation of 1871, the prevailing opinion, 
according to the Commission, was that the treaties of the individual States 
continued in force: they either bound the federal State as a successor within 
their regional limits or they continued to bind the individual States through the 
federal State until terminated by an inconsistent exercise of federal legislative 
power.100 But if  these treaties were capable of being terminated merely by dint 
of an inconsistent exercise of federal legislative power, it signifies that the
Federation was not bound, or did not feel itself bound, to apply the treaties. If  
under international law it could terminate certain treaties by operation of federal 
legislative power - i.e. through municipal law - without regard to the views of the 
treaty partners of the individual States, then it indicates that succession was not 
always automatic.
In the case of non-federal unions, where a composite successor State is created 
from two States so that one organ is responsible for the international relations of 
the new State, the two preceding States may retain their separate identities within 
the union, or they may cease to exist entirely as separate entities, the single new 
State succeeding the two or more preceding States to the extent that no evidence 
of their individual status within the union survives whatsoever. Either case 
might apply to a unification of Germany. For the purposes of succession to 
treaties, the result would be the same: one German State would exist under 
international law as the successor to the Federal and Democratic Republics.
Two recent precedents have been the uniting of Egypt with Syria to form the 
United Arab Republic (UAR) and Zanzibar with Tanganyika. The latter union 
resulted in the new State of Tanzania, which has survived to the present day.
The UAR declared that the pre-union bilateral treaties of Egypt and Syria were 
considered as continuing in force within the regional limits in respect of which 
they had been concluded.101 ¥ ith  regard to multilateral treaties, an interesting 
communication from the Foreign Minister of the UAR to the UN 
Secretary-General included the statement that "....all international treaties and 
agreements concluded by Egypt or Syria with other countries will remain valid
275
within the regional limits prescribed on their conclusion and in accordance with 
the principles of international law."*^ At first reading, this seems to say that the 
treaties will remain in force in accordance with the principles of international 
law. This, if  it meant that the UAR considered itself obliged to act in this way, 
might indicate the existence of ot>inio juris with regard to the it>so iure 
continuation of treaties following a succession involving a union of States. 
However, the presence of the word “and" makes the statement ambiguous, because 
it may be read (although this is perhaps less likely) as meaning that the treaties 
will remain valid within the prescribed regional limits and that, furthermore, 
they will remain in force in accordance with the principles of international law- 
as if  to say that the regional limits are one thing, while the principles of 
international law are quite another. That is, they are the normal principles, not 
necessarily related to treaties which apply to all States in their State practice 
which do not necessarily include ipso iure succession to treaties. Thus caution 
should be exercised in attributing too much weight to the statement in the 
absence of clarification.
Nevertheless, regardless of whether or not it felt itself bound, the UAR 
certainly did maintain in force wherever possible the treaties of its predecessors. 
Article 69 of the country’s Provisional Constitution read, in part:
“The treaties and agreements (of Syria and Egypt) will remain 
valid in the regional spheres for which they were intended at 
the time of their inclusion according to the rules and regula­
tions of the International Law."
Again, this extract does not t>y itself show a belief on the part of the UAR that it 
definitely considered itself obliged to retain the treaties in force, though such 
may be inferred from the text.
According to O'Connell, additional caution should be exercised in using the UAR 
as a precedent because, in his view, the arrangement by which it came into being 
was sui generis.*0'*
It is interesting that when Tanganyika came into being as a newly 
independent State, while giving notice that all pre-independence treaties 
applicable to it would continue in force only on a provisional basis, it 
acknowledged that some treaties might survive by application of the rules of 
customary law.*0^  Although it reserved its position, there is at least evidence in 
its attitude of a preparedness to accept that there is no total clean slate. When 
three years later it entered into union with Zanzibar, the new State issued a Note 
which included the statement that, to the extent that their implementation was 
consistent with its constitution, all international treaties and agreements of the 
former States would "...remain in force within the regional limits prescribed on 
their conclusion and in accordance with the principles of international law.”106 
The wording is identical to the statement of the UAR and is therefore subject to 
the same reservations as the previous statement insofar as it may evidence opinio 
juris.*07
While the unification of Germany might follow'the above pattern, there is no 
reason why it should not become a unitary State, thus entailing the complete 
disappearance of the two existing States. The reasons for this are historical as
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well as legal: Germany existed as a unitary State from 1933 till 1949 and, for 
certain purposes, since then; also the two States have the same nationality; not 
in the sense of citizenship, hut in that they share a common linguistic, cultural 
and historical heritage. Indeed, it is because of this shared past that the GDR, in 
asserting its separate statehood, has followed a policy of Abgrenzung 
(demarcation) while the FRG has sought to stress the ties between the two parts of 
what it considered to be one nation.**®
The conclusions to be drawn with regard to the ILC's analysis are: unless there 
is agreement to the contrary (and this is contained in the VCSSRT), any succession 
to treaties in the event of uniting of States will be applicable only to the 
territories with regard to which the treaties originally applied - their 
geographical scope is not automatically extended;109 the form of uniting is of no 
significance as far as the Convention is concerned - the same rules will apply to 
the successor State* *0; treaties of the individual constituent states continue in 
force it>so iure following a uniting of States, although in the case of federation 
the precedents are less certain.*** However, the distinction between federation 
and other forms of union is probably itself of lesser significance.**2 Most 
important, the Commission concluded that "... a uniting of States should be 
regarded as in principle involving the continuance in force of the treaties of the 
States in question ipso iure."**9 This, it said, was based on the practice of States 
and the opinion of the majority of writers. The philosophy behind its conclusion 
was the need to preserve stability of treaty relations:
“As sovereign States, the predecessor States had a complex of 
treaty relations with other States and ought not to be able at 
will to terminate those treaties by uniting in a single State."* **
That is indeed a most laudable aim, but it is another matter whether the rule 
expressed in Article 31, Paragraph 1 does in fact reflect customary law and 
thereby automatically applicable to the unification of Germany. Not all of the 
practice was consistent and, as the Commission itself acknowledged, writers are 
not unanimous on the subject. Nevertheless, it is perhaps worth bearing in mind 
Akehurst's point that, since there is doubt as to the existing law, which may cause 
problems in proving that customary law is not in accordance with the 
Convention, future practice may tend to follow the rules as set out in it.* *^
It is difficult to sustain the view, on the basis of the evidence considered, that 
all cases of uniting of States result in ipso iure succession to treaties. Even since 
the Vienna Conference in 1978, opinion on this matter has varied. Brownlie 
argues quite bluntly that new States, since they are non-parties to existing 
treaties, cannot be bound by them. This rule, which he calls the rule of 
non-transmissibility, applies both to cases of decolonization and to other 
appearances of new States, whether by union or dissolution of existing States.**6 
The author goes on to criticize the distinction made by the ILC in this respect, i.e. 
between newly independent States and non-newly independent States, as not 
being reflected in State practice.**7 However, an interesting caveat with regard 
to this question is the following statement:
"This is not to deny that considerations of principle and policy
may call for a different outcome in the case of a union of states."* *8
It is possible to discern in this opinion sympathy with the view of the ILC in its 
commentary, that it is necessary to preserve stability of treaty relations. The
principle that Brownlie is arguing for is this, that sovereign States cannot be 
bound against their will. If  a new State inherits the predecessor’s treaties ipso 
iure. then it is being bound against its will in that its own wishes are not being 
taken into account. On the other hand, were it to be proved that Article 31(1) is an 
expression of customary international law, then new States will be bound by it; in 
Brownlie's view, it had not attained that status by 1978.
Recent Polish studies suggest that Article 31(1) does constitute part of the body 
of eustomary international law, although there is disagreement as to when it 
acquired that status. According to Szafarz, it has become so only since the time of 
the Vienna Conference.*19 She points out that "...both in the Committee of the 
¥hole and in the Plenary of the Conference the relevant Article was accepted 
without a vote, by consensus."*20 To adopt such a rule by consensus certainly 
indicates substantial, even overwhelming support. But it still does not necessarily 
mean that it was adopted because the States represented felt that the measure 
expressed customary international law and therefore they were obliged to support 
it. However, this is the view of Szafarz, who maintains that the adoption by 
consensus was a clear expression of the opinio juris of the represented States.*2* 
One can understand the enthusiasm of Poland to have the VCSSRT enter into force, 
whether through the necessary ratification and accessions or the recognition of 
particular provisions as declaratory of customary international law, since, as will 
be shown, this would work in Poland’s interest vis-a-vis Germany, but it is less 
clear why Polish writers should adopt so slavishly the standpoints of the socialist 
States and most of the so-called newly independent States. Certainly, the State 
practice to which Szafarz refers is identical to that discussed in the commentary 
of the ILC, and it is on the basis of that practice and the consensus adoption of
Article 31 Cl X plus her opinion that weight must be attached to"...the ever growing 
interdependence of States...",*22 that she concludes that "...the principle of ipso 
iure continuity is the only conceivable one in the context of uniting of States" 
and that the principle is binding in contemporary customary law.*29 The 
principle may indeed be so binding, but, given that the author cited no additional 
evidence of state practice in support of this claim other than the somewhat 
dubious contention that adoption of Article 31(1) by consensus at the Vienna 
Conference indicates the existence of opinio juris amongst the members of the 
international community, then, despite the undoubted merits of the evidence
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cited, it is not entirely convincing.
Tyranowski takes an even stronger stand with regard to ipso iure succession in 
the case of uniting of States, maintaining that Article 31(1)"... reflects an already 
existing customary rule of international law."*24 In fact, he is so sure of this that 
he cites no evidence to persuade the reader that he may be correct in his 
evaluation of that provision. The two writers quoted express an opinion which is 
almost unanimously held in Poland and it may be taken for granted that the 
future practice of Poland will be to treat Article 31(1) as part of customary 
international law.
The endorsement by the Vienna Conference of the ILC's view that the form of 
uniting of States is of no significance, thereby demeaning any possible 
substantive difference between federal and other kinds of union, is also regarded 
with approval by Polish writers. This may be viewed as a consequence of their 
acceptance of the normative character of Article 31(1). Tyranowski, while 
maintaining that the question "...whether treaties remain in force in case of a
uniting of States is determined by other elements than the constitutional 
structure of the new State/* *^5 recognises however that the foundation for the 
continuity of treaties may be affected by the constitutional structure of the new' 
State: thus, if  the constituent parts of the new State preserve their own
treaty-making poorer, then the continuity of treaties is a result of identity and 
continuity under international lav of the new part-State with the old State, while 
with regard to treaties oumth the treaty-making capacity of the new part-State 
there would be succession to treaties.1^ 6 Even in such a case, however, the 
relevant point is that all of the treaties of the States which made up the union 
remain in force with regard to the new State.
Ssafarz, without discussing the case of federation in any detail, nevertheless 
accepts that Article 31(1) covers all forms of uniting of States and regards this as 
part of customary law.1
The fact that the Vienna Conference adopted the principle of automatic 
continuity in all cases of uniting of States does show a determination not to 
differentiate in future between federation and other forms of uniting of States. 
Even though the practice prior to then may not have been uniform, the strong 
consensus in favour of Article 31 (1), combined with the interest of the 
international community of enjoying certainty in treaty relations, should 
encourage the establishment of Article 31(1) as a customary norm, if  it has not 
already achieved that status. As sovereign entities. States unite of their own free 
will. They also have obligations vis-a-vis third States and, as the ILC commented, 
they should not be able to terminate these treaties by uniting into a single State. 
This approach is based also upon the primacy of international law over municipal
law, at least with regard to cases of federation resulting from uniting of States,128 
as it denies the possibility of treaties lapsing through an exercise of the federal 
legislative power which would be inconsistent with the treaty obligations of a 
predecessor State.
The significance of the above discussion for the situation in which a united 
German State appears on the international scene is that, in the absence of 
ratification by East and ¥est Germany of the VCSSRT, there is a movement towards 
the attainment of customary international law status by Article 31(1) which could
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bind the united German State to succeed to all treaties of the predecessor States 
unless agreement to the contrary ware reached with the other parties to these 
treaties, or it could be established that application of the treaty in respect of the 
successor State would be incompatible with the object and purpose of the treaty.
Even before consideration of the specific question of succession to boundary 
treaties of the predecessor State(s), it appears that a reunified Germany would 
have difficulty in escaping the judgment that it is going to succeed ipso jure to 
the treaties of the ERG and the GBR.
(vii) (b) Succession to Boundary Treaties. The question of succession to 
boundary treaties is also dealt with in the VCSSRT. Article 11, entitled "Boundary 
regimes", states, in full:
"A succession of States does not as such affect:
(a) a boundary established by a treaty; or
(b) obligations and rights established by a treaty and 
relating to the regime of a boundary."
In its commentary, the ILC immediately raised the question of whether States 
succeed to the treaties which established boundaries, or rather to the boundary 
itself.12^  According to the Commission, treaties of a territorial character, which 
include boundary treaties, have been covered by a traditional doctrine which 
treats them as part of a separate category which is not affected by a succession of 
States.1^ 0 The essential question for the purposes of this study must be whether 
the existing territorial status quo - including the existing frontiers - is bound to 
remain unchanged following a succession of States, regardless of whether it does 
so by succession to the boundary treaty itself or to the actual territorial situation 
created by the boundary treaty. However, the question of what is actually 
succeeded to maybe of importance in deciding whether the territorial status quo 
survives a succession of States. Tyranowski points out that, if  only the actual 
boundary is succeeded to, rather than the treaty establishing it, then the 
succession may not include rights and obligations concerning the boundary 
regime which are contained in the treaty.1^ 1 He adds:
"¥hat is the basis of the special problem of boundary treaties 
is that they create a lasting state of affairs and not the fact that 
they are executed. After their execution the boundary treaties 
are a lasting foundation of the state they have established and 
also of the mutual rights and obligations concerning the regime 
of the boundary." *32
The point is that, if  there were no succession to the boundary treaty, the failure to 
succeed to some of the provisions of the treaty could endanger the stability of a 
frontier settlement if  the boundary regime in the treaty were part of such a
settlement.153
While Article 11 of the VCSSRT does not state specifically that boundary treaties 
are unaffected by a State succession (in fact, paragraph (a), which provides that a 
succession of States does not affect a boundary established by a treaty, would 
appear to show a preference for the theory that it is the actual boundary situation 
rather than the treaty which survives), it does allow' for survival of rights and 
obligations established by a treaty and relating to a boundary regime. Thus 
boundary treaties may not survive a succession of States intact: provisions not 
relating to the regime of a boundary will presumably lapse.15^  This division of 
Article 11 reflects a division among the Members of the ILC, some of whom 
considered the distinction between succession to boundaries and boundary 
treaties to be artificial.1^  The inclusion of Paragraph (b) in Article 11 had the 
effect of rendering the disagreement less important, so it meant that, without 
admitting that there was succession to boundary treaties as such, relevant 
provisions of such treaties were included within the ambit of the Article. It was 
considered by the ILC that, by formulating the rule of state succession and 
boundaries in these terms, it was acting in accordance both with previous 
practice and the trend of modern opinion.1^  The Commission further 
characterized Article 11 as being purely negative, in that it "...goes no further 
than to deny that any succession of States simply by reason of its occurrence 
affects a boundary established by a treaty or a boundary regime so 
established."'1^  Thus it remains perfectly possible to challenge the validity of a 
boundary following a succession of States on other grounds.
Opinion would appear to be almost unanimous that Article 11 reflects existing 
customary international law and did so at the time of the adoption of the 
Convention. The ILC quoted various judicial decisions in favour of this judgment.
In the Free Zones of Upper Savoy end District of Gex Case (France v Switzerland
(1932)158, there arose the question of the extent to which France, as a successor 
State to Sardinia, was obliged to respect the Treaty of Turin of 1816 between 
Switzerland and Sardinia. This treaty had fixed the border between Switzerland 
and Sardinia, and France had succeeded to Sardinian territory which was covered 
by the treaty. The PCIJ held that France was bound to respect, meaning adhere to, 
the 1816 treaty because it “...succeeded Sardinia in the sovereignty of that 
territory."1^  These words were quoted by the ILC with approval in its 
Commentary which pointed out that the Swiss Government itself had strongly 
emphasized what it considered to be the “real" character of this treaty. According 
to the Commission, this case is "generally accepted as a precedent in favour of the 
principle that certain treaties of a territorial character are binding ipso jure 
upon a successor State."148
However, the Commission did reserve its position somewhat with regard to the 
ambit of the PCIJ ruling. Because the territory in question (the Free Zones) was 
established as part of international settlements reached at the end of the 
Napoleonic Wars, it was unclear, said the Commission, whether the Court's 
judgment applied generally to treaties of a territorial character or whether it wras 
intended to be limited to treaties forming part of a territorial settlement and 
establishing an objective treaty regime141 Nevertheless, even if  the latter 
alternative were the correct one, it still evidences a conviction that there was 
obligatory succession in limited cases.
The idea of objective treaty regimes was considered also by the ILC in the 
preparatory work leading up to what became the Vienna Convention on the Law
of Treaties of 1969. For the purposes of that treaty, at least, it preferred not to 
propose any special provision on treaties creating such regimes.142 But a similar 
notion appeared in the Aaland Islands Case (Sweden v Finland) (1920)14^  a case 
which was also taken into account by the ILC with regard to Article 11 of  the 
VCSSRT. This dispute arose before the PCIJ had been set up and vras referred by 
the Council of the League of Nations to an ad hoc Committee of Jurists. The 
question was whether or not Finland was obliged to maintain the demilitarized 
status of the Islands. The circumstances were that Great Britain, France and 
Russia had agreed upon the demilitarization of the Islands as part of the 1856
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peace settlement between these three States, the Islands at that time having been 
under Russian sovereignty. Following Finland's detachment from the Soviet 
Union at the end of World War I, Finland being the successor to this territory, 
Sweden argued that Finland was bound by the provisions of the 1856 treaty 
concerning the demilitarization of the Aaland Islands. The Committee of Jurists 
held that, while it could not accept the existence of ionternational servitudes in 
the true technical sense of the term,144 the demilitarization provisions were 
indeed still binding upon Finland. According to the Committee, if  there was such 
a. thing as a. real servitude in the present case, then it vmild bind Finland to 
observe the provisions of the 1856 treaty. However, that country was bound for 
another reason:
"The provisions were laid down in European interests. They 
constituted a special international status relating to military 
considerations, for the Aaland Islands. It follows that until 
these provisions are duly replaced by others, every State 
interested has the right to insist upon compliance with them."145
"Finland, by declaring itself independent and claiming on this 
ground recognition as a legal person in international law, 
cannot escape from the obligations imposed upon it by such a 
settlement of European interests.
The recognition of any State must always be subject to the 
reservation that the State recognised will respect the obliga­
tions imposed upon it either by general international law 
or by definite international settlements relating to its 
territory."146
This case illustrates how States as successors may be bound to adhere to treaty 
rights and obligations not only with regard to their boundaries but actually the 
whole of the inherited territory. Furthermore, the obligation maybe vis-a-vis 
States which are not even parties to the treaty which imposes it in the first place: 
Sweden was not a party to the treaty which imposed the demilitarized status on the 
Aaland Islands. According to the ILC, the decision in Sweden's favour could be 
made in this way because the 1856 treaty, an international settlement established 
in the general interest of the international community, had a dispositive effect:
"Thus it seems to have viewed Finland as succeeding to an 
established regime or situation constituted by the treaty rather 
than to the contractual obligations of the treaty as such."14^
As well as being relevant to the case of a united Germany and the obligations 
which it inherits automatically with regard to its boundaries and territories from
the two German States, the Aaland Islands Case is pertinent with regard to the 
obligations of the German State which survived in 1945- Both in the Yalta and 
Potsdam Agreements, provision was made for a third State (Poland) to have ' 
certain rights vis-a-vis another State (Germany). Of course, Germany w'as not a 
party to either of these agreements, but they w'ere made with full legal authority: 
the Yalta Agreement expressed with regard to Poland's western frontier the 
intentions of the Three Pow'ers. Once Germany was defeated, they concluded the 
Potsdam Agreement which, being a partial implementation with regal’d to 
Poland's western frontier of the Yalta provisions, constituted an exercise by the 
Powders of their lawfully assumed supreme authority. In the Potsdam Agreement, 
although they ware acting for themselves, they ware acting with regard to 
Germany, wiiose own authority for independent action had been temporarily 
suspended. The Yalta and Potsdam Agreements may be regarded as provisional 
objective regimes with regard to Germany, the purpose of wiiich was to prepare 
the way for the still outstanding peace settlement with Germany. This peace 
settlement will itself constitute a definitive settlement by wiiich, according to the 
above precedent, other States v/ould be bound.
Two more recent cases regarded by the ILC as relevant to State succession with 
regal’d to boundaries are the Temple of Preah Vihear Case (Cambodia v Thailand) 
(1961)148 and the Rights of Passage over Indian Territory Case (Portugal v India) 
(1957).149 In the latter case, the ICJ ruled that the right of passage of Portugal to 
twro enclaves in Indian territory had been established as a regional custom with 
regard to private persons, civil officials and goods in general. Portugal had 
exercised this right against the UK and India had inherited this situation viien it 
acquired independence.15° In other w-'ords, India succeeded to real obligations
with regard to its territory automatically, without reference to its own will in the 
matter.
Although the Temple Case did not deal with State succession in the sense of 
appearing in the judgment of the ICJ, it is relevant to the issue of boundary 
treaties. The boundary between Siam and France had been fixed by treaty in 1904 
and neither Thailand (Siam) nor Cambodia (the successor State of France with 
regard to the relevant territory) appear to have disputed the continuance in force 
of this treaty following the attainment by Cambodia of i n d e p e n d e n c e . 1 ^ 1  i n  the 
view of the Commission, more important for its purposes were the submissions of 
the two States with regard to the French-Siamese treaty of 193? and Cambodia’s 
succession to France’s rights thereunder:
"...both parties seem to have assumed that, in the case of a newly 
independent State, there would be a succession not only in respect 
of a boundary settlement but also of treaty provisions ancillary to 
such settlement. Thailand considered that succession would be 
limited to provisions forming part of the boundary settlement 
itself, and Cambodia that it would extend to provisions in a 
subsequent treaty directly linked to it.”1^
Both of these cases show a belief on the part of the involved States that successor 
States are bound to observe obligations of the predecessor (s) with regard to 
provisions dealing directly v/ith territory, i.e. relevant to the scope of the 
successor’s sovereignty or the exercise of that sovereignty. The question of 
frontiers, though dealt with separately in the VCSSRT, is one aspect of rights and
duties pertaining to territory and this explains the relevance of the Rights of 
Passage Case. The Commission seemed to t>e quite certain that the assumption of 
both parties in the Temple Case, that there must be succession to boundary 
settlements concluded by or with regard to predecessor States, reflected a general 
opinio juris:
"That this assumption reflects the general understanding 
concerning the position of a successor State in regard to an 
established boundary settlement seems c le a r . ’’^
This attitude is also reflected in literature on the subject, though that is not to 
say that authors all agree on the content of Article 11 of the VCSSRT. Brownlie, 
while maintaining the view that a new State is generally not bound by treaties of 
the predecessor, nevertheless accepts that "...the change of sovereignty does not 
as such affect boundaries."^4 This he regards very much as an exception to the 
general category of so-called dispositive treaties (those which deal with rights 
over territory), and that succession to rights and obligations in such treaties 
always occurs, because they “...run with the land....".1^  These would of course 
include boundary treaties. A similar attitude was taken by O’Connell, who said 
such treaties are more of a conveyance than an agreement, “...an instrument for 
the delimitation of sovereign competence within the impressed territory. The 
State accepting the dispositive obligation possesses for the future no more than 
the conveyance assigned to it, and a Power which subsequently succeeds in 
sovereignty to the territory can take over what its predecessor possessed. The 
basis of the restrictions imposed on the territory is therefore not destroyed by the 
change of sovereignty."^6 McNair also supported the existence of a special
category of dispositive treaties and quoted in support of his opinion, inter alia, the 
Aaland Islands demilitarization treaty.1^  Brownlie regards this distinction as 
unjustified, arguing that there exists insufficient evidence either in principle or
practice to permit it.1
¥ ith  regal’d to boundaries in particular, O’Connell wrote:
"If a boundary treaty merely defines a frontier, then it 
is instantly executed, and what is inherited is not the treaty 
but the territorial extent of sovereignty."1^ 9
The problem in such a case is that if  a boundary treaty leaves the actual 
delimitation of a boundary to future settlement and a change of sovereignty 
occurs in the meantime, is a successor State bound? Presumably, if  the 
delimitation provisions are essential to the definition of the boundary, then they 
would constitute "real" elements of the original boundary treaty, to which a new 
sovereign would succeed as a consequence of succeeding to the boundary. The 
simple "conveyance" theory is criticized by Tyranowski, who argues that it has 
not been substantiated in international law and, further, that it automatically 
excludes the question of boundary treaties themselves from the problem of State 
succession in respect of treaties. This would have the further consequence of 
excluding rights and obligations concerning the boundary regime from being 
subject to succession160 Thus Tyranowski argues that it is the boundary treaty 
itself which is the object of succession, thereby maintaining the stability of 
frontier regimes.161 This provides some support for Brownlie's argument against 
the existence of a general category of dispositive treaties in the sense that it
excludes from that category treaties relating to boundaries. Regardless of the 
alleged distinction between dispositive and non-dispositive treaties, all writers 
would probably agree that the elements of treaties relating to boundaries, if  not 
the treaties themselves, survive a succession of States. This is a minimal position 
and it does not necessarily mean that those who would argue for succession to 
boundary treaties themselves are actually guilty of an error of judgment. If  the 
question of succession of States and boundaries is posed in the form “Does a 
successor State have an obligation to respect boundaries?" rather than "Do 
boundary treaties bind a successor State?", then it maybe more easily answerable. 
If  a successor State is obliged to respect existing boundaries, then it may be 
argued that it is bound by all parts of the treaties of the predecessor State(s) 
which were applicable to its boundaries. Such a position is certainly consistent 
with the evidence discussed thus far. Another way of expressing the position, 
which emphasizes the stability of the international territorial regime and 
perhaps clarifies the basis for the importance of succession with regard to 
boundaries, is provided by O’Connell:
"Since a State can acquire from another only so much territory 
as that other possessed, the latter’s boundary treaties with 
neighbouring States delimit the extent of the territory absorbed.’’*62
State practice would also appear to support the characterization of Article 11 of 
the VCSSRT as customary international law. The ILC discussed in this context 
Article 62 (2) (a) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties which provides, 
as an exception to the general rule according to which a fundamental change of 
circumstances may be invoked as a ground for terminating or withdrawing from
a treaty, that such fundamental change of circumstances may not be invoked "if 
the treaty establishes a boundary." The Commission said that the exception to 
Article 62 with regard to treaties was. accepted by most, but not all. States which 
participated at the United Nations Conference on the Law of Treaties which led to 
the adoption of the Convention.16^  The view' that Article 62 as a whole reflects 
customary international law' finds strong support in the Fisheries Jurisdiction 
Case (Jurisdiction) (United Kingdom v Iceland) (1974)164, in wdiich the ICJ stated 
in its judgment:
i
"This principle, and the conditions and exceptions to which it 
it is subject, have been embodied in Article 62 of the Vienna.
Convention on the Law of Treaties, which may in many respects 
be considered as a codification of existing customary law' on the 
subject of the termination of a treaty relationship on account of 
change of circumstances."16^
In its preparatory w/ork to Article 62. the ILC argued for the boundary exception 
because it appeared already to be generally accepted as such by jurists and 
because Article 62. w/ere this exception not included, might become a source of 
dangerous frictions rather than an instrument of peaceful change.166 In its 
commentary to the VCSSRT, the ILC argued that these considerations appeared to 
apply with the same force to a succession of States.167 Thus the necessity for the 
maintenance of boundary regimes in all circumstances had already obtained 
widespread support among States.
An interesting study of the rebus sic stantibus rule with regard to frontiers
indicates that there has been some opposition to the frontier exception in Article 
62.168 author looks at State practice in which States have attempted to alter 
their obligations relating to territorial sovereignty by application of the rebus 
sic stantibus rule, but concludes that these cases cannot be interpreted as 
militating against the exclusion of treaties establishing frontiers from the 
operation of the rule, because such was not the purpose of the practice 
concerned.169 On the basis of State practice and the preparatory work for the 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, he takes the following view:
"The binding character of the prohibition to adduce the rebus 
sic stantibus norm with respect to frontier treaties, established 
already in customary international law ..."178
"The prohibition of its application with respect to frontier treaties 
is in full harmony with the most important and unconditionally 
binding principles of universal international law. In the field of 
the law of treaties it represents an important example of the 
application of the principle of territorial integrity of States in 
coni unction with the principle of the prohibition of the use of 
force in international relations."171
The Commission examined various instances in which, following a succession 
of States, the parties involved considered themselves bound not to question treaty 
elements with regard to boundaries. These included: wiiile Somalia disputes its 
boundaries with Ethiopia and Kenya, it does not claim that as a successor State, it is 
it>so jure freed from any obligation to respect boundaries established by treaty of
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the predecessor State. It raises its challenge on grounds of self-determination. 
The predecessor State was the UK, which in 1897 concluded an agreement on its 
boundary with Ethiopia. Both the UK and Ethiopia considered that this treaty 
remained in force. Again, the UK argued in response to Afghanistan's 
questioning the boundary settlement between the two States following the 
independence of Pakistan and India, that clauses dealing with the establishment 
of an international boundary could not be affected, even if  the treaty itself 
was.17**
Another case not looked at by the Commission, but quite pertinent to this study, 
is that of the incorporation by Germany of the borderland of Alsace-Lorraine 
from Erance, as a result of which Germany took over the rights of France with 
regard to that territory. According to a decision of the Reichsgencht (German 
Supreme Court) of 1891, the boundary treaty concluded between the Grand Duchy 
of Baden and the Erench Kingdom on 5 April 1840 remained in undisputed 
force.17^  Though this is a municipal law case and quite dated, it shows an attitude 
on the part of Germany which was reflected in the twentieth century in the 
inter-State disputes quoted above. In the view of Tyranowski, the decision 
"...expresses in an almost model way the customary norm of international lav/ in 
accordance with which boundary treaties concluded by the predecessor devolve 
ipso iure on the successor State." His opinion is that ipso jure succession to 
boundary treaties is determined by what he calls "the fundamental principle of 
succession": that succession does not affect existing State boundaries.174
Furthermore, the same writer considers, and cites substantial evidence in support 
of his claim, that "Practice shows unequivocally that with regard to traditional 
cases of State succession (annexation, cession, secession, uniting and dissolution
of States) the customary norm of international law is that the boundary treaties of 
the predecessor devolve ipso iure on the successor."1*^
Insofar as these comments cover the same ground as Article 11 of the VCSSRT, 
they are, in the opinion of this writer, quite justified. But from the evidence 
taken into account thus far, it would appear that not all aspects of boundary 
treaties must devolve ipso iure on the successor State - purely political provisions, 
for example, probably would not. Tyranowski describes the FRG-Poiand treaty on 
the normalisation of their mutual relations as a boundary treaty, because it 
contains provisions concerning the western frontier of Poland.176 According to 
Tyranowski, then, any State succeeding to the federal Republic ought to succeed 
ipso iure to the whole treaty. Now in the view of this writer, a united German 
State almost definitely would succeed to the whole of the ¥arsawr Treaty: but it 
would succeed to those Articles (i.e. all except Article I ) which do not deal with the 
frontier under the rules governing succession following a uniting of States, and 
it would succeed, under the obligatory succession with regard to frontiers rule, 
only to Article I. Article 111(2) of the ¥arsawr Treaty provides that the parties 
agree that a broadening of their cooperation in the sphere of economic, 
scientific, technological, cultural and other relations is in their mutual interest. 
This is all fascinating stuff and presumably intended to encourage improved 
relations between the two States and therefore a Good Thing, but why should the 
successor State of the ERG succeed to this provision ipso iure just because Article I 
of the same treaty contains ¥est German recognition of the Oder-Neisse line? For 
such is the logical conclusion of Tyranowski‘s argument. In fairness, it should be 
noted that Tyranowski does acknowledge one problem area, vis., the extent of ipso 
iure succession with regard to provisions concerning a frontier regime, but
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asserts that the successor will also inherit such provisions where they constitute 
an integral part of a frontier settlement, i.e. if  they are a condition for the course 
of a boundary.177
The conclusions of the ILC with regard to Article 11 and the customary law 
basis for it seem to emphasise the situation created by boundary treaties rather 
than the treaties themselves. It speaks of “boundary settlements" being 
unaffected by occurrence of State succession.*78 It expressly acknowledged what 
it considered to be the prevailing opinion of jurists that it is the legal situation 
created by the treaty rather than the boundary treaty itself to which it>so iure 
succession should apply: in such a situation, it would seem to be “...a general rule 
that a succession of States is not as such to be considered as affecting a boundary 
or a boundary regime established by treaty prior to that succession of States.'’*79
In conclusion, it may be said that Article 11 of the VCSSRT does constitute 
customary international law and must therefore be regarded as applicable in all 
future cases of State succession regardless of whether or not the predecessor State 
is a party to the Vienna Convention. It is possible that the scope of succession 
with regard to boundaries extends beyond the ambit of Article 11 under customary 
law, so as to include treaties dealing with boundaries, but the evidence considered 
above is not in itself sufficient, in the view of this writer, to justify such a 
conclusion.
(vii) (c) Binding Effect of Actions of the Predecessor State(s). It is necessary to 
consider for the purposes of this study a third question, in addition to the rules 
governing State succession upon a uniting of States and with regard to
boundaries, viz. to what extent, if  any, may a predecessor State bind a successor 
State in its actions, independently of the rules considered above?
The reason for this is that the Federal Republic of Germany has asserted with 
regard to the Yarsaw Treaty that it acted in its own name and therefore could not 
be considered by its action as in any way compromising or restricting the 
freedom of action of a united German State.*80 It is obvious from the general 
discussion above that a united German State is going to have severe problems in 
finding an escape route if  it should desire to avoid obligations of the GDR and FRG 
to which it would succeed. On the face of it, the rules governing uniting of States 
and succession to boundaries, the application of which to the German problem 
will be outlined in more detail below', do a most effective belt and braces job in 
obliging a united German State not to question the boundaries which it wuuld 
inherit. However, the FRG made, one presumes seriously, the assertion that the 
Yarsaw Treaty could not bind a future unified German State and, in the interests 
of a comprehensive assessment of the German question, this assertion deserves to 
be considered.
The statement by the FRG that it entered into the Yarsaw' Treaty only in its own 
name would, in most other agreements, be regarded as quite innocuous. It is a 
general rule of the law' of treaties that States cannot bind other States against 
their will. This follows directly from the concept of State sovereignty. Article 34 
of the Vienna Convention on the Lawr of Treaties provides:
“A treaty does not create either obligations or rights for a 
third State without its consent."*8*
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Thus it is implied in every treaty that, subject to the application of other rules of 
international lav, no other States may be bound by the treaty. The ERG would 
appear to have been stating the obvious then, but, as is clear from its Note to the 
three Western Powers after the signature of the Warsaw Treaty, its aim was to 
prevent any possibility of a united German State becoming automatically bound to 
respect the Oder-Heisse line as the Polish-German frontier because of the ERG 
recognition of it in Article I . It has been concluded already that neither West nor 
East Germany is identical with the Germany which survived after 1945,182 and so 
there is no question of the Warsaw Treaty becoming binding upon that Germany 
by virtue of any identity between the two. Nor would a united German State be 
identical with the Eederal Republic (unless it incorporated the GDR, a possibility 
which may effectively be discounted). Therefore it would not be bound by the 
ERG's treaty obligations simply by reason of the fact that the ERG had undertaken 
them.
The Eederal Republic was attempting to preserve what it perceived to be the 
freedom of action of a united German State with regard to its eastern frontier at a 
future peace settlement, as envisaged at Potsdam. Nevertheless, the legal position 
of the united German State and the assessment of its rights and duties must be 
established from all of the law that is relevant: not only the treaties and 
agreements concluded amongst the Eour Powers, the two German States and many 
other European States including, crucially, Poland; regard must of course be had 
also to the general rules of international lav/, including the law of State 
succession. In this context, the declaration by the Eederal Republic cannot 
override any legal effects which may arise from the creation of a united German 
State. If  a united German State will be bound by any commitments of the ERG, it
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will be so bound through the operation of rules discussed earlier in this chapter; 
the Federal Republic itself has no right to restrict the freedom of action of 
Germany and the latter State cannot be obliged to adhere to any limitation of its 
sovereignty which the former may attempt to establish:18^  "The State inherits 
certain rights and duties irrespective of the will of the predecessor or even of its 
o wn will."184
Moreover, as Sfcubiszewski points out,18^  if  the FRG declaration is to be 
considered as a reservation to the Warsaw Treaty, it would require to be accepted 
by Poland in order to be valid between the two States, and Poland accepted no such 
reservation. In this context, a speech made by the Polish Foreign Minister on 27 
April 1972 shows the attitude of Poland. He emphasized that the treaty was the 
only acceptable platform for Polish-West German relations,186 and in a 
subsequent speech made one month later, soon after the adoption of the 
Bundestag Resolution, the same person stressed that no reservation contained in 
that Resolution could affect the Warsaw Treaty under public international law.187 
This statement was important because Article 2 of  that Resolution included the 
following claim:
"The FRG has assumed on its own behalf the obligations it
undertook in the Treaties"188 (with the USSR and Poland).
Therefore, Poland made it clear that the declaration of the FRG, made both in 1970 
and in 1972, that its obligations vis-a-vis Poland could not bind Germany, had no 
legal effect.
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Clearly, the declaration t>y the Federal Republic cannot bind a united German 
State in the absence of consent by that State. Even if  it should agree to be bound 
by the wishes of the Federal Republic, it would nevertheless be restricted in its 
freedom of action by the rules of customary international law' with regard to 
succession in the event of uniting of States and concerning boundary regimes. 
The Federal Republic cannot prejudge the succession issue.
(viii) The Rights and Duties of the United German State in Light of the Relevant 
Rules of State Succession
If  there were to occur fusion between ¥est and East Germany so as to create 
one State, this would certainly have the effect of bringing about the replacement 
of the two existing States by one State in the responsibility for the international 
relations of the relevant territory/89 despite the somewhat abnormal existence 
of two separate sovereignties with regard to the territory, if  it be accepted that 
they may exist, then it is feasible that one of these may be subject to a succession 
of States within its own limits of authority.
From the foregoing discussion, it may be stated that any general rules of 
succession would have to be part of customary international law to be applicable 
to the present case. Neither of the German States is a party to the VCSSRT, which 
anyway is not yet in force. Opinion would appear to support strongly automatic 
succession to treaties within their territorial limits; however, there remains 
dissent from this mew. Nevertheless, insofar as the discussion is confined to the 
frontiers of Germany, it may be stated that boundary treaties and those parts of 
treaties which relate to the regime of a boundary will be succeeded to.
The results of the succession for the Oder-Neisse line would be reached, first, 
by talcing the relevant treaties of East and West Germany and extracting those 
elements relating to the frontiers. Because there would definitely be succession 
to these frontier provisions, it is of lesser importance that there remains 
uncertainty over the issue whether or not a new State created by the uniting of 
two or more existing States must ipso iure be bound by all treaty rights and 
obligations of the preceding States. Second, having established what these 
provisions are, they must be considered in light of the rights and duties of the 
Four Powers relating to Germany as a whole. In the absence of any 
foreknowledge of how the Four Powers might act during a unification of 
Germany, it must be assumed that they would seek to exercise their joint 
responsibilities with regard to Germany as a whole at the subsequent peace 
settlement in a manner consistent with their previous statements on this subject; 
in any case the final delimitation of the Polish-German frontier would take place 
only then.
This is yet another situation in which the present different policies of the Four 
Powers to the German question require consideration. If, as the USSR holds, 
Germany ceased to exist, then the united Germany would be a successor State to 
two States which were themselves successor States of Germany. The difficulty 
would be in deciding how the continued exercise of Allied rights and duties could 
be consistent with such a situation. It is not possible to anticipate how' the USSR 
would act in such a situation - since it is the one Pow'er w'hich presently 
maintains that there is no German question. It is possible, however, for the USSR 
to participate in a peace settlement on the basis that there is one German State, 
regardless of its age, with w'hich the Polish-German frontier should be delimited 
(but not altered).190
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The problem is quite different if, as is the view of this writer, Germany 
continues to exist simultaneously with the fRG and GDR, that existence being 
manifested by the continuous performance of certain functions by Allied 
personnel in Germany. If  East and West Germany, existing simultaneously with 
Germany, did unite, thereby creating one German State, What would be the 
relationship, if  any, of that new German State to the old one? One possibility is 
that, since the Federal and Democratic Republics are themselves partial successors 
(in the sense of having succeeded to part of its sovereignty rather than part of its 
territory) of Germany, the new united State might be regarded as a partial 
succession by the old Germany: that is, a deliberate choice by the four Powers to 
recreate the status quo ante by reversing the legal developments of 1949-1955 and 
subsequently. This would have the effect of establishing identity between the two 
Germanies. However, would there be a legal obligation on the part of the four 
Powers to establish any such identity? In the Convention on Relations between 
the Three Powers and the federal Republic of Germany (as amended by No. I to the 
Protocol of Termination of the Occupation Regime of the federal Republic of 
Germany) of 23 October 1954, it is provided, in Article 2, that:
"... the Three Powers retain the rights and the responsibilities, 
heretofore exercised or held by them, relating to Berlin and to 
Germany as a whole, including the reunification of Germany 
and a peace settlement."191
The corresponding treaty between the USSR and the GDR states, in Article 5:
"(The Contracting Parties) w ill.... malce the necessary efforts to 
achieve a settlement by peace treaty and the reunification of Germany
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on a peaceful and democratic basis.“*92
While it may be maintained that the use of the term “reunification" means the 
re-establishment of the same legal entity, the fact that the Four Powers have 
denied the existence of any identity between the Germany of 1945-1949 and the 
two present German States reduces the chances of them treating a State created by 
the unification of the FRG and the GDR as identical. One of the reasons for 
denying identity between either the FRG or the GDR with Germany was to deny 
either of them, acting unilaterally, the capacity to act for the whole of Germany, 
and it might therefore be argued that this justification, of preventing the GDR or 
FRG from, individually, acting for the whole of Germany, would no longer be 
relevant following reunification. However, regardless of the justification for 
treating both the Federal and Democratic Republics as non-identical with 
Germany, there is no legal basis for assuming automatic identity of the reunified 
Germany and the old Germany. By itself, it could not acquire any rights, duties or 
capacities other than those possessed by the predecessor States, unless accorded 
them by the Four Powers.
The creation of the GDR and FRG in 1949 was not merely a change of 
government with regard to the relevant territory. I f  such were the case, the 
likelihood of identity would be much stronger, because a change of government 
by itself does not entail any break in statehood. The events of 1949-1955, even if  
regarded at the time as temporary, in that provision was made for the eventual 
final exercise of Allied intentions with regard to the whole of Germany, did 
nevertheless cause a permanent change in the status of Germany. Two States 
were established as subjects of international law separate from Germany. By
uniting, they would create one subject of international law, also separate from the 
Germany on the territory of which they were situated. Another reason for 
suggesting that the Four Powers would be reluctant to treat the reunified 
Germany as identical with the old Germany is that developments did not simply 
cease when the GDR and FRG were created. They themselves incurred obligations, 
some of which might even have been regarded as impossible for a united 
Germany to incur except by authority of the Four Powers. Germany would inherit 
the obligations of the FRG and the GDR with regard to its boundaries and, while 
the Four Powders would still retain the power to decide on Germany's frontiers, it 
might be more difficult for them to propose alterations to these frontiers, because 
the new' State, being legally identical with the old Germany, would itself be 
committed to respecting the present external borders of the GDR and the FRG. 
Such a situation would be inconsistent with the policies followed hitherto by at 
least the Western Powers. It might arise that Germany, in the event of identity 
existing, would be bound through succession to the frontier obligations of the FRG 
and GDR, as recognised by the Four Powrers, but not bound until the final decision 
at a peace settlement, as stipulated at Potsdam. Such a conflict wras not presumably 
intended. Moreover, there is no reason why the Four Powers' rights and duties 
with regal’d to Germany must apply only to the German State which existed in  
1945. The Allies assumed supreme authority with Germany, including the absolute 
right to decide on its status. Thus they could jointly bring about the legal demise 
of that State without simultaneously losing any rights or duties wiiich they 
possessed with regard to it, because one of their rights was that of absolute powder 
over its status.
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It might in practice, be necessary to introduce some mechanism thereby 
their rights and duties continued to exist with regard to any entity created on 
German territory, but this should be regarded not as a legal impediment but 
rather as a practical measure necessary to ensure the continuation of the four 
Power capacities. Indeed, such a course of action would bear resembla nee to that 
adopted by the USSR in its relationship with the GDR, whereby the Soviet Union 
regards the GDR as a successor State to Germany (in the traditional meaning of the 
term - i.e., succession to territory); it seems to regard Germany as no longer in 
existence, but it nevertheless acknowledges the existence of, and continues to 
exercise, certain rights and duties which are based on its original status as one of 
the four Powers and expressly provided for in certain instruments such as the 
1955 treaty with the GDR mentioned above.
There are, then, justifications for the view that a reunified Germany could be 
identical with the pre-1949 Germany, although under existing conditions there 
are legal impediments to such a course. It is most unlikely that identity would 
have to be regarded as existing. Another option is that the new German State 
would not be identical with the pre-1949 Germany, but rather would exist, 
temporarily, side by side with it. In such a situation, the prognosis would be less 
complex. The reunified Germany would succeed to the territorial obligations of 
the two predecessor States. The rights and duties of the four Powers regarding 
Berlin and Germany as a whole, which constitute the remaining evidence of the 
separate statehood of Germany, would then be capable of final application with 
regard to outstanding matters, including the delimitation of the Oder-Heisse line 
at the peace settlement with the united German State. Once actually exercised, no 
capacities would remain to the four Powers (unless some were agreed with the
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German State or imposed as a condition of the peace settlement, in which case 
they would have a different legal basis). The final manifestations of the Germany 
of 1945 would have t>een incorporated into the reunified Germany, which alone 
would survive. In other words, until the final exercise of their remaining joint 
supreme authority, or until the decision is taken to renounce jointly such 
authority without its being exercised, the united German State could exist only in 
the context of, and subject to, the four Power capacities which evidence the 
survival of the old united German State.
(ix) Applicability and Effect of the Zgorzelec and ¥arsaw Treaties
The situation which would arise for a reunified Germany is that, whether or 
not identity would exist with the old Germany, it would have to acknowledge the 
binding effect upon it of the obligations incurred by the GDR and the fRG with 
regard to the Oder-Neisse line. These of course are to be found in the Zgorzelec19^  
and Warsaw Treaties of 1950 and 1970 respectively.194 The former treaty 
describes the Oder-Neisse line as "the state frontier between Germany and 
Poland",19^  while the latter characterises it as “the western State frontier of the 
Polish People’s Republic."196 When two or more States agree by treaty that a State 
frontier exists, they do not merely acknowledge the geographical disposition. By 
describing the Oder-Neisse line as a State frontier, the GDR and the fRG also 
showed that they accepted Poland’s physical existence as a State extending in the 
West to that line and it follows therefrom that Poland exercises sovereignty over 
the relevant territory and that they agreed to such a state of affairs:
’’...the frontier of a state is also a juridical concept. In international
law it means a line that separates the territory over which one state
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has sovereignty from the territory that belongs to another state, 
areas which are res nullius or res communis, or territory which has 
been endowed with a status different from sovereignty. The use of 
the term "state frontier" means that the signatories consider that 
the area which lies beyond the Oder and the Neisse is under the 
territorial supremacy and sovereignty of Poland."19^
In asserting that Poland does exercise sovereignty over the Oder-Neisse 
territories, the Potsdam Agreement must be recalled: it granted Poland mere 
"administration”. However, being an agreement between the UK, USA and USSR 
and binding these States as well as France (to the extent to which that State agreed 
to be bound)198 and Germany, it would not bind the future GDR and FRG as third 
States, except insofar as they have accepted or had it lawfully imposed upon them. 
¥hile they succeeded in part to the authority exercised by the Four Powers, of 
course they are not identical with Germany (and not therefore directly bound by 
the Potsdam Agreement), nor have they inherited any obligations or rights 
concerning the final decision on the eastern German frontier - a power explicitly 
retained by the Allies. It follows that West and East Germany could incur for 
themselves obligations with regard to the Polish-German frontier, despite the 
continued existence of Germany. Their sovereignty is limited by the occupying 
Powers which created them and one of the limitations is that the final decision on 
this frontier would have to await the peace settlement. A reunified Germany 
would inherit these obligations regardless of its own wishes, but subject to the 
Four Power authority. In other words, Poland can rightly maintain vis-a-vis East 
and West Germany, as well as a reunified Germany, that it is entitled to exercise 
sovereignty over the Oder-Neisse territories, but to retain such capacity after the
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peace settlement, it would require the support of the Tour Powers, through a final 
formal delimitation of the frontier along the Oder-Neisse line.
Despite the apparent recognition of Polish sovereignty by the Germans 
outlined above and supported by Skubis2ewski, Frow n and Meyrowits,199 it must 
be acknowledged that opinion is not unanimous with regard to the legal 
significance of the ¥est German commitment contained in the ¥arsaw Treaty. It 
is no surprise that ¥est German and Austrian writers in particular have 
questioned the nature of Poland’s tenure with regard to its western territories. 
Such doubts have been expressed relatively recently by Verdross, Simma and 
Geiger in a joint work on the legal status of the Oder-Neisse territories.200 They 
start from the proposition that Germany as a whole continues to exist in the sense 
of international law and that it is not limited in extent to the area of the FRG; 
under international law it is a legally existing State, though incapable of 
acting.201 This remark is in itself disputable, as the authors admit.202 Firstly, 
exception cannot be taken to the belief in the continued existence of Germany, 
since this writer agrees with the proposition. However, the assertion that 
Germany exists as a State in the sense of international law should be qualified. 
Verdross et al argue that Germany is incapable of acting and that this is what 
makes it different. Yet this writer would argue that, rather, Germany in a sense is 
capable of acting, but it is the form of that capability which makes it so unusual 
in comparison with other States, for its acts are carried out by the Four Powers 
when they exercise their competence with regard to Germany as a whole. This 
competence is the final active manifestation of the German State as represented 
in the acts carried out under the supreme authority of the Four Powers. Germany 
cannot act outwith the Four Power capacity; this shows its individuality. It is
certainly true that the united German State does not act for itself at present; this 
is Verdross’s point. The supreme authority of the Four Powers constitutes 
authority acquired instead of sovereignty. The acts of the Four Powers may t>e 
regarded as acts for Germany and even by Germany in that the Four Powers 
assumed all active authority for that country. Some of this wras surrendered to the 
FRG and the GDR; those elements retained evidence the continued statehood and, 
when the Allies act in their special capacity with regard to Germany, this shows 
how/ Germany may act, even if  only through the Allies.
Verdross et al are also correct to assert that Germany is not limited to the 
territory of the FRG. Germany certainly exists within the confines of the four 
occupation zones. The implication behind this assertion is that some may regard 
Germany as being limited to the territory of the FRG, whether on a temporary and 
practical basis or on a legal basis, because of the theory, as enunciated by h e  
Federal Constitutional Court in 1973, that the Federal Republic is partly identical 
(teilidentisch) with G erm any.20^ Of course, this Court is entitled, within the 
confines of its municipal jurisdiction, to indulge in whatever "whimsical 
speculation (s>“204 may happen to occur to its judges while they are not 
contemplating their return to Berlin. But, as has been established, all questions 
regarding the status of Germany are the prerogative of the Four Powders. Any 
statements of the Federal Constitutional Court, be they the ratio decidendi, obiter 
dicta or whimsical speculation, cannot bind the Four Powders. Moreover, it follow's 
that any attempt by this Court to attribute to its rulings international legal effect 
must be treated as ultra vires. Certainly such utterances have no legal effect on 
the status of Germany, or the FRG and the GDR under public international law'. 
Any criticisms which apply to the Court in its ruling on partial identity apply
a fortiori to those writers who support this dictum.
Following from their conclusion that Germany continues to exist, and to exist 
beyond FRG territory, Verdross et al consider the likely status of the areas to the 
east of the Oder-Neisse line. It is in this context that the distinction between 
sovereignty (Souveranitat) and territorial supreme authority not amounting to 
sovereignty (Gebietshoheit)20  ^ acquires significance. They argue that the 
distinction between territorial sovereignty and Gebietshoheit is recognised both 
by State practice and the international legal judiciary.206 Further, that the 
Oder-Neisse territories are subject not to the sovereignty of Poland, but merely to 
its Gebietshoheit, because the "original” sovereign retains its rights over the 
territory 207 The basis for this evaluation is, apparently. Article IV of the ¥arsaw 
Treaty:
"This Agreement shall be without prejudice to any bilateral or 
multilateral international agreements which the Parties have 
previously concluded or which affect them.”208
According to Verdross etal if  this provision reserves to a future peace treaty the 
decision with regard to sovereignty over the Oder-Neisse territories, a treaty 
which only an all-German Government can enter into for Germany (and it is 
clear from the text as a whole that the writers support such a view'), while on the 
other hand Article I of the ¥arsaw Treaty provides that the Oder-Neisse line 
constitutes, for the FRG, the western State frontier of Poland, this can only mean 
that the Federal Republic does not actually recognise the territorial sovereignty 
of Poland over the Oder-Neisse territories; however, the FRG wall raise no further 
obj ections to the exercise by Poland of full Gebietshoheit in these territories 209
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Although there is much to t>e said for the proposition that only an all-German 
Government may enter into a peace treaty for Germany with regard to the 
Oder-Neisse line in order to achieve a final arrangement of this issue in the sense 
that this was envisaged in the Potsdam Agreement (since it is the Potsdam 
Agreement, among others, which is taken into account when the obligations 
referred to in Article IV of the Varsaw Treaty are mentioned), two criticisms must 
be made. Firstly, with regard to the assessment by Verdross et al of  the Potsdam 
Agreement; secondly, concerning the effects which they attribute to Poland's 
tenure over the Oder-Neisse territories, as a result of the Potsdam Agreement,
I
vis-a-vis Vest Germany.
In the Potsdam Agreement, it is provided that the final delimitation of the 
western frontier of Poland should a ra t a "peace settlement".21*^  The term "peace 
treaty" is not employed; it is true that a peace treaty could be a likely means by 
which the outstanding matters would be regulated, but this process could take 
another form, for instance, the agreement upon a settlement not including any 
peace treaty in the traditional form.211 Furthermore, the impression might be 
gained from the wording used by Verdross etal that the united German State must 
have a say in the final decision on the eastern German frontier. Two conditions 
suggest that Germany wrould have no say: the first of these is contained in the 
Declaration of 5 June 1945 by the Four Powers regarding the defeat of Germany 
and the assumption by them of supreme authority in that State. The Preamble 
states, inter alia:
"The Governments (of the Four Powers) will hereafter determine 
the boundaries of Germany or any part thereof and the status of 
Germany or of any area at present being part of German territory."212
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The second is contained in the Potsdam Agreement itself. Part I A(3 )(l) of the 
Protocol stipulates, in part, that the Council of Foreign Ministers "....shall t>e 
utilised for the preparation of a peace settlement for Germany to be accepted by 
the Government of Germany ....“.2*3 Although the Council of Foreign Ministers 
does not operate, nevertheless the commitment to prepare a peace settlement has 
survived.
The viev has been taken 214 that the three ¥estern Powers, at least, may have, 
in the Deutschlandvertrag, committed themselves to acceptance of a genuine 
right of negotiation for Germany at the peace settlement, under Article 1. 
.paragraph 1:
"The Signatory States are agreed that an essential aim of their common 
policy is a peace settlement for the whole of Germany, freely negotiated 
between Germany and her former enemies, which should lay the
foundation for a lasting peace ...."21^
It must be asked whether the Western Powers alone had the authority to accord to 
Germany a right of negotiation which it certainly did not possess under the 1945 
provisions. On the face of it, the Soviet Union would also haw- to agree to such an 
alteration of the status quo. It must also be asked if  the expression, that a freely 
negotiated peace settlement is an essential aim of the parties, actually amounts to 
a legal commitment in the first place.
There is a second sentence in paragraph 1. This says:
"They further agree that the final determination of the boundaries 
of Germany must await such settlement."
If  this is interpreted strictly, then the Paragraph, read as a whole, seems to claim 
a right for States other than the Four Powers to participate in the decision with 
regard to Germany’s frontiers: "...Germany and her former enemies ....’’. This 
would certainly exceed the ambit of the right claimed under the June 1945 
Declaration on the assumption of supreme authority, since this reserves to the 
Four Powers the right to determine the boundaries of Germany. Acting together, 
they could certainly seek to include other States in the decision-making process. 
However, such an action would require the consent of all four States, not only the 
western ones.
It wuuld appear, therefore, that any extension of the right to decide on 
Germany's frontiers, is of a dubious nature, both as to the quality of such a right 
and the number of States to wrhich it may be actually extended. At most, the three 
Western Powers have taken upon themselves the obligation to maintain, as a 
political commitment, their support for the inclusion of Germany as an active 
participant in the decision-making process at a future peace settlement.
It is now necessary to consider the characterisation by Verdross et al of 
Poland’s tenure over the Oder-Neisse territories as Gebietshoheit with regard to 
the Federal Republic. West Germany, when signing the Warsaw' Treaty, 
emphasised that it could act in its own name only: it could not commit any other 
State.2*6 This reflects no more than the maxim pacta tertiis nec nocent nec 
prosunt, or, as it is expressed in the Vienna Convention on the Law/of Treaties:
”A treaty does not create either obligations or rights for a 
third State without its consent." (Article 34).2*^
Opinion, while admitting certain possible exceptions, follows the ruling given in  
the German Interests in Polish Upper Silesia Case (Merits), that "A treaty only 
creates law as between the States which are parties to i t 218'219.
The Federal Republic of course sought to prevent any other State, but 
particularly Poland, from imputing to it recognition of the boundary by Germany 
as a whole - a not unreasonable imputation, given previous FRG claims to identity 
with Germany. But the FRG is not and never has been identical, or even partially 
identical, with any other German State, because the Four Powers have always 
denied such identity. Therefore, while the two States, in Article IV of the Warsaw 
Treaty, did acknowledge the existence of other instruments of international law/ 
which affect them, they were acting for themselves only. Their actions had no 
effect as such on the position of the Four Powers (it is another matter that some or 
all of the Four Powers may have restricted their own freedom because of 
approval given to the Treaty); nor can the Potsdam Agreement restrict the 
capacity to act of West Germany if  that State acts only within the limits set upon 
its freedom of action when it acquired sovereignty. Acting only in the name of 
the Federal Republic of Germany, the FRG could not, even if  it claimed to, affect 
the rights and duties of the Four Powers, or the three Western Powers, 
concerning Germany as a whole. They are quite separate States.
Given the lack of identity, given that the FRG entered into the treaty for itself 
alone, there could be no limit upon the extent of the commitment it might incur - 
as long as this ware genuinely accepted for itself only and the States acted in
accordance with international law. This is exactly what occurs in Article I of the 
Warsaw Treaty: the parties agree that the Oder-Neisse line forms the western State 
frontier of Poland and acknowledge, in Article I?, that they agree upon this 
without affecting any other relevant treaties and agreements. It is vital to bear 
in mind at this stage the extraordinary peculiarities of the situation. West 
Germany has no common boundary with Poland; it has never shared a boundary 
with Poland. Yet for twenty years it had been depicted in Poland as the main 
threat to that State's territorial integrity - the revanchist German State. It is 
probably true that this was done at least partly for domestic political ends (in 
particular, to nurture a stronger sense of national unity in the socialist State, as 
opposed to national unity against the socialist State, which seems sometimes to be 
omnipresent). Yet there was always a genuine fear in Poland of the German 
threat, apart from that whipped up by the authorities. The ratification of the 
Warsaw Treaty seemed to remove this threat, though from time to time it is 
revived in the official media - which perhaps does indicate, given the absence of 
any real challenge, that the revanchist threat has been a useful tool at certain 
times which its manipulators are reluctant to give up.
West Germany, through its claims to speak for all Germans and its sometime 
claim to identity with the Reich, through its refusal to acknowledge any Polish 
claims, through its strident assertions that the German question still had to be 
settled, was perceived from Warsaw as a source of insecurity. When the FRG 
sought eventually to establish its relations with the States to its east on a more 
normal footing, it had to acknowledge the needs of those States. Poland's 
principal condition as far as West Germany was concerned was simple: 
recognition by that State of the Oder-Neisse line.220 Poland already considered 
itself to be sovereign over the Oder-Neisse territories; the GDR accepted this 
interpretation of the situation. Poland regarded the Federal Republic as
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representing itself only. But by entering into the Warsaw Treaty, the ERG could 
no longer assert that it x?as not bound to accept the territories as part of the Polish 
State. If  the Federal Republic were identical with Germany, it could mean either 
that Germany was bound by the Warsaw Treaty to accept the Oder-Neisse line as 
the boundary under public international law, or (perhaps more likely) the treaty 
could newer have been concluded in the first place because the frontier issue is 
not something which Germany is competent to decide for itself. But the FRG was 
acting for itself, and acting within its competence. Its act did not affect in any 
way the position of the Four Powers and their position did not present any legal 
impediment to it. In fact, the Western Powers expressed their approval of the 
FRG's initialling of the treaty and emphasized at the time that their own position 
was unaffected.221 Any treaties or agreements concluded by the Federal Republic 
or affecting it - the formula used in Article I? - could not inhibit its ability to 
recognize in the fullest sense the Oder-Neisse line as the western State frontier of 
Poland, because these were concerned with the status and frontiers of Germany as 
a whole, and the Federal Republic did not seek, at any point, to attribute to 
Germany any legal consequences from its own action in entering into the Warsaw 
Treaty.
Why did the Parties refer to the border as the western State frontier of Poland, 
rather than, say, the Polish-German frontier? Both States had to take into account 
their own legal positions as well as their relationship towards the GDR. Poland 
considered that there was no German State with which to decide upon this issue; 
the FRG spoke only for itself. The formula adopted succeeded in respecting both 
stances. Poland had already concluded a border treaty with the GDR and, had it 
agreed upon a formula with the Federal Republic which incorporated the idea of
Germany, it could have been perceived by the GDR as some form of interference 
in its internal affairs. Furthermore, for Poland to agree on a "Germany" formula 
in the Warsaw Treaty, this might have undermined its contention that it had 
settled the issue of the frontier in the Zgorselec Treaty of 1930 with the GDR. 
Poland's view was not that the FRG had any legal say in the frontier issue, but 
that, given its previous opposition to the Oder-Neisse line, Poland had been unable 
to conduct normal relations with i t 222 Therefore recognition of the frontier had 
no constitutive effect for Poland here; what mattered wras that it had constitutive 
effect for the Federal Republic which, after the entry into force of the Treaty, 
would be unable to question the frontier, with the consequence that the mutual 
relations of the tw^ o States could be normalised.
A less calculable factor was the offence which might be caused to the GDR by 
the Treaty, at a time when the FRG sought to improve its relations with all of the 
socialist States. The GDR would appear to have been against Poland normalising 
its relations with the FRG before the two German States had themselves entered 
into some formal relationship.22  ^ By reaching a consensus with Poland and the 
Soviet Union without having recognised the GDR, the Federal Republic can only 
have strengthened its negotiating position vis-a-vis that State. .Nevertheless, 
given that West Germany did want to come to terms with the GDR, the setback for 
the GDR may have been mitigated by the fact that the Warsaw Treaty did not 
formally impinge upon its own authority as the German State actually bordering 
Poland, by using the name of Germany in the agreed formula for the frontier.
The formula incorporated in Article I constitutes further evidence in favour of 
the separate existence of, on the one hand. West Germany and, on the other.
Germany itself. Regardless of the nature of Poland's tenure over the Oder-Neisse 
territories vis-a-vis the Four Powers, it has a. quite separate authority with regard 
to West Germany: the Warsaw Treaty - i.e.. West Germany bound itself through 
that instrument; it committed itself to a position which.amounts to no less than 
full recognition by it of Polish sovereignty over the territory to the east of the 
Oder-Neisse frontier.
The argument of Verdross et si. that Poland can have only Gebietshoheit as a 
result of the Warsaw Treaty, is based on the false premise that Germany retains
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title over these territories, and therefore, that the FRG could not recognise Poland 
as having sovereignty.224 It has been shown that, independently of the existence 
vel non of Germany, and independently of the extent of its territory, the FRG was 
capable of recognising Polish sovereignty.
The position with regard to the German Democratic Republic is less fraught 
with controversy. Fewer claims have been made on behalf of the GDR as being 
identical with Germany: those who claim such a relationship to exist between the 
FRG and Germany base their arguments, to a large extent, on the claims made by 
the Federal Republic itself. The GDR has long ceased to have such pretensions and 
now' claims to act for itself only, though the Zgorselec Treaty was concluded by 
the GDR in the name of the German nation and it does refer to the frontier as the 
German-Polish State frontier.
It is clear from the Preamble of this treaty that the parties regard it as having 
an executory character with regard to the Potsdam Agreement:
"...desiring to stabilize and consolidate mutual relations on the 
basis of the Potsdam Agreement which established the frontier on 
the Oder and Lusatian Neisse...."
The reserved authority of the Four Powers with regard to the frontier question 
does not prevent such a conclusion. The separate personality of the GDR from 
Germany enables the former State to recognize with legal effect, for itself, the 
frontier which the Parties consider to have been established in 1943. As the 
German State actually bordering Poland, it is appropriate that it be competent to 
treat the agreement with Poland as executing, that is, giving effect to, the 
decision of the Allies as it sees it. This of course is without prejudice to the 
competence of the Allies. The Warsaw Treaty is of course non-executory in 
character; this is because the Federal Republic is not in a. position to give 
practical effect to the Potsdam Agreement, even if  it shared the Polish and Fast 
German interpretation of that instrument.
Contrary to the opinion held by the extremist school of Polish thought 
concerning territorial issues, the Zgorzelec Agreement does not constitute the 
peace settlement mentioned in the Potsdam Agreement.22  ^ Such a judgment 
entails a nonsensical reading of the Potsdam Agreement combined with a smug 
deafness to ail the statements of the Western Powders and even those of the Soviet 
Union, insofar as that State has acknowledged the continued existence of Four 
Powrer capacity without specifying what this actually means.
Greater merit does perhaps pertain to the notion that the GDR, as the successor 
State to Germany on that part of its territory adjoining Poland, by concluding the
Treaty of 1950, did lawfully settle the frontier issue.226 However, the GDR could 
only perform such an act within the limits of its ow'n authority. If  Germany had 
ceased to exist - the East German view/ - then, as the successor State, the GDR would 
have an authority denied to the ERG, because of the former's geographical 
proximity to Poland, to conclude a frontier settlement. If, on the other hand, 
Germany continued to exist for certain purposes, then the GDR is excluded from 
creating any obligation outvith its own limited capacity in this field, and the 
Zgorselec Agreement is therefore unable to act in such a way as to bind the 
German State.
(x) Compatabilitv Following the Unification of the GDR and the FRG
Were Article 31 (1) (b) of the VCSSRT to be applicable to the unification of the 
tw'o German States, the question arises whether or not the border provisions 
contained in the Warsaw' and Zgorselec Treaties 'would be so radically affected that 
their application vis-a-vis the united German State would be incompatible with 
the objects and purposes of the original treaties.
For various reasons this question must be answered in the negative. First of 
all, there exists the general customary rule of international law, expressed in  
Article 11 of the VCSSRT, that a succession of States does not as such affect 
obligations and rights established by a treaty and relating to the regime of a 
boundary. Given the apparent strength of authority in favour of the rule that a 
change of sovereignty does not as such affect boundaries, any form of unification 
which purported to render the border provisions, when applied to the united 
German State, incompatible with the objects and purposes of the treaties, would be 
unlawful without the agreement of Poland.
Furthermore, there is no time limit contained in either of the treaties which 
w'ould restrict their application according to the duration of the existence of West 
and East Germany as separate States. One of the purposes of the treaties w'as to 
provide stability in central Europe and this itself w/ould indicate that the treaties 
ought to continue to be applied.
The Federal Republic has stressed that it undertook the obligations contained in 
the Warsaw' Treaty in its own name only. But such a declaration is not in itself 
sufficient to prevent the devolution of certain rights and obligations 227 The 
treaties, as w'ell as containing no time limit, contain no provisions which w'ould 
prevent the devolution, by normal rules of State succession, of the frontier 
provisions as a binding source of rights and obligations upon the united German 
State. The only limitations are those contained, by implication, in Article I? of 
the Warsaw/Treaty, which expressiymaintains the validity of existing treaties and 
agreements concluded by or affecting the Parties. No corresponding provision 
exists in the Zgorselec Treaty/28 Since neither the FRG nor the GDR has, or has 
ever had, capacity to act in the name of Germany as a whole, and since upon 
unification, this German State would still not be identical with the Germany as a 
whole h e  separate existence of which is still maintained by at least some of the 
Four Pow/ers, the unified German State w'ould be created subject to the eventual 
exercise by the Four Pow'ers of their authority with regard to the final peace 
settlement, but still a quite separate subject of international law' It w/ould inherit 
for itself the border provisions of the Zgorselec and Warsaw' Treaties. The only 
way in which the rights and duties of the Four Powers and, in particular, the 
right to decide upon Germany's frontiers, can affect the united German State, is 
through the establishment of a peace settlement. This can only occur, under the
present rules, after the unification. The act of unification would t>e between the 
FRG end the GDR alone and, as such, would incorporate the obligations incurred 
by each with regard to frontiers. Because the unification of West and East 
Germany wuuld not diminish or increase the rights of the Four'Powers (it w'ould 
bring hitherto dormant rights into play), the rights and duties of the Four Powers 
would not affect the position of the unified German State at the time of succession. 
The full capacity of the Four Powers.would remain and the succession of States 
would take place in that context: i.e., subject to this capacity, which may even 
represent in a sense the continued statehood of Germany since 1945.
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Republic of Poland. Bonn, 1971, at pp. 10-11.
181. This undoubtedly reflects customary international law:
Brownlie, Note 43, supra, at pp. 619-620.
182. Chapter Five, pp. 190-197.
183. This is also the opinion of Professor Skubiszewski:
Nowe traktaty w sprawach niemieckich: problemy terytorialne.
(New Treaties with Regal’d to German Affairs: Territorial Problems). 
1973(3) PiP 13, at 15-16:
"... RFN nie jest w stanie w drod2e aktu jednostronnego zapobiec 
temu, izby jej ewentuainy i przyszly sukcesor przejal ukiad lub 
wynikajace z niego zobowiazania. Sprawa nalezy do stosunkow 
pomiedzy sukcesorem (czyii zjednoczonym panstwem niemieckim) 
apozostalym kontrahentem (czyli Polska); poprzednik sukcesora (tj. RFN) 
nie moze prawnie i skutecznie przeszkodzic sukcesji."
-"... the FRG is not in a position, by means of a unilateral act, to 
prevent its eventual and future successor from talcing over the 
treaty or obligations resulting from it. The matter belongs to 
relations between the successor (that is, the united German State) 
and the remaining contracting party (that is, Poland); the 
successor’s predecessor (i.e. FRG) cannot legally and effectively 
prevent the succession." (My translation)
184. "Panstwo dziedziczy pewne uprawnienia i obowiazki niezaleznie 
od woli poprzednikalub nawet swej wlasnej woli.”
Ibid, at 15.
183. "... nic nie wskazuje na to, jakoby Polska zgodzila sie na takie
zasrzezenia. Tymczasem dwustronny charakter ukladu przesadza. 
iz aprobatadrugiego kontrahentajest konieczna. by zastrzezenie 
uczynic skutecznym.”
- "...nothing indicates that Poland agreed to such reservations.
Meanwhile, the bilateral character of the treaty shows in advance 
that the approval of the other contracting party is necessary to 
make the reservation effective." (My translation)
Ibid.
186. TrybunaLudu, 28 April 1972.
187. TrybunaLudu, 26 May 1972.
188. CMND 6201, Doc. No. 150, p. 256.
189. See pp. 254-258, supra.
190. See pp.239-241, supra.
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191. See Note 11, supra.
192. See Note 12, supra.
193. See Note 28, supra.
194. 830UNTS328.
195. Article. 1.
196. Article. 1.
197. Skubiszewski, Note 1, suprev at 37.
A similar view is expressed by Ftwein, writing with regard to the Warsaw 
treaty: Die deutschen Grenzen in volkerrechtiicher Sieht(The German 
Frontiers in the Perspective of International Law).
1979 34, E A Teil 1,591 at 591-592.
"Nach Art.I des ¥arschauer Vertrages ist die Oder-Neisse-Grenze- fur die 
Bundesrepublik Deutschland eindeutig die Staatsgrenze zwischen Polen und 
der DDR. Das Gebiet ostlich von ihr ist polnisches Staatsgebiet...
Der ¥ortlaut des Art.I des ¥arschauer Vertrages stellt fest, dass die 
bestehende Grenzlinie die westliche Staatsgrenze der Volksrepublik Polen 
bildet. ¥estliche Staatsgrenze bedeutet, dass das Gebiet bis dahin zum 
Staatsgebiet der Volksrepublik Polen gehort. Daein Gebiet nicht einerseits 
Staatsgebiet eines Staates, andererseits eines anderen Staates sein kann, ist 
mit dem Inkrafttreten dieses Vertrages fur die Bundesrepublik Deutschland 
Klarheit daliin geschaffen worden, dass fur sie die Gder-Neisse-Gebiete 
polnisches Staatsgebiet geworden sind".
-"By Art. I of the ¥arsaw Treaty, the Oder-Neisse frontier is for the 
Federal P.epublic of Germany undoubtedly the State frontier between 
Poland and the GDR. The territory east of it is Polish State territory....
The warding of Art I of the ¥arsaw Treaty states that the existing 
frontier line constitutes the western State frontier of the Polish People's 
Republic. ¥estern State frontier means that the territory up to there 
belongs to the State territory of the Polish People's Republic. That a 
territory cannot on the one hand be State territory of one State, and 
on the other hand of another State, is with the coming into effect of 
the treaty made clear for the Federal Republic of Germany, that for it 
the Oder-Neisse territories have become Polish State territory." (My 
translation).
Meyrowitz also appeal’s to interpret Art I. to this effect: Le Traite de 
Varsovie du7 Decembre 1970 (The ¥arsaw Treaty of 7 December 1970).
1971 752 R&BIP, 944, at 997.
"...laR.F.A. "constate", c'est-a-dire reconnait, i'existence de cette 
souverainete comme souverainete de jure. Car laconstatation que 
laligne de l'Gder-Neisse" constitue lafrontiere d'Etat occidentale 
de le Republique populaire de Pologne" implique a 1‘evidence la 
constatation que l'autorite exercee par i ’Etat poionais d l'egard de 
ses provinces du Nord et de D Ouest est de la meme nature que celle qu'il 
detient sur le reste de son territoire: la souverainete."
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- "The IRQ notes (or certifies) that is to say recognises, the existence of 
this sovereignty as sovereignty de jure. Tor the observation that the 
Oder Neisse line "constitutes the vestern State frontier of the People's 
Republic of Poland" implies obviously the observation that the 
authority exercised by the Polish State vith regard to its provinces 
in the North and ¥est is of the same nature as that vhich it holds 
over the rest of its territory: sovereignty."
N.B. Meyrovitz uses, in his french translation of the vord “agree" 
the term, "constatent, d'un commun accord". It might have been 
more accurate had he used the term employed in the french 
translation provided in the UNTS, viz. "affirment d’un commun 
accord."
198. "The Protocol contained in section 1(B) an agreed letter of 
invitation to be addressed to the Governments of franee and China 
vith the proposal to join the Council of foreign Ministers, franee 
accepted this invitation, formal french statements shov that franee 
vas also informed about the other decisions taken at Potsdam. The 
french Government accepted the provision for the aims of occupation 
including those concerning the German eastern frontier, france 
objected, hovever, to the establishment of central German 
departments, and to several other parts of the Protocol, including
the economic principles, france vas therefore never bound by 
the entirety of the decisions talcen at the Potsdam Conference." 
frov/ein: Potsdam Agreements on Germany (1945)
In: R. Bernhardt (ed.): Encyclopedia of Public International Lav, Vol. 4, 
Amsterdam, Nev York, Oxford, 1982, p. 141 at 143.
199. It should be pointed out here that these authors are stated to be in 
agreement vith this v/riter vith regard to the legal significance of 
the term “State frontier", as contained in the Warsav Treaty, but 
that opinions on other aspects of the Oder-Neisse frontier as a legal 
issue do vary.
200. A. Verdross, B. Simma, R. Geiger: Territoriale Souveranitat und 
Gebietshoheit. Zur Vollcerrechtiichen Lage der Oder-Neisse Gebiete. 
(Territorial Sovereignty and Gebietshoheit. On the International 
Legal Status of the Oder-Neisse Territories).
Bonn, 1980.
201. "Unsere Darstellung der volkerrechtlichen lage der Oder-Neisse- 
Gebiete geht davon aus, dass "Deutschland als Ganzes" als Staat im 
Sinne des Volkerrechts bis heute fortexistiert und sich in seiner 
raumlichen Ausdehnung nicht etva auf die Bundesrepublik 
Deutschland beschrankt. Deutschland ist nach unserer Ansicht
ein nach Volkerrecht zvar rechtsfahiger, aber handlungsunfahiger 
Staat.”
Ib id ,a tp .ll.
202. Ibid.
203. Case before the Federal Constitutional Court of the FRG, brought by 
the Bavarian State Government, v ith  regard to the legality of the 
Grundvertrag. 31 July 1973.
1973 NJ¥ 1539.
English summary and partial translation: 1976 70 AJIL 147.
204. Skubiszevski, Note 1, suprav at 25 (referring to the sometime FRG 
claim that it vas identical v/ith the Reich vith in  its frontiers of 
December 31,1937).
205. In  viev of the difficulty entailed in establishing a more concise yet 
accurate translation of Gebietshoheit, the German term v ill be 
employed henceforth.
206. “Die Staatenpraxis ebenso vie die volkerrechtliche Judikatur 
unterscheiden klar und deutiich zvischen der territorialen 
Souveranitat und der Gebietshoheit...."
Verdross et al. Note 200, supra at p. 15.
I
207. "... der ursprungliche territoriale Souveran dieses sein ("Eigentums"-) 
Recht uber das Gebiet behalt, vahrend der faktisch die Staatsgevalt 
uber das betreffende Gebiete ausubende Staat die Gebietshoheit in  
einem Umfang innehat, dass das Territorium fur alle praktischen 
Zvecke als sein Staatsgebiet."
- "...the original territorial sovereign of this retains its ("Property"-) 
right over the territory, while the State actually exercising executive 
pover over the territory in question holds Gebietshoheit to such an 
extent that, for all practical purposes, the territory appears to be its 
State territory."
Ibid, at p. 87.
208. See Note 194, supra.
209. "Yenn der Yarschauer Vertrag in Artikei IV die Entscheidung uber 
die territoriale Souveranitat hinsichtlich der Oder-Neisse-Gebiete 
einem kunftigen Friedensvertrag vorbehalt, den fur Deutschland 
nur eine gesamtdeutsche Regierung eingehen kann, andererseits 
aber Artikei I des Yarschauer Vertrags besagt, dass die Oder-Neisse- 
Linie fur die Bundesrepublik Deutschland die vestliche Staatsgrenze 
Polens bildet, so kann dies nur bedeuten, dass die Bundesrepublik 
zvar nicht die territoriale Souveranitat der Volksrepublik Polen 
uber die Oder-Neisse-Gebiete anerkennt, dass sie aber gegen die 
Ausubung der vollen Gebietshoheit des polnischen Staates in  
diesem Gebieten keine Einvendungen mehr erhebt."
Verdross etal. Note 200, supra, at p. 86.
210. Potsdam Agreement (Protocol), Part V III, B. 
CMND 1552, Doc. No. 13, p. 57.
211. This is also the opinion of Professor Skubiszevski:
"The Potsdam Agreement does not use the vords "peace treaty", 
but uses the term "peace settlement", vhich seems to be a vider 
concept and does not exclude another method other than a 
traditional peace treaty."
Taken from private comments made v ith  regard to this thesis,
26 June 1985-
212. CMND 1552, Doc. No. 7, p. 38.
213. Note 210, supra, at p. 49.
214. "In Article 7 the parties to the Deutschlandvertrag specify that vhat they 
have in mind is not a settlement imposed by the Great Povers but one vhich 
is "freely negotiated betveen Germany and her former enemies .... In  
other vords, frontiers are no longer, in the viev of the three Yestern 
Povers and the ERG, a subject to be regulated through unilateral action by 
the Big Four, but a matter to be negotiated vith  the participation and 
consent of the German Government and other Governments."
Skubiszevski, Note 13, supra at 101.
215. Note 11, supra.
216. Note 180, supra
217. 1969 8 ILM 679.
218. PCIJSer. A, No. 7, at pp. 28-29.
219. McNair, Note 55, supra at p. 310;
Brovnlie, Note 43, supra, at pp. 619-620;
Goralczyk, Note 65, supra at p. 88.
220. N.Ascherson: The Polish August. London, 1981, at pp. 52-53- 
Ascherson's viev, that for Poland the most important factor vas to gain 
unqualified recognition of the frontier by the FRG, is confirmed by Polish 
vriters:
"There vas only the problem of the attitude of the Yest German Government 
to the established and existing vestern frontier of Poland; the CDU/CSU 
Governments in Bonn had for 20 years refused to recognise this frontier, 
vhich excluded the possibility of any agreement and normalisation of 
relations betveen the tvo countries and made it impossible to eliminate that 
hotbed of distrust and unrest in Europe.”
Sulek: The Normalisation Agreements of 1970-72 and European Security.
1972 13 PYA 219, at 236;
"Dla Polski fundamentem normalizacji bylo uznanie granicy na Gdrze i 
Nysie".
- "For Poland the foundation for the normalisation vas the recognition 
of the border on the Oder and Neisse." (My translation)
K. Skubiszevski: Zachodnia granica Polski v  svietle traktatov.
(The Yestern Frontier of Poland in the Light of Treaties).
Poznan,1975, at p. 229.
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The author discusses the evolution of the FRG position, from the conception 
of non-aggression to acceptance of the frontier, at pp. 228-237.
221. "Her Majesty’s Government note vith  approval the initialling of the Treaty. 
They share the position that the Treaty does not and cannot affect the 
rights and responsibilities of the Four Povers as reflected in the lenovn 
Treaties and Agreements."
Extract from Note sent by the UK Government to the FRG Government on 
19 November 1970. Similar Notes vere sent by the US and French 
Governments.
CMND 6201, Doc. No. 130, p. 229.
222. Sulek, Note 220, supra. Further explanation of the Polish perception of this 
problem is given at pp. 230-231.
Nicholas Betheil is correct to say that "..it had been anon-negotiable 
point on the Polish side to include in the treaty a statement that 
the Oder- Neisse Line 'is' the frontier betveen Germany and Poland” - 
N. Betheil: Gomulka: His Poland and His Communism, Harmondsvorth, 1972, 
at p. 276.
But he is incorrect to say that Poland vanted the frontier settlement to be 
betveen "Germany" and Poland; such a formula vould have contradicted 
tventy years of Polish policy on this issue. Poland's viev vas that there 
existed tvo German States, one of vhich had already recognised the 
Oder-Neisse line. Poland had never regarded ¥est Germany as being 
able to act in  the name of Germany under international lav.
223. Ascherson, Note 220, supra, at pp. 98-100.
224. See p. 31L supra.
225. Gelberg, Note 29, supra, at 123; Fiszer, Note 29, supra, at 303.
226. Gelberg, Note 29, supra, at 123.
227. See pp. 297-301, supra.
228. The Preamble does contain the statement that the Parties desire ”... to 
stabilise and consolidate mutual relations on the basis of the Potsdam 
Agreement vhich established the frontier on the Oder and Lusatian 
Neisse..."
It might be thought that, since the Parties accepted the Potsdam Agreement 
as the basis for their mutual relations, they vould accept also that part 
of it vhich postponed the final delimitation of Poland's vestern frontier 
until a peace settlement. Hovever, since Poland and the GDR are of the 
viev that the Potsdam Agreement actually settled this issue, it may justi­
fiably be said that the Zgorzelec Treaty contains no provision corresponding 
to Article IV of  the Warssv Treaty.
CHAPTER SEVEN
Problems of Nationality as aConsecrence of the Territorial Changes in Poland and 
Germany in  1945
(i) Introduction
The title of this chapter indicates vhat should be stressed at the beginning. ; 
It is not proposed to deal v ith  the general rules, be they international or 
municipal, relating to citizenship. The subject is not being considered as a 
separate issue; rather, it is discussed vith  regard to the particular problems vhich 
arose as a result of the mass movements of population and territorial alterations 
in  central Europe (the former being, to a large extent, a result of the latter), 
especially vith  regard to the Germans - both Reichsdeutsche and Volksdeutsche.* 
The position of Polish citizens vho, at least until 1939 and, in many cases, till 1945, 
had lived in that part of Poland vhich in  1945 vas detached from Poland for the 
benefit of the Soviet Union,2 v ill also be considered. The study then v ill deal 
essentially vith  the Poles and the Germans and v ill be presented in the context of 
the Polish and German (i.e., the FRG, the GDR and Germany) States, those States the 
frontiers of vhich form the main topic of this thesis.
There vere at least tvo stages in vhich the Germans left the areas they had 
inhabited. First of all, there vere those vho vere evacuated or fled voluntarily 
ahead of the advance of Soviet and Polish armies from the east .3 Some of these 
may have left as early as 1944, but they may be classed as one category. Secondly, 
there vere those vho had remained in the German eastern territories and other 
parts of eastern Europe as they fe ll to the Allied forces, but vho vere
subsequently obliged to leave in  accordance v ith  Paragraph X II of the Protocol of 
the Potsdam Agreement. This provides, inter alia:
"The three Governments, having considered the question 
in all its aspects, recognise that the transfer to Germany 
of German populations, or elements thereof, remaining 
in Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary, v ill have to be 
undertaken. They agree that any transfers that take place 
should be effected in an orderly and humane manner."4
In other vords, those Germans remaining in these areas vere forcibly expelled. 
Hovever, their legal status vould be no different for present purposes from that 
of those vho had already left because, had these individuals not left earlier, they 
vould have been obliged to do so by virtue of the above decision.
Arguably, a third stage of mass population movement of Germans has 
occurred, though this vas certainly not forced. This is the emigration from 
Poland to either the FRG or the GDR of Polish citizens agreed to be of German 
ethnic origin, by mutual agreement of the States and Red Cross organisations 
involved and on an individual basis, i.e., each individual or family made a separate 
application vhich vas given individual attention. Thus, vhile the numbers vere 
such as to constitute a mass movement, amounting to several hundred thousand^ 
in fact the decision vhether to move to another country from Poland vas taken 
not by that State, but by the people affected. It vas open to them to remain in  
Poland.^  ¥h ile there may exist interesting questions vith  regard to the 
citizenship of these people, by far the more important is the former category:
those vho vere obliged to leave as a result of the execution of the Potsdam 
Agreement.
There remain other categories of Germans: Volga Germans vho vere forced 
to move vith in  the Soviet Union7 and fu ll German Citizens vho vere deported to, 
or obliged to remain in , the Soviet Union for extended periods amounting on 
occasion even to ten years or more.8 Questions vhich arise vith  regard to these 
people relate perhaps more to the legality of their detention and treatment in  the 
Soviet Union rather than vhat particular citizenships they may possess. They 
v ill form no further part of this discussion.
The citizenship status of the Poles is less complicated. The study v ill be 
restricted to those born in vhat vas eastern Poland betveen the vars and is nov 
part of the USSR, and those bom in  the Oder-Neisse territories and the southern 
part of East Prussia. It does not concern itself v ith  those living outside Poland 
vho have lived in Poland at some time and vho possessed Polish citizenship yet 
failed to renounce it (or to gain the consent of the relevant Polish authorities to 
such renunciation?). Nor does it deal vith  their descendants, vho may have 
acquired Polish citizenship through the tus sanguinis.*0 vhich is possible under 
Polish citizenship lav.** Theoretically, any person possessing Polish citizenship 
may not be recognized as having another citizenship.12 Because Poland of course 
cannot regulate the conferral of citizenship by other States, cases arise vhere 
persons of Polish citizenship may possess another citizenship. This may be 
voluntary or by automatic operation of lav. Thus, people born outside Poland, at 
least one of vhose parents is a Polish citizen, may acquire the citizenship of the 
host country and of Poland. This vas particularly easy in, for instance, the United
Kingdom, vhere, until the entry into force of the British Nationality Act, 1981, 
citizenship vas generally accorded by operation of the lussoli1^  principle.14 The 
problem for such dual citizens is that, in  Poland, they could be treated as Polish 
citizens and therefore forced to perform m ilitary service or prevented from 
leaving the country. Such cases have been recorded in the past,1^  but it has to be 
said that, as far as Poland is concerned, those most at risk in practice are persons 
vho have actually lived in Poland but then acquired a foreign citizenship vhile  
abroad, rather than those born outside Poland to Polish parents, vho vould 
appear to enjoy some kind of de facto immunity, even to the extent of being able 
to visit Poland using foreign passports.16
These cases have been mentioned because they raise issues of real legal 
significance and deserve to be mentioned in any look at the operation in practice 
of Polish citizenship lav  insofar as it may affect other States.
Before discussing the citizenship issues relating to the Oder-Neisse 
territories and Germany, mention should also be made of the present vriter's 
general perception of the matter.
(ii) Historic Rights or Recovered Territories?
The Germans and the Poles vould appear to have much more in  common
than many of them vould, perhaps, like to believe. On both sides there exists, at
least in certain circles, an inability to viev their common past through any but
the most nstionalistically-tinted glasses. This tendency finds its apotheosis in the
debate about disputed territories, areas vhere both nations17 have maintained a
presence over extensive periods. Unfortunately, this bigotry finds its vay even
into legal analyses of this matter. This is not surprising i f  one happens to 
consider that international la v  is not to be studied as if  in  a vacuum, but rather 
ought to be related to its historical-political-economic context. This vrite r 
believes that a greater understanding of the lav  v ill be achieved by looking at it 
in  the vider context of its development. Hovever, it is suggested that the vider 
context - the reference to historical and political factors in  support of one side's 
case - is exactly vhat has been used deliberately to obscure relevant facts vhich 
might influence a legal analysis. In  particular, since 1945, the insistence by West 
Germans of the Germans' “historic rights" to the eastern territories and the 
absolute confidence of official Poland and many of its apologists that Poland has 
finally "recovered its territories" in  the vest, all serve to obscure, by gross 
over-simplification, the history of territories vhich, in  truth, have a far more 
complex past. Indeed, the proposition could be defended that they have never 
been entirely one nor the other.
The present vrite r has deliberately avoided undertaking, for the purposes of 
this thesis, detailed study of the history of these territories because, in the first 
place, the year 1945 provides a clear critical date (because of the assumption in  
that year by the Four Povers of supreme authority v ith  regard to Germany and 
the Agreement reached at Potsdam concerning the right of Poland to administer 
"former German territories" and the expulsion of the Germans from these 
territories). These measures vere, legally, quite independent of any pre-var 
legal regime in that area and vere legally binding on all the parties, plus 
Germany (and Poland accepted the arrangements18). In the second place, to 
enter into the pre-1945 history of these territories (from the point of viev of 
clarifying their legal status) is to enter an endless cave without the option of
turning back. The point is that such research may indicate that, pre-1945, one 
side or the other had a stronger claim. But, it is suggested, this vould not be 
decisive; and even if  it vere decisive, the events of 1945 mentioned above vere so 
radical that they vould take precedence, in terms of the legal veight to be 
attached to them, over vhatever title existed in 1945 prior to the end of the var, 
or, indeed, prior to 1939.
These issues are being discussed here, rather than in one of the chapters 
devoted specifically to territory, because they are particularly relevant to the 
issue vhether or not there exists a Recht auf die Heimat.1^  And, if  there is such a 
right, does it extend to those vho vere expelled as a result of the measures adopted 
in 19457 The Recht auf die Heimat is essentially concerned vith  the relationship 
of people to the territory vhich they inhabit; thus the expulsion of the Germans, 
the question of their nationality and citizenship status, and the question of any 
connections vhich they may have to these territories, are all related. 
Nevertheless, if  there does exist a Recht auf die Heimat. it must be established in  
light of the measures taken after World War II  concerning Germany and the 
Germans.
There is no shortage of vriters vho have sought to reinforce legal 
arguments by playing the history card. The one thing vhich seems to be common 
to all is that they choose to present the history of these territories in  such a vay 
that little, if  any, room remains to take account of the legitimate claims of the 
other side. For instance, the Director of the Gottingen Research Committee felt 
able to claim that "....these provinces have been a part of Germany since time 
immemorial and their inhabitants German according to language and
civilization."20 For him this vas beyond question; the reader vas not invited to 
consider to vhat extent they really vere, or had been, German. Such vas his 
enthusiasm for the greater glory of Germany that he even described the Free City 
of Danzig as part of German territory21 He also claimed that the FRG vas so 
altruistic that, acting "in the interest of the free vorld", it called "for the return 
of those territories belonging to it.*22 In other vords, the FRG, in  addition to 
purporting to speak on behalf of all Germans, also claims to act on behalf of “the 
free vorld", vhatever that may be 2^
Another vrite r vho is guilty of presenting a one-sided historical viev of 
this problem is de Zayas. In  his book about the expulsions,24 he vrites about the 
historical presence of the Germans in the relevant areas. This vrite r is not 
questioning the accuracy of his statements about the German presence; rather, it 
is the absence of discussion of the Polish presence vhich may mislead. For 
example:
"It is difficult to convey to people unfamiliar v ith  German 
tradition and attachment to the soil the emotional meaning 
of the loss of the ancient German provinces east of the 
Oder-Neisse Line....
Had the Germans not displayed such a deep attachment to the soil of other States 
from 1938 onvards, they might never have incurred the losses vhich obviously 
cause such deep distress to Dr. de Zayas. De Zayas cannot be defended from the 
charge that he abuses history to help justify legal arguments, on the ground that 
his book is prim arily historical. He clearly attempts to deal v ith  legal issues
related to the Oder-Neisse territories and ihe expulsions. While his book is about 
the expulsion of the Germans, to omit almost any reference to the Polish presence 
is to give the impression that these areas vere exclusively German.
Having said this, it is appropriate to stress that most vriters vho have 
discussed German citizenship and the expulsions have sought to examine the legal 
issues vithout necessarily mentioning the viev that the relevant territories and 
populations had been exclusively German.
In Polish legal literature, there exists also a substantial number of 
references to the history of the problem, in describing the areas as the 
"recovered territories." In fact, the term has been employed regularly 
throughout the post-var period, and adopted officially by the Polish Government, 
as is shovn in the folioving examples.
Thus Bolestav Wieviora, one of the leading Polish experts on Polish-German 
issues under international lav  until his death in 1963, describes these territories 
as having been returned to Poland, after their seizure centuries before, thanks to 
the historic decision talcen at Potsdam vith  regard to the Polish-German 
frontier.26 He elaborates on this later in the same vork:
"One has to stress, though, that the lands vhich Poland 
vas given in the vest and in the north vere not at all 
lands strange to us. Poland has historic rights to these 
lands. They vere lost to Poland as a result of centuries 
of German expansion, carried out under the slogan
"Drang Nach Osten."27
There can be no doubt that the vrite r claims on behalf of Poland some form of 
legal title based on previous rights enjoyed by that State v ith  regard to these 
territories.
According to Wieviora's colleague. Professor Aifons Klafkovski, it even 
became official Polish policy to define these lands as recovered territories:
"Poland regained her Western Territories under the 
provisions of the Potsdam Agreement.... The lands returned 
to Poland in 1945 vere officially defined as Recovered 
Territories. The name implies a return to the mother country 
of territories vhich in the course of history have suffered the 
vagaries of fate, as is frequently the case v ith  border lands."28
The Oder-Neisse territories and the southern part of former East Prussia form 
about one-third of contemporary Poland. Some might therefore feel that it is 
stretching a point some vhat, even if  one accepts Klafkovski’s definition, to 
describe this area as "border lands". It is perhaps just possible that, in  viev of the 
large areas vhich have formed the basis of territorial disputes, the term can be 
justified.29
Official approval of the idea of recovered territories can actually be found 
vithout great difficulty. The then Polish Eoreign Minister, in a speech to the 
Polish Parliament, described them as such in a speech in 1972 concerned v ith  the
ratification of the Warsav Treaty:
"Wroclav, Szczecin and Gdansk have again become 
Polish cities. The Polish population living in the Mazury 
region, on the Oder river and the Baltic, subjected for 
for centuries to Germanization, returned to its Motherland."30
Even Manfred Lachs discussed the historic Polish links v ith  these 
territories, though he avoided describing them as "recovered" and vas more 
circumspect about the significance of these ties?1
A more dubious claim is made by Jasica, vho maintains:
"There vas a deep conviction among the vhole Polish people, 
expressed also by the Polish Government in Warsav, the 
Polish Govemment-in-Exile in London, and by the 
Polish Roman Catholic Church as veil, based on history, but 
first of all on the decisions of the Yalta Conference, that 
the territories east of the Odra and Nysa Rivers vere due to 
Poland and that, therefore, the Polish armed forces and their 
Soviet allies did not conquer enemy territory, but regained 
Polish territories; at the beginning they vere even called 
"Regained Territories."^2
While it is possible to picture Mikolajczyk, Bierut and Gomulka possessing such 
thoughts, it is less easy to imagine tvo inhabitants of Warsav, trying to survive in
their ruined city, discussing the finer points of the issue whether or not Szczecin 
had ever been a Polish city. A greater incentive towards finding the Polish 
character of these areas vould, of course, have been provided by the knowledge 
that nearly one-half of pre-war Poland vas to become a part of the Soviet Union.
As vith  writers vho favour a "German" interpretation of the legal status of 
the Oder-Neisse territories, there are many Polish writers vho do not play the 
history card and vho concentrate on the study of aspects of the problem more 
amenable to legal assessment. Nevertheless, the reader is frequently confronted 
by purported legal analyses vhich seem to claim a monopoly of legal rights and
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the truth - both on the West German and the Polish sides. This vriter considers 
that these contradictory claims serve only to support the proposition that the 
problems of nationality and expulsions, if  considered in the pre-1945 context, w ill 
remain insoluble.
In terms of their past, and the question, whether the Oder-Neisse territories 
are really Polish recovered territories or subject to the historic rights of the 
Germans, the only fa ir conclusion is that they are neither one nor the other; or 
perhaps they are both. The same may be said for some of the people vho live in  
contemporary Poland vhere there vere substantial German populations until 
19415, and for some of those vho left for Germany.^
The better approach then, it is suggested, is to be concerned only with the 
legal aspects of the issues vhich w ill be considered, wherever possible. 
Associated issues of anon-legal character v ill be considered only if  essential to a 
clear legal conclusion in specific cases.
(iii) The International Character of Nationality
The traditional, and widely accepted, view is that nationality and questions 
relating to it are a matter for the exclusive jurisdiction of each State. It was up to 
each State to decide questions of nationality for itself. This view was expressed by 
the Permanent Court of International Justice as early as 1923:
"The question whether a certain matter is or is not solely 
within the jurisdiction of a State is an essentially relative 
question; it depends upon the development of international 
relations. Thus, in  the present state of international law, 
questions of nationality are, in  the opinion of this Court, 
in  principle within this reserved domain."^4
A matter solely within the domestic jurisdiction of a State was not regarded by the 
Court as necessarily involving only one State:
"The words "solely within the domestic jurisdiction" seem 
rather to contemplate certain matters which, though they 
may very closely concern the interests of more than one 
State, are not, in  principle, regulated by international law.
As regards such matters, each State is sole judge."^
The right of each State to decide its own rules relating to nationality was 
confirmed in the Nottebohm Case:
“It is for Liechtenstein, as it is for every sovereign State, 
to settle t>y its own legislation the rules relating to the 
acquisition of its nationality..."^6
This state of affairs has found widespread support among writers. Weis describes 
this attribution to the domestic jurisdiction as being recognised both by 
customary and conventional international law; it is, furthermore, "an essential 
element of [the State’s] sovereignty."^7 Oppenheim also mentions that it is for 
municipal, not international, law to determine who w ill be considered a subject of 
a State 3s The proposition, as far as it goes, would appear to be generally accepted 
in  the West and would appear to enjoy strong approval in  the USSR too.^ 9
Two qualifications must be made to this apparently generally accepted rule. 
First of all, it is not actually accepted universally. Professor Brownlie, in  
particular, considers that there exist "compelling objections of principle to the 
doctrine of freedom of States in this context."40 At the risk of over-simplification, 
it may be said that Professor Brownlie argues convincingly that the obligations 
incumbent upon all States under general international law are such, that it is 
rather the case that States cannot have exclusive control over questions of 
nationality; that to have such control would indicate a certain immunity from 
international law and an ability to ignore and impinge upon the equal rights of 
other States. In  other words, to stress the exclusive jurisdiction of States is to 
mis-state the position.
The second qualification to the general rule is one mentioned invariably by 
writers who state the general proposition. They then go on to argue that
nationality is a concept of both municipal and international law, and that its 
international character has the effect of lim iting the international freedom of 
States to regulate matters of nationality,41 or of lim iting the obligation of other 
States to recognize the attribution of nationality (because of a breach of 
international legal limits on the freedom to determine nationality)42 Attempts to 
justify the general proposition of exclusive jurisdiction while acknowledging the 
existence of internationally effective curbs on freedom of action can even lead to 
confusion and contradiction. Randelzhofer seems to suffer particularly badly. On 
the one hand, he considers that “the freedom of States to regulate their 
nationality is today somewhat more restricted by rules of international law than it 
was in 1923/43; on the other, he states that the "validity of the conferment of 
nationality in municipal law is in  no way limited by international law."44
These two statements cannot be reconciled, unless they are interpreted to 
mean that, within its municipal jurisdiction, the State enjoys complete licence to 
regulate its citizenship, but that any measures which it takes may not necessarily 
be entitled to recognition in the international arena, if  they breach the rules.
Such an interpretation makes a nonsense of the international law relating 
to nationality. It is a rule of international law which provides that States have the 
right to decide upon matters of citizenship. To then argue that, therefore, 
international law has no effect upon the actions of States when they are 
regulating citizenship matters is to render meaningless the rules of international 
law applicable to this matter. It is also the case that the State regulates its 
citizenship because it is the sovereign - i.e., no other State can regulate its 
citizenship. But, while each State is entitled, under international law, to enjoy
freedom from interference t>y other States in the conduct of its internal affairs, it 
is not entitled to enjoy freedom from interference t>y international law. As a 
State, it is inherently bound by certain rules,4^  such as the rules of universal 
customary international law. The proposition can be defended that, were a State 
to adopt legislation purporting to attach its citizenship to persons with no 
cultural, ethnic or domiciliary connection to it, such measures would, or could, 
constitute an infringement of the sovereignty of other States. Such 
considerations highlight the conflict involved between the freedom of a State 
within its municipal jurisdiction and the limitations imposed upon it by 
international law. But even if  a State can have a citizenship law, valid within the
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domestic jurisdiction, which is nevertheless outwith the conditions imposed by 
international law, is this necessarily an argument for saying that the citizenship 
law should therefore be subject to international law? Or is it not more an 
indication that greater clarity is required in defining the relationship of 
international law to municipal law, and the need, if  such a need be perceived, of 
obliging all States to ensure that municipal laws, to enjoy municipal validity, must 
be in conformity with international law?
Despite such conflicts, which may not be solved, it is possible that the 
relationship between international law and municipal law can be regulated 
relatively satisfactorily.
The flexible approach, in such a situation, seems to reflect more accurately 
the relationship between municipal and international law in matters of 
nationality:
"Nationality is not capable of performing a role confined 
to the reserved domain or the realm of state relations: in  
principle it has two aspects, either of which may be dominant, 
depending on the facts and type of dispute."46
Weis, while acknowledging the legislative competence of the State in  
matters of nationality, acknowledges that a State can be limited in  its freedom of 
action by its own treaty obligations,47 and by “the principles and rules of 
customary international law,*46 which include conditions for the acquisition and 
loss of nationality which a State may impose and rules for the solution of conflicts 
of nationality laws and determination as to nationality in doubtful cases.49 
Nevertheless, while regarding such rules as having validity in international law, 
Weis maintains the supremacy of municipal law, as far as the acquisition and loss 
of nationality are concerned, within the domestic jurisdiction of the State: thus a 
State w ill be internationally liable if  its nationality law fails to conform to its 
international obligations. But the municipal law remains valid, though 
unlawful.^ 0
Frequently discussed in the context of this problem is the Convention on 
Certain Questions Relating to the Conflict of Nationality Lawsp1 adopted at The 
Hague in 1930. While this is of limited authority in  establishing the status of the 
rules it incorporates^2 Article 1 does indicate the problem of the fact that, while 
the State confers nationality;, the obligation upon other States to recognize the act 
of the conferring State is limited:
"It is for each State to determine under its own law's who are
its nationals. This law shall fee recognised fey other States 
in  so far as it is consistent with international conventions, 
international custom, and the principles of law generally 
recognised with regard to nationality."
The limits imposed fey international law are very clearly set out, but the problem 
remains that, even within the Convention, the jurisdiction of the conferring State 
is not limited; limitations exist only vis-a-vis other States, such as the now 
well-established rule that a State cannot afford diplomatic protection to one of its 
own nationals against a State if  its national also possesses the nationality of that 
State (Article 4). While the second sentence of Article 1 may detract from the 
international legal validity of questionnable nationality regulations, can it really 
be said that the principle of autonomy is thereby deprived of its i n t e g r i t y ? ^  it 
might be argued, though this writer would not necessarily do so, that, by 
indicating the limited duty of other States to recognize citizenship laws, the 
Convention thereby acknowledges the fact that a State does not need to have the 
recognition of other States for its citizenship law for that law to enjoy validity 
within the State; in  other words, at least for some purposes, the integrity of the 
principle is maintained despite the limited obligation of recognition by other 
States.
The strength of the proposition that matters of nationality belong to the 
competence of each State, and the extent of its acceptance, however qualified, are 
perhaps reflected in the fact that even those who criticize or modify the 
proposition very often start their account of the position by stating it. Despite the 
qualifications which must be made in establishing the international legal
significance of the rule, it does contain an element of truth that withstands 
attack. All States do regulate their nationality, though this has certainly not been 
the case since time immemorial. The right to regulate it is not questioned. It is 
where the exercize of the right goes beyond the limits which preserve the 
sovereignty of other States that it is subject to international restriction.
Such a proposition is no more than a statement of the preceding analysis. 
The State is bound by rules of municipal law and international law. Taken 
together, the sum of rights and duties which are applicable would mean that the 
municipal law had to conform to the obligations existing vis-a-vis other States. It 
is only by separating the jurisdictions from each other completely that the 
distinction can be maintained. Certainly, if  the State wishes its nationality law to 
be effective in the international arena, it w ill need to ensure that it is compatible 
with international customary law and other generally recognized principles.^ 4 
The State w ill be answerable, moreover, under international law for its acts which 
have international effect, including those connected with its nationality; that 
much is clear from the Nottebohm case:
To exercise protection, to apply to the Court, is to place oneself 
on the plane of international law. It is international law 
which determines whether a State is entitled to exercise pro­
tection and to seize the C ou rt. “55
The discussion of the extent to which the rules relating to nationality fall 
within the domestic or international jurisdictions shows that, in conjunction with 
the right of each State to regulate its citizenship, there are limits imposed by
international law upon this freedom which come into play whenever problems 
arise between States with regard to nationality. This is of great significance in  
the case of Germany, as w ill be shown below.
(iv ) Nationality in the FRG and the GBR in the Context of Germany as a Whole.
It is necessary to go back even beyond 1918 to find the origins of the 
contemporary state of affairs of German nationality. In  1913, the German Reich 
enacted a nationality law, the Reichs-und Staatsangehorigkeitsgesetz.56 Thus its 
territorial scope included not only the whole of pre-war Germany but also large 
areas of territory which became part of the Polish State after World War I as a 
result of Poland's independence and the provisions of the Versailles Treaty, 
Prussian Poland, as it were.5?
The nationality law entered into force on 1 January 1914>° and, at first 
provided for two categories of German citizen: citizenship of a federal State or 
direct imperial citizenship.^ 9 Federal citizenship applied mainly to those bom to 
parents having German citizenship, whether within the Reich or outwith it. 
Imperial citizenship was reserved for other categories, such as aliens in German 
colonies or natives of such colonies, former German citizens not resident in  
Germany60 and certain aliens employed in the imperial service 61 In such cases 
citizenship was not automatic but could be granted on application. Dual 
citizenship was generally not permitted but possible in  certain cases.62 The 
whole situation was further complicated by provisions relating to the acquisition 
and loss of other federal citizenships within the Reich 6^
However, the position was simplified somewhat by the Ordinance of 5
February 1934 concerning German Nationality. This abolished the separate 
citizenship of each German Land and established a single German citizenship.64 
Various other amendments were made during the 1933s, the purpose of which was 
to remove from certain categories of person the status of and entitlement to 
German citizenship, though other States did not always accept fu lly  these 
changes6^
It should also be mentioned at this stage that, following the establishment of 
the Polish State, the territorial scope of the German nationality law' was reduced 
in  accordance with the reduction in the Reich’s area. The Versailles Treaty of 
Peace between the Allied and Associated Powers, on the one part, and Germany, on 
the other, provided, inter alia, at Article 91:
"German nationals habitually resident in  territories 
recognized as forming part of Poland w ill acquire Polish 
nationality ipso facto and w ill lose their German nationality."66
Thus international regulation of its citizenship law was agreed to by 
Germany at this stage, if  only for restricted purposes. Article 91 also imposed a 
requirement that German nationals who had become resident in these territories 
only after 1 January 1908 should obtain special authorization from Poland before 
they could acquire Polish citizenship. There also existed, for a temporary period 
of two years, various rights of option for another nationality, depending on the 
individual's place of habitual residence. Article 91 applied also to Upper Silesia; 
however, it came into force for that area only after the definitive distribution of 
the relevant territory following the plebiscite which v'as held there in 1921 67
Poland was also left with international obligations concerning the 
regulation of its citizenship after Versailles. It concluded a peace treaty with the 
USA, the British Empire, France, Italy and Japan.68 This was done in accordance 
with Article 93 of the peace treaty between Germany and the Powers. Articles > 6 
dealt with the acquisition of Polish nationality by persons resident in  Poland 
possessing different nationalities. Again, it was open to such persons to opt for 
another nationality, though if  they did so they usually had to leave for the State 
whose nationality they had chosen.
After Versailles, therefore, the position was that persons bom on Polish 
territory which, in  1913, had been part of the German Reich, no longer acquired 
German nationality, because the German citizenship law had ceased to apply to 
these areas. They became Polish. Germany, then, became the Germany which 
existed within the frontiers of December, 1937, i.e. prior to the territorial 
expansion which occurred before and during the Second World War. Until then, 
the German nationality law did not as a rule confer nationality on individuals 
born on Polish territory.
After the defeat of Germany in 1945, by which time the territorial scope of 
its nationality laws had been further extended to include areas incorporated into 
the Reich, as well as persons of German origin living in  other parts of Eastern 
Europe,69 all of which acts (annexation during the conflict and overriding the 
municipal laws of the States concerned) could be regarded as unlawful in that 
they appear to have been in  violation of the Hague Convention No. IV concerning 
the Laws and Customs of War on Land, some elements of the German citizenship
law were repealed by the Allies, including the law of 15 September 1935 on Reich 
citizenship 70
At this point there remained extensive German populations in  the territories 
east of the Gder-Heisse line which were controlled by the Poles, as well as in  
Hungary and Czechoslovakia. Most of these were transferred to the areas under 
Allied occupation in  accordance with the Potsdam Agreement. There remained 
thousands of German citizens in Poland (i.e., Poland within the post-1945 
frontiers), though many of these did eventually leave for Germany.
As is known, the Allies did not annex Germany; it continued to exist as a 
State. Therefore, the inhabitants of Germany retained the citizenship of that 
State. This was uniform throughout the four zones of occupation and remained so 
at least until 1949. It might have been thought, and with good reason, that 
following the creation of two new States in 1949, they would each have adopted 
their own citizenship legislation. However, neither West nor East Germany did so. 
The law of 1913 would appear to have remained in force in both States from 1949 
until 1967, though the GDR did in the meantime enact laws which referred to 
citizens of the GDR, while the ERG has also added to the 1913 law. That is not to say 
that the law has been applied uniformly in the GDR and the ERG 71
(v) The GDR and German Citizenship
With the creation of the GDR in 1949, a constitution was adopted which 
claimed that there was only one German nationality - Article 1 (4). The GDR 
claimed to be the only representative of the German people and purported to act 
on its behalf in international affairs.72 This much it shared in common with the
Federal Republic. But at some point the GDR leadership started to develop a policy 
of separation from the other German State. This was developed, as far as internal 
legal measures were concerned, with the adoption of a separate citizenship law 
for the GDR in 19677$ It is widely considered that the catalyst which made the 
adoption of such measures feasible, through the consolidation of unimpeded State 
control in  the GDR, was the construction in 1961 of the Berlin Wall.74 The 1967 
law has actually been described as the main de jure event of the separation of 
Germany.7  ^ It certainly made quite clear to the world that the GDR saw itself as a 
separate entity from the Federal Republic. But the legal separation has been 
taken a stage further by the 1974 Constitution of the GDR.
According to the 1967 law, citizenship of the GDR came into existence with 
the founding of the GDR.76 It covered mostly persons who were German nationals 
at the time the GDR was founded and who had their domicile or regular abode in  
the GDR and had not lost their citizenship in the meantime,77 plus persons of 
German nationality at the time of the founding of the GDR who, having their 
domicile or regular abode outside the GDR, had voluntarily been recorded as GDR 
citizens by the competent authorities.78
Dual citizenship is not specifically prohibited, but the GDR w ill not permit its 
citizens to assert towards it any rights or duties arising from the citizenship of 
another State79 In theory, this is not as exclusive as the equivalent Soviet 
provision, which provides that Soviet citizens w ill not be recognized as belonging 
to citizenship of another State,80 nor is it as strict as the Polish law, which 
provides that a Polish citizen cannot simultaneously be recognized as a citizen of 
another State,81 but the effect would be the same, viz., to deny to the dual national
the opportunity to be treated as a citizen of his second State while in  the GDR. This 
is accepted practice, but could have harsh effects upon individuals who have 
acquired the GDR citizenship through operation of GDR law, yet have few actual 
links with that country.
The law came into effect upon proclamation82 and simultaneously repealed 
several other laws and decrees concerned with nationality, including the 1913 
citizenship law plus all its remaining valid amendments and supplementary 
regulations.89 Thus there can be no doubt that the 1913 law was applicable in the 
GDR. In other words, in  1967, the GDR formally renounced, by its repeal, the 1913 
law, which provided for one German citizenship, and adopted a new, quite 
separate, citizenship. The provisions of this law clearly were intended to 
differentiate the citizenship status of the inhabitants of the GDR from that of the 
FRG population, to establish the link between the East Germans and the GDR and to 
break the link with Germany as such, and thereby any possible connections with 
the Federal Republic.
Yet the links with the past were not entirely severed. A new constitution 
was adopted the following year, in which the GDR clearly asserted its separate 
identity, yet nevertheless acknowledged some form of relationship to Germany, 
though not necessarily a legal one. The GDR described itself as a socialist State of 
the German nation;84 again, a commitment towards unification of Germany, 
admittedly on the basis of "democracy and socialism",*® was specified. However, 
this constitution was substantially amended in 1974. Gone from the Preamble and 
the first part of the constitution are the references to the German people and the 
German nation. The GDR is no longer a socialist State of the German nation; it is a
socialist State of workers and farmers86 Article 8 (2) of the 1968 version, 
describing the aims of fostering normal relations with the FRG and working 
towards unification, has disappeared completely. This is a consequence of the 
conclusion by the two States of the 1972 Treaty on the Basis of their Relations, in  
which the Federal Republic finally acknowledged, while reserving its position on 
the German question, the separate existence as a State of the GDR.87 According to 
the GDR interpretation, the FRG has finally recognized that the two States are 
quite separate and this is reflected in the 1974 amendments, which show the 
culmination of the development by the GDR, both internally and internationally, 
of its separate existence as a State. Given that every State has the right to its own 
citizenship, by recognizing the GDR as a State the FRG has also recognized this 
right.
It is possible that a link remains between the GDR citizenship and German 
nationality. It has been suggested that, under Article 1 (a) of the 1967 law, the 
GDR citizenship is derived from the German nationality:
"A citizen of the German Democratic Republic is anyone who 
(a) was a German national at the time of the founding of the 
German Democratic Republic ....“88
But the writer correctly adds that GDR citizenship was deemed to be retroactive to 
the creation of the Democratic Republic in 1949. Such an arrangement would be 
consistent with the policy that Germany had ceased to exist in 1949, and that the 
GDR was a successor State vis-a-vis Germany. As a successor State, its inhabitants, 
in the absence of specific agreements otherwise, would have acquired the
citizenship of the new State at the moment of succession, i.e. the population would 
follow the change of sovereignty.89 ¥eis is reluctant to support the change of 
nationality by automatic process of law from the old State to the successor State 
where the former has been totally extinguished90 (the view of the GDR); 
however, the GDR clearly regards its citizens as having acquired its nationality in  
this way.
Therefore, according to its own interpretation of the legal status of 
Germany, the GDR regards its citizens as possessing GDR citizenship only. ¥h ile  
they did at one time possess German nationality, this is no longer the case because 
there is no German State in existence; nor is there any link between the GDR 
citizenship and that of Germans who are citizens of the Federal Republic.91 The 
GDR is, of course, entitled to decide for itself how to regulate its citizenship, but 
this freedom, apart from any limitations which may exist with regard to its right 
to act domestically without external interference, is certainly limited in  the 
international arena. Apart from the general conditions imposed by international 
law. States which continue to regard the State of Germany as still existing, even if  
only for very limited purposes, may also regard that State as having citizens. 
These might be all persons regarded as German under the German nationality law 
of 1913 as amended by the Control Council. They could possess two German 
citizenships - one for the GDR and one for Germany. In the event of a unification 
of the GDR and the FRG and the creation of a common citizenship for the new 
State, because the united State would not be identical with the surviving German 
State, the population would continue to have two citizenships, though that of the 
“old" Germany would cease to exist when that State itself ceases to exist.
¥h ile  it is possible that the USSR has estopped itself from maintaining the 
existence of the all-German nationality (since it regards Germany as having 
ceased to exist), such a situation would, in  the view of this writer, have developed 
in  breach of the joint rights and duties shared by the USSR with the three 
western Powers, including the right to alter the status of Germany by joint action. 
¥h ile  the three ¥estern Powers may not have accepted the unilateral Soviet 
limitation, or alteration, of the joint capacity, and although the USSR has 
recognized the continued existence, in  principle, of Four Power capacity (in the 
joint statement made by the Four Powers with regard to the application by the FRG 
and the GDR for admission to the United Nations Organisation),92 nevertheless a 
situation of conflicting obligations has arisen, founded on the fundamentally 
different perceptions of Fast and ¥est about the German situation as an issue of 
law and politics. The Soviet Union might be said to regard the Four Power 
capacity as continuing to exist only on the territory of the FRG and the GDR, while 
aspects which have not been fulfilled as intended (in particular, the conclusion 
of a peace settlement) have in practice been regulated on an ad hoc, often 
bilateral, basis, are awaiting the conclusion of a peace settlement with the FRG 
and the GDR after they have unified, or are simply no longer relevant. In  this 
context, the USSR recognizes only one nationality for the GDR - the DDR 
Staatsburgerschaft, as provided for in  the law of 1967, and a second, legally 
distinct, nationality for the citizens of the FRG.
The three ¥estem Powers have all recognized the GDR as a State. This they 
did following the conclusion of the Grundvertrag. The UK would appear to have 
recognized it by the sending of a telegram from the Foreign Secretary to the GDR 
Foreign Minister on 22 December 1972," and diplomatic relations were
established on 8 February 1973.94 Diplomatic relations were established between 
France and the GDR the following day, 9 February 1973, while the USA waited until
3 September 1974 before making the leap."
Having recognized the GDR, the ¥estern Powers also of course recognized 
the GDR citizenship. Hitherto, this had not always been the case. The GDR had 
been regarded not as a State but as the Soviet zone of occupation in Germany. Its 
acts had, to some extent, been given effect in  the UK on the premise that it was 
acting on behalf of the USSR, i.e. it was subordinate to that State, the authority of 
which in and over the GDR was recognized by the UK.96
The GDR passport was not acceptable for travel to many western countries 
for a substantial period - firm  evidence of the refusal by these States to recognize 
the GDR and its citizenship 97 However, these States had already made it clear at a 
NATO ministerial meeting in 1972 that, despite the developments in Germany, all 
the rights and responsibilities of the Four Powers would continue.98 This means 
that the GDR citizenship must have been regarded as existing simultaneously with 
whatever kind of German nationality its inhabitants possessed through Germany 
as a whole.
The question might legitimately be asked, what is the practical effect of this 
apparent dual nationality? On the territory of the GDR, there is no effect; the 
GDR does not recognize it anyway. The ¥estem Powers themselves do not actively 
promote any all-German nationality; their action is restricted to maintaining 
nationality by implication from their all-German policy: Germany exists, for 
certain purposes, but is not active, except perhaps through the manifestation of
all-German statehood which occurs in  the exercise of Four Power rights and 
responsibilities in limited areas. The only active citizenship for citizens of the 
GDR at present therefore, is the GDR citizenship. Their all-German nationality is 
areal one which exists in  a potential condition. This view, however, is not shared 
by the USSR. Furthermore, while present geopolitical circumstances persist, it is 
most unlikely that the political w ill may arise to bring about any alteration in the 
legal status of Germany and, consequently, its nationality.
(v i) The FRG and German Citizenship
There is, in  a sense, no ¥est German citizenship as such - or so each ¥est 
German Government would have the world believe. But there is a law governing 
citizenship and nationality in  ¥est Germany. This is an amended version of the 
1913 law, similar to that which existed in East Germany until 1967. But the 
difference ends there. ¥h ile, in the GDR, the policy of treating the GDR as a 
successor State of the defunct Germany was developed during the 1950s," and the 
retention of the 1913 law to regulate citizenship became a legal and political 
anomaly which was eventually remedied, with retroactive effect, in  1967, in  the 
FRG on the other hand the retention of the 1913 law represented a manifestation 
of a quite different legal assessment of, and political stance towards, the status of 
Germany, which, though it never enjoyed the support of any of the Four Powers 
as far as the legal aspects were concerned, nevertheless received substantial 
political backing. This was of course the FRG claim to being identical with 
Germany.
The FRG also came into being in 1949 with a constitution. This was the Basic 
Law (Grundgesetz) of the Federal Republic of Germany.100 It was promulgated by
the Parliamentary Council on 23 May 1949 and, with various amendments, 
remains in force to the present day. The Grundgesetz contains certain provisions 
relating to nationality and these must be taken into account along with the 1913 
law. First of all, power to legislate on citizenship in the Federation is vested 
exclusively in the Federation.101 This is not in  itself of great significance 
internationally, except that it enables third parties to rely entirely on the 
authority of the Federation in nationality issues. Article 16 deals with deprivation 
of citizenship, but most important is Article 116, which provides:
" (1) Unless otherwise provided by law, a German within the meaning 
of this Basic Law is a person who possesses German citizenship or 
who has been admitted to the territory of the German Reich within 
the frontiers of 31 December 1937 as a refugee or expellee of 
German stock (Volkszugehorigkeit) or as the spouse or descendant 
of such person.
(2) Former German citizens who, between 30 January 1933 and 8 May 
1945, were deprived of their citizenship on political, racial, or 
religious grounds, and their descendants, shall be regranted 
German citizenship on application. They shall be considered as 
not having been deprived of their German citizenship if  they 
have established their domicile (¥ohnsitz) in  Germany after 
8 May 1945 and have not expressed a contrary intention.”
¥h ile  the 1913 law as amended remains valid today, it must be read in  
conjunction with the Grundgesetz Article 116(1). Although the Basic Law applies 
only within the territory of the Federal Republic,102 provision is made for it to
apply to "other parts of Germany ... on their accession." But it purports to apply to 
many more Germans than just those in  the Federal Republic; it covers all 
Germans within the territory of the Reich as it existed on 31 December 1937 who 
had been admitted as refugees or expellees (plus their spouses and dependents) in  
addition to the normal category of German citizens, which, under the 1913 law, 
included at least all Germans living in  the Germany of 31 December 1937. ¥hat 
this means is that any citizens of the GDR who succeed in reaching FRG territory 
w ill be entitled to citizenship. In  fact, they w ill possess it automatically, but wall 
not be obliged to be treated as such at least since the conclusion of the 
Grundvertrag in 1972; they may, if  they wish, enter the FRG and remain there as
I
GDR citizens.
The essence of the FRG policy is that it continues to regard the 1913 law as 
providing one German citizenship for all Germans, whether in  the Federal 
Republic or the Democratic Republic.109 This is a direct consequence of the FRG 
policy that Germany continues to exist, and, furthermore, that the FRG and 
Germany are identical, or partially identical.
In the opinion of the Federal Republic, Germany survived the defeat of 1945 
and continued to exist as a subject of international law.104 The GDR was regarded 
not as a State but as some kind of puppet institution set up in the Soviet zone of 
occupation.109. Not being a State, the GDR could not grant its citizenship to its 
population, who remained, in the eyes of the FRG, Germans under the old German 
citizenship law, as described in Article 116(1) of the Grundgesetz.
Article 116(1) also classifies as Germans persons who have been admitted to
the territory of the Reich within its 1937 frontiers. This has t>een interpreted by 
a Dutch court as "not a provision on citizenship but a rule relating to certain 
foreigners, designed to grant a special status to these groups in order to safeguard 
their persons and their property.”106 But this provision does purport to give to 
such persons all rights available under the Grundgesetz to German citizens. These 
include, in  Articles 1-18, substantial basic rights, which are available to all the 
persons covered by Article 116 (1) (subject to the effective territorial limitations 
of federal authority). Germans who are not German citizens are in  effect 
accorded all of these rights, which are directly enforceable.10^  Even if  Article 
116(1) is not a provision on citizenship, it may fa irly  be said that its effect is to 
accord rights which, together, are akin to that status. Article 116(1) has been 
described as introducing, instead of the distinction between national and 
foreigner, a kind of gradation beyond that of German national, to include also 
“German" - what the writer describes as a kind of antichamber (une sorte 
d'antichambre) of German nationality, including disparate groups of people with 
German connections, many of whom have actually acquired German nationality 
later.108
The ERG citizenship lav/is an expression of its Deutschlandt>olitik. It claims 
to be identical, legally, with the German State which survived after 1945.10^  This 
claim has never been accepted by any of the Four Powers, and it must not be 
forgotten that it is these States, and not the Federal Republic, who have the right 
to decide upon the status of Germany in accordance with their supreme authority. 
The closest that the Western powers ever came to acknowledging any all-German 
capacity of the FRG was the following statement:
"Pending the unification of Germany, the three Governments 
consider the Government of the Federal Republic as the only 
German Government freely and legitimately constituted 
and therefore entitled to speak for Germany as the 
representative of the German people in international 
affairs."110
This was no more than political support. It is certainly not necessary for a 
government to be freely and legitimately constituted to be entitled to speak for a 
people in international affairs. Besides, the FRG Government had received no
i
support from the population of the Soviet zone of Germany. The statement of 
course should be taken in its context, which was that both the FRG and the GDR 
were competing to gain recognition as “the" German State, one supported by the 
Western Powers, the other by the USSR.
Mention should be made of the fact that the Western Powers did actually 
approve the Grundgesetz. and impose certain amendments, before it was allowed 
to come into effect. They therefore may be deemed to have approved of the 
definition of a German contained in Article 116(1). The fact that they did not 
amend Article 116(1) indicates that they did not perceive it as impinging upon the 
separate status of Germany itself, for which they were responsible. Thus they 
refused to agree that Berlin, or West Berlin, be included as a Land in the in itial 
organisation of the Federal Republic.111 Despite the differentiation of Berlin 
from the other Lander, it has been included in the Grundgesetz.11^  In fact, not 
only West Berlin, but Greater Berlin, is included. Berlin is, however, treated quite 
separately from the other Lander.1 ^
The FRG continued to accord its nationality according to the 1913 law 
because it regarded itself as being identical with Germany. If  the two were 
identical, then their citizenships were also identical under Federal law. In fact, 
the Federal Republic failed to differentiate between the two:
The German Empire, continued by the Federal Republic of 
Germany, was the only German State, which in law, though 
not in fact, had jurisdiction over the whole of Germany and 
its population."114
This was the position in West Germany until the conclusion of the 
Grundvertrag with the GDR in 1972. It meant that Germans in  the sense of Article 
116 (1) included all inhabitants of the GDR plus an uncertain number in  the 
Oder-Neisse territories, all of whom had a right to be regarded as German by the 
official organs of the FRG, provided that they would be present in  the Federal 
Republic.1 ^  This right was established as a constitutional one.116
The Federal Republic was regarded as a newly organised continuation of the 
German State, identical with it, and therefore all German citizens continued to be 
German citizens in relation to the Federal Republic.117 This obviously caused 
problems with the Democratic Republic, particularly after it had established a 
separate citizenship for itself. But for the Federal Republic, the maintenance of 
the single German nationality became, as well as being a consequence of its 
German policy, in  practice one of the vital ties between the people in the two 
German States, and therefore, regarded as a major uinifying factor.110 So the
position in 1972, according to the FRG, was that there was only one German 
nationality, to which all Germans in the FRG and the GDR were entitled. This was 
the nationality available under the law as it applied in the Federal Republic, 
which claimed to be identical with Germany.
The position was altered somewhat as a result of the Grundvertrag: the FRG 
recognized the GDR as another State in Germany.1 ^  The FRG thereby 
acknowledged the GDR citizenship; but again, that citizenship must be considered 
in  the light of the FRG recognition, which was by no means unqualified. The two 
States had agreed that they disagreed on the national question.120 In the FRG 
view, the GDR could not be a foreign State, even if  it is another State. This was 
confirmed by the ruling of the Federal Constitutional Court 
(Bundesverfassungsgericht) in  its judgment of 31 July 1973 following the 
application by the Bavarian State Government to have the treaty with the GDR 
declared void on grounds of its incompatibility with the Basic Law.121 This ruling 
binds the FRG in all its aspects.122
By agreeing in the Grundvertrag that the jurisdiction of each of the Parties 
was confined to its own territory, and by agreeing to respect each other's 
independence and autonomy in internal and external affairs,12^  the Federal 
Republic was obliged to modify its policy concerning citizenship. This was 
expressed by the Court in  the following terms: in  accordance with the general 
obligation that the treaty must conform to the Basic Law, the treaty should be 
interpreted so that any GDR citizen (DDR Burger - the use of this term in itself 
could be taken as an admission by the Court of the existence of GDR citizenship) 
finding himself in the area of protection of the FRG (in den Schutzbereich der
BRD) and of its constitution as a German, should be treated as a German like any 
citizen of the FRG.124 This is because the FRG still considers itself identical with 
Germany, and its citizens to be citizens of Germany. Thus, while acknowledging 
the right of the GDR to control its own citizenship within its own territory, the 
FRG, in exercize of its own right to control its citizenship, would accord equal 
treatment to GDR citizens subject to the above conditions.
This would appear to explain the modification by the FRG of its position 
vis-a-vis Germany. In the judgment of the Court, because of the territorial 
restrictions on its jurisdiction, the Federal Republic is no longer identical, but 
rather, partially identical (teilidentisch) with the Reich as regards its territorial 
extent.12^  The Court then went on to claim that the FRG population and territory 
belong to and are part of, the unitary German State - the Reich.126 In the view of 
the Court this nationality embraced even GDR citizens within the GDR.
The judgment of the Court must be open to question. Regardless of its 
significance within the municipal jurisdiction, the Grundvertrag clearly placed 
relations between the two German States on the international plane; they are 
governed by international law. How else can the relationship be characterized, 
when they establish its basis in a treaty which accords them equal rights,127 
agree to be guided by the purposes and principles set out in the UN Charter,128 
undertake to respect one another's territorial integrity and confirm the 
inviolability of their mutual frontier,120' 1^ 0 and agree to exchange permanent 
missions?1^ 1 These are all functions carried out, rights enjoyed and obligations 
undertaken, usually, by States. The reservations made by the Federal Republic do 
not bind the GDR to accept that State’s position on the German question. These
reservations do have legal effect within the FRG. But on the international plane, 
it is the treaty itself which signifies the extent of the Parties* commitment.
It has been suggested that the federal Constitutional Court had in  reality 
adopted the theory whereby two German nationalities (of the FRG and the GDR) 
coexist beneath the roof of the common German nationality.1^  Such a situation, 
were it the case, would receive much support from this writer. But this is not 
what the Court did. It emphasised that the FRG citizenship, legally, was identical 
to that of the Reich. ¥h ile  this may be settled, however incorrectly, within 
Federal law, it cannot be the case under international law.
In  its international relations with the GDR, the FRG cannot force that State to 
recognize the FRG*s position on nationality where that stance transgresses the 
bounds of international legality. Different theories exist in  the Federal Republic 
about the relationship of the GDR citizenship to that of the FRG and Germany. 
Some are outlined by Blecfcmann, who rightly points out that the GDR is a State 
“with its own jurisdiction also on nationality matters."1^  One of these theories is 
that the 1967 GDR citizenship law must be interpreted in the sense that it confers 
not citizenship of the GDR, but the common German nationality.1^  This ignores 
the fact that it is for the GDR to decide matters of its nationality; the FRG cannot 
exceed its own jurisdiction. ¥h ile if  the matter is discussed in terms of 
international law, then it must be discussed, insofar as the status of Germany is 
concerned, according to the position of the Four Powers, since it is they who 
retain the authority to decide the future status of that State.
Much comment exists with regard to the FRG concept of German nationality
and the attempts to extend it beyond citizens of the ERG. janicki mentions an 
exception to the rule according to vhich GDR citizens are regarded as Germans 
under FRG lav: these are aliens in  the FRG vho, "not having “German
citizenship" in the West German sense of the term, have acquired or acquire the 
citizenship of the GDR, that is, have become citizens of that state by 
naturalization."1^  such persons, in  the FRG, may be given "identity cards valid 
for citizens of the German Democratic Republic."1^ 6
Janicki expresses a typical Polish viev, that Germany no longer exists. His 
opinion is that the Reich ceased to exist in  1945, but that German statehood 
survived until 1949, vhen "the limited German statehood of the occupation came 
to an end. In  this way German citizenship in the all-German sense came to an end 
too. Its place was taken by the institutions of citizenship of the Federal Republic 
of Germany and the German Democratic Republic."1^
Bernhardt, on the other hand, considers that the inhabitants of the GDR, and 
Germans beyond the Oder-Neisse line, do possess a special status based on valid 
FRG lav and that this status is consistent v ith  international lav.1^ 8 They are all 
Germans in the sense of Article 116(1? of the G r u n d g e s e t z . 1 ^
Hailbronner believes that the judgment of the Federal Constitutional Court 
does not justify a reduction of German citizenship in the sense that only those 
vho vish it may be treated as German citizens. German citizenship as a status 
denoting membership of the all German State population is independent of the 
v ill of the population. So long as the GDR is not regarded as a foreign country in  
relation to the FRG, its citizens cannot be recognized as having a foreign
citizenship.1*18 This is no different in  its essentials from Bernhardt's analysis and 
reflects accurately the position within the FRG. Such an approach is justified, in  
that nationality is, to a large extent, a matter for domestic regulation. 
Nevertheless, it has its international aspects, and the two German States are not 
exempt from this consideration. Indeed, because of their peculiar circumstances, 
they are, if  anything, even more susceptible to international law in this area. 
Because besides the restrictions imposed by general international law they are 
subject to the peculiar conditions pertaining to Germany.
It should be stated once more that, in the opinion of the Four Powers, which 
is decisive, the Federal Republic is not identical with Germany. Therefore, its 
citizenship is not the same as the German citizenship which exists as a facet of 
German statehood. The relationship of Germany to the Federal Republic is the 
same as that which it enjoys towards the Democratic Republic. FRG and GDR 
citizenships are quite separate under international law and under GDR law, but 
not under FRG law. Under FRG law, its citizenship is the same as that of the 
German State, but international law rejects this thesis. Under GDR law, GDR 
citizenship is quite separate from that of the FRG; it enjoys no closer legal ties 
with that State than with any other, and there is no all-German citizenship. This 
position enjoys the support of the USSR, which, by doing so, probably has 
breached its joint rights and responsibilities by unilaterally altering its stance on 
the maintenance of all-German statehood.
Every citizen of the GDR and the FRG possesses an all-German citizenship if  
he or she comes within the definition of a German according to the citizenship 
law of 1913, as amended until 1949. This citizenship is separate legally from any
German citizenship such persons would acquire upon a unification of the FRG and 
the GDR. This is because the unified State would not itself be identical with 
Germany. Frowein argues that the "quality of “German” as far as legal status is 
concerned should be taken to be one of the consequences of continuing Four 
Power rights and special relations between the two German States. This status of 
German is certainly different from a regular nationality since no single German 
Government exists."141 This is correct as a proposition of international law. But 
this is not the single German nationality claimed by the Federal Republic; such a 
claim does not induce a duty of recognition by other States, certainly not by the 
GDR. However, it is probably justified to say there is a genuine link to connect the 
FRG and Germans who seek its protection after leaving the GDR,14^  in  that GDR 
citizens share their all-German citizenship with FRG citizens. True, the link is not 
with the Federal Republic if  it is considered just as any State. If  one considers the 
special circumstances, however, apolitical connection might be established. This 
might detract from the view that there is no identity between either presently 
active German State and Germany, but the possible political link is surely 
insufficient, by itself, to establish identity.
(v ii) Citizenship in the Qder-Neisse Territories and Polish East Prussia
Given that the German nationality may extend to Germans within the Reich 
frontiers of 31 December 1937, the question arises about the nationality of the 
inhabitants of those German areas which fe ll under Polish administration in 1945, 
and which have been recognized as Polish State territory by the GDR and the FRG. 
The only doubt as to Poland's title to those territories is the theoretically existing 
right to alter the frontier at a peace settlement (though any alteration could 
result in  an increase rather than reduction of Polish territory).
Nevertheless, Poland considers itself sovereign with regard to these 
territories and regards all its laws as applicable there in the same manner as they 
apply throughout Polish territory. The first move towards this was the Decree of 
13 November 1945, which came into force fourteen days later, providing that the 
whole body of law binding in  the circuit of the District Court in  Poznan should 
take effect in the Recovered Territories.148 It was made absolutely clear in  this 
case that the territory was regarded as Polish sovereign territory and that all 
German legislation was incompatible with the legal order which had been 
established. Therefore, the Polish citizenship law of 20 January 192Q144 became 
applicable in these areas, to be followed by the citizenship laws of 8 January 
1951148 and 15 February 1962146. Each of these laws emphasizes that dual 
citizenship for a Polish citizen w ill not be recognized by the Polish State.14^  This 
should not have given rise to any substantial problems. During the immediate 
post-war years, most of the German population had been transferred to Germany 
proper (i.e., to one or other of the four occupation zones) in  accordance with Part 
XII of the Potsdam Protocol. Nevertheless, it was clear that, even after the 
transfers had ceased in  1948, substantial numbers of Germans remained in  Poland. 
Of those, many left for the FRG or the GDR during the 1950's.148 This did not see 
the end of the problem. Poland acknowledged in 1970, in an Information by its 
Government, that “a certain number of persons of indisputable ethnic German 
origin", as well as persons from mixed families, remained in Poland.149 In  
addition, the existence of separated families was acknowledged and the Polish 
Government undertook to give further consideration to these cases, as well as 
cases of "Polish nationals"180 who wished to be reunited with relatives in the GDR 
or the FRG. These relatives may have been Polish citizens; but it is inconceivable
that most did not hold German nationality within the terms of the 1913 law as 
applied in the FRG, or GDR citizenship according to the 1967 law. In such cases, 
dual nationality would probably have arisen.
The admission by Poland of the existence of ethnic Germans in  Poland 
signifies that most of them, at least while resident in  Poland, would have had dual 
nationality. This is because all persons residing in the recovered territories who 
wished to remain in Poland had to acquire Polish citizenship by means of a special 
verification procedure which involved demonstration of Polish nationality and 
submission of a declaration of loyalty to the Polish State.181 Other persons, Polish 
citizens who had claimed German nationality, were deprived of Polish citizenship 
and removed from Polish territory.182 The intention thus was to have only Polish 
citizens living in Poland - through the exclusion and removal of the above 
categories plus the mass transfer of Germans.
The dual nationality arises because, even having Polish citizenship, such 
ethnic Germans, if  born in those parts of Poland which were part of the Reich in  
1937 - the recovered territories - would still be German according to the 1913 law. 
Given the continued existence of the all-German State, they might even be 
tri-nationals. According to the ¥est German assessment of the 1913 law, such 
persons could only be dual nationals, since, in  this view, the Federal and German 
nationalities are one and the same thing. According to the view that Germany 
exists as a separate subject of international law, they could be citizens of 
Germany, but not of the FRG or the GDR (but they could be citizens of Poland). 
Thus there are three possible nationalities available - but not all at the same time. 
So trinationality would exist only in a special sense; it would not be available
^ u u
under one system of lav  (such an occurrence is not rare - multiple nationality 
can exist among citizens of a State which does not recognize the right of its 
nationals to possess any nationality apart from its own).
Nevertheless, it should not be forgotten that the German State exists only in  
very special circumstances, one of which is that it must lose substantial amounts 
of territory, formally, at a peace settlement. Thus the nationality of Germany, 
insofar as it extends to these areas, may also be regarded as restricted, 
furthermore, the Potsdam Agreement provided for the transfer of the German
population from these areas; from this it might be argued that the all-German
/
nationality vas no longer to apply to those areas, unless some vere returned to 
Germany at the peace settlement.
If  there are any ethnic Germans remaining in Poland - and up to 125,000 
more left for the FRG and GDR as a result of the Polish-¥est German Protocol on 
Resettlement concluded in 1975*^ 3 -  then they w ill continue to enjoy dual 
nationality. This issue is a sensitive one: the Polish Government has regularly 
disputed the numbers of ethnic Germans cited by Yest German sources to be 
living in Poland, and moreover considered that its preparedness to cooperate in  
emigration had been exploited by Polish nationals for employment purposes 
As long as Yest German Governments are prepared to maintain the existence of 
an ethnic German minority in  Poland, there w ill remain instances of dual 
nationality. Such persons w ill either be regarded as German citizens or as 
Germans within the meaning of Article 116(1) of the Grundgesetz, as w ill their 
spouses and descendants.
For Poland, there are no legal restrictions on its tenure over the Oder-Neisse 
territories and the southern section of former East Prussia. The inhabitants of 
these areas are Polish citizens. Given that the FRG has recognised the Oder-Neisse 
line as the Yestern State frontier of Poland, it has been suggested that it is 
required to amend its domestic legislation to conform to its international 
obligations; in  particular, that Article 116(1) of the Grundgesetz should be either 
amended or given a new interpretation.1^  xhe response of the Yest German 
Government would be that its recognition of the Oder-Neisse line must be 
considered in the context of the still-existing German State, and that it can act 
only in  its own name. However, by taking up with Poland the case of ethnic 
Germans living in Poland, the Federal Republic clearly exceeds its self-proclaimed 
limited capacity, because it dealt with German matters outwith the FRG 
jurisdiction. In  this respect, Poland, by agreeing to deal with the FRG, is hardly 
exempt from all blame.
Clearly, the FRG continues to regard the Polish recovered territories as 
In la n d 1^  for the purposes of its citizenship legislation, since it continues to 
maintain the right to regard as Germans persons it claims to be living there, of 
German ethnic origin. Despite the fact that the FRG does not attempt to exercise 
any authority outside its own territory, the mere existence of FRG municipal law 
which purports to deal with some of its citizens may justifiably be perceived as an 
interference in Poland’s right to conduct its own internal affairs.
If  the Polish recovered territories were not considered to be Inland, any 
German who at his request acquired Polish citizenship could lose his German 
citizenship. This is because a German w ill lose his German nationality if, having
neither his domicile (Yohnsitz) nor his permanent residence (dauemden 
Aufenthalt) in  the Inland (as that term is understood by the FRG), he acquires on 
his own application a foreign citizenship. Because these territories are still 
regarded as Inland, the acquisition of Polish citizenship does not entail the loss of 
German citizenship under FRG law.1^
The Federal Republic w ill almost certainly maintain its present view of who, 
legally, are Germans as long as the German question remains form ally unsettled. 
It has succeeded through cold war and Qstpolitik in retaining the definition in  
Article 116(1) of the Grundgesetz. despite the opposition from the socialist 
countries. Yhile the numbers of ethnic Germans may have diminished to 
insignificant amounts - though the FRG would dispute this - the remaining 
numbers, plus their spouses and descendants w ill continue to be regarded as 
Germans by the FRG, and the problem w ill remain open.
(v iii) Citizenship of Transferred Populations
Following the establishment of Polish jurisdiction over the recovered 
territories, German nationals were transferred beyond the Oder-Neisse line. For 
those who had never held Polish citizenship, there was no alteration in  their 
status; they remained German nationals in Germany.
The position of Germans who had been transferred from Poland, but who 
prior to 1939 had held Polish citizenship, was somewhat different. This was taken 
account of in  the citizenship law of 1951, which reflected the fact that the 
population of Poland had become more "Polish" (in the sense that ethnic 
minorities of Polish citizenship were no longer living on Polish territory) as a
result of the frontier alterations and population movements. Article 4 provides:
"Polish citizenship w ill not be held by any person who did have 
Polish citizenship on 31 August 1939 but who lives permanently 
abroad and who:
(1) in  connection with the change of the borders of the Polish 
State, acquired citizenship of another State in conformity with 
an international agreement, or
(2) is of Russian, Byelorussian, Ukrainian, Lithuanian, Latvian 
or Estonian nationality, or
(3) is of German nationality, unless the spouse of this person 
has Polish citizenship and lives in Poland.”
The effect of Article 4(3) would be to exclude from Polish citizenship all those 
German nationals who had held it until then, but who were included in  the 
transfer of Germans from Poland, unless the spouse lived in Poland and had Polish 
citizenship. An earlier decree of the Polish Government, made on 13 September 
1946,158 had already deprived of Polish citizenship persons who had claimed 
German national status before and during the w a r . ^ 9
It is not uncommon for States to allow for the deprivation of their 
citizenship - such provisions exist in  the Soviet citizenship law of 1 December 
1978,160 the GDR citizenship law of 1967161 and in  the latest Polish citizenship 
l a w . 1 6 2  Yeis lists various grounds upon which deprivation of citizenship is based 
in  municipal law. These include: entry into foreign service or m ilitary service or 
acceptance of foreign distinction, departure or sojourn abroad, conviction for
certain crimes, political attitude or activities and racial or national grounds.16^  
Such acts are by no means confined to the socialist countries; deprivation of 
nationality may occur according to the laws of countries of the Yest and East, as 
well as other States. Mass denationalisation, as provided for in Polish legislation 
of the late 1940's and early 1950's, is regarded as a relatively recent 
phenomenon.164
Account should be taken of the fact that most, if  not all, of those Germans 
who lost their Polish citizenship by such measures were already resident in  
Germany, as a result of their removal from Poland, and possessed German 
nationality. There was, therefore, as much of a link between the individuals 
affected and the German State as there was with Poland. It is unlikely that any of 
those affected became stateless as a result of Polish measures.16^  The question 
arises whether these Germans possessed a Recht auf die Heimat. but deprivation of 
nationality would not have breached such aright, if  it exists. Those who claimed 
it invariably stressed their German nationality and their “right'* to the Heimat as 
one they held as Germans, not Poles. Given that Poland transferred the Germans 
from these territories - described as "former German territories" in thePotsdam 
Agreement - by rights created in its favour by those States bearing responsibility 
for Germany, to then take the logical step of removing Polish nationality from 
these Germans could hardly be regarded as a breach of an international duty 
(such a breach being perhaps illegal).166
The status of Polish citizens who lived in that part of Poland which fe ll 
under the State jurisdiction of the USSR is governed by different criteria. The 
transfer of this part of Poland to the USSR is much less controversial; both of the
States involved were agreed that this should take place. The role of other States in  
this territorial adjustment was seen at the Yalta conference. They agreed th a t"... 
the eastern frontier of Poland should follow the Curzon Line with digressions 
from it in  some regions of 5 to 8 kilometres in favour of Poland."167 Thereafter, 
the frontier became a bilateral matter for Poland and theUSSR,168 and these States 
concluded treaties on the Polish-Soviet boundary on 16 August 1945169 and on 15 
February 1951. They stated that their common frontier had been established by 
the decision of the Crimea (Yalta) Conference,170 and the frontier was described 
in Articles 1 and 2. The frontier between the two States passing through East 
Prussia was established "pending final decision on territorial questions at the 
peace settlement."171 A separate treaty confirming this part of the frontier was 
signed on 5 March 1957, and came into force on 4 May 1957.172 The eastern 
territories of Poland were regarded as being, without dispute, under Soviet 
sovereignty since 16 August 1945, by the United States Foreign Claims Settlement 
Commission in a 1961 Decision.17^
Polish citizens resident in  these territories who had possessed Polish 
citizenship prior to 17 September 1939 (the date of the Soviet invasion of Poland) 
were to be permitted to leave for Poland proper - i.e., west of the Curzon Line - 
subject to the condition that this applied only to Polish and Jewish nationals174 
The consent of the USSR for this transfer was required because the people 
involved had acquired Soviet citizenship in the meantime, the Soviet Union 
having incorporated these territories into the USSR (some of it via Lithuania) and 
imposed Soviet citizenship on all the inhabitants,17^  by means of an internal 
decree.176 Following the German invasion of the USSR and the reestablishment 
of diplomatic relations between Poland and the USSR, the USSR acknowledged the
existence of Polish nationals on Soviet territory, but, in  a Note to the Polish 
Government on 16 January 1943, once again claimed that all Poles from Eastern 
Poland (i.e., east of the Curzon Line) were Soviet nationals.177 This was their 
status under Soviet law in  1945; hence the need for Soviet consent, expressed in  
an agreement between the two States of 6 July 1945,170 to the departure for Poland 
of those persons who had been Polish citizens prior to 17 September 1939170 
Before leaving for Poland, the requirement existed to denounce the Soviet 
citizenship prior to resettlement in the country of choice. Thus dual nationality 
was avoided through resettlement in  accordance with the terms of the 
convention.
It is clear that the citizenship status of Polish citizens, particularly those 
formally resident in that part of Poland invaded and occupied by the USSR on 17 
September 1939, was highly confused, particularly because of changes in Soviet 
policy towards the inhabitants of these territories, changes which were 
frequently accompanied by legislative acts purporting to deal with nationality 
and citizenship.100
Those Poles who exercised the right to opt for Polish citizenship, as provided 
for in  a decree issued by the Supreme Soviet on 22 June 1944,181 were able 
subsequently to leave for Poland. But this decree covered only Soviet citizens of 
Polish nationality who were serving personnel of the Polish army in the USSR, 
those who had served in it, those who were collaborating with it, plus their 
families. This degree did not therefore necessarily cover all the pre-war Polish 
citizens who had acquired Soviet citizenship. Nevertheless the 1945 agreement, 
coupled with a further Polish-Soviet agreement of 25 March 1957 regarding
further repatriation from the USSR of Polish nationals,182 left most Polish 
nationals in  Poland.
Remaining instances of dual nationality between the USSR and Poland have 
been settled according to rules set out in  two conventions, of 195818^  and 1965184 
Poland has also concluded a treaty with the GDR on the settlement of cases of dual 
nationality.1^  The rationale behind all of these instruments is the prevention of 
cases of multiple nationality as such, rather than the regulation of citizenship of 
persons who have been involved in mass population movements. As has been 
mentioned, the socialist countries have adopted a uniform approach to nationality 
in that they do not recognize, and seek to avoid, the holding by their own citizens 
of other citizenships186 The Polish-GDR treaty of 1975 on the regulation of cases 
of dual nationality explicitly recognizes the common attitude of the two States in  
this area.187
The conclusion is that persons who possessed Polish citizenship prior to 17 
September 1939 subsequently acquired Soviet citizenship if  they had been 
normally resident in that part of Poland incorporated into the USSR (east of the 
Curzon line). AH such persons of Polish and Jewish nationality, excluding 
therefore Polish citizens of Ukrainian, Byelorussian, Lithuanian, Estonian and 
Latvian nationality, were permitted to leave the USSR for Poland during and after 
1945. Those who possessed Soviet citizenship had to denounce it prior to departure 
to Poland, thereby retaining only Polish citizenship.
(ix) The Legality of the Mass Transfer of Germans from the Oder-Neisse 
Territories and Polish East Prussia
The discussion is being restricted to the German population because it is in  
this context that legal controversy exists. No substantial objections to the transfer 
of the Polish populations from pre-war Eastern Poland have been raised on legal 
grounds.188 That is not to say that this transfer was definitely lawful in  all its 
aspects; neverthelelss, it is generally accepted and little is to be gained from 
going into the matter in  depth.
Nor w ill the legality of the transfer of the German population of Soviet East 
Prussia be discussed. There was general agreement that this territory should be 
transferred to the USSR180 (and, indeed, that the southern part should become 
part of Poland).108
The principal objections raised with regard to mass transfer after Yorld Yar 
I I  concern the transfer of the German population from those areas of Germany 
which fell under Polish administration as a consequence of the Potsdam 
Agreement, which had stipulated that "the transfer to Germany of German 
populations, or elements thereof, remaining in Poland, Czechoslovakia and 
Hungary, w ill have to be undertaken."101 It was on this foundation that Poland 
proceeded to expel from its territory, including that under its administration, the 
German population, some of which was indigenous, some already evacuated from 
other areas of what had been, hitherto, eastern Germany. It has been claimed 
that "approximately 16 m illion Germans were either put to flight or expelled from 
their homes in the years 1944 to 1949 and even beyond."102 The writer then states 
that Poland "annexed some 41,000 square miles of German territory which had 
been provisionally placed “under Polish administration" at Potsdam. These 
annexations", he adds, "resulted in the expulsion of the German native
populations from East Prussia, Memel, Danzig, Pomerania, East Brandenburg, 
Lower Silesia, Upper Silesia, and Sudetenland."10^  This includes territories 
"annexed" by the USSR, which the writer had mentioned already.
There are two objections to the above statement. Firstly, the German 
populations were not expelled as a result of Polish and Soviet annexations. It is 
irrelevant for these purposes whether or not these territories had been annexed. 
The transfer of Germans took place under the authority of the Potsdam 
Agreement, not because of any annexations. Even if  Poland did purport to annex 
this territory, and even if  such annexation were unlawful, the expulsion of the 
German population did not thereby become unlawful. Secondly, the writer 
describes Danzig as part of the German territory. This is false and misleading: 
Danzig had been a Free City incorporated into the Reich. That incorporation had 
not been recognized by the UK and USA, at least, nor by Poland. Considering that 
the author himself later stresses that Danzig was not part of the Reich,104 it is all 
the more confusing that he describes it as German territory.
The number of Germans actually expelled from the Polish recovered 
territories has been the subject of dispute, one side (the Yest German) claiming 
that much higher numbers resided there than the other was prepared to admit. 
According to Churchill, Stalin claimed that most of the Germans had already fled 
and that the Poles had simply taken over deserted areas in  the wake of the Soviet 
m ilitary advance.10^  Churchill, however, believed that up to eight million 
Germans remained in these territories, or had their homes there.106
The actual number of persons expelled is not, however, of significance for
the legality of the expulsion - whether one million or ten million people were 
involved, it was surely amass expulsion - but it is important in  that it shows that 
the Potsdam Agreement certainly intended that Germans should be expelled from 
the Oder-Neisse territories and not only from the pre-war Polish territory. The 
Allied Control Council adopted a plan for the removal of 3,500,000 Germans from 
Poland to the Soviet and British zones of occupation.107 The estimates of the 
number of Germans in pre-war Poland vary from about 800,G00108 to 1,400,000.100 
Clearly, then, the Control Council’s plan was meant to include in  the transfer 
Germans still in the Oder-Neisse territories.
Perhaps the principal charges made against those who ordered and executed 
the expulsions is that they were contrary to the Recht auf die Heimat of the 
expellees,280 and that the manner of execution was such that it constituted a 
crime against humanity.281 The former claim is sometimes expressed in the 
context of an apparent right to self-determination of the German people.
As for the legality of expulsions, Brownlie has taken the view that 
expulsions "may occur by agreement and are lawful provided certain conditions 
are observed."282 He then cites the Potsdam Agreement as a case in  point, and it is 
true that the proper authorities - the UK, USA and USSR - did agree to the 
expulsions. This was not a matter for Germany to decide, the Allies having 
assumed supreme authority. Brownlie suggests, furthermore, that the normal 
rules of belligerent occupation may not be applicable in  a situation where a war 
of sanction results in  the final defeat and occupation of an aggressor State and 
"the imposition of measures designed to remove the possibility of recurrence of 
aggression."20  ^ The author considers the occupation of Germany and the
measures adopted by the Allied Control Council to be an excellent case in  point. In  
such instances, the regime established is not a normal belligerent occupation; it 
may entail basic changes in  the structure of government and political life  of the 
country.204
The removal of the German population from the Oder-Neisse territories could 
certainly be regarded as a measure to improve security and reduce chances of 
aggression in future; the substantial German minority in  Poland prior to 1939 
(around 3% of the total population) served to reduce the security of that State, 
particularly as relations with Germany deteriorated.20  ^ Skubiszewski has 
suggested that a State may undertake a transfer of population v/hen a part of its 
population is considered disloyal, more dedicated towards a foreign State and 
desiring that the territory inhabited by them be incorporated into another 
State 206 The German population in the Oder-Neisse territories could certainly be 
regarded as anti-Polish after six years of war between Poland and Germany, and 
even as a threat to its existence, since it was Germany that had invaded Poland 
from the Oder-Neisse territories in 1939.
Such measures as those carried out by Poland are acknowledged explicitly by 
Professor Brownlie as perhaps entitled to consideration as legitimate measures of 
security intended to prevent future threats to the peace207 and the legality of 
mass expulsion has been explicitly recognized recently by a distinguished ¥est 
German international lawyer as lawful in  certain circumstances, in  particular 
"where a State by avoiding such measures would be exposed to a situation which 
could endanger its own existence",200 unless its performance would violate jus 
cogens.
The possibility that expulsions may be contrary to the principle of the right 
of self-determination is acknowledged by Skubiszewski and Doehring, but the 
latter argues that despite this, mass expulsion may be justified to protect the 
State's existence,209 while the former argues that there is no general right under 
international law of a people to decide its fate by plebiscite (one of the rights 
claimed for the Germans in the Oder-Neisse territories); not can the right of 
self-determination be taken into account without reference to Article 107 of the 
United Nations Charter210 which could suspend the application of the right of 
self-determination of the Germans as citizens of an enemy State 211
There exists, then, substantial authority in favour of the legality of the mass 
expulsions which occurred from the Oder-Neisse territories. It is suggested that, 
as a matter of principle, mass expulsions may, in  certain circumstances, be lawful; 
and in  the case at hand, the action was lawful because of the legitimate 
entitlement of Poland to remove from its territory a population which constituted 
a fundamental threat to its own security as a State, and perhaps a threat to the 
security of other States. This action was taken with the express approval of the 
States responsible for the government of Germany and in execution of a policy set 
out in  the Potsdam Agreement.
The transfer of the Germans was to be carried out in "an orderly and 
humane manner." It is quite possible that the method of transfer did not 
correspond in every case to this requirement. However, that in  itself does not 
detract from the legality of the actual transfer. It may signify that the States 
responsible should have ensured that standards of treatment were such that all
transfers were orderly and humane. If  they were not, then those who suffered 
might feel they should t>e able to bring a claim against the Polish State for the 
manner of their transfer. But the Potsdam Agreement itself makes no provision 
for this.
It is worthy of note that the FRG Government, which had been active in  
asserting the "rights" of the expelees to regard the Oder-Neisse territories as their 
homeland, has expressed the view that any right of self-determination of the 
German people, the implementation of which the FRG demands, does not entail the 
making by the FRG of any territorial claims, nor does the FRG claim any alteration 
of frontiers.212 This view was expressed in the Bundestag Resolution of May 1972. 
It does not bind any State but is an expression of FRG foreign policy. It shows 
that, in  the view of the FRG, even the exercise by Germans from the Oder-Neisse 
territories of the right to self-determination cannot justify the alteration of the 
existing territorial status quo. Any Recht auf die Heimat proposed by the 
Germans, in  light of this declaration, pertains not to particular German territory, 
but to a right to live in Germany.
The rationale behind the territorial situation established as a result of the 
Versailles peace settlement after the First Yorld Yar was that, in Europe, national 
frontiers should reflect, if  possible, the actual ethnic populations - hence the 
number of plebiscites held to settle finally the frontier between Germany and 
Poland in Upper Silesia and East Prussia. This was feasible only to a limited extent. 
Large ethnic minorities in several States were a not uncommon phenomenon 
between the wars.
In  1945, a new method was adopted, at least with regard to Germany. Instead 
of drawing boundaries to follow existing ethnogeographic configurations, the 
boundaries have been drawn (subject to final delimitation) according to other 
criteria, including territorial compensation (though the idea of compensation for 
Poland as a result of losing territories in the East was probably not a causal legal 
link between the western frontier of Poland and its eastern territories)219. New 
ethnogeographic configurations have been created, artificially, to conform to the 
new boundaries which were imposed without the need for German approval.
The fact that the German population was expelled from the Oder-Neisse 
territories has been cited as evidence of the Allies* intention to make these 
territories permanently Polish, and to free it of troublesome elements.214 A 
counter argument to this is that, i f  such were really the intention of the Allies, 
then it renders meaningless the reservation to a peace settlement of the final 
delimitation of the frontier 219 However, it is not suggested by the author of the 
proposition, that the mass expulsion evidenced the Allies* intention to settle the 
Polish-German frontier on the Oder-Neisse line, that the frontier question was 
therefore definitively settled indirectly through the mass expulsions (this is how 
such a proposition has been interpreted216). Rather, Skubiszewski has always 
maintained that the frontier is a matter that remains to be finally regulated at a 
peace settlement (his view is that such regulation must take the form of a 
confirmation of the existing situation217). His point is that the mass expulsions 
show evidence of a future intention to establish the frontier on the Oder-Neisse 
line. The reason for the failure to do so at Potsdam is that the instrument agreed 
upon there was not a peace treaty. Therefore, it is quite logical, having delayed 
the actual peace treaty, nevertheless to take measures which are deemed
necessary and which, formally, do not have to await such an agreement.
Clearly, there exist many problematic legal issues with regard to the matter 
of mass expulsion or transfer of populations. The aim here has been to show how 
these matters arise in  the context of the Polish-German frontier, and to suggest 
that the peculiar circumstances argue in  favour of the legality of the actions 
which were taken. Any Recht auf die Heimat if  it exists, may be subject to a more 
vital and greater State interest of security and territorial integrity. However, the 
claims of individuals are not lightly to be dismissed.
i
The Institut de Droit International has considered mass transfer of 
populations and its conclusions were reported in  1952.210 The participants must 
have been acutely aware of the significance of the subject so soon after 1945. The 
Report presented to the Session by Count Pallieri in  1950 stressed the need to 
consider the rights both of individuals and of States, although from the 
perspective of human rights alone, he would decide on a conclusion contrary to 
population transfers.219 States had to try  to make good citizens of all their 
inhabitants. But all possibility of transfer was not denied to States, and it was 
stressed that this was particularly so in the case of implacable opposition to the 
State by individuals 220 Yet such transfer must not be conducted in  an inhumane 
manner. Yhile stressing that States did have the right to transfer populations, 
the Count repeatedly invoked the duty to act humanely; the duty went along with 
the right.
Members of the Institute were also offered a questionnaire regarding 
population transfers. The tenth and final question concerned the transfers
carried out in accordance with the Potsdam Agreement. There was a certain 
reluctance to deal with the legality of this transfer. One participant described it 
as a lesser evil,221 hardly a definitive articulation of his views on the legality of 
it. Another regarded the transfer as a temporary measure and considered it 
inappropriate to discuss the question while a legal solution remained 
outstanding.222 De Visscher thought that the Potsdam dispositions with regard to 
transfers were inspired by political aims only and on that basis believed that 
they could not be considered legitimate from the point of view of international 
law.229 Yiniarski considered that the Potsdam accord was exceptional but 
necessary; Germany's consent to what occurred later was obtained through its 
unconditional surrender, while Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary gave their 
express agreement. He also claimed that the Agreement took account of the 
arrival of massive amounts of people from the east of Poland, though it is unclear 
whether this was regarded as apolitical or legal link.224
The general impression is of the controversy that the issue inspired, though 
there remained near unanimity on the existence of a right to transfer 
populations subject to certain restrictions on the State's freedom.229
This tends to support the conclusion that, while the Allies probably were 
justified in  ordering the transfer of the Germans from the Oder-Neisse territories, 
serious doubts exist about the way in  which the transfers were executed.
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CHAPTER EIGHT
Conclusions
(i) The Status of Germany
It has been concluded that evidence exists for the proposition that the Germany 
of 1945 continues to exist in  some limited form. It is possible that this is no more 
than a certain retained competence of the UK, USA, USSR and France vith  regard 
to Berlin and Germany as a vhole. There is also reason to suggest that, although 
the Allies did not assume sovereignty over Germany, it is their continued acts in  
Berlin and Germany, plus those vhich they retain the right to perform on some 
future occasion, vhich represent the only active manifestation of that German 
State. Germany, it has been argued, continues to exist as a State v ith  a legal 
personality quite separate from both the FRG and the GDR. The sovereignty of 
Germany, manifested through the exercise of supreme authority by the Allies, is 
quite separate and independent from that of West and East Germany, vhich 
succeeded to most active elements of German sovereignty during the years 
1949-1955.
The ideas expressed v ith  regard to the status of Germany bear some 
resemblance to the roof CDach) theory,* according to vhich the FRG and GDR 
exist simultaneously vith  Germany. But legal differences do exist. The roof 
theory has it that Germany continues to exist, though vithout organs. The GDR 
and the FRG are connected under the roof formed by this German State. Neither
may claim identity v ith  the vhole of Germany; neither is a foreign State 
vis-a-vis the other? One problem vith  the roof theory is that the GDR, at least, 
vould oppose it, on the ground that it regards itself as a successor State to the 
German State, vhich has ceased to exist. The legal structure proposed by this 
vriter has the advantage of being non-discriminatory: it ignores the vievs of 
both German States on the ground that this is a matter for the Four Povers 
anyvay and lies quite outvith the competence of West and East Germany.
Insofar as it has been shovn that both West and East Germany do exist 
simultaneously vith  Germany, it may be considered that Germany forms a kind of 
roof, the more that these tvo States did succeed to part of the statehood of Germany 
vithout it actually ceasing to exist. But it is not possible to sustain the close legal 
connection of the GDR and FRG to each other as ve il as to Germany, a link vhich 
is of fundamental importance to the roof theory. No identity exists betveen 
Germany and the other tvo German States. There is, hovever, one definite link in  
lav. This vould become active upon unification of the tvo German States. It is the 
right of the Four Povers to decide upon the status and frontiers of Germany. This 
right exists v ith  regard to the Germany of 1945, yet it vould be exercised vith  
regard to the united German State, being in fact the vehicle for the retention of 
Allied rights and duties. From the perspective of the Four Povers, the notion that 
East and West Germany are not foreign States to one another, as claimed by the 
Federal Republic and postulated according to the roof theory, is difficult to justify, 
just because they deny any identity. The Federal and Democratic Republics are 
entitled, as they have done in the Grundvertrag. to regulate their mutual 
relations. They are even entitled, vith in  the limits of their authority, to differ
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inter se as to the legal character of their relationship. But any theory vhich 
claims identity v ith  Germany vould constitute a contradiction of the vievs of the 
four Povers in a domain vhich they have lavfully reserved to themselves, and 
should therefore not t>e regarded as possessing a sound legal basis.
Germany does exist as a kind of roof; it vould be futile and unrealistic to deny 
the obvious connections. But the legal link is not great and can only assume its 
fu ll potential folioving unification. Like Germany itself, it is in many vays 
potential rather than actual. The relationship, as it exists in the viev of this 
vriter, is founded not on the vishes and acts ofWest and East Germany, but on the 
practice of the Allies.
The roof theory at its most extensive vould include, in addition to the FRG and 
the GDR, non-State entities: both parts of Berlin, the territories east of the 
Oder-Neisse and, until it became part of the federal Republic in 1956, the Saar? 
The Saar vould, of course, be included nov as a Land in  the Federal Republic. 
¥ere the tvo German States to unite, it is not foreseen that Berlin vould be 
excluded from the process, though, given its separate status, it is possible that the 
inclusion of Berlin might be formally postponed until the final settlement. 
Problems could arise v ith  regard to the status of East Berlin, treated as it is by the 
USSR and the GDR as part of the GDR, contrary to the vie vs of the Western Povers 
and the FRG. Nevertheless, such difficulties vould not t>rima facie affect the 
border question.
The Oder-Neisse territories could only be considered as part of Germany in  this
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l i t e r ’s version of the roof theory, to the extent that they have not been formally 
and finally separated from the rest of Germany at a peace settlement. Yet again, it 
should be stressed that they vould not form part of the German State created from 
the GDR and the ERG prior to such a settlement. Only insofar as the Allies have 
not, acting as the supreme authority for Germany, separated these territories 
from Germany, does any connection remain.
(ii) The German Commitment to the Qder-Heisse Frontier
The separate personality of the GDR and the ERG from Germany is vital in  
evaluation of the status of the Oder-Neisse line. At present, this frontier is as valid 
under international lav  vis-a-vis East and Yest Germany as any other frontier. 
Both States have expressly recognised it as the vestern frontier of Poland and 
neither has any right to question it in  the future. Poland's title is founded, not on 
the treaties with the ERG and the GDR, but on the Potsdam Agreement. This 
instrument is equivocal v ith  regard to the vestern frontier of Poland, having 
postponed its final delimitation till a peace settlement, pending vhich Poland vas 
to administer the Oder-Neisse territories. Hovever, having recognised the 
Oder-Neisse line as Poland's vestern State frontier. East and Yest Germany have 
also recognised Polish sovereignty over the relevant territory. Therefore, should 
these tvo States unite, the successor State vould inherit the obligation to treat 
Poland as sovereign over these territories and to accept the Oder-Neisse line as the 
vestern State frontier of Poland.
Such a commitment vould not exist for the Four Povers; nor for the 
Germany vith  regard to vhich they exercise supreme authority. These States are
bound by the Potsdam Agreement and, unless they can agree jointly to create a 
nev situation, the legal effect of vhich vould be to remove the still open question 
of the peace settlement, they cannot be obliged to accept Poland as sovereign over 
the Oder-Neisse territories for all purposes. The border question remains, then, to 
be settled at the peace settlement. There is much to be said for the viev of 
Sfcubis2evski and Frovein, that vhile this question remains, formally, to be 
decided on that occasion, the acts of at least some of the Four Povers, through 
vhich they haw expressed their approval of the Zgorzelec and Yarsav Treaties, 
estop them from questioning the existing situation; in other vords, that the final 
delimitation can be no more than the confirmation of the present territorial 
disposition. Hovever, the reservation of existing rights and duties expressed 
simultaneously v ith  the approval of these treaties and at other important dates 
detract from the merits of this theory. If  these States vere obliged to do no more 
than confirm the Oder-Neisse line at the peace settlement, a similar commitment 
vould exist on the part of the surviving German State as represented by the 
authority of the Four Povers. The Polish frontier question vould, legally, be 
ansvered.
( iii)The Status of the Oder-Neisse Territories
These territories remain, formally, subject to final confirmation or alteration 
at a peace settlement. This is because of the provision in the Potsdam Agreement 
vhich accords Poland the right to administer the territories until that time. At 
present, Poland exercises a jurisdiction over these territories vhich is no 
different from that vhich it exercises over the rest of the territory subject to
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Polish rule. A special M inistry was set up soon after Yorld ¥a r I I  to deal with the 
territories gained from Germany but this was disbanded a few years later.
Poland regards itself as sovereign over these areas and enjoys the support of 
the Soviet Union in  this. Poland also enjoys sovereignty vis-a-vis the FRG and the 
GDR as a result of the bilateral treaties concluded with these States in 1970 and 
1950 respectively. The support of the Soviet Union is subject to confirmation of 
the peace settlement because of that State's status as one of the Four Powers, but 
the Soviet Union itself maintains that this question was settled at Potsdam. The 
Soviet view is believed to be an incorrect interpretation of the commitment it 
made in that instrument, since it seems to contradict the wording of the 
agreement and the intention of the Parties at the time. It may be assumed, 
however, that, were the USSR to agree to participate in a peace settlement, it 
vould take the position that the frontier could only be that vhich already exists; 
this follows from its consistent commitment to the Oder-Neisse line as the western 
frontier of Poland.
The Oder-Neisse frontier enjoys the same protection as all other frontiers 
under international law. This means that any violation of this boundary would be 
just as unlawful as other boundary violations. The only potential means of 
alteration of the frontier, which differentiates it from other frontiers, is through 
the exercise of powers described in the Potsdam Protocol. The inviolability of the 
Oder-Neisse line is expressly included in the general agreement on inviolability 
of European frontiers contained in the Moscow Treaty.4 The Yarsaw Treaty 
contains, in Article I, paragraph 2, an affirmation of the inviolability of the 
"existing frontiers" of the FRG and Poland both at the time of conclusion of the
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treaty and in  the future. Any violation of the frontier would constitute a breach 
of Article 2(4) of the United Nations Charter? It has been argued that the term 
"inviolable", as used in the Moscow Treaty, may also preclude peaceful change^ -  
in  other words, would a peaceful change of a frontier constitute a violation in  the 
sense of Article 3 of the Moscow Treaty? Even if  Article 3 does possess this wider 
meaning, the Polish western frontier remains subject to the Potsdam provisions 
until these are executed or the Eour Powers take joint action to dispense with the 
outstanding elements. Nevertheless, this also means that Poland is at present the 
State responsible for this territory under international law and it is entitled to all 
the protection available to other States.
There is no question that the three Yestern Powers also regard Poland as being 
responsible for the Oder-Neisse territories under international law. By 
maintaining the right to decide upon the final delimitation of the Polish-German 
frontier, however, they cannot be said to have acknowledged Poland as the deiure 
sovereign authority for these areas. No State may act entirely as it wishes within 
its own territory because it must adhere to the rules of international law. In  this 
sense, Poland is no more restricted than any other State. But the formal temporal 
restriction on Poland's tenure persists: it has the right to administer this 
territory but the frontier is subject to delimitation by the Eour Powers at some 
unknown future date. Polish authority vis-a-vis the EourPowers may be 
characterised as being subject to certain limitations which make it look more like 
Gebietshoheit than anything else. In  that case, which State possesses 
sovereignty? To the extent that the Germany of 1945 continues to exist, it may 
retain certain rights with regard to the Oder-Neisse territories, but only in a 
certain context. Just as Germany continues to exist as the vehicle for the
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maintenance of certain Allied rights and responsibilities, vh ile most active 
elements of its statehood vere devolved upon the GDR and the FRG, so Germany 
continues to possess rights over this area, vhich may amount to sovereignty for 
certain purposes only: the exercise by the Allies of their supreme authority by 
making the final delimitation of the frontier. Only in this sense, i.e. through the 
exercise of certain functions by the Four Povers, may it be said that sovereignty 
vests in  Germany. For all practical purposes, Poland became responsible for the 
territory.
Furthermore, in  asserting the Four Pover rights vith  regard to the territory, 
relevant duties must also be taken into account. In particular, the obligation 
assumed by the Povers that Poland must receive territory at the expense of 
Germany. This means that at least some territory, of indeterminate area, must be 
assigned to Poland; therefore, the sovereignty of Germany exercised by the Four 
Povers, such as it is, is further limited by this obligation.
The Oder-Neisse territories have been treated separately from other pre-var 
German areas since 1945. Germany vas to be divided into three zones of 
occupation - one each for the USSR, the UK and the USA (v ith  the exception of 
Greater Berlin, vhich vas to be occupied jointly by these three States) - by 
agreement of these countries in the Protocol of 12 September 19447 as amended by 
the Agreement of 14 November 1944? Hovever, this plan vas amended, firstly, to 
include France as an occupying pover. France vas accorded its ovn occupation 
zone (on territory detached from the UK and US zones) in Germany as ve il as a 
zone in  Berlin (also detached from the UK and US zones). France acquired an 
equal say in the control and destiny of Germany.9
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Of greater importance is the second amendment. In  the Potsdam Agreement, it 
vas decided that, being under Polish administration, the Oder-Neisse territories 
“should not be considered as part of the Soviet zone of occupation in Germany."*0 
Two points must be mentioned: Poland also was authorised to administer two areas 
of territory under this provision, vhich vere not part of the Oder-Neisse area - 
Gdansk (the former Free City of Danzig, vhich vas not part of Germany in 1939), 
and that part of East Prussia vhich did not fa ll under Soviet jurisdiction. 
Secondly, the areas vhich fe ll under Polish administration vere excluded from 
the Soviet zone of occupation "for such purposes". This might be read as implying 
that for other purposes, beyond those for vhich Poland had to administer the 
territory, it might be regarded as remaining under Soviet occupation. In  
particular, it might be construed as maintaining a residual Soviet competence and 
responsibility. Nevertheless, already in 1945 there vas a clear decision, taken by 
the UK, USA and the USSR, and subsequently approved by France, to treat these 
areas separately, and this decision was given immediate effect. Folloving the 
statement made at Yalta, that Poland should, in principle, receive substantial 
accessions of territory in the north and vest, the decision made at Potsdam may be 
perceived as the first stage in  the detachment of territory from Germany and its 
attachment to Poland.* *
The attitudes expressed in the immediate post-var period by the ¥estem  
Povers tovards the nev territorial situation can be described at best as mixed. 
Certainly, it vas not felt at the time by all Four Povers that Poland should 
unquestionably receive at a peace settlement all that had fallen under its 
administration.*^ The position is confused somevhat by the establishment of the 
socialist system of government in Poland vhich, in itself, may have contributed to
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a more radical divergence of opinion among political leaders than had actually 
existed at Potsdam. Hovever, it is possible to make a stronger case, vith  hindsight 
(taking into account the division of Germany and Europe plus subsequent legal 
developments on the bilateral level) for the viev that only by the mid-1970’s, 
vhen most of these developments had already occurred, might it justifiably be 
argued that in  1945 the vhole of the Oder-Neisse territories had already begun to 
be detached from Germany and attached to Poland.
¥h ile the Four Povers continued to cooperate in the day to day running of 
occupied Germany, it might have been possible for them to come to an agreement 
for the final settlement of outstanding issues relating to that country. This might 
have entailed some adjustment of the area placed under Polish administration. In  
1945, Poland's tenure certainly seemed to be temporary in that a peace settlement 
vas genuinely anticipated; placing large areas under Polish administration vas 
not t>er se a final disposition of the territory. But even in 1945, the Potsdam 
Agreement may be taken to have begun the process of detachment of an 
indeterminate amount of territory from Germany for the benefit of Poland. And 
vith  the passage of time, it has become increasingly justifiable to take the viev  
that this indeterminate amount vould turn out to be the area placed under Polish 
administration in 1945.
Poland then has enjoyed the right of administration over these territories as 
far as the Western Povers are concerned, and the right of sovereignty vis-a-vis 
the GDR and the FRG and, at least in that State's opinion, vith  regard to the Soviet 
Union also. Because of the residual Four Pover capacity, this administrative 
tenure is still significant and remains subject, theoretically, to alteration. Yet it is
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also possible that administration itself may come to acquire the legal character of 
sovereignty. Thus Skubiszewski cites instances of administration over territory 
where such administration proved to be “the first and decisive step towards 
sovereign rule", whatever its original limitations and purpose.1  ^ The author 
himself stresses that analogies between these and the situation east of the 
Oder-Neisse line should not be drawn too far. The significance of these instances 
is that there was no express reservation of sovereignty to another State. The 
Potsdam Agreement is also silent as to the maintenance of German sovereignty 
over the relevant areas. Nevertheless, it does contain the express statement that 
the final delimitation of the frontier is to take place at the peace settlement. 
Again, Professor Skubiszewski is in  a position to cite other examples of what he 
refers to as "detachment of territory prior to a regulation of its definite status."1^  
In  other words, "a State can lose supremacy over a part of its territory and yet the 
determination or delimitation of the specific frontier may take place at a later 
d a te ."*5 Skubiszewski argues that administration by Poland may be exercised "a 
titre de souverain", and that such a state of affairs has been brought about by: the 
granting of administration to Poland by entitled authorities, this administration 
having a wider substantive validity than mere internal administration;16 the 
absence of any express reservation of sovereignty with regard to these 
territories; the view that sovereignty is not a mere status, but also the ability to 
exercise the rights of sovereignty, as expressed by Max Huber in  the Island of 
Palmas Case and Judge Sir Percy Spender in  the Right of Passage over Indian 
Territory Case.17 Perhaps the crux of the argument is the following statement:
“....when a clause protecting the unchanged status of sovereignty is
absent, the purpose of the administration helps to elucidate the status
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of the territory. The aim of the Great Powers was to revise the eastern 
frontier of Germany in favour of Poland. The Potsdam Agreement 
constituted the basic decision which gave expression to that aim. In  
view of the purpose which the Great Powers intended to achieve there 
was practically no chance to establish, let alone maintain, the duality 
between the exercise of sovereignty by Poland and the nominal 
sovereignty supposedly retained by Germany.”*®
The purpose of according the right of administration to Poland was to make
j
that State entitled to exercise fu ll authority over the area until a peace settlement, 
at which Poland would certainly acquire some, perhaps all, of the territory. Even 
if  Poland has become sovereign for all purposes, that sovereignty remains subject 
to an exceptional limitation not normally attached to this type of tenure, viz. the 
right of other States to decide upon the final disposition of the territory. This is 
acknowledged by Professor Skubiszewski, who nevertheless argues convincingly, 
that matters which, normally, would have been dealt with in a peace treaty, have 
been rather regulated through a series of settlements, including the ¥arsaw and 
Zgorzelec Treaties. By approving, separately, these settlements, the Eour Powers 
have committed themselves to accepting the present Polish-German frontier if  
and when they finally should exercise their entitlement to decide upon the 
frontier at the peace settlement:*0
"...the rights and responsibilities of the Four Powers, forty years 
after Potsdam, do not include the competence to impose a territorial 
regulation that would be different from the present.”20
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However, in  the opinion of this writer, such a view cannot be sustained. The 
Yestern Powers, at least, have repeatedly and consistently reserved all their 
rights pertaining to Berlin and Germany as a whole at every critical date. It is not 
without significance that they did so when expressing their approval of the 
Yarsaw Treaty. The very purpose of these reservations has been to keep alive 
their rights and duties whenever it might appear that they may be altered. One of 
the most significant of these has been the power to determine the Polish-German 
frontier. To argue that this power has been so reduced in its scope as to constitute 
nothing more than the right, formally, to confirm the existing situation, is to 
deny the intended and real effect of these consistent and repeated reservations: to 
hold that these States, by their actions, have actually committed themselves to an 
obligation which they appear never to have intended to assume. Because all 
actions of the Yestern Powers which might indicate a binding commitment to 
approval of the Oder-Neisse line at a peace settlement were made subject to the 
condition that the right to decide the course of the Polish-German frontier was 
retained.21 Therefore, even if  Poland does indeed enjoy sovereigntyvis-a-vis all 
States with regard to the Oder-Neisse territories, it is sovereignty subject to the 
Four Power authority.
In this context, certain similarities may be noticed between Poland and the FRG 
and GDR. Just as Yest and East Germany are recognised to haw fu ll sovereignty 
within the limits of their authority, but nevertheless lack certain powers because 
of the retained Four Power authority, which is based upon the continued 
existence of Germany, it might be argued that Poland's tenure has gradually 
acquired the attributes of sovereignty, even though this is actually limited. For 
most purposes, Poland exercises sovereign authority over the Oder-Neisse 
territories.
Furthermore, if, as Verdross etal have argued, Germany possesses sovereignty 
over the Oder-Neisse territories, then it may also be considered to possess 
sovereignty at least for certain purposes, with regard to the territory of the 
Federal and Democratic Republics (unless they would argue that German 
sovereignty is confined to the Oder-Neisse territories and East Prussia). Yet few 
would question nowadays the existence of the FRG and the GDR as sovereign States 
within their frontiers. If  German sovereignty can exist (albeit subject to very 
precise limitations) simultaneously with that of the GDR and FRG on their 
territory, might it not exist simultaneously with the sovereignty of Poland over 
the Oder-Neisse territories - again, subject to the various conditions imposed by 
the entitled States, including Poland's right definitely to receive some territory at 
the expense of Germany? Alternatively, if  Poland enjoys mere Gebietshoheit with 
regard to this area, do not, then. East and Yest Germany enjoy no more than this 
authority over their territories? The Four Powers, it is clear, regard the FRG and 
the GDR as possessing sovereignty over their own territories. If  two 
sovereignties, each subject to peculiar limits, can exist simultaneously on the 
areas allotted to these States, it may be possible for two sovereignties to be present 
also with regard to the Oder-Neisse territories.
One difficulty in  attributing sovereignty to Poland is that of establishing when 
exactly that State maybe deemed to have acquired it. No such doubts apply to the 
FRG and the GDR: they had each become sovereign States by 1955, following their 
establishment in  1949. In  the case of Poland, the most that can be said is that by 
1972, following the ratification of the Yarsaw Treaty, its sovereignty had been 
recognised by both German States and the USSR, and the three Yestern Powers 
had approved of the Yarsaw Treaty. To the extent that Poland enjoys sovereignty,
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this may be regarded as the conclusion of a process begun in 1945 and stretched 
out over a period of nearly th irty years. But the Warsaw Treaty did not accord title 
over these territories to Poland.
The legal conclusion is clear: Poland’s tenure over the Oder-Neisse territories 
is as secure and as comprehensive as it can be, so long as Four Power capacity 
regarding Germany’s frontiers exists. The Western Powers have not committed 
themselves to the Oder-Neisse frontier to the extent that they may not question it 
at a peace settlement. Had they not expressly reserved their fu ll capacity, they 
would, through their approval of treaties concluded in the meantime, probably be 
bound to do no more than confirm the existing arrangement should a settlement 
ever talce place. In  such circumstances, it is suggested, the analysis presented by 
Professor Slcubiszewslci would be the correct one. Thus, as far as the question of 
Poland's right to respect for itswestern frontier, on the Oder-Neisse line is 
concerned, the essential difference between that view and the opinion of this 
writer lies in the effect of Four Power approval of recognition by the FRG and the 
GDR of the Oder-Neisse line.
Talcing into account the fact that the new German State created following the 
unification of West and East Germany would be bound not to question the 
obligation, which it would inherit automatically, to recognize the Oder-Neisse 
frontier as the line at which its sovereignty ends and that of Poland begins; 
talcing into account that Poland has in fact administered these territories as its 
own since 1945; considering also that these facts are part of a new but 
nevertheless real situation which developed quite differently from the way 
events were anticipated in 1945 during the fist post-war months; given that the
right of the Allies to decide upon Germany’s status and frontiers, representing the 
final manifestations of statehood of the Germany of 1945, would actually fa ll to be 
exercised vis-a-vis the united German State which had itself inherited an 
obligation to accept legally the frontier from two German States created by the 
Four Powers, it is almost inconceivable that the Western Powers (since the Soviet 
Union is already on record as accepting the Oder-Neisse line unreservedly) might 
propose any alterations at the peace settlement. Nor is there any evidence that 
that these States retain any hostility towards Poland’s permanent right of 
sovereignty over these areas.
i
The only impediment to unreserved Polish sovereignty is the insistence of the 
Western Powers that this matter must await the peace settlement. This is the 
obligation assumed at Potsdam. But obligations assumed by the UK, USA and the 
USSR, and concurred in by France, can be altered: the Potsdam Agreement 
contains no provision which would prohibit further joint action by the Four 
Powers apart from that provided for in that instrument: if  they have supreme 
authority, then the only limits upon them are themselves (so long as they act 
within international law generally). The Four Powers have agreed jointly, as 
recently as 1972, when they expressed their support for the applications by the 
FRG and the GDR for membership of the United Nations, that they continue to 
have joint rights and responsibilities. Therefore, there is nothing to stop them, if  
they have the political w ill, from agreeing jointly, after deciding that the 
outstanding provisions of the Potsdam Agreement (whatever these maybe) are no 
longer capable of performance, to assume a new joint course of action. This could 
entail a complete reappraisal of rights and responsibilities, including the 
recognition of the Oder-Neisse line as the western State frontier of Poland for all
purposes, and no longer subject even to theoretical revision. Alternatively, 
without making reference to any other aspects of their capacity, the Four Powers 
could agree that, without implying any judgment as to the present legal status of 
the Oder-Neisse frontier and the territories to the east of it, from a certain date 
onwards they accept this frontier for all purposes as the Polish-German frontier 
and that they renounce any right they might have to alter it. If, as is claimed, 
the Four Powers have supreme authority over Germany, and even if  that supreme 
authority has been limited to certain purposes since the creation of the FRG and 
the GDR, then they can make such commitments.
Such a scenario is not unthinkable. During the Berlin Blockade or following 
the erection of the Berlin Wall, few would have predicted that already by 1971 the 
situation of West Berlin would have been regulated to such a degree that it is no 
longer, even if  potential remains, one of the most sensitive areas of the world. If  
the Four Powers could find the political w ill to settle this issue (admittedly not in  
legal terms), it is possible that they could come to an agreement about the 
Oder-Neisse line. What is lacking in this case is the desire of the Western Powers 
to accept unreservedly Poland as the sovereign authority with regard to the 
territories it gained in 1945. In  this sense, the provision in  the Potsdam 
Agreement,, whereby the final delimitation of the Polish-German frontier is 
postponed until a peace settlement, is not so much a legal restriction as apolitical 
excuse not to act.
(iv ) The FRG-GDR Frontier 
Under international law, there is no question that West and East Germany
exist as separate States. This means that their common frontier is an 
international frontier. The Federal Republic has claimed that the two States, 
though separate, are not foreign to each other. This has not been accepted by the 
Democratic Republic; it regards the relationship as the same as that between any 
other two States. Thus the GDR considers the frontier to be an international 
frontier in  the fu ll legal sense of that term*, that point at which the territory of 
one State ends, to be replaced by the territory of another, quite separate, State. 
The FRG accepts that the frontier is inviolable, but maintains that it has a peculiar 
status, even if  it is not treated differently in practice. The Federal Constitutional 
Court has likened it to a Land frontier within the Federal Republic. This 
comparison is spurious. The FRG and the GDR are foreign States vis-a-vis each 
other. The only possible link is through the still-existing all-German State, with 
which neither is identical, or even partially identical, in  law.
In the context of the still-existing Four Power rights and responsibilities, the 
frontier may be regarded as some form of internal demarcation line. In  this role 
it is highly restricted. Such a status cannot apply between any States except for 
the three Western Powers on the one hand, and the Soviet Union on the other.
In  the event of unification by the FRG and the GDR, the border between them 
would disappear. However, it would continue to exist as a demarcation line for the 
Four Powers until they had finally ended their role in the settlement of 
outstanding questions relating to Germany. It is therefore a matter of 
contemporary controversy, as is the Oder-Heisse frontier. However, unlike the 
latter, it would surely lose most if  not all of its significance as a matter of dispute
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following unification, unless perhaps the Four Powers elected to retain some form 
of, hitherto unforeseen, residual capacity in  Germany even following a peace 
settlement.
(v) Outstanding Issues of Citizenship Arising from the Territorial Changes and 
Mass Movements of Population
Although each State enjoys substantial freedom to regulate its citizenship, 
international law w ill not necessarily afford unfettered recognition of such 
regulation. This is because international law itself places restrictions on the 
validity of nationality rules, especially insofar as these may be seen to affect 
legitimate rights of other States.
The international character of citizenship is of significance with regard to 
Germany. The FRG maintains the validity (with certain amendments) of the Reich 
citizenship law of 1913. This law had also been applied in the whole of Germany 
from 1945-1949, and in the GDR from 1949 onwards. This was consistent with the 
position of both German States at the time of their creation in 1949: each one 
claimed to be the only German State; its nationality was the only German 
nationality.
The GDR quickly altered its position on the German question, eventually talcing 
the view that two new German States had succeeded to the all-German State, which 
no longer existed. The adoption in 1967 of a separate citizenship law, for the GDR 
exclusively, constitutes one of the most obvious and legally significant 
expressions of this policy. It purports to establish retroactive effect for the
separate GDR citizenship to the year 1949. This is consistent with the later, but not 
the earlier, GDR assessment of its status relative to Germany as a whole. The 1967 
law does not attempt to extend East German citizenship to the citizens of the ERG as 
a group. This is in conformity with the belief that, just as the FRG is a separate 
State no different from any other State, so its citizens possess a quite separate 
citizenship and are in no way entitled to preferential or discriminatory treatment 
under GDR citizenship law relative to nationals of other States.
However, it is possible that both GDR and FRG citizens possess a second 
nationality: that of the still-existing all-German State. Such a nationality is at 
present not active; it would depend for its coming into effect upon the German 
State becoming active again. Such a nationality is held also by those FRG citizens 
who would possess German citizenship under the 1913 law in its state as at 1949. 
The 1913 law, as developed in the FRG since then, should be seen, in terms of 
international law, as the citizenship law of the Federal Republic only. The fact 
that successive FRG Governments regard the 1913 law as applicable as the German 
nationality law cannot of itself achieve for the law such a status on the 
international plane. The Four Powers do not regard the FRG as being legally 
identical with the German State. It follows that the citizenships of each must be 
separate. The only link, on the international level, between the FRG and the 
German citizenships, is that which exists between the GDR and the German 
citizenships.
The varying attitudes towards nationality issues, where Germany is concerned, 
reflect and follow from the different stances of the involved States with regard to
the German question as a whole. The very close connection of nationality issues 
to State and territorial ones is shown also with regard to the populations of the 
Oder-Neisse territories. Persons of German ethnic origin living in these areas are 
regarded under the FRG Constitution as Germans, despite the fact that most of 
them w ill be also Polish citizens. This provision remains in force despite the 
recognition by the FRG that the relevant areas constitute Polish State territory. 
This may be explained by the possible special status of the Oder-Neisse territories: 
they remain, formally, subject to delimitation at a peace settlement. Nevertheless, 
this special status applies only vis-a-vis Germany, for which the Four Powers are 
responsible under international law. For the FRG, it is Polish State territory only. 
This is beyond question because, firstly, the FRG enjoys 110 legal identity with 
Germany; secondly, because the FRG explicitly recognized it as such. Therefore, 
the Oder-Neisse territories, legally, enjoy no closer connection to the FRG than 
any other areas of Poland, despite their history. The FRG decision to treat as 
Germans Polish citizens from these areas should be considered in this context and 
may justifiably be regarded as interference in the internal affairs of another 
State.
The present situation is that any Polish citizens who are German under the FRG 
Constitution probably enjoy dual citizenship, even though they are unable to 
demand to be treated as citizens of the FRG while in Poland. In  its attitude to 
nationality questions, the FRG is as unjustified as in its attitude towards territorial 
questions. Its claim to partial identity with the Reich is untenable under 
international law; so is the ambit which it claims for conferral of its citizenship. 
Given the restriction of its present and future claims with regard to territory
442
which the federal Republic accepted in the treaties of 1970-1972 with the Soviet 
Union, Poland and the GDR, the failure to adjust its laws with regard to nationality 
accordingly indicates a real discrepancy between municipal law and 
international obligations.
The number of persons resident in  Poland who might be German according to 
Yest German law is relatively small in  comparison with the amount of German 
citizens who inhabited the Oder-Neisse territories and the southern section of East 
Prussia prior to 1945. This is due to the fact that most of those who had not already 
left voluntarily were obliged to depart for one of the zones of occupation in  
Germany in accordance with the agreement reached at Potsdam by the UK, USA 
and USSR.
Similar mass movements of (mostly) Polish citizens occurred, as those resident 
in pre-war eastern Poland left or were expelled from these territories. The two 
States involved - Poland and the USSR - have not questioned the legality of these 
actions and they are no longer controversial. But the legality of the expulsion of 
the Germans in accordance with the Potsdam Agreement has been disputed by the 
FRG. However, there exists historical precedent for the validity of mass 
expulsions, and there is substantial agreement that such expulsions may be 
justified where the vital interests of the State are concerned. Moreover, the 
Potsdam decision to transfer the Germans is regarded as an example of a lawful 
mass movement decided upon by the entitled authorities.
The actions of the Four Powers with regard to Germany, including the decision
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to expel the German population from the Oder-Neisse territories, has to be seen as 
part of the general programme to establish a new regime in  Europe following the 
defeat of Germany. The Eour Powers assumed supreme authority and clearly 
considered this to include the right to transfer enormous numbers of Germans to 
new domiciles. It would appear that States do, in  certain circumstances (such as 
those prevailing in Europe in 1945), have the right to transfer large numbers of 
people. This is what happened.
The Oder-Neisse territories were, even in 1945, regarded as “former German 
territories." The expulsion of the Germans was part of the preparations for the 
outstanding peace settlement, at which Poland was to receive substantial 
accessions of German territory. It would seem unlikely that all of the Germans 
remaining in these areas would have been removed if  it was genuinely 
anticipated that some of these territories would once more fa ll under German 
control by decision taken at the peace settlement. This adds to the strength of 
Poland’s claim.
Finally, it may be stated that there remain, formally, outstanding legal issues 
with regard to the Oder-Neisse frontier and, consequently, the former German 
territories now contained within Poland. These must be decided at a peace 
settlement, or else the Eour Powers must either decide to remove the formal 
requirement that such a settlement should take place at all, or take some joint 
action which would remove the frontier question from the agenda of such a peace 
settlement. In  the meantime, the Four Powers have taken measures towards a 
peace settlement, including the mass expulsion of Germans from the relevant
territories. But since 1949, no joint action has been taken. However, outstanding 
issues have been regulated on a bilateral basis (where the western frontier of 
Poland is concerned) and, on what was regarded at the time as a temporary basis, 
for Germany, by the ¥estern Powers on the one hand and the Soviet Union on the 
other. These arrangements with regard to Germany now seem permanent, 
although the German question remains as a legal issue. There is no apparent joint 
political w ill amongst the Four Powers to take the radical action necessary, either 
to settle outstanding questions - on which they are, anyway, in disagreement - or 
to declare them formally to be closed and remove them from existence.
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